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Abstract
This study examines the place of the PDS within the German political system. By
developing and employing a typology of regional parties this work illustrates that the PDS has
been politically successful on account of its mobilisation of distinct territorial interests - in
much the same way as other regional parties across the democratic world have done. The
creation of a territorial divide along the former inner-German border has offered the PDS the
opportunity to re-model its image and profile as the protector of eastern German specificity.
The West German party system that expanded eastwards in 1990 has not been able to
sufficiently channel regionally specific sentiment into the political process: and it is for this
reason that a regional party has been able to stabilise itself in the eastern states. The PDS has
taken advantage of a number of structural advantages (in terms of its regional heritage,
leadership, its party organisation and so forth) in moulding and shaping a policy package that
reflects the differing opinions, attitudes, values and beliefs of many eastern Germans. It is as
a result of this that the PDS has been able to stabilise its position within the eastern German
regional party system and to build a platform that offers it the opportunity of being a long-
term actor in the German party system.
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Introduction
The PDS as a Regfonal Party in Eastern Germany 1989-2000
Introduction
The stabilisation of the Partei des Demokratis~hen Sozialismus (Party of Democratic
Socialism - PDS) in eastern Germany has been one of the most surprising outcomes of the
unification process'. Whereas the PDS was once perceived as unlikely to have any future at
ale, developments over the last decade have seen the party stabilise and prosper from a
political base that offers it the opportunity to develop into a medium/long-term regional
political force. The spectrum of political and academic opinion expressed on the topic of the
PDS remains, however, wide and diverse (see chapter one). At the one extreme, notably in
conservative circles, the PDS is viewed as an extremist, undemocratic and disruptive force,
that should be regarded as a pariah, as well as a threat to the democratic stability of the
German state. At the other end of the spectrum, the PDS is regarded as a broad-church of
socialist opinion, aiming to fundamentally alter the economic inequalities in German society
by reversing the trend towards neo-liberalism and social inequality. Many further positions
are also held in between these two poles.
This work consciously attempts to analyse the PDS from a perspective that avoids
partisan alignments and value judgements. For this reason the ideological contradictions
within the PDS's programme are given markedly less attention than in other works. The
reason for this is simple: the core hypothesis of this work is that the PDS is a regional party
that, uniquely, mobilises territorially salient interests within the political arena. By doing this,
the PDS has established itself as a political force at the local, regional and federal levels based
on a core electorate in the five eastern Lander and Berlin. rAs unsuccessful attempts to expand
westwards have proven, the PDS remains an eastern German regional party, articulating
interests that are specific eastern Germans.
The development and rejuvenation of the PDS has surprised a number of political
analysts. It was originally believed that as a result of the collapse of the eastern and central
I This is surprising not least because the PDS is the direct successor party of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands (SED) - the former ruling party of the GDR.
2 Heinrich Bortfeldt: Von der SED zur PDS: Wand/ung zur Demokratie? (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1992), p.295;
Gordon Smith: 'The 'New' Party System', in Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl and Stephen
Padgett (eds.): Developments in German Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), p.100; Patrick
Moreau: PDS - Anatomie einer postkommunistischen Partei (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1992), p.459; Manfred
Gerner: Parte; ohne Zukunft? Von der SED zur PDS (Miinchen: Tilsner Verlag, 1994), p.59.
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European state socialist regimes, the PDS would, after perhaps an interim period of
representing the apparatchicks of the GDR state, disappear as an anachronism of a bygone
age.
Hence although the PDS was widely expected to enter' the 12thBundestag in 1990,
largely as a result of a relaxation of the entry requirements, few analysts expected the PDS to
return in 1994. But the PDS confounded its critics by utilising its strength in eastern Berlin to
successfully win four seats: thus ensuring parliamentary representation in the 13th Bundestag',
Although the PDS. was (perhaps paradoxically) generally given a much better chance of
survival in 1998 than it had been in 1994, it was also not until the final results were recorded
that the PDS knew it had successfully hurdled the 5 per cent barrier - so entering the
Bundestag for the first time as a Fraktion rather than as a Bundestagsgruppe.
The PDS's strong and consistent showing in the late 1990s in the eastern states should
not, however, disguise the traumatic and schizophrenic early period of the party's
development. From the fall of the Berlin Wall on the ninth of November 1989 it became clear
that the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party (SED», in its pre-
1989 guise, was heading for oblivion. For this reason the SED set out on a process of
disjointed, piecemeal reform - reforming party structures and processes as much as it had to,
while being simultaneously aware that radical reform would lead to widespread
disenchantment within the intrinsically conservative party membership", Follo~ing the
formation of the SEDIPDS in February 1990, Gregor Gysi, the Berlin lawyer who had quickly
.risen through the party's much maligned hierarchy to be party leader, championed the
dropping of the name SED altogether, in order to (hopefully) signal a clear and definitive
break with the pasts. Yet despite this apparently rapid change, the party remained tied to
much of the ideological rhetoric it had espoused in the GDR6. Itwent to considerable lengths
3 Although the PDS did indeed return to the Bundestag in 1994, it did so despite only registering 4.4 per cent of
the vote. The PDS made use of a clause allowing parties obtaining three directly elected members to take their
place in Parliament as a Bundestagsgruppe rather than a Bundestagsfraktion. Although this prevented the PDS
from enjoying the same rights as the parties who did achieve 5 per cent, it none the less enabled the PDS to
register 30 members of the Federal Parliament.
4 . Daniel Hough: 'SED to PDS: A Case of Continuity through Change?', in Paul Cooke and Jonathan Grix
(eds.): German Monitor: East Germany: Continuity and Change (Amsterdam: Rodopi B. V., 2000a), pp.123-
132.
S Heinrich Bortfeldt (1992): op. cit. For a detailed English language account of the PDS's development in this
formative period see Peter Barker 'From the SED to the PDS: Continuity or Renewal?', in German Monitor -
The Party of Democratic Socialism. Modern Post-Communism or Nostalgic Populism? (Amsterdam: Rodopi
B.V:, 1998), pp.l-17.
6 For a particularly critical analysis of the PDS's development see the work of Patrick Moreau, Jurgen Lang
andlor Viola Neu. Patrick Moreau (1992): op. cit; Patrick Moreau & Jilrgen Lang: Was will die PDS? (Frankfurt
am Main: Ullstein, 1994a); Patrick Moreau and Viola Neu: Die PDS zwischen Linksextremismus und
Linkspopulismus (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Interne Studien 76, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1994); Patrick
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to retain as many of the assets and possessions of the SED as was possible - ensuring that,
both financially and organisationally, the PDS remained a viable entity'. Without the
connections and networks inherited from the SED, the PDS would have struggled to survive
the initial 'transitional' phrase after unification8• Yet internal reform could not prevent the
party from, between mid-1989 and December 1991, losing over two million members. Only
the former SED cadre remained loyal to the party", Legally the party can, therefore,
legitimately be described as the successor party (Nachfolgepartei) of the SED.
This work will illustrate that the PDS has, however, achieved longer-term political
success as a result of other, more surprising societal developments. The PDS has been
politically successful as a result of its effectiveness at articulating specific regional interests.
The core hypothesis of this work is therefore:
The electoral success of the PDS is based upon the political mobilisation of
uniquely eastern German interests.
In order to test this hypothesis, this thesis is split into five chapters. The first two
chapters concentrate on placing this work within the context of other studies of the PDS, as
well as creating an analytical framework suitable for analysing the core hypothesis - that the
PDS is an eastern German regional party, prospering as it mobilises territorial (Le. eastern
Gernian) sentiment within the broader political arena. Chapters three, four and five are based
on extensive original research, drawing on opinion poll data, party programmes, speeches,
interviews and so forth in order to demonstrate exactly how the PDS mobilises territorially
specific sentiment.
Moreau and Jurgen Lang: Linksextremismus. Eine unterschtitzte Gefahr (Bonn: Bouvier, 1996); Patrick Moreau:
'Mit Lenin im Bauch ... ? Die POS auf der Suche nach einer Berliner Republik von Links', in Politische Studien,
Heft 349, September/October 1996, pp.27-42; Viola Neu: Die Potentiate der PDS und der Republikaner im
Winter /997-98 (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1998); Patrick Moreau: Die PDS: Profit
einer antidemokratischen Partei (Munchen: Hanns Seidel Stiftung, 1998); Viola Neu: Die PDS 10 Jahre nach
dem Fall der Mauer (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1999).
7 One source has claimed that while in 1992 the SPO had assets amounting to OM 276.8 million, the POS could
register a remarkable OM 438.7 million. This Week in Germany: 20 January 1995, p.S.
8 Gero Neugebauer: 'Hat die POS bundesweit im Parteiensystem eine Chance?', in Michael Brie, Martin Herzig
and Thomas Koch: Die PDS - Empirische Befunde und Kontroverse Analysen (KOln: Papyrossa Verlag, 1995),
f.4l.
In October 1989 the SEO officially had 2.3 million members, but by the end of 1991 the POS's membership
had dropped to 172,000. Following these initial losses, the membership of the party has stabilised somewhat,
and membership numbers have continued to fall at a much more gradual rate. At the end of 1997 the POS was
still able to register just over 100,000 paid-up members. See Patrick Moreau (1998): op. cit. p.97.
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Chapter one discusses the relevance of adopting a regionalist approach to a study of
the PDS. The review of the secondary literature on the PDS identifies the four broad
approaches that authors tend to adopt when discussing the PDS, before analysing their
respective strengths and weaknesses. All four highlight different parts of the PDS's complex
nature, and it is for this reason that they each contribute something to understanding more
about the party's development, ideological orientation and inner-contradictions. But the
underlying assumption in all four approaches remains that the party will be, at best, a
medium-term marginal party of protest and of economic and social transformation, and, as
such, attempts at linking the PDS's existence to wider schools of thought have been limited.
Chapter one therefore illustrates that a specifically regionalist approach is lacking. There has
been remarkably little scholarly work dedicated to analysing the PDS's key political strength-
the articulation of territorially specific interests - a failing that this work aims to overcome.
The second chapter further develops the theoretical basis of the thesis, as well as the
analytical framework that is employed in chapters three, four and five. The PDS, like other
regional parties of the democratic world, is at home in its own socio-cultural environment,
articulating specifically regional interests within the political arena. This is in spite of
strenuous efforts to broaden its electoral base nation-wide. It, therefore, seems strange that
very little academic analysis has been conducted on the issue of the PDS as a regional party -
comparable and consistent though it appears with other regional movements". The second
chapter opens by discussing the nature of political regionalism, before discussing how parties
which represent territorial specificity fit into the body of academic research on party system
development and party system change. This reveals how the existing framework for analysis
does not unpack regional party success effectively. This has traditionally been on account of
their heterogeneous nature, their wide-ranging aims and demands, their varying strengths and
the inherent difficulties of classification that analysing them poses.
Section 2.3. therefore illustrates that a systematic attempt to classify the foundations of
regional party success is presently lacking. Section 2.4. introduces an analytical tool that
enables the political scientist to unwrap the complex nature of regional party success - a
typology of regional parties. The first part of the typology broadly outlines the Structural and
Causal Factors inherent in Regionalism. Not only does this enable the existence of an eastern
10 The only study that has attempted to place the PDS in a cross-national, regional perspective is that conducted
by David Patton, and he limits himself to a comparison with the Lega Nord, the SNP in Scotland and the Reform
Party in Canada. While enlightening, Patton's article only touches the surface of successful territorial
mobilisation, and leaves scope for a broader analysis On the, as he concludes, similarities in political manner
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German Trotzidentitdt (identity of defiance) to be analysed in chapter three, it also provides
an analytical tool for discussing a supplementary hypothesis of this thesis:
The political mobilisation of a territorial identification is the key variable
underpinning the success of regional parties. The existence of a sense of regional
identification alone will not guarantee the success of a regional party, but where
regional parties are successful, strong and salient regional identifications are
visible.
The cultural and socio-economic variables posited in section 2.4. form the
cornerstones of the development of regional identities: and without these, regional parties are
not going to be able to succeed. The complex interaction of a regional identification II and
other salient' cleavages (class, economic difference, religion and so forth) dictate, in each
individual case, exactly what constellation of political forces exists within that region. The
second part of the section 2.4. then sets out three agency factors which are important in the
mobilisation of regionalism by regional parties.
The typology outlined in chapter two is then applied to the only comparable political
party within Germany - the Bavarian CSU. The example of Bavaria is discussed as it is a
specifically German case of regional identity creation. The historical specificity of
'Bavarianism', coupled and re-enforced by salient feelings of regional identification based on
unique social and cultural foundations, have ensured that Bavarians, like eastern Germans,
possess strong feelings of territorial belonging. The example of Bavaria is used to illustrate,
firstly, that a peripheral identity exists in another part of Germany and, secondly, that a
political party (the CSU) successfully channels Bavarian feelings of 'differentness' into the
regional and national political arenas.
Chapter three moves on to discuss a key part of the core hypothesis: that eastern
Germany is a distinct and unique political and cultural regional space. Eastern Germany can
be defined as a regional space as Easterners exhibit sustainable attitudinal and value
between these parties. See David F. Patton: 'Germany's Party of Democr~tic Socialism in Comparative
Perspective', in East European Politics and Societies, Volume 12Number 3, Fall 1998, pp.500-526.
II It.is worth clarifying here what is exactly meant by the term 'identity'. In the context of this work 'identity'
is taken to mean the distinct norms, beliefs and values of an individual (or group) that can be regarded as a
persisting entity. Further to this, and particularly within the context of larger communities, identity can also be
understood as a set of behavioural or personal characteristics by which an individual is recognisable as a member
of a certain group. For a broader discussion on the defmitional problems that one is inevitably faced with when
discussing the phenomena of social identity see David B. Knight: 'Identity and Territory: Geographical
. Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism', in Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Volume
72 Number 4, 1982, pp.514-531; Ernest Gellner: Culture, Identity and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Michael Keith and Steve Pile (eds.): Place and the Politics of Identity (London:
Routledge, 1993).
17
Introduction
difference when compared to western Germans, as civil society, the economy and political
competition function in different ways", The first part of the typology helps to reveal the
processes of identity creation that have taken place in the eastern states, leading to the
establishment of a Trotzidentitdt directed against the dominant western German culture,
political discourse, institutional structures and economic norms. Collective feelings of
uniqueness have therefore spawned solidarity amongst eastern Germans. The transformation
process has lent itself to a re-identification of many eastern Germans with 'their' territorial
space and a subsequent orientation towards regional feelings and sentiments. Both the legacy
of combined experience within the GDR and the socialisation processes that this entailed,
coupled with the unique and complex transformation processes that unification spawned, have
enabled eastern Germans to collectively re-identify with one another (if not the state where
they used to live) in a way that would have been unthinkable as the Berlin Wall came down.
These complex developments have created territorial divide along the former East-West
border that cross-cuts other more longstanding social cleavages in Germany. The typology
highlights the clear differences that exist in the Weltanschauungen of eastern and western
Germans - and the advantageous climate that had been created for a party mobilising
specifically eastern German concerns within local, Land and national political arenas.
The second part of the typology is applied to the PDS in chapters four and five. The
fourth chapter illustrates how the PDS has developed the capacity to mobilise Easternness,
while the fifth chapter dissects the PDS's policy package in detail, illustrating how the PDS
attempts to make policy for eastern Germany. These are powerful preconditions of the PDS's
success in the eastern states, enabling it to be successful as a result of the EastlWest divide
and the processes of identity creation that this has spawned.
12 For further discussion of the nature of civil society in the GDR/eastern Germany, see Jonathan Grix: Civil
Society in East Germany Pre and Post-1989 (Birmingham: Discussion Papers in German Studies, The
University of Birmingham, Number 4, 1999).
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Chapter five turns to the policy approaches of the PDS, illustrating how its policy
package and parliamentary work is based on issues and policies that are of particular salience
in the eastern states: in other words, the PDS remains strong and vociferous on exactly the
issues where eastern German self-perceptions and attitudes vary from their western German
brethren.
The concluding chapter of this work pulls the strands of the argument together. It is
argued that the nature of the eastern German regional space, characterised as it is by a
separate identity based on differing cultural and value underpinnings, has stabilised as the
transformation process has continued. The cross-cutting nature of the East/West cleavage
ensures that a politically distinct environment will continue to offer a regional party the
opportunity to mobilise regionally specific sentiment. The PDS, embedded as it is in the
social and political structures of the eastern states, articulates territorial issues, interests and
problems - justifying comparison with other such political parties. The thesis concludes by
offering suggestions for further research arising out of the completion of this study.
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Chapter One
1. The Place of the PDS within Academic Debate
1.1. Introductory Remarks
In order to set out the key ideas underlying this work, it is important that the proposed
regional approach to the study of the PDS is placed within the context of other studies of the
party. It is for this reason that this thesis commences with a review of the existing approaches
employed in studying the PDS. This review illustrates the lack of serious debate on the
subject of the PDS as a long-term (regional) phenomenon. It is only in very recent times, in
particular following successful election results in 1998 (at the federal level in September
1998, but 'also in the state elections in Saxony Anhalt and Mecklenburg West Pomerania) and
1999 (at the European level as well as the state level again (in Brandenburg, Saxony,
Thuringia and Berlin» that the longer-term nature of the PDS's political appeal has been
taken seriously both by the media and the political classes.
In spite of the prominent belief that the PDS remain(s)(ed) a transitory phenomenon,
detailed and sophisticated studies of the party's history, ideological orientation, electoral base
and position within the political system have all contributed to what is now a broad base of
work on the party':'. Rarely, however, have authors gone further than claiming that the party
has the potential to be at best a medium-term phenomenon, prospering as the transformation
of eastern Germany continues. The literature review in this chapter illustrates that adopting a
regional approach fills a gap within the academic debate and throws further light on both the
reasons behind the party's successes to date, as well the very nature of territorial mobilisation
within the FRG. It will also highlight that authors have persistently neglected the importance
of territory, and the societal cleavage that exists between the old andnew federal states, in
analysing the reasons for the PDS's longevity. This work attempts to rectify these deficits.
1.2. Approaches to the study of the PDS
This chapter concentrates on the four main approaches that are adopted in studies of
13 The most balanced and thorough account of the PDS's development remains, however, that by Gero
Neugebauer and Richard Stoss, See Gero Neugebauer and Richard Stoss: Die PDS: Geschichte, Organization.
Wahler. Konkurrenten (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1996).
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the PDS. It is, the contention of this work that while all of the discussed approaches do
contribute valid and important ideas to understanding the development of the PDS, they do
not adequately illustrate the uniquely territorial position of the PDS within the eastern
German political landscape. All of the approaches, to greater or lesser extents, neglect the
process of regional identity creation that has ensued eastern Germany-wide post-1989. The
establishment of a cross-cutting EastlWest societal cleavage and the effects of societal
transformation are best highlighted by using a regionalist approach. Consequently, there
remains remarkably little academic work dedicated to analysing the party within the
framework of other parties which articulate sentiment based on a territorial divide (i.e. other
regional parties).
None the less, for a party that registers a minimal percentage of the vote nationwide
(even if it achieves around 18-25 per cent in eastern Germany), there has been a surprisingly
large amount of literature published on the PDS. The focus of this literature review is,
therefore, to identify and summarise four broad, frequently interlinked, approaches that
authors have chosen to adopt when analysing the PDS. Section 1.3. proceeds to highlight
both their strengths and weaknesses before offering conclusions on their validity and their
applicability to this study.
The four approaches to be discussed are as follows:
• The protest party approach
• The Socialist reform party approach
• The anti-system extremist party approach·
• The milieu party approach
Each of the four approaches is generally employed within the framework of two main
schools of thought on the PDS and its role in Germany today. As has already been touched
upon, the first sees the PDS as a dysfunctional, disruptive element within the German political
system, often bordering on the extremist fringe, contributing to a destabilising of political
life", while the second sees the PDS more as a stabilising, reforming, corrective influence
stressing its integrative and representative functions.
It must, however, be emphasised that each approach is not taken to be individual and
distinct, and significant degrees of overlap and co-ordination are evident in all the literature
14 Lothar Probst: Die PDS - von der Staats- zur Regierungspartei: Eine Studie aus Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
(Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2000).
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on the PDS. But some approaches clearly do still have more salience than others, hence after
briefly discussing the fundaments of each approach, conclusions will be drawn as to their
strengths and weaknesses before the interlinked strands of the different approaches are pulled
together and the author's own approach to the study of the PDS is elaborated upon.
1.2.1. The Protest Party Approach
In the eastern German case, protest voting can be defined as the action of voting for a
party with the aim of articulating disruptive, non-institutionalised feelings of disenchantment,
brought on by conceptions of subjective or material dissatisfaction with one or all of the
social, economic and political changes invoked since the collapse of the GDK It does not
have to be based on material disadvantage, although, of course, in certain circumstances this
may playa major role", Almost every analysis of the PDS incorporates, in some shape or
form, the concept of the PDS as a protest party. A considerable amount of academic research
that was conducted in the mid-1990s invoked this approach and viewed the party as a
representative of diffuse and uncoordinated protest movements'". A complex mixture of
economic, political and socio-psychological dissatisfaction was perceived to be the basis of a
vote for the PDS, and it was subsequently believed that as the eastern Lander became further
integrated into German society, and as, in particular, the economic environment in the new
Lander improved, then the reasons for protest voting would subside. This analysis has clearly
proved to be somewhat off the mark.
But the fact is not disputed that the PDS has represented a "reservoir for protest
voters,,17and throughout the 1990s the PDS proved itself to be the principal vehicle through
which dissatisfaction with socio-economic and political change in eastern Germany was
articulated. This form of protest voting is based on the subjective, psychological
dissatisfaction of Easterners with the social, economic and political realities of contemporary
German life. A number of authors have, however, stressed the material differences between
eastern and western Germans, and they have tried to ground the PDS's political stabilisation
IS The majority of Eastern Germans are clearly fmancially better off now than they were in the GDR. Even
those who are unemployed can have incomes and material possessions that far outstrip those they earned in East
Germany. Eastern Germans are also substantially better off than other citizens of former state socialist countries
• mainly on account of the financial support that they have received from western Germany. It is only,
importantly, in direct comparison with western Germans that eastern Germans see themselves as materially
disadvantaged> and this is the key relationship that proponents of the 'materially disadvantaged' (see 1.2.1.1.)
afProach are referring to. .
I Gero Neugebauer: '1994 im Aufschwung Ost: Die PDS. Eine Bilanz', in Gegenwartskunde, Volume 43
Number4, 1994, pp.431-444.' .
17 Hans-Georg Betz and Helga A. Welsh: 'The PDS in the New German Party System', in German Politics,
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in the successful articulation of eastern German material disadvantage. These two sub-
approaches have differing levels of validity, as the analysis below reveals.
1.2.1.1. Material Protest
Throughout the early 1990s material protest, based on the weaker economic position
of the eastern states and the weaker financial position of Easterners in general, was believed
to be a key variable in explaining PDS support in eastern Germany. At the 1999 state election
in Saxony, for example, voters for the PDS viewed both their, own personal economic
situation and the general economic environment as worse than supporters of the SPD or CDU
did18•
Many eastern Germans, on a broader and more expansive scale than solely the former
functionaries of the SED regime, believed that post-1989 they were going to have the
opportunity to take part in the economic success story that they (largely correctly) perceived
West Germany to be. But as the economic and social difficulties of the transformation from a
command to a capitalist economy endured, many grew disillusioned with the inability of the
eastern economy to 'catch-up' with that in the West. Unemployment rose, job insecurity
increased, the state no longer appeared able or willing to support the poor and weak in society
and general disenchantment with the inequalities and contradictions of the social market
economy increased (see section 3.2.2. for further analysis of this). Easterners became more
and more aware of their disadvantageous economic position vis-a-vis Westerners and sought
to express this through the ballot box by supporting the non-establishment, left-wing PDS 19.
Persuasive though this argument may appear at first it does not, however, correspond
to the reality of the PDS's support base in the eastern states. The socio-economic profile of
both the PDS's membership and its broader electorate are not characterised by particular
economic hardship (see tables 1 and 2).
Volume 4 Number 3, December 1995, p.98.
18 See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Wahl in Sachsen: Eine Analyse der Landtagswahl vom 19. September 1999
(Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1999), p.55. " ,
19 See for example Rainer-Olaf Schultze: 'Wiederspriichliches, Ungliechzeitiges und kein Ende in Sicht: Die
Bundestagswahl vom 16. Oktober 1994', in Zeitschriftftlr Parlamentsfragen, Volume 26 Number 2, May 1995,
p.344.
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Table 120
The Results of the 1998 Federal Election per Age Category in Western and Eastern
Germany (in per cent)
CDU/CSU SPD Alliance FDP PDS DVUI
90/Greens NPDIREP
W E W E W E W E W E W E
18-24 31 21 37 28 12 6 7 6 2 22 6 13
25-34 29 21 45 33 11 6 6 3 2 22 4 9
35-44 31 24 45 33 12 5 6 3 1 22 3 8
45-59 36 28 44 37 6 4 9 3 1 23 3 2
60+ 47 34 39 38 3 2 7 3 1 19 2 2
Total 37 27.4 42.3 35.1 7.3 4.1 7 3.3 1.2 21.6 2.9 5
Within the party membership, where many former SED functionaries are still active, a
mere 12 per cent of members of the PDS are either Vorruhestiindler or unemployed (and so
theoretically most likely to suffer material disadvantagej". At the 1994 election Jurgen W.
Falter and Markus Klein described the areas of high unemployment in eastern Germany as the
PDS "Wahltiefburgen" (electoral wastelandsj'f and the over-representation of civil servants
and white collar workers as disapproving the theory that the PDS is singularly a party of those
materially disadvantaged", Patrick Moreau and Jurgen P. Lang contend that "PDS support is
characterised by dissatisfaction and pessimism, yet its supporters personal situations do not
appear to be that b~d"24- further dispelling the idea that economic deprivation is a motor of
PDS support.
20 See Infratest Dimap: Wahlreport: Wahl zum 14. Deutschen Bundestag 27. September 1998 (Berlin: Infratest
Dimap, 1998).
21 Gero Neugebauer and Richard Stoss (1996): op. cit. p.151. It is also misleading to contend that a majority of
eastern Germans view themselves as unification losers - as in 1998, 67 per cent of Easterners regarded
themselves as being the exact opposite - the winners from the unification process. Infratest Dimap (1998): ibid.
fi
53
jiirgen W. Falter and Markus Klein: 'Die Wahler der PDS bei der Bundestagswahl 1994. Zwischen
Ideologie, Nostalgie und Protest', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 51-52/94, p.24.
23 Markus Klein and Claudio Caballero: 'Ruckwarts in die Zukunft. Die Wahler der PDS bei der
Bundestagswahl1994', in Politische VierteljahresschriJt, Volume 37 Number 2, June 1996, pp.229-247.
24 Patrick Moreau and Jurgen P. Lang: 'Aufbruch zu neuen Ufern?', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 86/96,
1996b, p.55.
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Table 225
The Results of the 1998 Election According to Education and Occupation
CDU/CSU SPD Alliance FDP PDS
90/Greens
W E W E W E W E W E
Ed.J.l~atiQn:
High 33 23 35 33 16 8 10 4 2 29
Middle 37 26 42 34 6 3 7 3 1 20
Low 39 34 48 38 3 2 4 3 1 17
O~~YlJa1iQn:
Worker 30 24 53 36 4 2 4 3 1 19
White 31 25 46 35 10 6 7 3 1 25
Collar
Workers
Civil 35 26 37 32 14 7 8 3 1 25
Servants
Self- 45 38 23 21 10 4 16 12 2 18
Employed
Out of 23 19 49 37 11 4 6 2 2 25
Work
Pensioners 46 34 41 39 2 2 7 3 1 19
In 28 21 36 29 17 11 7 6 4 22
Education
Statistics referring to the 1998 election expressly illustrate the heterogeneous nature of
the PDS electorate. The young and the old, men and women, well educated and those with no
or few qualifications all vote for the PDS in relatively large and consistent numbers'". It is
especially noteworthy that voters from all age-categories supported the PDS. This is in
contrast to the membership structure of the party, which is dominated by people over 60 years
of age (see also section 4.3.)27.
The majority position within the PDS literature no longer stresses a 'materially based
25 Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.57.
26 Even in Berlin, where the POS's considerable electoral successes are generally attributed to the high
proportion offormer SED nomenclature resident in the eastern districts of the city, it is clear that the POS's base
of support is heterogeneous. For example, 18 per cent of 18-24 year olds in eastern Berlin voted for the POS in
the 1999 state elections, just as did 18 per cent of the 45-59 year old category. 19 per cent of POS supporters
were in full-time employment, while only 16 per cent were pensioners and 17 per cent were still in some form of
education. See Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.: Wahl in Berlin: Eine Analyse der Wahl zum Abgeordnetenhaus
vom 10. Oktober 1999 (Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, Bericht 100, 1999), p.28 & p.35.
27 See Oscar W. Gabriel and Oskar Niedermayer: 'Entwicklung und Sozialstruktur der Parteimitgliedschaften',
in Oscar W. Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer and Richard StOss (Hrsg.): Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), p. 294. 67 per cent of the POS membership is over 60 years of age.
See Peter Christian Segall et al: Die PDS im Wahljahr 1999: 'Politik von links. von unten und von Osten'
(Munchen: Akademie fur Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Hanns Seidel Stiftung e. V, 1999), p.122.
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protest' explanation ofPDS success. Section 1.2.1.2. illustrates how proponents of the protest
hypothesis have moved to describe the PDS's electoral success as being based upon a
subjective, rather than objective, deprivation at the hands of the 'New' Republic.
1.2.1.2. Socio-Psychological Protest
When discussing the importance of socio-psychological protest in explaining PDS
success in eastern Germany it is important to differentiate between the motives of the
membership of the party and those of the PDS's broader electoral base. This is as these two
groups support the party for very different reasons. Wilfred Barthel et al have. in their
comprehensive survey of the values, opinions and motivations of the PDS membership, firmly
concluded that "unification losers have congregated in large masses in the PDS',28. Many
PDS members' worked for long periods of their life in the (ultimately) vain attempt at making
the GDR into a successful political, economic and social project. Members of the
.Aufbaugeneration genuinely believed that the GDR was the first attempt to create a socially
just, socialist state on German soil. Its failure represents the failure of their hopes and
ambitions.
Slightly younger former SED functionaries who remain in the PDS are now deprived
of the power and prestige that they were once accorded in the GDR. Although they remain
materially better off than they were pre-1989, it is the loss of status that causes feelings of
disenchantment with the FRG. They owed their career development to the GDR system, and
with its abolition went the legitimisation for their chosen career path. It is for these reasons
that both of these segments from within the PDS membership can be termed socio-
psychological protesters.
Viola Neu, talking of the PDS's base of support in the wider electorate, asserts that
"the PDS electorate is largely made up of the 'losers' from 1989"29. This observation is more
questionable than the conclusions that Barthel et al came to about the motives behind the •
membership's support of the party. And not only because Neu does not attempt to define
exactly what she means by the term 'unification losers' (see below). Tables 1 and 2 (above)
illustrate that the PDS's base in the broader electorate is much broader and heterogeneous
than that of its membership (see section 4.3. for an analysis of the PDS's membership
28 Wilfred Barthel et al: 'Forschungsbericht Strukturen, politische Aktivitaten und Motivationen in der PDS -
Mitgliederbefragung der PDS 1991' (Berlin: Trafo-Verlag, 1995), p.9.
29 Viola Neu: 'Das Wiihlerpotential der PDS Ende 1993' (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,
1994).
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profiler'", This paradox is indeed not lost on PDS party elites, who have to tread a careful
line between the wants and desires of an ageing membership and those of a much more
heterogeneous electorate. An element of protest certainly encourages Easterners to support
the PDS as it represents their feelings of dissatisfaction with the present day German
economy, society and political system. But, as this thesis aims to illustrate, viewing this
purely as diffuse protest misses the point that such sentiment is territorial in nature.
Proponents of the protest party approach still perceive the PDS electorate principally
in terms of 'unification losers' - whether this be in the material sense (i.e. Easterners remain
poorer than Westerners, even if they are richer than they were in 1989 - see section 1.2.1.1.)
or in the socio-psychological one. Generally, as was mentioned above, they are seen as those
eastern Germans who have seen the power and the prestige that they had attained within the
GDR taken away from them. As such the concept frequently boils down to expressions of
subjective feelings and emotions. These 'unification losers' are not normally beset by
r-
particular forms of economic hardship, but rather by a psychological unwillingness to accept
the FRG as home.
Socio-psychological protest is something that has, however, also been evident in the
sectors of the electorate who had most to gain from unification. Easterners remain critical of
the way that the GDR (and their lives and achievements within the GDR) is handled in
popular discourse. They also remain highly critical of politicians who make promises that
they appear unable to keep. Broad-based feelings of second class citizenship exist across all
of the eastern states as Westerners continue to dominate politics and economics in the united
Germany. "Perceptions of collective inferiority" argue Beverly Crawford and Arendt Lijphart
"have created a culture of victimisation and political helplessness't" in eastern Germany,
enabling, they argue, the PDS to develop a role for itself as an agent within the party system
that can incorporate the disparate feelings of discontentment of eastern Germans into one
coherent voice. This dissatisfaction often has strongly anti-capitalist leanings (see section
1.2.2.), and the bedrock of the eastern German Trotzidentitii?2 is the demarcation that
Easterners make between themselves and Westerners.
Although many commentators still view the socio-psychological protest approach as
30 For a particularly lucid account of the political beliefs of the PDS membership see Lothar Probst: Die PDS in
Rostock: Eine Lokalstudie uber die Anatomie einer postkommunistischen Partei, in Peter Barker (ed.): German
Monitor - The Party of Democratic Socialism. Modern Post-Communism or Nostalgic Populism? (Amsterdam:
Rodopi B.V, Volume 42, 1998), pp.54-77; or Lothar Probst (2000): op. cit.
31 Beverly Crawford and Arendt Lijphart: 'Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms and International
Pressures', in Comparative Political Studies, Special Issue. July 1995, p.I80.
32 The issue of an eastern German identity has prompted considerable academic discussion, and it is something
that is of great importance to the PDS. For a closer examination of the fundamentals of this see chapter three of
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the key variable in the electoral longevity of the PDS, it is not possible to view the PDS as a
party ofpure protest. "The widely stated cliches stressing that PDS voters are nostalgic SED
beneficiaries, pure protest voters or opponents of German unity are only valid for a
minority,,33and even though the PDS has, at times blatantly, adopted this approach during
election campaigns", the reasons for the party's continued survival are more complex than
this approach alone can highlight. Within its electorate 'unification losers', in the form of
those who have suffered losses of pride and privilege stemming from their lives in the GDR,
clearly do not dominate'",
Although the PDS fared disproportionately well amongst people with an advanced
formal education (29 per cent of graduates in the eastern states in this category voted for the
party in 1998), it was also able to poll strongly in the less well-educated sectors of the
electorate". Pensioners remain slightly (19 per cent) underrepresented in the PDS supporter
profile, as do the self-employed (18 per cent - although this remains considerable higher than
a left-wing, socialist party would normally expect), while workers (25 per cent), civil servants
(25 per cent) and white collar workers (25 per cent) are all over-represented. In comparison
to other parties (see table 2) the PDS electorate remains heterogeneous and representative of
eastern German society as a whole".
Furthermore, feelings of dissatisfaction and discontentment with the·political process
are not just limited to PDS (and/or DVU) voters, as broad swathes of eastern German voters
who choose to support the CDU and/or SPD also remain unhappy with the political and
economic situation in the eastern states". Neugebauer and Stoss highlight the need to view a
vote for the PDS as being something between a reaction to the ideological rhetoric of the
this work.
33 Der Spiegel: 6 November 1995, p,42.
34 During the 1994 Bundestag election campaign, for example, the PDS openly campaigned on the slogan
"Election Day is Protest Day". See Wayne C. Thompson: 'The Party of Democratic Socialism in the New
Germany', in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 29 Number 4, 1996, p.439.
3S Joyce Marie Mushaben: 'Auferstanden aus Ruinen: Social Capital and Democratic Identity in the New
Lander', in German Politics and Society, Volume 15Number 4, Winter 1997, p.94.
36 More precisely (and only in eastern Germany), 16.6 per cent of Easterners without any qualifications voted
for the PDS, while 19.9 per cent of those with Mittlere Reife/Realschule qualifications, 26.5 per cent of those
with A Levels (Abitur) and 28.7 per cent of Easterners with university degrees did so. See Infratest Dimap:
'Wahlverhalten' in Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.5.
37 Of particular note are the comparisons in the CDU electorate between the number of self-employed who
support the party (38 per cent in eastern Germany) and the number of unemployed (19 per cent in eastern
Germany). The number of those still in education (21 per cent in the eastern states) who voted for the CDU is
also (from the point of view of the CDU) worryingly low. Despite its convincing victory in 1998, the SPD also
displays considerable differences in sectoral support. This is shown in that only 21 per cent of civil servants
supported the SPD in eastern Germany, while 39 per cent of pensioners did. Infratest Dimap (1998): ibid. p.57.
38 See Marc Howard: 'Die Ostdeutschen als ethnische Gruppe? Zum Verstandnis der neuen Teilung des
geeinten Deutschlands', in Berliner Debatte INITIAL, Heft 4/5, 1995a, pp.119-131.
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GDR and a mark of protest against the transformation from a socialist to a capitalist society",
Yet protest voters are generally viewed in the political science world as volatile swing
voters. Hence 'protest parties' are by their nature seen as transient phenomenon that citizens
only turn to in extraordinary conditions of political, economic or social dissatisfaction'", In
the case of the PDS one can see that evidence assembled since 1990 reveals PDS party
alignment to be strong and sustained. In fact, the PDS has the most loyal supporters of any
party in eastern Germany - a trait that would not normally be associated with protest parties".
Indeed, although the PDS played on its reputation as a protest party in the early and mid
1990s in particular, it is now clear that if Easterners wish to protest at the political level, then
they tend to the parties of the far-right - principally the German Peoples Union (DVU). The
DVU even usurped one of the PDS's 1994 election slogans by claiming in the 1998 campaign
that if Easterners wanted to Protest wdhlen (,protest with your vote'), then it should be the
DVU that they vote for. This is exactly what the PDS had claimed for itself in 1994. Hence
although the PDS profits from feelings of general dissatisfaction in the eastern states,
characterising the PDS as a 'protest party' is misguided'f.
The PDS is regarded by many Easterners as an aspect of normality, rather than as a
protest phenomenon, as it articulates eastern German interests within regional and national
political arenas. 67 per cent of Easterners (but only 36 per cent of Westerners) view the party
as being 'democratic', while three-quarters do not object to the party being represented in the
Bundestag'", It is therefore more constructive to investigate the protest potential that the PDS
mobilises in terms of the articulation of regional distinctiveness. It is here that analysis of the
PDS as a protest party needs to factor in the territorial element of this 'protest', as 'protesters'
view themselves as part of a social and cultural grouping that exists within the eastern states
(see section 1.2.4.).
The protest party approach is not therefore sufficient in explaining the successful
mobilisation of votes by the PDS in eastern Germany over a sustained period of time. This
39 Gero Neugebauer and Richard Stoss (1996): op. cit. p.162.
40 The success of the right-wing nYU in the Saxony Anhalt state election of 26 April 1998, when the party
polled 12.9 per cent of the vote, despite having almost no party basis in the Land, would be a more typical
example of a protest party attracting the votes of the socially dissatisfied, electorally volatile sections of the
populace. In the 1998 Federal Election, just 5 months after the nyu's triumph in Saxony Anhalt, the party did
not manage to jump the 5 per cent hurdle in any state, and in the 1999 elections in the eastern states (in
Brandenburg, Saxony, Thuringia and Berlin), the nYU was only able to enter one eastern parliament
(Brandenburg).
41 Jiirgen W Falter and Markus Klein (1994): op. cit. p.24. Hans-Georg Betz and Helga A. Welsh (1995): op.
cit. p.92.
42 Eva Sturm: 'Und der Zukunft zugewandt'? Eine Untersuchung zur Politikfiihigkeit der PDS (Opladen: Leske
und Budrich, 2000), p.315.
43 Hans-Joachim Veen et. a1.: Analyse der Bundestagswahl yom 27. September 1998 (Sankt Augustin: Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, 1998), p.43.
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approach remains short-term in nature, and, even at its most far-sighted, implies that when
Easterners become 'satisfied' with their economic and social positions within the FRG, the
PDS will inevitably disappear from the party political landscape. Yet there is little evidence
to suggest that the eastern states are likely to economically catch-up with the western states in
the foreseeable future - and if at some point genuine equality is achieved, then the PDS may
still have entrenched its position as an eastern German regional party to such an extent that it
can outlive the dissipation of one the key structural variables (economic inequality) that
shaped the cleavage divide between the eastern and western states of which it is a product.
Furthermore, many young people support the PDS who never experienced the GDR (i.e. the
those in the 18 - 24 age group, see table 1) - a phenomenon that the protest party approach is
unable to adequately explain away. This approach neglects the attractiveness of the PDS to
people across all social strata within eastern Germany. It also neglects the fact that the party's
support has grown to be both loyal and reasonably well distributed. This is not a
characteristic of a party that is built on short-term protest, dissatisfaction and disillusionment.
It is for this reason that the base of the party's support has to be conceptualised as being more
loyal than that of a mere transitory 'protest' phenomenon.
1.2.2. The PDS as a Modern, Socialist Reform Party
This approach is only adopted by a minority of authors. Furthermore, many of the
proponents of this approach often appear to hold principles which the party itself espouses.
The PDS is viewed as a renewed, democratic-socialist party that has grown out of the
reforming wing of the SED. Rather than treat the party as a transitory 'protest' phenomenon
the emphasis shifts to the important long-term role that the PDS could/should playas the heir
to the long established Marxist-communist tradition in Germany.
This is in stark contrast to the hostile responses that the party generates across the
majority spectrum of academic literature (see in particular section 1.2.3.), as well as in the
journalism covering the party's activities. Commentators adopting this approach are often not
afraid of calling for a structural realignment of the left, very possibly involving the eventual
dissolution of the PDS as it is today", in favour of some other future constellation of left-
44 Frank Unger has called for the dissolution of both the SPD in eastern Germany as well as the PDS, in order to
form a new political organisation that he proposes to call the Social Democratic Union (SDU). Those in the PDS
who understood themselves as Communists would form a newer version of the KPD, while those on the right of
the eastern SPD would (if they wished) form another centre party, or they would join the Alliance 90/Greens.
The SDU would, he proposes, be a broad, eastern Germany Volkspartei, with its own Fraktion status within the
Bundestag. This would enable socialism inGermany to be represented in a coherent and flexible manner. The
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wing political groupings. It is against the background of a social democratic'", possibly
supplemented by an eco-liberal party, that the PDS would contribute to the "ideological
rearmament" of the German Left46.
Fritz Vilmar encapsulates much of the analysis covered by proponents of this
approach when he notes:
as an eastern German regional party ... the PDS will stagnate in the respectable,
but futureless '20 per cent ghetto', ultimately remaining around the 5 per cent
mark in all of Germany.
Vilmar contends that the shift rightwards of the SPD, as it distances itself from anti-
capitalism and Keynesian economics has generated sufficient space on the left of the political
spectrum for a socialist/anti-capitalist all-German party to establish itself and as such "the
PDS has the chance to occupy the vacated position ... (to the left a/the SPD) ... within the all-
German political spectrumr", For its part, the party openly tries to cast itself as a democratic,
reforming, socialist party48and it is clear that the overwhelming majority of PDS members,
supplemented by a considerable portion of its electorate, remain committed to the ideal of a
society beyond capitalism", in a way that members of the SPD and the Greens do not.
SDU would enjoy a similar arrangement with the SPD that the COU currently does with the CSU. See Frank
Unger: 'Adieu PDS? Pladoyer fUr eine neue Parteienlandschaft der Linken in der Berliner Republik', in Heinz
Beinert (ed.): Die PDS - Phenix oder Asche? (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1995), pp.81-88.
45 The more conservative elements within the POS membership frequently warn against a 'social-
democratisation' of the party. They point out that there is no place in the German party system for a second
. version of the SPD. While agreeing with these claims, the leadership of the PDS tends to claim that the SPD is
moving so far to the right on issues such as the funding of the welfare state, social justice, peace and economic
strategy that the SPD is leaving a void to its left that the POS has to fill. This means a broadening of the PDS' s
electoral base - and an acceptance of what many would contend were traditional socialist/social democratic
positions. This is certainly the position of a number of members on the right of the PDS, who see a role for the
PDS as a broader based left-wing party. An example of a broadening of the POS's profile rightwards came in
1999 when Uwe Kitsch, a former SPD MP in Bavaria, publicly renounced his SPD membership and joined the
PDS.
A number of former Staatsparteien across central and eastern Europe have chosen to change their
ideological orientation and have become social democratic parties. This was made much easier in every other
case than it was in eastern Germany, as a new party system was forming following the collapse of state
socialism. The PDS never had this option (which is not to say that it would have taken it anyway), as the West
German party system quickly expanded Eastwards. .
46 Gunter Minnerup: 'The PDS and the Strategic Dilemmas of the German Left', in German Monitor, Peter
Barker (ed.) (1998): op. cit. p.214.
47 Fritz Vilmar: in Neues Deutschland, 16/lJ January 1999, p.l.
48 Following the elections to the European Parliament in 1999, Dietmar Bartsch felt confident enough to
proclaim that the PDS is a sozialistische Volkspartei (socialist peoples party) in the eastern states. This gives
recognition both to the PDS's strength in all sectors of the eastern German electorate and its ideological
. underpinnings as party that is in opposition to the capitalist structures of German society. See 'Wahlen
entscheidend ftlr die Zukunft der PDS', in Schweriner Volkszeitung, 15 July 1998, p.l.
49 Lothar Bisky, the long-time Vorsitzender of the POS, has defined that POS as an "out and out anti-capitalist
party", stressing the POS's willingness to fundamentally change the economic structures of German society. See
'Bisky kandidiert nicht noch einmal fur den POS-Vorsitz: Auf der Suche nach einer Alternative zum
'angelsachsischen Kapitalismus", in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 April2000, p.2.
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This having been said, the party programme of 1993 speaks rather circumspectly of
socialism as an "indispensable goal, a movement and a system of values" and a "society in
which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of air50. In
practice the programmatic orientation of the PDS remains vague and ill-defined as an array of
factions and undercurrents battle for the heart and soul of the party. As Neugebauer and Stoss
observe, "revolutionaries stand in opposition to reformers, libertarians to dogmatists,
fundamentalists to pragmatists and progressive forces against those with more conservative
vaiues"S1 and the diffuse number of ideological beliefs held ensure any characterisation of the
party is limited to that ofa 'socialist' broad church of leftward opiniorr".
Studies that analyse the PDS through the prism of socialist politics highlight much of
the ideological heterogeneity evident within the party. By attempting to de-construct what the
PDS means by socialism proponents of this approach highlight the broad base of ideological
diversity that stretches between the reforming, pragmatic leadership around Gregor Gysi,
Andre Brie and Lothar Bisky to unreconstructed Communists such as Sarah Wagenknecht,
Ellen Brombacher and Michael Benjamin in the Communist Platform and/or Marxist Forum.
Such proponents analyse, from an altogether more supportive position that those adopted by
advocates of the anti-system approach such as Patrick Moreau, what the PDS understands by
the term socialism, what it has learnt from the socialism in the GDR and what it must do if it
is to create a coherent alternative to the capitalism it claims to despise", This is especially
important for the future of the PDS project as despite the fact that the PDS has condemned
Stalinism, it has yet to produce a coherent and systematic analysis of its own communist past.
Only by successfully accomplishing this can the party define and construct a definition of its
current ideological identity.
It does, however, remain clear that an expressly socialist party has logically only a
limited function acting as a representative of regional interests. Proponents of this approach
SO PDS: Programme of the Party of Democratic Socialism (Berlin: PDS, 1993), p.ll.
SI Gero Neugebauer and Richard Stoss (1996), op. cit. p.114.
52 The PDS openly describes itself as an "alliance of left-wing forces", stressing that its commitment to
democratic socialism is not "tied to any defined philosophical outlook, ideology or religion". See PDS (1993):
of" cit. p.31. .
S See for example Michael Benjamin: 'DDR-IdentWit und PDS', in Lothar Bisky, Jochen Czemy et al (eds.),
Die PDS - Herkunft und Selbstverstdndnis (Berlin: Dietz, 1996), pp.231-236. The 'mainstream' elements of the
PDS remain highly critical of the state-socialism that existed across central and eastern Europe pre-1989. This
can be seen by the large amount of literature available on PDS websites on Geschichtsaufarbeitung
(http://www.pds-online.de/geschichte) and in more formal documents such as the Party Programme. In the 1993
Party Programme, for instance, the PDS observes that "many questions concerning our own history remain
unanswered ... (and) ... the mistakes, shortcomings and crimes committed in the name of socialism have
dismayed us and roused us to deep reassessments, so that we are critically examining our moral and political
tradition in full consciousness of our own responsibility for the distortion of the socialist idea". PDS (1993): op.
cit. pp.3-4.
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seem to avoid facing the reality of political competition in Germany today: the PDS is not a
socialist party that is particularly strong in one region of the country: on the contrary, it is a
regional party that is built on socialist principles. The PDS has concentrated considerable
efforts on expanding westwards - but with marginal success. Even in the districts where the
party has registered its best share of the vote in the West54, there has been an over-
representation of people with a university or Hauptschule diploma and a low percentage of
Realschule graduates or, alternatively, a very high percentage of unemploymenr". It is,
therefore, clear that the tendency towards PDS support has tended to be highest in areas
populated by the 'intellectual' left, rather than the 'working class' left.
Falter and Klein elaborate further, and define three characteristics of PDS support in
both East and West. Highpopulation density, relatively high percentage of the population at
work in the service sector and a relatively high unemployment rate'". Andre Brie, on the
other hand, has emphasised how the same societal problems, albeit to different extents and in
a different economic and societal basis, exist in both the West and East of the country, hence
the need for an all German socialist party is a real one57• Proponents of this approach stress
the need for a distinctive contribution from the PDS as a party to the left of the SPD and the
Greens. Only then can the PDS influence societal change as a s~cialist party exerting
pressure on its social democratic brother".
This approach is strong in highlighting the ideological direction of the PDS. It is
clearly a party that seeks a society beyond capitalism, and although it is vague on what this
society would look like, it is clear that it would be based on nominally socialist values and
structures. This approach also throws light on the complex internal ideological discussions
within the party as well as on the slow and incremental process of programmatic development
that the PDS has undertaken. This approach highlights that 'socialism' remains the common
denominator that h~lds the membership of the party together. This is in spite of the different
S4 In the second ballot in 1998 Federal Election, the PDS received its highest share of the vote in the western
Lander in BerlinlKreuzberg/Schiineberg (4.4 per cent). It also registered between 3.5 per cent and 3 per cent in
Bremen West, Hamburg Mitte, Berlin Neukolln and Berlin Tiergarten. See Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.83.
ss Gerald R. Kleinfeld: 'The Return of the PDS', in David Conradt, Gerald R. Kleinfeld, George K. Romuser
and Christian S0e: Germany's New Politics (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995), pp.221-254.
S6 Jiirgen W. Falter and Markus Klein (1994): op. cit. p.24.
S7 Andre Brie: Wahlerpotenttal der PDS: Erkenntnisse, Tendenzen und MlJglichkeiten (Berlin: PDS-
Grundsatzkommission, 1996), p.16. .
S8 Left-wing commentators have argued that this must be a long term aim of the PDS, and only over the course
of a number of years will the PDS see any real policy change as a result of adopting this approach. The
publication of the Erfurter Erkliirung (Erfurt Declaration) is the only hard and fast document proclaiming such a
left-wing strategy as being advisable, and although it has been signed by trade unionists, church representatives,
intellectuals and politicians, only one position holding Social Democrat (Richard Dewes from Thuringia) was
among them. The declaration itself lamented the state of the German nation and, even though it was critical of
much of the opposition parties policies and strategies, called for a change in the Kohl (as it was then)
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understandings that reformers and conservatives, traditionalists and pragmatists understand by
-the concept. This approach is, therefore, particularly effective at illustrating why the
development of socialist thought within the party can only be completed at a pedestrian speed
on account of the diverging ideological beliefs that exist within the membership.
In spite of these strengths, this approach has one major shortfall: it is conspicuously
unable to explain why the PDS has been so ineffective at expanding westwards. Although its
proponents do stress what the PDS should be, their analysis still bears remarkably little
resemblance to the reality of the PDS's present-day political position. A German socialist
party would have to find much more resonance in the western populace to be able to make
this claim seriously. The PDS has been unable to take advantage of the SPD's move
rightwards and remains a party with few members and few voters in western Germany. This
is best illustrated by a few simple facts: in 1994 the PDS had 975 Basisorganisationen (grass-
roots groups) in Saxony Anhalt, 841 in Thuringia, 930 in Mecklenburg West Pomerania,
1,619 in Saxony, 1,188 in Brandenburg and 953 in Berlin. In the western states the PDS had
a combined total of 124 Kreisverbiinde and grass-roots groups across all ten states'". Judging
by these statistics the PDS had an almost identical number of organisational units in the
Mecklenburg city ofRostock as it did in all of western Germany'",
The socialist party approach is unable to explain why so many Easterners and so few
Westerners support the party - and although discrepancies in voter support are evident for
every political party, the extreme nature of the PDS's failure in the West indicates that voters
in the East are likely to support the party for other reasons than a particular affinity to
socialism (even if socialism remains a political ideology that is more widely supported in the
eastern states). Hence this approach is severely limited by its unwillingness to accept the
reality of the contemporary party politicallandscape in Germany today.
1.2.3. The Anti-System, Extremist Party Approach
Through the early 1990s this approach came to predominate in discourse on the PDS.
However, as time has passed it has gradually lost its dominant position, even if a number of
authors still continue to talk of the PDS as a both extremist and anti-system. One of its main
proponents has been Patrick Moreau who has produced a number of detailed studies on the
~overnment.
9 Jurgen P. Lang, Patrick Moreau und Viola Neu: Auferstanden aus Ruinen? Die PDS nach dem
Superwahljahr 1994 (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1995), p.37.
60 See Lothar Probst (2000): op. cit.
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position of the PDS within the German political system?'. He sees the PDS as a left-wing,
anti-system, extremist party that both polarises and destabilises the German party system.
Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse further claim that the PDS's subversive influence poses a real
challenge for the democratic actors within German politics todal2, and the party has led to a
"blockierte Demokratie" (blocked democracy) or to what has been called "polarisierter
Pluralismus,,63 (polarised pluralism), in which the PDS threatens not only Germany's
traditional coalition model of stable government, but also constitutional democracy as it has
developed since 1945.
According to this approach the PDS is seen as having contributed to the 'polarisation'
of the German party system as it is perceived as 'ideologising' political discourse and
broadening the political spectrum to include 'left-wing extremists'. The social and economic
transformation problems (see chapter three) in eastern Germany have also fuelled debate on
the rise of extreme right-wing sentiment'" leading to the possibility of the catch-all people's
parties of the centre-left and centre right having to deal with parties on both their left (the
PDS) and the right (in the form' of the German Peoples Union (DVU), Republicans or
National Democrats (NPD), depending on circumstance) that, according to this approach,
reject the ''federal constitutional consensus''",
The pragmatic left-wing nature of the PDS has led Jiirgen P. Lang to refer to the PDS
as an "extremely opportunistic party" whose parliamentary orientation and commitment to
representative democracy are purely functional'", Attempts to sideline elements like the
Communist Platform (KPF), the AG Junge Genosslnnen (nominally the party's youth-wing)
or the Westlinken (left-wing western Germans - whose discourse tends to be much more
ideologically left-wing than that in the East) should be seen above all as tactical steps, rather
than as genuine evidence of democratisation within the party, as the PDS seeks tactical ways
61 Patrick Moreau (1992): op. cit.; Patrick Moreau and Jiirgen Lang (1996): op. cit.; Patrick Moreau (1996): op.
cit. pp.54-61; Patrick Moreau (1998): op. cit.; Patrick Moreau, Marc Lazar and Gerhard Hirscher (eds.): Der
Kommunismus in Westeuropa. Niedergang oder Mutation? (Landsberg am Lech: Gunter Olzog Verlag, 1998).
62 Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse: Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin:
Prophylaen, 1993), p.4l.
63 Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten: 'Postkommunisten im Spagat: Zur Funktion der PDS im Parteiensystem', in
Deutschland Archiv, Volume 30 Number 6, November/December 1997, p.873. See also Giovanni Sartori:
Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis - Volume J (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1976). .
64 The rise of what is known in the popular press as a 'right-wing' sub-culture, as well as the DVU's strong
showing in the Saxony Anhalt Landtag election of 26 April 1998 and the Landtag election of the 5 September in
Brandenburg, highlight the existence ofa superficially 'right-wing' sentiment in the new Lander.
M Viola Neu (1999): op. cit. p.5.
66 Jiirgen P. Lang: 'Nach den Wahlen 1994: PDS-Strategie im Wandel?', in Deutschland Archiv, April 1995,
p.380.
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of achieving its anti-democratic aims'". Moreau and Lang concur with this analysis:
The political ideas of the PDS are tactical manoeuvres, whose aims stretch much
further than their individual demands would have one believe ... (and) ... the PDS
has developed an ideology that at first theoretically brings the existing system into
question, in order to, supported by pseudo-democratic mass acceptance, with
embellished, consciously diffuse, aims, eliminate it68•
Manfred Gerner, in his work Partei ohne Zukunft? Von der SED zur PDS agrees,
claiming that the PDS merely pays lip-service (Lippenbekenntnisse) to democracy, and that
the Marxist-Leninist tendencies of the party basis pose a clear and distinct extremist threat to
the Federal Republic's democratic structure'",
In particular the factions on the left of the PDS cause commentators like Moreau, Lang
and Gerner to further distinguish the party as 'extreme', as, in Moreau's words, the PDS has
developed itself, particularly in western Germany, into an "Anziehungspol" (poll of attraction)
for left-wing extremist elements", The structure of the PDS is complex and allows the
existence of a number of groups with different perspectives. While all mass parties do
contain contradictory elements, the level of incompatibility within the PDS suggests,
according to this approach, a failure to reconcile democracy with the party's stated goals.
Proponents of this approach argue that although the party has clearly developed and
reorganised from its days as the SED, it has yet to genuinely reform. As Kleinfeld observes
"the result (is) a post-Communist party, whose members largely continue to regard
themselves as Communists'i'", Kleinfeld argues that the PDS has a classic Communist party
structure, and that these organisations are typical vehicles for orchestrating extra-
parliamentary activity, as well as simultaneously undermining the social and political organs
of society. He notes:
Their goal is to exacerbate the conflict potential in society. The main point is not
that the individuals who may be addressed by the groups represent a uniform party
concept, but these individuals are contacted and mobilised for the PDS 72.
The Communist Platform is certainly the most well known of these groups, and
67 Viola Neu: 'Party of Government in Waiting', in German Comments, Aprill997, pp.20-24.
68 Patrick Moreau and Jiirgen P. Lang (1996): op. cit. p.60.
69 Manfred Gerner (1994): op. cit. p.242.
70 Patrick Moreau: 'Eine kurze Geschichte der PDS in der bundespolitischen Parteienlandschaft (1989 - 1997)"
in Patrick Moreau, Marc Lazar and Gerhard Hirschner (eds.) (1998): op. cit. p.277.
71 Gerald R Kleinfeld (1995): op. cit. p.225. See also Patrick Moreau and Jurgen Lang (1994): op. cit.
72 Gerald R. Kleinfeld (1995): ibid. p.226.
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although its membership ranges somewhere between 1,000 (according to the leadershipj' and
4,500 (according to the KPF itself)", and it would be relatively easy to dispose of these
extremist elements, the rank and file membership of the party appears to have no wish to do
S075. In their work on the PDS, Moreau and Lang claim that 48 per cent of PDS supporters
believe that communism will once again increase in salience, while 47 per cent of the PDS
electorate hold the idea of communism up as a positive thing. They claim that "PDS support
still orientates itself towards the communist worldview and towards the hope of its
realisation'l'", Bortfeldt has also observed that "not an insignificant number of party
members are in opposition to the (capitalist) system,,77 and although they may not be
members of the various extreme-left factions, the socialisation process within the GDR fosters
considerable toleration of them.
And indeed, orthodox members of the PDS's left-wing groupings readily claim that
the formation of the GDR was the first attempt on German soil to live in a non-capitalist
society. Sarah Wagenknecht and those around her on the Communist Platform even insist
that the decline of socialism began with Nikita Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin in 1956.
Such statements are taken as being evidence of the shallow nature of the reform process
undertaken within the party". If the groups around Wagenknecht superficially accept the
pluralism within the party and within German society as a whole, then, it is argued, this is for
purely tactical reasons, and not out of the conviction that their is any genuine alternative to
Marxism.".
Within the party programme, the central message appears to be a "fundamental
rejection"SOof the political and social system of the Federal Republic, and subsequently of the
social market economy that has evolved. Proponents of this approach argue that the PDS has
the gradual overcoming of constitutional democracy as its ultimate aim, followed by the
imposition of a rather vague socialist order that is based on the ideals of Marx, Engels,
Gramsci and Lenin". Moreau elaborates: .
73 'Sarah Wagenknecht, Chefin der 'kornmunistischen Plattforrn': Von Goethe zu Hegel, von Hegel zu Marx,
von Marx zu Lenin', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 14October 1994.
74 Jiirgen P. Lang (1995): op. cit. pp.375-376. .
75 Jurgen P. Lang (1995): ibid. pp.369-380.
76 Patrick Moreau and Jilrgen P. Lang (1996): op. cit. p.56.
77 Heinrich Bortfeldt: 'Die Ostdeutschen und die PDS', in'Deutschland Archiv, Volume 27 Number 12,
December 1994b, p.1283. See also Ilse Spittman: 'PDS - Anwalt der Ostdeutschen', in Deutschland Archiv, July
1994, p.673.
78 Patrick Moreau: in Patrick Moreau, Marc Lazar and Gerhard Hirscher (1998) (eds.): op. cit.
79 Manfred Gerner: 'Antagonismen der PDS _ Zum Pluralismus der SED-Nachfolgepartei', in Deutschland
Archiv, MarchlApril1996, pp.227-239.
80 PDS (1993): op. cit. pp.2-3.
8( Gerald R. Kleinfeld (1995), op. cit. pp.226-230.
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The ideological foundation (of the PDS) is still built on classic ideological
traditions that also characterised both the SED regime and the international
communist movement: Anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism/anti-Arnericanism and
anti-liberalism unify in a political-economic project characterised by dirgist,
statist and totalitarian tendencies'",
It is contended that the PDS should consequently be handled with caution. Yet it is
noticeable that while the PDS is accused of ideological dogmatism, the parties of the centre-
right have not been averse to using ideological weaponry in the attempt to de-legitimise the
PDS in the eyes of the electorate'". The CDU/CSU frequently stress what they believe to be
the extremist, unacceptable nature of the party. After the re-election of the Social Democrat
Reinhard Hoppner as Ministerprdsident of Saxony-Anhalt in May 1998 with the help of PDS
votes, CDU spokesman Otto Hauser, claimed that "it is roughly the same as if the National
Socialists had, under another name, played a role in governing post-1945 Germanyt'":
Gunter Beckstein, the Bavarian Home Affairs Spokesman, has also claimed that "the PDS is
an anti-constitutional party',ss just as Theo Waigel has observed that the programmatical
positions of the PDS illustrate that the it is attempting to build a 'new' republic "on political
and economic structures inherited from the SED,,86. In academic discussion, Eckhard Jesse
has summarised the position of this school of thought in slightly less controversial, but no less
unequivocal fashion when he observed that:
... the PDS, through its origins in the SED, its programme, its ambivalent position
on the use of force, its evasive approach to GDR history and its close links to anti-
democratic action groups is, at its core, an extremist political party".
82 Patrick Moreau: in Patrick Moreau, Marc Lazar and Gerhard Hirscher (1998) (eds.): op. cit., p.286.
83 The most obvious (but by no means only) examples of this are the 1994 'red-sock' and 1998 'red-hands'
campaigns by the CDUlCSU, openly playing on the controversial issue of past relations between social
democrats and communists. Neither campaign had any direct relevance to contemporary political debate. The
1994 campaign was largely perceived to have been successful, although the 1998 campaign was noticeably
dropped in the weeks preceding the federal election. This is as the eastern German electorate appeared to be
tired of CDU/CSU references to such events, and their attempts to picture the PDS as a modem day Communist
Party.
84 Otto Hauser (CDU): 'PDS stimmt fur Heppner - heftige Kritik aus Bonn', in Leipziger Volkszeitung, 27 May
1998,p.1.
85 Gunther Beckstein (CSU): 'Union fordert verstarkte Oberwachung der PDS', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 22
April 2000, p.5.
86 Theo Waigel (CSU): 'Die geistigen Grundlagen der Christlich-Sozialen Union', in Hanns-Seidel Stiftung:
Geschichte einer Volkspartei - 50 Jahre CSu, 1945-1995 (Munchen: Hanns-Seidel Stiftung, 1995), p.63.
87 Eckhard Jesse: 'SPD and PDS Relationships' in German Politics, Volume 6 Number 3, December 1997, p.99.
See also Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse (eds.): op. cit. pp.193-214. As far as this author is aware, nowhere is
the PDS ambiguous on the use of force. This applies for home and international affairs. At the international
level the PDS is particularly 'unambiguous', as, as high profile disagreements at party conferences illustrate, the
PDS seeks a radical demilitarisation of international affairs. Debates on the Kosovo War in 1999 and the use of
UN troops in international conflict at the Munster Parteitag (Conference) of April 2000 particularly illustrate
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This analysis is also supported by the Bavarian Office for Upholding the Constitution,
which continues to regard the PDS as an extremist party. According to their 1997 analysis of
the party, the PDS ...
... belongs to the group of parties that can be defined as 'post-Communist' or
'nee-Communist'. These definitions are intended to show the PDS has not
distanced itself from either Communist ideology or practice. On the contrary, the
PDS remains in its core traits very much the old party ... (the SED) ... 88
The report further adds that:
The PDS is a relic of the GDR and is politically responsible for the violent, and
above all economic, problems in the eastern states ... the PDS remains 'neo-
Communist' as it has turned itself into a Communist party along the lines of other
western European Communist parties, without reducing its communist, and
therefore extremist, character'".
The reports of the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution illustrate that
there remains a tendency to regard the PDS as an Uberbleibsel (left-over) of the GDR. The
fact that upwards of two million citizens vote for the party is not seen as sufficient evidence
that the questions that party asks, the criticisms it articulates and the positions that it takes
need to be taken as seriously as those of other parties. Proponents of this approach much
prefer to dwell on the undoubted contradictions and problems that the party has in coming to
terms with its own past and its left-wing ideological position rather than what it says about
Germany (and in particular eastern German) politics and society today.
The PDS itself, as one would expect, rejects notions that it IS 'anti-system' or
'extremist' out of hand:
To categorise the PDS as an extremist party is stupid, outrageous and completely
ignores the development of the party. The party programme, it's statute and a
range of party resolutions have established a clear break with Stalinism. The
party has repeatedly declared that it respects the Basic Law ... and, furthermore, in
the Bundestag the PDS has fought against attempts to undermine it90,
this. See PDS DisputiPressedienst, Nummer 4 (Disput) and Nummer 15/16 (Pressedienst), 2000.
88 Bayersiches Staatsministerium des Innem: Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS) (Munchen:
Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Inneren, 1997), p.5.
89 Bayersiches Staatsministerium des Innem (1997): ibid. p.5.
90 Dietmar Bartsch: oWermacht eine extreme Politik?', in PDS Pressedienst, Number 20, 14 May 1998. See
also http://www.pds-online/pressedienstl9820/24800.html
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Helmut Holter, the PDS leader in Mecklenburg' West Pomerania and Minister in the
SPDIPDS coalition, has articulated this slightly differently, although in no less categorical
fashion. Holter sensibly points out that the reform of any political system is not the same as
seeking to overthrow it. As he observes:
The PDS's support of the Basic Law and of the constitution of Mecklenburg West
Pomerania, and with it the acceptance of the legitimacy of the German state
(Staatswesen) and of parliamentary democracy does not exclude discussion and
constructive criticism of the deficits evident in contemporary democracy",
Lothar Bisky is also adamant that the PDS is a ''part of the Federal Republic's
society", although the party still clearly strives for a "better society" and as such recognises
and supports the idea that changes in Germany are only possible and desirable through the
achievement of governmental majorities". Harald Ringstorff, the SPD Prime Minister of
Mecklenburg West Pomerania (and leader of the first SPD-PDS coalition government) further
states that the "PDS has apologised to the victims of the SED regime and to the SPD for the
forced unification of 1946" and it is clear that Ringstorff regards the PDS as an eminently
more viable coalition partner than the CDU93• Despite the inability and/or unwillingness of
the PDS's leadership to completely distance itself from its SED past, the PDS has moved
irrevocably away from the 'Staatspartei' structure ofpre-1989. No votes are contrived (or at
least no more than any other party attempts to impose its will on its members), any member is
free to stand for election and, as the resignations of party luminaries like Andre Brie and
Gregor Gysi illustrate, the party 'basis' does not always act as the leadership expects or hopes
it will". In this sense the democratic changes and healthy debates that have come to
characterise conferences since 1989 represent a distinct metamorphosis. The PDS does still
need to continue re-defining its controversial past, but the numerous documents that the
historical commission of the PDS produces do illustrate that the party is making progress on
91 Helmut Holter: Die PDS als Zukunftspartei (Schwerin: PDS Landesverband Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
November 1999), p.2.
92' See 'Bisky kandidiert nicht noch einmal fUr den PDS-Vorsitz: Auf der Suche nach einer Alternative zum
'angelsachsischen Kapitalismus", in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 Apri12000, p.2.
93 Harald Ringstorff (SPD): quoted on the 17 November 1998 in 'Das rote Gespenst', in Der Spiegel, Nummer
10, 1999, p.23.
94 The most widely publicised spat between the PDS leadership and the 'basis' occurred at the 2000 Party
Conference in Miinster over UN military intervention in areas of political crisis. The 'basis' refused to back the
Executive proposal to review every case on its individual merits, insisting instead that the PDS rule out all forms
of UN military intervention - with no exceptions. This was in direct contravention to what the Executive had
proposed. Gregor Gysi, attempting to make the best of a bad job, described the defeat as "a victory for inner-
party democracy", and although the decision rendered the PDS, in effect, Politikunfahig, it illustrated that
democracy is very much alive and well within the PDS. See 'Das Fiasko der PDS-Reformer', in Siiddeutsche
Zeitung, 10 April2000, p4. See also 'Preis des Erfolgs', in Neues Deutschland, 11 Apri12000, p.l.
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this front. Claims by opponents that the PDS glorifies the GDR need clarification. The PDS
is unwilling to dismiss the GDR as a footnote in history". It is unwilling to accept that the
attempt at building a socialist state was illegitimate'", Furthermore, the PDS (like many
eastern Germans) is aggrieved at perceived attempts at 'sidelining' the lives and experiences
of Easterners pre-198997•
The PDS is also prepared to admit that socialism in the GDR was fatally flawed98•
The lack of democratic accountability, the dogmatic economic planning?" and the huge
contraventions of human and civil rights have all been condemned by the PDSIOO• The role of
95 See Lothar Bisky's thoughtful speech held at the Tranenpalast in Berlin on the 7 October 1999. Lothar
Bisky: '50 Jahre DDR "Vorwarts und nicht vergessen?''' on http://www.pds-
online.de/geschichte/991 Q/ddr50.htm
96 See line three of 'Das Programrn der PDS: 2. Das Scheitern des sozialistischen Versuchs', on
http://www.pds-online.de/dokumente/progranunlpunkt02.htm
97 See paragraph two of 'Das Prograrnm der PDS: 2. Das Scheitern des sozialistischen Versuchs', on
http://www.pds-online.de/dokumente/progranunlpunkt02.htm' .
98 The POS does not state that the socialism that existed in central and eastern Europe was fatally flawed from
the beginning, but it does admit that its failure was necessary in view of its inability to react to the economic
demands that competition with capitalism placed upon it. Furthermore, its deficiencies in terms of democracy
and the inability of the leaders of the state-socialist countries to implement reforms suitable for counteracting
such deficiencies rendered it doomed to eventual failure. See http://www.pds-online.de/dokumente/
prograrnm/punkt02.htm For a broader analysis of the PDS's interpretation of life in the GDR, the reasons for its
failure and the SED's role in this see http://www.pds-online.de/geschichte. The PDS has, in spite of the
I production of these documents, still found the path to reconciling itself to its past difficult. At the time of
writing a clear and coherent explanation of what went wrong in the GDR, why and what this means both for the
PDS and any socialist future world is lacking. But, while it is clear that parts of the POS membership are never
likely to be able to subjectively come to terms with the failings of the SEO and the GDR, the reforming
leadership of the party has made strides in this direction. The most notable example of this was an open letter by
Gregor Gysi to the party in August 1996. In it he expressed his belief that most of the PDS membership were, in
some form or other, party to 'real-existing socialism', and were therefore a part of its failure. He stated that
admitting this very fact was indeed painful, but there was no way. of avoiding it. He claimed that the
membership of the SED and the PDS had done too little to change the GDR for the better and that 'we' had
defended undemocratic and anti-emancipatory practices for too long, even though these practices were not worth
defending. Those people who still have not realised this, according to Gysi, clearly have not grasped the nature
of the reform project on which the POS is built. See Gregor Gysi: 'Zur gegenwartigen Diskussion in unserer
Partei', PDS Pressedienst, Nurnmer 34,1996, pp.9-12.
99 See paragraph 5 on http://www.pds-online.de/dokumente/programmlpunkt02.htm Furthermore, the PDS has
also stated that the market is a necessary component of contemporary society. In one document, for example, it
has claimed that "we have to accept the market, but we don't want 'Markt pur' (purely the market}". See
http://www.pds-online.de/geschichte/9808/weizsaecker-brief.htm '
100 The PDS has explicitly stated this on a number of occasions, of which one of the most prominent came in a
letter to ex President of the FRG, Richard von Weizsacker in August 1998. See paragraph three on
http://www.pds-online.de/geschichte/9808/weizsaecker-brief.htm The process of Geschichtsaufarbeitung does,
however, remain an uneven one within the POS, hence differing groupings and platforms within the party often
have different (and on occasion diametrically opposed) opinions on the same events. No issue highlights this
more than the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. Unequivocal condemnations of the event can be
found in statements made by a number of younger POS members (including Halina Wawzyniak, then a member
of the PDS Executive) in 'Geschichtsaufkl1irung versachlichen! Erklarung junger POS-Mitglieder zum
Politburo-Prozess', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 36, 1997, p.ll, as well as in statements made by Petra Pau,
leader of the POS in Berlin and since 1998 MdB, and Carola Freundel, leader of the POS in the Berlin city
parliament in PDS Pressedienst, Volume 33, 1997, p.43. A much less unequivocal analysis of the event can be
found by referring to Hans Modrow: 'Zum Jahrestag des 13. August 1961. Personliche Erklarung von Hans
Modrow', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 35, 1997, p.l1.
42
Chapter 1 Approaches to the Study of the PDS
the SED in these crimes has also been unambiguously admitted'?'. The PDS needs to
establish how a future socialist state would function over and beyond simply condemning
capitalism. While these are undoubtedly important issues, it is clear that, in light of the PDS's
programmatic and practical work, they do not constitute a threat to the FRG's democratic
consensus. The PDS is unambiguous, particularly in light of its experiences in the dictatorial
GDR, on the need for societal change to be brought about through the democratic process.
The all-encompassing Marxist-Leninist ideology of the SED has been replaced and the
PDS now attempts to portray itself more as a broad church of leftward leaning opinion,
having denied the importance of the leading role of the working class and chosen to adopt less
ideologically extreme positions. Anyone who wishes to oppose capitalism and the societal
relationships that it fosters is welcome within the party, and although definitive statements of
what the party hopes to achieve (particularly the rather flimsy semi-definition of socialism)
are lacking, the PDS has moved towards being a broad left-wing alternative to the SPD. It
accepts the democratic 'rules of the game', and attempts to offer an alternative to the unjust
capitalist system it perceives Germany to be caught in the grip or02. Regardless as to the
coherence of this alternative, the party has adapted to the system, and now adheres to the rules
of the political game like any other party.
Practical experience substantiates this claim. Following the much vaunted toleration
of an SPDIAlliance 90/Greens coalition by the PDS in Saxony Anhalt, as well as participation
in a governing coalition in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, it is clear that one should also pay
attention to the way the PDS has actually behaved in the real world of eastern German
government. As Peter Bender commented in Die Zeit:
The SPD and Greens have been tolerated by the PDS in Saxony Anhalt for four
years - would this have been possible with a radical party? (Reinhard) Hoppner's
experience has been that when he has spoken with the CDU and the PDS, he
could never rely on the support of the CDU, whereas he could with the PDS. The
results were seen on election day (26th April 1998) - those people who wanted to
vote 'radically' voted for the DVU103•
In Mecklenburg West Pomerania, where the PDS is now part of a governing coalition
101 "The traditional separation of powers was not adhered to and a democratic electoral system was not
implemented ... the right to criticise and to complain existed judicially, but in practice it was hardly ever
realised". See paragraph five on http://www.pds-online/dokumente/programmlpunkt02.htm -
102 The PDS has continued to align itself with all the fundamental requirements of the constitution, and the
party's programme and policy documents do not seek to overthrow the democratic structures on which the FRG
has been built. A number of commentators focus considerable attention on the alleged 'anti-constitutional'
activities of the KPF. neglecting the fact that the party has clearly renounced all claim to societal transformation
by any other means than through the democratic process.
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with the SPD, 38 per cent of citizens were of the opinion that the PDS was a completely
normal party, while a further 29 per cent viewed it as being compatible with the
parliamentary/democratic structures of the FRG. Over two-thirds of the Mecklenburg West
Pomerania's citizens viewed the PDS as an 'almost' normal partyl04. This is replicated in the
FRG as a whole where, in July 1999,68 per cent of Germans viewed the PDS as a 'normal,
democratic party' lOS.
But despite the party's protestations to the contrary, and regardless of wild politically
motivated claims, PDS members do largely remain anchored in their SED heritage - although
ideological foes of the PDS, and the majority of authors who view the PDS as 'extremist', see
any movement away from this base as evidence of a strategy rather a fundamental shifting of
beliefs - subsequently leaving the PDS in something of a no-win situation. Proponents of this
approach have allowed their analysis to verge on ideological dogmatism, as they have no
inclination of viewing the party as anything other than a disruptive political actor. Moreau,
for instance, leaves little doubt as to what his opinion of the party is by calling his
(empirically impressive) 1998 work a 'Profile of an Anti-Democratic Party': this goes against
much of the evidence available on the internal dynamics of PDS political debatelO6• The
ideological opposition to socialism that such authors espouse means that they cannot bring
themselves to accept that a socialist party can legitimately function within the FRG. They
perceive the FRG, supported by the Basic Law, to be a state based on capitalist principles:
something that the Grundgesetz is anything but clear about. Neu claims that a "a change
towards democratisation is not recognisable" and that the "alleged change is of a tactical
nature" - but even the most cursory glance at political activity within the PDS reveals that, if
anything, the party suffers from too much ideological pluralism 107. Criticisms of the PDS as
contributing to an ideological broadening of the political spectrum also appear, in light of the
PDS's clear acceptance of the Basic Law, somewhat hollow. 'Polarised pluralism' may make
political life in the FRG more complicated for the CDU/CSU and SPD, but this is by no
means a justification for ostracising the PDS. The PDS occupies a democratically legitimate
political position in the German party spectrum and it garners votes on the basis of a
democratic political platform - and as such Backes and Jesse's claims of 'blocked democracy'
sound more like a recognition that the other parties are going to have to fight for votes with
103 Peter Bender: inDie Zeit, 14 May 1998.
104 Politbarometer Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Bielefeld: EMNID-Institut, Meinungs- und Sozialforschung,
Marz 1998), p.20.
lOS Viola Neu (1999): op. cit. p.5.
106 Patrick Moreau (1998): op. cit.
107 Viola Neu (1999): op. cit. p.7.
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another political opponent.
The overriding view amongst authors who adopt this approach is one of extreme
scepticism and mistrust. These authors fall short of calling for the outright prohibition of the
PDS, but they stress the importance of mobilising democratic forces against the party. This
approach emphasises the perceived ambiguous nature of the party's commitment to.
democracy, and chooses to illustrate both the anti-system and extremist elements that are still
evident. While legitimately pointing out the questionable commitment of the left-wing fringe
to parliamentary procedures and to the social market economy, it is often apparent that too
much concentration is paid to factions like the KPF, the AG Junge Genosslnnen or the
Marxistisches Forum (Marxist Forum). The PDS may well still be under observation by the
Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution (LandesverJassungsschutzamt), but the
party as a whole is not regarded as being extremist by the federal authorities. It seeks to
change societal structures through policy initiatives, does not seek in any way to use violence
and recognises and accepts both democracy in general and the democratic structures of the
FRG in particular'I". One suspects that even if the party survives another twenty years, some
of the proponents of this approach will continue to brand the candidates and constituents of
the party as leftover SED stalwarts'?", The PDS clearly is committed to the constitutional
foundations of the Federal Republic. It has reiterated this on countless occasions. The
network of AGs, IGs, Platforms and Fora contribute to healthy internal political debate,
making the PDS the most pluralist and Diskussionsfreudig of all Germany's political
parties'", Furthermore, much to the chagrin of conservative critics, there is nothing in the
Federal Republic's constitution that expressly forbids the creation of a socialist economy.
Therefore, it is distinctly dubious to claim that the anti-capitalism of the PDS is, in itself, anti-
constitutional. Although the unification treaty of 1990 makes a specific point of emphasising
that the economy of the FRG is a 'social-market' one, this is clearly meant to be an expression
of the economic system as it was at the time. There is no clear and unambiguous passage that
dictates that this has to remain so in the futureIll.
Hence this approach paradoxically illustrates what the PDS is not: an extremist and
anti-constitutional party. It integrates disruptive left-wing elements into the political process,
yet remains able to act within the constitutional limitations of the German political order.
108 Kurt Moller: 'Extremismus', in: Bernhard Schafers and Wolfgang Zapf (Hrsg.): Handworterbuch zur
Gesellschaft Deutschlands (Opladen: Leske and Budrich 1998) p.l98.
109 ' ,Joyce Marie Mushaben (1997): op. cit. p.96.
110 Rainer Linnemann: Die Parteien in den neuen Bundesltindem (Munster: Waxman, 1994), p.106.
III Jens Alber, Christina Nubel and Martin Schollkopf 'Sozialstaat/Soziale Sicherheit', in Bernhard Schafers
and Wolfgang Zapf (Hrsg.): Handworterbuch zur Gesellschaft Deutschlands (Opladen: Leske and Budrich,
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Viewing the PDS as the vehicle for left-wing extremist sentiment fundamentally misses the
point that the PDS' s everyday political activities are not in any way extremist. And this is
patently obvious to the vast majority of electors in both the eastern and western states, who
have long ceased to regard the PDS as an extremist political organisation.
1.2.4. The Milieu Party Approach
Authors such as Jens Bastian and Hans-Georg Betz and Helga A. Welsh have
approached the study of the PDS from the perspective of the party as the representative of a
distinct 'milieu' in eastern Germany!", Bastian contends that the PDS is "above all else a
party of the Milieu,,!!3, that remains specific to both its social environment and its culture.
Richard Schroder elab,orates further, describing the PDS as a "milieu party with elements of a
self-help group, kept together by a common feeling of protest,,114while Betz and Welsh stress·
the "importance of the PDS as the main political representative of a specific socio-economic
and cultural milieu"llS. After the 1999 elections Jesse also observed that "the PDS is
principally a milieu party and its protest function is of secondary importance''t'", This
approach clearly recognises that the party unites different groups, characterised by high levels
of education, secularisation and urbanisation, which share similar cultural and political
orientational'", These groups may be diverse, but they are united within a broad cultural
milieu - whose interests and problems in coming to terms with life in the FRG are articulated
by the PDS within the political arenal18•
Neugebauer has subsequently summarised the social milieu that supports the PDS as
one that is:
... defined by the comparable worlds in which the majority of its members live.
They live largely in cities or towns, they are (or were) frequently white collar
workers, are (in comparison to members of other parties) in possession of higher
1998), p.622.
112 Jens Bastian: 'The Enfant Terrible of German Politics: The PDS Between GDR Nostalgia and Democratic
Socialism', in German Politics, Volume 4 Number 2, August 1995, pp.95-111 and Hans-Georg Betz and Helga
A. Welsh (1995): op. cit. pp.92-111.
113 Jens Bastian (1995): ibid. p.107.
114 Richard Schroder: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, see Gerald. R. Kleinfeld (1995): op. cit. p.242.
lIS Hans-Georg Betz and Helga W. Welsh (1995): op. cit. p.92.
116 Eckhard Jesse: 'Die Landtagswahl in Sachsen vom 19. September 1999: Triumphale Bestatigung der CDU',
in Zeitschrift for Parlamentsfragen, Volume 31 Number 1, March 2000, pp.76.
117 Stefan Hradil: 'Die Modemisierung des Denkens. Zukunftspotentiale und 'Altlasten' in Ostdeutschland', in
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B20/95, p.7.
118 Michael Vester: 'Milieuwandel und regionaler Strukturwandel in Ostdeutschland', in: Michael Vester,
Michael Hoffman and Irene Zierke (eds.): Soziale Milieus in Ostdeutschland. Gesellschaftliche Strukturen
zwischen Zerfall und Neubildung (Koln: Bund, 1995), pp.l 0-11.
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levels of formal education, are not religiously committed and belonged to the
carrier-groups iTrdgergruppens of the SED at the different levels of party, state
and societal system. This ensures that they largely represent the founders and the
inheritors of the GDR system ... 119
Throughout the 1990s the PDS was seen as being anchored in this well-organised and
stable milieu. The PDS was perceived as being unable to move away from the socio-
structural base of the former Dienstkiasse120 of the GDR, with its roots firmly embedded in
the SED, and in particular the Aufbaugeneration 121. The milieu is seen as being relatively
closed as well as occupationally and geographically definedl22• These functionaries, in spite
of their relatively rapid adaptation to life in the 'new' Germany, still feel (through joint
experience) bonded together through loss of the pride and prestige that they had attained
before 1989123•
Heinrich Bortfeldt has emphasised how this logically meant that the PDS was initially
viewed very much as an "Auslaufmodell", being essentially regarded as a final resting place
for those disaffected as a result of the abolition of the GDR and a temporary political home
for the politically unsatisfied". Bortfeldt argues that apart from the obvious 'external'
factors like the general acceptance of the party within the federal political system and the
Ausgrenzung (exclusion) that accompanied this as a result of being the successors to the SED,
'internal' factors like a radically shrinking membership, the ageing of the party faithful and
the lack of clear orientation would dictate that the milieu within which the party existed would
soon shrink to the extent that the PDS would cease to be a relevant factor in national
politics 125.
Much as is the case with the protest party approach, there has, therefore, tended to be .
an implicitly short-term nature to this approach, as those who feel particularly attached to the
GDR and part of the milieu that has provided a backbone of PDS support will, by definition,
119 Gero Neugebauer (1995): in Michael Brie, Martin Herzig and Thomas Koch: op. cit. p.Sl.
120 The term Dienstklasse can be traced back to the work of Heike Solga, and her work on the class structures in
East German society. She defines the Dienstklasse as "the privileged, socially self-contained and highly
qualified administrative and operative functionaries that worked in the GDR in the leading positions in the
economy, administration, universities, media, military, mass organisations and smaller SED circles of power
that exerted power within GDR society". See Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten (1997): op. cit. p.871. See also Heike
Solga: 'Die Etablierung einer Klassengesellschaft in der DDR: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit des Postulats sozialer
Gleichheit', in Johannes Huinink et aI, Kollektiv und Eigensinn. Lebensverliiufe in der DDR und danach (Berlin:
Akad. Verlag, 1995), pp.45-89.
121 Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten (1997): ibid. p.871.
122 Markus Klein and Claudio Caballero (1996): op. cit. pp.229-247.
123 Gero Neugebauer and Richard Stoss (1996): op. cit. p.162 and p.2S5. Joachim Raschke: 'SPD und POS.
o Selbstblockade oder Opposition?', in Blatter fUr deutsche und intemationale Politik, Number 12, 1994, pp.14S3-
1464.
124 Heinrich Bortfeldt (1994b): op. cit. p.12S3.
125 Gero Neugebauer: 'Die Position der PDS im Parteiensystem', in PDS Pressedienst (Berlin: Nummer 46, 15
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become fewer and fewer over time. Gordon Smith's 1992 conclusion epitomises much of the
academic viewpoint in the early 1990s, stressing that as soon as 'normal' 126 election rules
were once again invoked, the PDS would cease to achieve federal representation:
Its federal-wide vote (2.4 per cent (in 1990)) as opposed to its share in East
Germany alone (11.1 per cent) means that the PDS either must make significant
advances in West Germany or somehow recover a following in East Germany.
Neither eventuality is realistic':".
Until the PDS successfully returned to the Bundestag and performed above
expectations in the Land elections of 1994, German political scientists held similar opinions.
In the run-up to the 1994 federal election, for example, Manfred Gerner observed that "it is
doubtful that the PDS will find the method or the means to re-enter the Bundestag,,128, while
two years earlier, in 1992, Heinrich Bortfeldt was even more conclusive:
The PDS will not re-enter the Bundestag at the 1994 federal election. It has a
national Wdhlerpotential (potential electorate) of around 1 - 2 per cent and is thus
well on the way towards political Bedeutungslosigkeit (nothingnessj'f".
This judgement has proven misguided. The short-term milieu party approach IS
therefore not sufficient in explaining the success of the PDS as an eastern German regional
party. The PDS is no longer a "living corpse" or "dinosaur,,130 of a previous era, and as such
analysts have slowly begun to discuss the methods, strategies and beliefs that underpin the
party's apparent stabilisation within the German political eystem':". Contrary to initial
projections, the contemporary milieu from which the PDS garners support has broadened and
to an extent metamorphosed to include many who were never in the Dienstklasse of the GDR.
•
November 1996), p.17.
126 To enter the Federal Parliament, political parties have to register at least 5 per cent of the popular vote. The
PDS failed to do this in both 1990 and 1994, although it did straddle the 5 per cent barrier in 1998. It entered the
1990 Parliament as the 5 per cent hurdle was, for this one election, applied to eastern Germany and western
Germany separately. The PDS was, therefore, comfortably able to clear this barrier in the eastern states. In 1994
the PDS once again entered the Federal Parliament, despite registering only 4.4 per cent of the vote. On this
occasion the party made use of an almost forgotten clause allowing parties representation if three of their
candidates were directly elected. The PDS was able to return four directly elected MPs (something it repeated in
1998) from eastern Berlin - so avoiding the necessity of clearing the 5 per cent barrier.
127 Gordon Smith (1992): in (Jordon Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl and Stephen Padgett (eds.): op.
cit. p.100.
128 Manfred Gerner (1994): op. cit. p.59.
129 Heinrich Bortfeldt (1992): op. cit. p.295. Similar analysis was also offered by Patrick Moreau in his
numerous works on the PDS. See for example Patrick Moreau (1992): op. cit. p.459.
130 John Ishiyama: 'Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders and Processes of Democratisation in
Eastern Europe', in Comparative Politics, Volume 27 Number 2,1995, pp.147-166.
131 Henry Krisch: 'Searching for Voters: PDS Mobilisation Strategies, 1994-1997', in Peter Barker (ed.) (1998):
op. cit. p.39.
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This is something that proponents of the milieu party approach did not envisage and cannot
adequately explain. It is for this reason that a regional party approach is applicable - as it
enables the regional nature of the PDS's success to be deconstructed. Furthermore, at the
1998 Federal Election the PDS'ssupport clearly began to level out across eastern Germany,
and the party is no longer a party that relies principally on the GDR stalwarts who
predominate within the party membership. The PDS lost, by a considerable margin, more of
its support in the five eastern Berlin constituencies - the traditional Hochburgen (strongholds)
of the PDS as a result of the large number of former functionaries who live there - than it did
anywhere elsel32• Despite retaining the 4 seats (Direktmandate) that the PDS had won in
1994, the PDS still lost 5.7 per cent (of second votes) in Mitte-Prenzlauer Berg, 5.1 per cent in
Hellersdorf-Marzahn, 5 per cent in Friedrichshain-Lichtenberg and 4.2 per cent in
Hohenschonhausen-Pankow. In the fifth eastern Berlin seat, which Siegfried Scheffler won
for the SPD, the PDS also lost 3.4 per centl33• Indeed, only in Kcpenick-Treptow, with the
high profile candidature of Lothar Bisky, did the PDS manage to increase its proportion of
Erststimmen (by 1.7 per cent)!".
The skilful reinvention of the PDS as a party that represents eastern German interests
stems from the changed nature of its appeal - and as such the party has developed from being
a 'milieu' party into a 'regional' party. A considerable proportion of the eastern German
population consciously view themselves as being 'eastern German' (see chapter three), and as
such have redefined their interests within the context of being members of an eastern German
community. Hence patterns of electoral support in the eastern states since 1998 illustrate that
the 'milieu' party is now an out-dated concept - as the PDS is supported by a broad-base of
eastern Germans. This is as the PDS has embedded itself in the social and political structures
of all eastern German Lander and is perceived by the electorate at large as an advocate of
broad regional interests. The PDS is a child of German unity that has established itself as a
result of a representation gap that eastern Germans widely perceive as existing - owing to the
economic, cultural and institutional implications of the unification processl3S• This is
something that this approach tends to overlook, even if, in its implicit nature, it points in this
(
direction. The milieu is traditionally defined too narrowly, and it is limited to the former
servants and the subjectively disaffected. Laurence H. McFalls is nearer the reality of the
132 The PDS gained votes in every one of the eastern states, except Berlin, where it lost 1.4 per cent and
Mecklenburg West Pomerania where its proportion of the vote (23.6 per cent) remained exactly the same as
1994. The gains ranged from 1 per cent in Brandenburg, to 4.1 per cent in Thuringia. See Infratest Dimap
(.1998):op. cit. p.l80.
133 lnfratest Dimap (1998): ibid. p.64.
134 Infratest DiJ?ap (1998): ibid. p.65.
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situation when he notes that the PDS:
... represents a social process, namely the integration into the social order of the
enlarged Federal Republic of Easterners who wish none the less to have the
validity of their past recognised!".
This milieu approach is, however, useful in highlighting the societal influences evident
behind a vote for the PDS in the early and mid-1990s. The original milieu (of those close to
the aims and power structures of the GDR) within which the PDS existed in the early years is
still in evidence, and is still very supportive of the PDS in terms of actively advocating the
party's aims. But the 'milieu' approach has outlived its usefulness - as the PDS's electoral
base is now based on territorial affinity with eastern Germany. Eastern Germany may, at the
societal level, still be in a process of transformation, as citizens continue to 'find their place'
in the FRG. But at the economic and political levels eastern Germany is a space that is going
to remain fundamentally different from the western states. The milieu has expanded to
theoretically include many more eastern Germans, as the milieu is now based much more on a
fundamental identification with a past life in the GDR and with the territory of the eastern
states. Like Bavaria, the 'political clocks tick differently' in the East, as civil society,
economic imperatives and the nature of political life dictate that Easterners react and view the
structures and imperatives of all aspects of life in the FRG differentlyv". The longer the
perceptions of difference endure, the more likely it is that a sustained societal cleavage will
continue to stabilise between eastern and western Germany, offering the possibility that the
PDS will be able to anchor itself ever deeper into both the eastern German psyche, and the
eastern German political system.
1.3. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Four Approaches To The PDS
As has been already mentioned, no single approach is sufficient, if taken alone, to
throw adequate light on the complex phenomenon that the PDS has become. Elements of all
methods of analysis have some relevance in helping to understand the beliefs, strategy and
development of the PDS. Even those authors who clearly prefer to highlight one approach
over and above the others do not fail to appreciate the complexity of any analysis of the PDS.
Patrick Moreau, for instance, clearly and unambiguously highlights what he believes are
135 David F. Patton (1998): op. cit. p.505.
136 Laurence H. McFalls: 'Political Culture, Partisan Strategies and the PDS: Prospects for an East German
Party', in German Politics and Society, Spring 1995, p.59.
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undemocratic and extremist tendencies, but he does not fail to acknowledge that the PDS
platform and voter base also consists of elements of eastern German interest articulation,
protest and that it effectively articulates issues and problems spawned by the economic,
political and social transformation of the GDR. It is, therefore, beyond debate that elements
of all of the approaches that have been discussed need to be incorporated into any effective
analysis of the party.
The dissatisfaction of many Easterners with the effects of the transformation from a
command to social market economy, as well as continued uncertainty and mistrust of their
new environment, has found expression in a vote for the PDS. Protest has hence been a clear
and obvious fundament of PDS support. Furthermore, the psychological effects of nearly a
decade of social and economic turmoil remain evident today - and the protest party approach
highlights key regionally-specific elements of dissatisfaction that the PDS has successfully
articulated within the political arena. The protest party approach illustrates many of the
psychological beliefs of PDS supporters that supplement those of the bedrock of support that
former GDR functionaries also still provide. And it is indeed correct to presume that both ex-
functionaries and the subjectively disadvantaged are 'protesting' - even if at consciously
different things. The former functionaries are protesting largely at their loss of pride and
privilege, while the subjectively disadvantaged, following the optimism of the unification
years and the promises of 'flourishing landscapes,l38 and economic prosperity, at their failed
hopes and ambitions. It is for this reason that the protest party approach contributes
considerably to understanding how the PDS stabilised itself in eastern Germany throughout
the mid-1990s.
However, it is the contention of this work that the protest party approach alone is not
sufficient to explain the sustained longevity of the PDS. It is inherently short-term in nature,
and assumes that as and when Easterners become 'satisfied' with their economic and political
positions within the FRG then the PDS will disappear from the party political landscape. It
neglects the fact that the PDS is attractive to people across social strata within eastern German
society, and the base of the party's support has grown to be both loyal and reasonably well
distributed. This is not a characteristic of a party that is built on short-term protest,
dissatisfaction and disillusionment - and hence the base of the party's support has to be
137 Jonathan Grix (1999): op. cit.
138 Helmut Kohl used the phrase 'bluhende Landschaften' in an interview on Tagesthemen during the EU
summit in Dublin on the 28April 1990. His exact words were "when all the successful principles of the socia/-
market economy become reality in the former GDR, then, in three or four years, we will have a flourishing
landscape and we will all benefit from it". See Gabi Haeger: Wlichst wirklich zusammen, wasZUi~~'?
Identittit und Wahrnehmung der lntergruppensituation in Ost- und Westdeutschland (Muns ,('"~c'fJT Ver. ~ E
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conceptualised as being more loyal than that of a mere transitory 'protest' phenomenon.
The PDS does still remain a socialist party. Both its programme and ideological
rhetoric leave no doubt that the PDS is striving to achieve a society that is not based on
capitalist structures. While accepting the considerable ideological diversity in evidence
across the PDS, ranging from the reformed-Stalinists and die-hard Communists in the KPF, to
the reforming leadership around Gregor Gysi, this approach highlights the continued attempts
at exhorting radical societal change at the national level. It also illustrates the necessity of an
assessment by the PDS of the party's past and for this to be adapted into the PDS's concept of
what a future (socialist) Germany would look like.
The fundamental failing of the socialist party approach is that it does not reflect the
reality of political competition in the FRG. The PDS is not an all-German party, and it pas
manifestly failed to build an electoral base in the western states - therefore it is clear that the
political success of the PDS in the eastern states is based on some sort of regional appeal.
This appeal certainly has socialist elements to it, but to get to the bottom of exactly what this
is, one must adopt an approach that takes into consideration the values, culture, identity and
historical specificity of eastern Germans. The PDS has not been able to take on the mantle of
the political left in western Germany because it has no roots in the western states. In the
western states the SPD effectively channels socialist sentiments into its political activities,
whereas the territorial uniqueness of the PDS enables it to fulfil a unique political functions
(based on its territorial specificity) in eastern Germany. Its election results in the West reveal
that it has not established itself in any state, and, one would presume, ten years of persistent
failure are unlikely to be reversed in the future.
The anti-system approach is useful at highlighting the problems that sections of the
PDS membership have in coming to terms with the political, social and economic realities of
the FRG. B~t proponents of this approach overlook the integrative role that the PDS plays in
ensuring that left-wing ideologues are not cut off from the political system. Furthermore, the
PDS has proven itself capable of governing at the local level, and has been a stable party in
the unusual governing constellations in Saxony Anhalt and Mecklenburg West Pomerania - so
much so that they are frequently seen as possible models for other eastern Lander. Its record
at the micro-levels of eastern German politics reveal that it is perfectly capable of
sachorientierte political activity. Not only has the PDS been an efficient oppositional force, it
has also indicated that it can be a constructive and dependable force within governmental
structures.
Univ. Diss.,1998), p.l.
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The PDS enables those East Germans who are never likely to come to terms with life
in a capitalist society to find a place to vent their dissatisfactions. Yet, the party has (as much
as is possible) jettisoned its Stalinist baggage, and while requiring more reform before it can
be accepted as 'normal' in the sense that the other parties are, any recognition of the PDS as a
constitution threatening movement is exaggerated. The unsavoury elements within the PDS
are rich contributors to the pluralist structure ofPDS internal party democracy - but in no way
do they dictate policy andlor PDS activity at the federal, regional or communal level. At the .
micro-political level politics in the eastern states continues to function through personal
interaction - and talk of PDS representatives wanting to overthrow the capitalist system
fundamentally misunderstands both the nature of communal politics and the undeniable
contribution that PDS politicians make at this level (see section 4.8.).
The milieu party approach comes closest to conceptualising the east-west divide
evident in Germany today, although this divide is viewed as one that will disintegrate as and
when the East 'catches up' and the former functionaries of the GDR die out. The different
processes of socialisation within East and West Germany are not seen as having any long-
term effects on the political make-up of party competition within Germany. The
transformation process, it is contended, will eventually come to an end - and at this point
eastern German interests will be comparable with those of western Germans. There will be,
therefore, no function for a regional party in eastern Germany to fulfil. This work contests
this train of thought. ' The process of identity and cleavage formation that have taken place
since 1989, based on the transformation process and the socialist legacy of the GDR have
fundamentally changed the parameters of electoral competition in the new Lander (see
chapters two and three). Hence while the milieu approach correctly stresses the existence of a
cultural community in eastern Germany, it undervalues the importance of an eastern German-
wide specific subculture to PDS success as well as the rapid rise of an eastern German
identity. The analysis offered by proponents of this approach therefore only goes some way
towards explaining the cleavage divide - as it underestimates the strength and pervasiveness
of the regional identity that has stabilised in the East. The PDS has adopted ideological and
cultural language to substantiate their already strong regional anchorage - and it is these
arguments that have taken hold within the eastern electorate.
1.4. Eastern German Volkspartei?
The four approaches discussed above indicate that a vacuum exists within the present
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literature as little work has been done on the role of the PDS as a regional party. Yet it is this
approach which offers the greatest insight into explaining the PDS's longevity. In spite of the
tendency to view the PDS as a transitory phenomenon, there has none the less been talk by
some commentators, as well as in the popular press, of the PDS being an eastern German
Volkspartei (peoples party)139.
The concept of the Volkspartei was initially developed as an ideal type in the 1960s by
Otto Kirchheimer'f". The Volkspartei aimed to maximise electoral potential over and above
facilitating processes of social integration and direct interest articulation. In order to do this
the ideological platforms of Volksparteien were perceived as being broader than had
previously been the case as they attempted to transcend traditional economic, religious and
territorial divides in order to widen their electoral appeal and stress national interests. These
developments were, however, seen as inevitably leading to a weakening of the Volkspartei IS
ability to perform some of the traditional functions that parties have been ascribed: namely, to
act as agents of political integration, to democratically mediate between the institutions of the
state and society at large, to conceptualise and articulate particular interests, to formulate
policy, to co-ordinate relations between the executive and legislature and to recruit elites!".
The evolution of political competition in the 1970s and 1980s did appear to vindicate
Kirchheimer's theory, as larger, ideologically broader, parties developed in a number of West
European polities. West Germany was no different to other European states in this regard as
the CDU/CSU and SPD embraced broad alliances of voters and weakened their alignments
with class interests and distinct ideologies'V, The cnu was the first party to move along this
path in the late 1950s as it broadened its profile to towards an inter-denominational and inter-
class platform. The CDU stressed the broad concepts of social responsibility and a clear
commitment to the social-market economy", With the adoption of the Godesberg
Programme of 1959 the SPD chose to follow suit, abandoning its socialist doctrine in an
attempt to remain competitive with the CDU.
139 Michael Brie, in his thoughtful work of 1995, was the first to postulate that the PDS had developed into an
eastern German Volkspartei. See Michael Brie: 'Das politische Projekt der PDS - eine unmogliche Moglichkeit'
in Michael Brie, Martin Herzig and Thomas Koch (eds.) (1995): op. cit. pp.9-38. For an English language
extension of this hypothesis see Joanna Mckay: 'The Wall in the Ballot Box'. in German Politics, Volume 5
Number 2, August 1996, pp.276-291. For an example of politicians (ofa11 political persuasions) describing the
PDS as an eastern German Volkspartei see Johannes Leithauser: 'Inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung mit falschen
Parolen', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 October 1999, p.2. .
t40 Otto Kirchheimer: 'The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems' in Joseph La Polombara
and Myron Weiner (ed.): Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966), pp.l77 -200.
t41 Alan Ware: Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
t42 Stephen Padgett and Tony Burkett: Political Parties and Elections in Western Germany: The Search for a
~fw Stability (~ondon: C.Hurst.& Company, 1986), p.2.
Gordon Smith (1992): op. cit, p.79. .
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The apparent dominance of the political process by the CDU/CSU and the SPD,
coupled with the 5 per cent hurdle for national elections, tended to mean a squeezing out of
smaller parties, and throughout the 1960s (from the 1961 election), 1970s and most of the
1980s (unti11987) only three parties remained in the Bundestag. In recent years, however, it
has become clear that the Volksparteien are not in a position to extinguish political opponents,
and since the rise of the Greens in particular their dominance has come under threat for a
number of reasons!". But the ability of the CDU/CSU and the SPD to appeal to a broad base
of socially diverse voters that spans the political spectrum continues to lead to them being
branded, both in the academic and non-academic discourse, as Volksparteien.
The hypothesis that the PDS is an eastern German Volkspartei has been forwarded
since the mid-1990s. It gained further credence following the 1999 Berlin election, when the
PDS registered 39 per cent of the vote in the eastern parts of the city145.Wayne C. Thompson
adds that the PDS is indeed an eastern German Volkspartei "in the sense that it integrates
diverse groups of voters" to its cause''", while various eastern German politicians - from all
parts of the political spectrum - have articulated similar sentiments. East Berlin, even with its
high concentration of old SED functionaries and so-called 'unification losers', is an example
of this, as these people alone do not constitute the 39 per cent of the electorate who chose to
vote for the PDS in 1999. East Berliners of all ages and from all social strata have voted for
the party147.
The PDS's strong electoral performances in 1994 and 1998 were "largely due to the
party's ability to present itself as the only authentic advocate 0/ East German interests" and
"to provide East Germans with a sense 0/identity,,148- and it is this key political role that has
enabled the PDS to stabilise itself in the political system. The PDS is a cross-class (see tables
1 and 2) party that mobilises support from all sectors of the eastern German populace.
Although it struggles to convince citizens with religious backgrounds to support it, the fact
144 These include increased levels of electoral volatility, patterns of electoral dealignment, declining levels of
partisan identification and the fragmentation of party systems. For a discussion of the challenges to Volkspartei
dominance see Stephen Padgett: 'Introduction', in Stephen Padgett (ed.): Parties and Party Systems in the New
Germany (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), p.4. See also Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck
(eds.): Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984).
145 The POS was able to register 42 per cent of the first votes polled in the eastern districts of Berlin, with the
CDU polling 28.4 per cent and the SPD 19.3 per cent. Although the PDS polled slightly less of the second votes
(39.5 per cent), it still remained clearly ahead of both the COU (26.9 per cent) and the SPO (17.8 per cent). See
http://www.statistik-berlin.de/wahlen
146 Wayne C. Thompson (1995): op. cit. p.446.
147 In 1995, the POS was able to poll at least 30 per cent of the votes from within all age groups and social strata
in eastern Berlin. The POS fared worst in the women over 60 age-category, where it polled 30.7 per cent of the
vote. It did best in the women 35-44 age group, where it received 41.5 per cent of the vote. See Joanna McKay
(1996), op. cit.
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that far fewer eastern Germans are active Christians ensures that the POS is not fundamentally
weakened by this electoral hindrance.
The political activities of the SPO and the COU have inadvertently re-enforced the
feeling that the POS is the only party that can faithfully be trusted to look after eastern
German interests. The COU, following the broken promises of the pre- and post-unification
period, gradually lost much of its political credibility in the East, and by 1998 was viewed
with scepticism and mistrust by large sections of the eastern German electorate 149. As the
party that was in power at the federal level until 1998, the CDU was also seen as the party that
was responsible for the economic melt-down experienced in the eastern states - and it
ultimately paid the price with a crushing electoral defeat in September 1998.
But the SPO, after its initial failure to create an electoral base in eastern Germany in
the early 1990s, took a number of years to gain political credibility, and even following the
federal election victory of September 1998 the party soon plunged into electoral crisis in the
East as a result of a number of heavy Landtagswahl defeats in 1999. Whether the SPD
remains a Volkspartei in the eastern states is, as a result of its very weak organisational basis
of poor showings in a number of recent state elections, in itself an issue of contention. The
SPO remains a party that is perceived as having few policies that can transform the economic
situation in the East, and it is widely regarded as a western German party that is unable to
bridge the gap between its western German strongholds and the very different eastern German
political territory.
Neither the CDU nor the SPD are perceived in the eastern states as being parties who
cater for eastern German interests: whether these be in terms of regenerating the eastern
German economic base, defending the rights of eastern German citizens in united Germany or
articulating eastern German historical specificity. The POS is able to fulfil this role on
account of its unique heritage, its regional strength and its anchorage in eastern German
societal structures and organisations. While it is also undoubtedly true that a significant
proportion of eastern Germans will never support the PDS on account of its past as the SED
and its strong left-wing beliefs, it is just as clear that the PDS is the only party that serves the
specifically eastern German cultural self-appreciation. Jens Bastian subsequently notes that it
is possible to see where the hypocrisy of the western parties has helped sow the seeds of PDS
success'j", Former members of the Blockjloten151 were freely and easily incorporated into the
148 H Gans- eorg Betz and Helga A. Welsh (1995): op. cit. p.93.
149 Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit.
ISO Jens Bastian (1995): op. cit. plOO.
151 The Blockfloten parties included the CDU and the LDPD (the East German version of the FOP), and acted as
nominally independent parties, that in reality were very much in subservience to the SED.
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CDU and FDP, while members of the PDS were openly perceived as being unable to change
or adapt to the new political environment. While the western parties continue to stress the
continuities with the SED, the PDS has come, in the eastern states, to be regarded as the
representative of eastern Germans'j", Former civil rights activist Jens Reich helps further
highlight this by observing that no other party offers as many services that assist eastern
Germans in comprehending the mass of laws and regulations in the FRG, particularly as many
of its members are retired and have the time to respond to other people's worries and
concerns I53. All these factors broaden the electoral appeal of the PDS and enable it to appeal
to a broad spectrum of the eastern German electorate.
Evidence of double standards and the perception that Easterners should be
unreservedly grateful for unification has backfired in election campaigns, where the PDS has
been able to gamer votes from those who would otherwise not have felt such sympathy
towards the partylS4. Konrad Jarausch has succinctly observed that "many eastern Germans
feel deprived of their personal as well as of their collective past"IS5 and as a consequence
have opted for the one defender of their pasts that is available to them.
This provides evidence of how regional and nationalist parties can win over certain
groups of people who they can relatively easily claim to represent. Support can be retained
for as long as the group perceives itself to be threatened, mistreated or simply different,
regardless of whether the party actually has a clear and coherent strategy. The peripheral
position of eastern Germany within the FRG has ensured that eastern German cultural values
have been subject to a persistent battering by those held by western Germans (see section
2.3.2. for further discussion of this). In terms of political representation, the party system in
the eastern states is broader as a party (the PDS) represents eastern German uniqueness within
the political process. This is in contrast to the initial post-1990 reactions that perceived the
PDS as being a party for those which simply mourn the passing of the GDR. The fundaments
of political competition are different in the East, allowing specific territorial mobilisation to
occur. A considerable amount of work has been conducted into the nature of political
competition in eastern Germany. . Stephen Padgett has highlighted four particular
characteristics of eastern German political uniqueness. These all help to illustrate how the
152 Erich Schreck: 'Die PDS in der Parteienlandschaft', in Deutschland Archiv, March 1996, pp.471-472.
153 Jens Reich: 'Wo trotz und Mitleid sich verbunden', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 September 1994,
f·35. .
S4 Jurgen W. Falter and Markus Klein (1994): op. cit.
ISS Konrad H. Jarausch: 'The German Democratic Republic as History in United Germany: Reflections on
Public Debate and Academic Controversy', in German Politics and Society, Volume 15 Number 2, Summer
1997, p.42.
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POS has stabilised itself on the eastern German political stage!". These characteristics are:
1. the weakness of socially structured partisanship - resulting 10 electoral
volatility in eastern Germany
2. a preference for total opposition rather than moderate opposition
3. the importance of personalities
4. the influence of subjective factors
Factor one is certainly true for the other political parties in eastern Germany - but not
for the POS157.While many voters float between COU and SPO, and the Alliance 90/Greens
and the FOP are virtually non-existent, the POS's electorate does remain loyal and stable (see
section 4.8.). This is as strong alignments have been built up between the POS and its
followers, based on the POS's Easternness and many voters self-identification with eastern
Germany. Hence, the cross-cutting regional divide between eastern and western Germany
appears more politically salient in the eastern states than other traditional cleavages like class
or confession. The absence of clear and sustained partisan alignments in the East is
emphasised by the election results of the COU and SPO (see appendix) which have varied
greatly from state to state and over time. The POS's electorate, however, is the most stable
across time and place, of any of the parties in eastern Germany today. Eckhard Jesse
observed after the 1998 Federal Election that the POS is becoming "more a milieu party and
less a protest party,,158 - yet while Jesse consciously uses the term milieu, the phenomenon
that he is in fact talking about is the development of the POS into a regional party. As was
illustrated earlier, the POS is supported by a broad cross-section of the eastern German
electorate, and it has become ever more deeply rooted within eastern German society and
political life. Hence it is the contention of this work that the 'milieu' now encompasses all of
eastern Germany, and not just those who were particularly attached to the GOR - and as such
the concept 'milieu' it in itself out of date, as the POS has simply developed into a party
articulating regionally distinct interests and 'differentness'.
There is little doubt that the other three factors Padgett mentions (a preference for total
opposition, the importance of personalities and the influence of subjective factors) strongly
IS6 Stephen Padgett: 'Superwahljahr in the new Lander: Polarisation in an Open Political Market', in German
Politics, Volume 4 Number 2, August 1995, pp.75.95.
IS7 See the election reports published by both Infratest Dimap and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen for statistical
evidence of this.
IS8 Eckhard Jesse: 'Politische Studien - Zeitgesprach zum Ausgang der Bundestagswahl 1998', in Politische
Studien, Volume 362, NovemberlDecember 1998, p.ll.
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help the PDS defend self-perceived eastern German interests. While opposition to 'western'
parties is strong, the PDS will garner support as the party that cares for the interests and
worries of eastern Germans (see chapters four and five)159. It is argued that only when and if
western German parties become all-German parties (a process that remains anything but
certain) will the PDS consequently prove superfluous.
The importance of personalities in eastern German politics is also widely accepted, as
the political successes of Manfred Stolpe (SPD) in Brandenburg and Kurt Biedenkopf (CDU)
in Saxony illustrate. And the PDS has also benefited from possessing one of the most
enigmatic personalities in German political life - Gregor Gysi. He remains, in spite of his
imminent withdrawal from the political scene, the most visible and articulate of the PDS's
politicians, and he has been "indispensable to PDS success". His rise to power was
astronomically quick, and as the Berlin Wall came down he moved swiftly from the lower
reaches of the SED hierarchy to be PDS party leader by late 1989. It is down to his
"compelling personality''t'", as well as to the reformers around him, that the PDS has been
able to sail a difficult course between continuity with its past, and change to be able to adapt
to future requirements (see section 4.6. for more analysis of the importance of Gysi's
, leadership to the PDS, as well as a discussion of the role of other leading figures within the
party).
The final factor that distinguishes the eastern German political landscape from that in
the west of the country, the influence of subjective factors, has been crucial in the rise and
I
stabilisation of the PDS in the German political landscape. The PDS has proved masterful at
defending elements from everyday life in the GDR, as well as other forms of subjective
dissatisfaction and unhappiness with the transformation process. The much vaunted rise of
'Ostalgie' has further strengthened the PDS's role as an instrument for East Germans enabling
them to demonstrate their unwillingness to be treated as "Deutscher zweiter Klasse" (or
second class Germans'?') and to have to suffer high unemployment and social deprivation on
a scale unparalleled in the GDR (see chapter three).
The success of the PDS as an advocate of eastern German uniqueness did, on one
159 Claudia Ritter: 'Identitatspolitik in Ostdeutschland', in ldentitiiten in Europa. Welt Trends. Internationale
Politik und Vergleichende Studien, Nummer IS, Sommer 1997, p.72. .
160 Ann L. Phillips: •An Island of Stability - The German Political Party System and the Elections of 1994', in
West European Politics, Special Issue, July 1995, p.226. .
, 161 A 1997 survey conducted by the Bielefelder Meinungsforschungsinstitut Ernnid illustrated that a third of
eastern Germans still regarded themselves as second class citizens in the Federal Republic. Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 1997, p.4. See also Klaus Schroder: 'Die blockierte Vereinigung:
Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der Deutschen in Ost und West', in Gegenwartskunde, 3/1992, pp.299-300.
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occasion, lead to calls from within the party for the PDS to concentrate on acting primarily as
a representative of eastern interests within the structure of a left of centre alliancel'". As a
result of the consistent bedrock of eastern German support, Christine Ostrowski, a PDS
member of the Bundestag from Saxony'", and Ronald Weckesser (the leader of the PDS on
Dresden's city council) have, in a document that has become known as the 'Letter from
Saxony', presented a strong critique for abandoning the party's present strategy of attempting
to grow into a 'national' rather than a 'regional' party, and for completely reassessing the
PDS's raison d'etre, Ostrowski and Weckesser therefore conceptualised the approach that
this work pursues - that the PDS is successful as it articulates regional interests in the political
arena - although they were unfortunately unable or willing to further their ideas over and
above their initial contribution in 1996.
They claimed that what the PDS understands by the term socialism "has to be defined
by the experiences and beliefs of its millions of voters in the former GDR"164. They have
called bluntly for the PDS to be an eastern German people's party, as all attempts to broaden
the party's electoral base into western Germany have clearly failed "as there is no place in the
political landscape for a western version of the PDS ... as the fact that the PDS results in the
west lie below even the DKP's clearly illustrates,,16s. Ostrowski and Weckesser see the
strength of the PDS in its representative function in the eastern states, and subsequently stress
the PDS' s successful articulation of eastern German interests. They state that the CSU could
be used as a strategic model for the PDS to seek to emulate, as, Ostrowski and Weckesser
maintain, as, as a leftist, regional party the PDS may be able to exert considerably more
influence on the national (one presumes SPD-Ied) Govemment'P",
Despite the broad and often biting criticism from within the party that these comments
drewl67, it is clear that Ostrowski and Weckesser are offering a coherent theoretical approach
162 For more analysis of the place of the PDS within possible centre-left alliances see Nick Hubble: 'The PDS in
Erfurt and the Erfurter Erklarung', in Peter Barker (ed.) (1998): pp.78-93.
163 Christine Ostrowski was a member of the Bundestag until December 1990. and once again from September
1998 onwards. Between 1990 and 1998 she was a member of the Saxony state parliament. She is also
Stadtvorsitzende of the PDS in Dresden. '
164 Ostrowski and Weckesser also observe that the failure of the westward expansion does not surprise them as
those who associate themselves with the PDS in the western states are ideological left-wing radicals. and have
nothing whatsoever in common with the successful communal politicians who are the face of the PDS in the
eastern states. See Christine Ostrowski and Ronald Weckesser: 'FUr einen eigenen Weg statt 'links von der
SPD..••in Neues Deutschland. 8 May 1996. pS. See also http://www.christine-ostrowskLde/aktuelles.htm Page
7.
165 Christine Ostrowski and Ronald Weckesser (1996): ibid. p.S.
166 Christine Ostrowski and Ronald Weckesser (1996): ibid. p.S.
167 Following the publication of the Letter on the 8th of May. the pages of Neues Deutschland were full of
commentaries, letters and other contributions denouncing Ostrowski and Weckesser for attempting to undermine
the PDS's proposed expansion westwards. PDS politicians were also quick to rubbish the Letter (and its
authors) in the most public of fashions. Heiko Hilker and Uwe Adamczyk, two MdLs from Saxony, claimed that
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that is much under researched'f'. Their calls for a re-evaluation of the political left in eastern
Germany may be unpalatable for the PDS while they survive as a result of other influences,
but the continued failure of the PDS's Westausdehnung indicates that sooner or later the party
is going to have to admit that in the old states in remains a fish out of water, The PDS is
successful in the East because of what it is - a regional advocate of territorial specificity.
Parties to the left of the SPD (which is what the PDS attempts to profile itself as in the
western states) have never been able to build a firm footing in western Germany - and
Ostrowski and Weckesser recognise the long-term reality - that the PDS is unlikely to buck
this trend. This research aims to emphasise that the logic behind their arguments is correct,
and that, if the PDS is regarded as a regional party like other EUropean regional parties, one is
able to understand, through the articulation of territorially unique political sentiment, how the
party has reached where it is today.
None the less, the sound base of PDS support that exists in eastern Germany cannot be
regarded as solid enough to register the 20+ per cent of the vote in the East that is necessary
to achieve Bundestag representation, let alone true Volkspartei status. If the 5 per cent hurdle
is to be rendered meaningless for the PDS, then it needs to increase its share of the vote in the
eastern states to above the 30 per cent mark. This explains the continued efforts of the
reformist leadership to appeal to both younger voters (in contrast to the ageing membership),
the middle classes (and particularly small businessmen) and to expand into the western part of
the country. At the moment, and for the foreseeable future, the PDS needs every single vote it
can get, so as to clear the 5 per cent barrier. But long-term, the prospects of the PDS
appealing to Westerners remains slim.
1.5. The Regional Party Approach
The discussion above illustrates that although elements of all four of the traditional
Ostrowski instinctively sought media attention and as such would be overjoyed that she was in the political
limelight. Claudia Gohde, a member of the PDS Executive with responsibilities for the western state
organisations (Landesverblinde), was struck by the arrogance of Ostrowski in claiming that western members of
the POS were simply left-wing ideologues, while Angela Marquardt claimed that she personally had much more
in common with many western members of the PDS than she did with Ostrowski. For more evidence of
criticism of the Letter see 'Aufausgelatschten Wegen etablierter Parteien', in Neues Deutschland, 9 May 1996,
. 3
f68' Neues Deutschland, despite its staunch willingness to support the POS's campaign to expand westwards, has
also, on occasions, acknowledged that it is in the East where the POS has the potential to make a genuine impact
on German politics - therefore tacitly accepting the assumptions made by Ostrowksi and Weckesser. As Neues
Deutschland observed on the 9th of January 1996, "a new identity exists in the East ... characterised by a
conscious opposition to the arrogance of western German politicians ... and as a consequence the PDS is still
yet to maximise its electoral potential in the eastern states", See Neues Deutschland, 9th January 1996, p.1.
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approaches that are generally employed when discussing the PDS throw some light on the
reasons for the party's success, none has the capacity to see the PDS as anything other than a
short-medium term phenomenon. This is as they neglect the importance of eastern German
uniqueness and the success that the PDS has had in articulating this within the political arena.
They are not able to conceptualise the existence of a clear set of eastern German values,
preferences and attitudes that the PDS has mobilised into its clear and distinct eastern German
political platform. The approaches do much to highlight the mechanics behind votes for the
PDS but they make no attempt to conceptualise the PDS's key strength at a broader level: its
regional heritage and its ability to articulate eastern German interests and eastern German
identity within the political process. Discussion of the PDS as an eastern German Volkspartei
highlights that, regardless of whether the PDS has actually achieved true Volkspartei status'?",
the nature ofPDS support is broad, heterogeneous and almost exclusively regional in nature.
Hence this work adopts an approach that enables a discussion of the regional nature of
the PDS's success to be discussed without neglecting the valuable points that authors who
have adopted other approaches have also made. This thesis will, therefore, build on the very
tentative initial steps that the two PDS politicians from Saxony, Christine Ostrowski and
Ronald Weckesser, suggested for the party in 1996.
During the 1990s it became clear that broader sections of the eastern German
electorate were voting for the PDS over and above those who were blatantly protesting or who
stemmed from the ideological 'milieu' that is traditionally close to the party. As Koch-
Baumgarten has observed:
the PDS is an expression of the 'east-west' conflict as a conflict of values, it is not
the point of attraction for those critical of capitalism, but rather those critical of
western culture and modernisation!",
The support base of the PDS is subsequently characterised more by its position
towards the West than any zest for reform or through overt anti-capitalism, although these two
factors are unquestionably evident in the PDS'g platform'?'. This is a common trait amongst
regional parties, as they successfully articulate the sentiments of an 'in' group to act
politically against the 'out' group (see chapter two).
The PDS flourishes in an 'eastern German' community that needs political
representation at the local, regional and national level. The PDS responds to this by openly
169 The term Volkspartei is discussed in greater detail on pages 53-54.
170 Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten (1997): op. cit. p.872.
171 Gero Neugebauer and Richard St()SS(1996): op. cit.
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campaigning on issues that are close to eastern German hearts - such as unemployment, social
security, non-discrimination on the grounds of their past and/or the particular difficulties that
remain original to an eastern German who has experienced the GDR as well as the complex
transitional process from socialism to capitalism (see, chapters four and five). Only by
invoking a regional approach can one adequately unpack the reasons why the PDS,
entrenched as it is in eastern Germany, is able to voice these regionally salient attitudes within
the political process, as it is the territorial anchorage of the party that enables it to successfully
mobilise support in the political arena.
In order to explore this approach properly, this thesis creates an analytical framework
(a typology of regional parties) that enables comparisons of regional parties to be made - and
the PDS subsequently to be placed within this context cross-national context. This will enable
the core hypothesis of this work to be tested by highlighting the similarities between the
PDS's methods and motives and those of other territorially restricted political parties. The
PDS clearly remains a party that is regionally restricted in its successes, and, as it continues to
receive support form all social strata in eastern Germany, is thriving across the new Lander.
The fundamental restructuring of electoral competition within (eastern) Germany since 1989
has come about as a result of the differing life experiences and socialisation processes
experienced by eastern and western Germans. A cross-cutting territorial cleavage divide
exists as a result between Germans of East and West. The strength and organisation of the
'western' parties has not prevented a regionally concentrated party from taking root, and
making political capital from the economic, social, cultural and political deficits that eastern
Germans have experienced post-1989. A societal cleavage divide between the new and old
federal states is at the base of this, and it is this development that has launched the processes
of identity creation that are analysed in chapter three. In order to illustrate this, this thesis will
introduce a two-part analytical framework in chapter two, emphasising how parties that are
regionally restricted are successful. It will then be shown in later chapters that the PDS
appreciates the uniqueness of political competition in the eastern states, and as such mobilises
support as an articulator of eastern German specificity. The typology will illustrate that by
discussing other regional parties, and the methods and approaches that they employ, one can
understand exactly how the PDS has mobilised regional political support. The PDS, this work
contends, can, and does, mobilise support in eastern Germany as a result of a territorial
cleavage - as other regional parties do. This throws more light not just on the reasons behind
the success of the PDS, but also on the very nature of territorial support for regional' political
parties in general. It will be hoped that the conclusions that this works draws will enable
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further research to be conducted on the nature of regional party support in nation-states from a
comparative perspective. The factors within this work's analytical framework illustrate how
such a territorial divide enables regional parties to find a role for themselves within the
political system of a given nation-state. It is for this reason that chapter two carries the
discussion on by introducing the analytical framework of a typology of regional parties.
1.6. Regional Party Success in Germany: The CSU - A Contrast and a Comparison
This work also refers to the position of Germany's other explicitly regional party - the
Christian Social Union in Bavaria. The CSU has moulded itself into 'Bavaria's political
party', and achieves levels of voter support that remain pipe-dreams to all other political
parties. The CSU consistently polls over 50 per cent of the vote in Bavaria (and in the 1970s,
under the charismatic leadership of Franz-Josef Strauss, at times over 60 per cent of the vote)
and has consequently dominated Bavarian politics since the Second World War. This
ensures, in the words of Peter James, that the outstanding feature of Bavarian elections still
remains the fact that everyone actually knows the result well in advancel72• Furthermore, the
CSU's Bavarian dominance is coupled with considerable influence at the federal level as the
sister party of the CDU.
The CSU does not stand for election in any other part of Germany. It is therefore
another German regional party. The case of the CSU is of particular interest to this thesis as it
offers a specifically German example of territorial political mobilisation. The CSU
understands the uniquely conservative yet modem political identification that many Bavarians
appear to possess, and aggressively represents this within the political arena. It understands
the uniqueness of 'Bavarianism' and skilfully shapes its political package so that it is often
seen as encapsulating the very essence of Bavarian exceptionalism 173. The CSU has managed.
to become popularly accepted as the political representation of Bavaria. Bavaria is, in the
words of Alf Mintzel, a "CSU-Staat,,174. For this reason a discussion both of the nature of
Bavarian identity and the CSU's political mobilisation of this offers a revealing insight into
the way that PDS mobilises eastern German identification within the eastern German political
sub-system.
172 Peter James: 'The 1998 Bavarian State Election', in Representation, Volume 36 Number 1, Spring 1999,
fi;7Even the SPD in Bavaria calls itself the 'Bavarian SPO', illustrating how prominent 'Bavarianism' is within
Bavarian political, social and cultural life.
174 AlfMintzel: 'Regionale politische Traditionen und CSV-Hegemonie in Bayern', in Dieter Oberndorfer and
Karl Schmitt: Parteien und regionale Traditionen in der Bundesr~publik Deutschland (Berlin: Duncker and
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The CSU achieved this dominant position by forging a middle way between traditional
'Bayerntreue' ('Bavarian patriotism') and a necessary opening up and modernisation of the
Free State175• This ensured that it was able to outflank the more conservative and reactionary
Bayernpartei (BP) in the 1950s and 1960s. The BP eventually also failed in its attempts to
represent the agrarian, traditional interests of Altbayem, and consequently became ever less
able to accept the processes of modernisation and secularisation that Bavaria was concurrently
undergoing 176.
After extinguishing the threat of the BP the CSU proceeded to become electorally
dominant across all of Bavaria. It did this by becoming a broad-based regional Volkspartei
representing economic modernisation and wealth as well as traditional, conservative Bavarian
valuesl77• The CSU was able to formulate a social pact between big industrial companies and
the middle-classes allowing a stabilisation and preservation of the Bavarian social and
political system on conservative premiees!".
This work will not analyse the political position and development of the CSU in detail.
What it will do, however, is show how the CSU articulates regionally specific political and
cultural sentiment in both the regional and national political arenas. The CSU represents, and
indeed for many is considered to be a part of, their identity as Bavarians. The typology that is
developed in the section 2.4. is, therefore, applied briefly to the case of Bavaria and the CSU
in order to demonstrate the processes of territorial identity creation and their political
articulation, that take place in another part of Germany. This illustrates that the PDS is not
unique in articulating regional sentiment in the national political arenas - as the CSU has
successfully performed the exact same function for a number of years in Bavaria.
1.7. Methods and Sources for Analysing the PDS as an Eastern German Regional Party
Having established that a comprehensive discussion of the PDS as an eastern German
regional party is lacking, this work will construct a typology of regional parties in the
Humboldt, 1991), p.125.
I7S AlfMintzel (1991): ibid. p.lSO.
176 This process was none the less slow and gradual, and it was only after 1966 that the BP was finally and
irreversibly defeated by the CSU. See Alf Mintzel: Geschichte der CSU: Bin Oberblick (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977), pp.53-57. See also Alf Mintzel: 'Die Bauempartei', in Richard Stoss (Hrsg.):
Parteienhandbuch. Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980 Band 1, AUD his EFP (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), pp.395-489.
177 The best and most detailed analysis of the CSU's development and position within the German polity has
come from Alf Mintzel, For a particularly comprehensive account see Alf Mintzel: Die CSU-Hegemonie in
Bayern: Strategie und Erfolg, Gewinner und Verlierer (Passau: Wiss.- VerI. Rothe, 1998).
178 Alf Mintzel: 'The Christian-Social Union in Bavaria: Analytical Notes on its Development, Role and
Success', in Max Kaase and Klaus von Beyme (eds.): Elections and Parties (London: Sage, 1978), p.200.
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democratic world, before placing the PDS within the context of this 'ideal type'. An ideal
type is a vehicle that brings together the key elements of a particular phenornenon'Y, It
assists in making contrasts and comparisons of otherwise exceedingly complex and multi-
faceted societal entities 180. Existing regional parties exhibit very different characteristics,
some of which appear to contradict those of other regional parties - but by constructing a
typology of these parties, one can illustrate the aspects of their behaviour that are broadly
comparable, as well as empirically testable!". The typology is not, however, intended to
throw light on the relationships between variables. It is an abstraction of reality that posits the
key determinants of success - but in terms of weighting the importance of each variable it has
no explanatory capacity. Hence the ideal type is abstract rather than normative.
The typology that is created in this work is, therefore, an attempt at highlighting the
differing variables that have led to regional parties establishing a presence in a
national/regional polity. The aim is to highlight the conditions for success and the factors that
lead to sustained regional party existence182•
The first part of the typology is employed in chapter three. This allows the similarities
in the process of identity creation that has taken place in eastern Germany to be placed in the
context of similar processes that have taken place in other regions. Such processes of identity
creation can only be placed in their proper context by analysing the differences that exist in all
of the German state (Le. in eastern and western Germany) - hence an evaluation of both the
attitudes and values of Westerners and Easterners needs to take place. Within the context of
the typology, opinion poll data provides the backbone of this analysis. Since 1989 there have
been a multitude of studies on the attitudes of eastern Germans. In order to limit the risk of
methodological bias, data from the Allensbacher Institut for Demoskopie, TNS-Emnid, ISDA
and Infratest Dimap is applied183• These four public opinion research institutes provide a
broad cross-section of data on the values, attitudes and opinions of Easterners and Westerners.
They enable fundamental differences to be highlighted in terms of identities, value structures
179 See Fritz Ringer: Max Weber's Methodology. The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences
(Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.ll 0-121.
180 Jonathan Grix: An Introduction to Doctoral Studies in the Social Sciences (Birmingham: Discussion Papers
in German Studies, The University of Birmingham, Number 5, 2000), p.13.
181 Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill and Bryan S. Turner (eds.): The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology
(Middlesex: Penguin, 1994), p.l04.
182 Fritz Ringer (1997): op. cit. p.l l l.
183 As with most analysis that is based on survey data, two cautionary notes must be sounded. Firstly, the
answers given may not truly reflect the opinions of the respondent, as it is conceivable that, for one of a plethora
of possible reasons, respondents may wish to hide their true opinions. The formulation of the question is also of
great importance as responses can be significantly skewed if questions are poorly worded. It is for this reason
that a large base of survey data has been taken into consideration and, notwithstanding these difficulties, it is
clear that significant trends in this data do still remain clearly identifiable.
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and attitude orientations in both eastern and western Germany. There is a rich body of data
on the attitudes of Germans in both parts of the country, as well as a large amount of
secondary literature that successfully analyses the relevance of this for the wider political and
social environment in eastern Germany. This work draws on the findings of these studies to
illustrate how the eastern Trotzidentitdt has become embedded in the eastern German psyche.
The data is, however, employed in such a way as to illustrate the differences in self-
perception and general Weltanschauung between eastern and western Germans. This is not
meant to imply that commonalities do not exist. This is clearly not the case, as on a number
of issues there are no or only small differences in opinion between eastern and western
Germans. But as one of the supplementary aims of this work is to illustrate that Easterners
have a distinct self-understanding, and that the eastern German political space is unique, the
fundaments of the eastern Trotzidentitdt need to be explained. The reasons for the existence
of an identity of defiance are to be found in the value and attitudinal differences of eastern and
western Germans. Hence this study illustrate ways in which Easterners differ in the attitudes
to western Germans, and does not focus on the things that that they have in common. This
data forms the basis of this work's claim that a Trotzidentitdt exists in the eastern states. At
times data from other studies is also employed to illustrate particular points (i.e. on economic
matters studies by, for example, the Institut for Wirtschaftsforschung in Halle, or the
. Deutsches Institut for Wirtschaftsforschung in Berlin).
,
Chapters four and five aim to illustrate how the PDS articulates this territorial
specificity. A qualitative evaluation of the programmes, policy documents, working papers,
discussion papers and other party literature helps to build up a picture of the PDS's political
platform. These documents illustrate the PDS's position on uniquely eastern German issues
and problems. Semi-structured interviews with PDS politicians and activists in the eastern
states also add to the understanding of how the PDS mobilises eastern German sentiment. A
semi-structured method of interviewing was adopted in order to ensure that the discussion
covered all relevant aspects, while still enabling the respondent to diverge to areas that he/she
believed to be of particular interest. Interview evidence did not, however, playa particularly
prominent role in the writing of this thesis, as interview evidence is always a supplementary
to primary and secondary evidence also collected.
Chapter five specifically discusses the areas where the PDS has a strong profile: these
are the issues, firstly, where eastern Germans hold differing attitudinal preferences to
Westerners (see chapter three), and, secondly, topics which PDS politicians highlight in
debates, which appear in party programmes and on which the PDS has a particularly strong
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profile. Data from the federal and state Parliaments is used to illustrate how this is manifested
in the legislative arena, showing how the PDS has developed itself into the 'eastern German
voice' within the Federal Parliament and, to an extent, within regional parliaments.
The concluding chapter of this work draws the strands of the argument together. It
reviews the core hypothesis in light of the research conducted and offers concluding remarks
on both the nature of regional party success in general and PDS success in particular. It
briefly discusses the future prospects of the PDS in view of this. The final chapter also
attempts to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the study's approach and conclusions. It
also offers guidance for possible lines of enquiry in the future.
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Chapter Two
2. Regions and Regional Parties - An Analytical Framework
2.1. Introductory Remarks
This chapter develops an analytical framework within which the PDS can be discussed
as a regional party. It will develop a typology in order to illustrate how regional parties
mobilise 'specific territorial sentiments. The first part of the typology discusses two key
factors that help sustain/create a regionally distinct political environment. It is hypothesised
that a regional space is spawned as a result of a combination of these structural variables,' It is
as a result of these fault lines that regional parties are able to mobilise territorially specific
sentiment within the political arena. The first part of the typology is vital in understanding
exactly what regional difference is meant to mean .,...and only after having done this can one
move on to discuss how regional parties articulate this in the political arena.
The second part of the typology highlights three characteristics that distinguish a
regional party's activities within the political arena. They can be termed 'agency factors'.
The first part of the typology is employed in chapter three to explain the differences (in the
spheres of economics, politics, culture, values and attitudes) that differentiate the eastern,
states from the western states of Germany. They help to flesh out what the eastern German
identity of defiance is understood to mean. The second part of the typology is employed in
chapters four and five in order to illustrate how the PDS is the political articulator of this.
The typology is therefore used to show how a territorial cleavage exists between eastern and
western Germany, and that the PDS is the regional party that gives political voice to eastern
German attitudes, orientations and beliefs.
Before discussing the typology in more detail, it is first necessary to place regional
parties within the context of both established theories 'on political regionalism, as well as the
literature on the development and nature of party system change. Regional parties form a
heterogeneous group. This dictates that a discussion of the factors that promote and support
political regionalism is necessary, in order to place parties articulating expressly regional
sentiment within the wider discourse on political parties in general. Supplementary to this, it
is also necessary to discuss the nature of party system formation and change that has further
allowed them to carve out their niches in western polities. The discussion conducted in
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section 2.3. of this chapter, therefore, lays the foundations for the formation of the typology of
regional parties, which is outlined in section 2.4.
Section 2.3. illustrates that historically dominant parties are not necessarily able to
sustain their dominance over political activity across the whole territory of a nation-state,
even if they possess unquestionable advantages in their quest to do S0184. New, or renewed,
cross-cutting and territorially sensitive divides may enable regional parties to establish
themselves in a given party systeml85• The traditional parties power of agenda setting, their
efficient organisations and their widely perceived representative functions can be overcome in
certain cases, as new or alternative societal constellations form. These pose challenging
questions of the so-called 'national' parties, and if these parties fail to respond adequately,
then new and salient cleavage divides can be created. This intrinsically means that parties
articulating regionally specific sentiment are varied and very much place-specific. The
history of each individual region/nation subsequently plays a key role in dictating the precise
form that they take186• Evidence of this variety can be found right across western Europe, as
well as in Canada. It is hypothesised that in the case of Germany, the established parties have
,
not been able to incorporate specific eastern German sentiment into their programmes and
agendas. The effects of GDR socialisation and the post-1989 transformation period have
combined to fuel a process of identity creation within the eastern states. As such, space has
developed for a regionally concentrated party to establish itself in eastern Germany. This is
based upon the differences of opinion and attitude that Easterners exhibit in comparison to
Westerners (chapter three).
2.2. Definitional Considerations
However, before discussing this works analytical approach in more detail, it is
necessary to define exactly what is meant by the term 'regional'. This is a task, however, that
remains fraught with pitfalls as the term 'regional' remains something of an arbitrary concept.
Arthur Benz et al note that 'regions' are rarely sufficiently well-defined, and, as such, tend to
be analysed and discussed in different ways by different authors'". Konrad Kostlin,
184 Giovanni Sartori (1976): op. cit.
18S Stefano Bartolini & Peter Mair: Identity, Competition and Electoral Volatility (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), p.57.
186 Derek W. Urwin: 'The Price of a Kingdom: Territory, Identity and the Centre-Periphery Dimension in
Western Europe', in Yves Meny & Vincent Wright (eds.): Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), p.167.
187 Arthur Benz, Kimberley Crow & Everhard Holtmann: 'Regionen und regionale Politik', in Arthur Benz &
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meanwhile, unambiguously states that attempting to define what constitutes a region is in
itself impossible, on account of their man-made nature and their ever changing dynamics.
Kostlin is adamant that the interaction of external (structural) factors with localised
phenomena produce unique sets of human-inspired territorial circumstances - ensuring that
regions remain inherently unique and, therefore, 'undefinable' in their make-up'l", While
Kostlin's argument that regions remain fundamentally undefinable is true in absolute terms,
within their own social, cultural, economic or political context, the notion of a region does
take on a clear and coherent meaning. But one needs to be careful in interpreting exactly
what this is meant to mean. As structural phenomena, regions do not have identities,
aspirations or interests. To gain some sort of meaning, the spatial content of a region must be
associated with some other politically relevant differences: in attitudes, identities, culture,
levels of wealth and so on. Similarly, a basic and potentially divisive cleavage such as
language does not, in itself, create political conflict: it does so only when language is
associated with differential access to power, status or economic wealth. Hence agents play
fundamental role in articulating and giving value to (territorial) structural differencel89.
Sylvia Pintarits has observed that there are indeed two reference points for regions: the
first are economic/institutionalised/cultural characteristics that differentiate the region from
the other. The second is the comparison with other regions that are clearly different, but
formally take on the same role (i.e. they too are perceived or classified as regions)19o. Hence
the characteristics that arise to differentiate a region from the whole, and are seen as taking on
special territorial salience, are exaggerated/articulated by social actors - and as such a region
is constituted by the social actors who live within it.
For the purposes of this study' a broad definition of the term region is employed. A
region is, firstly, regarded as a geographic entity within a nation-state. The size and economic
and social structure of regions may still vary immensely. Nonetheless, it is possible to
propose as a working definition that regions are human constructs, that come about as the
result of the conceptual division of the world on the basis of a specific set of chosen
Everhard Holtmann (Hrsg.): Gesta/tung Regiona/er Politik: Emptrische Befunde, Erkltirungsanslitze und
Praxistransfer (Magdeburg: Landeszentrale filr Politische Bildung Sachsen Anhalt, 1998), p.IS.
188 Konrad Kostlin: 'Die Regionalisierung von Kultur', in Konrad Kostlin und Hermann Bausinger (Hrsg.):
Heimat und Identitdt: Prob/eme regionaler Kultur (Neumunster: Studien zur Volkskunde und Kulturgeschichte
Schleswig-Holsteins Band 7, 1979), pp.2S-38.
189 David J. Elkins and Richard Simeon: 'Introduction', in David J. Elkins & Richard Simeon: Small Worlds:
Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life (London: Methuen, 1980), pp.xi.
190 Sylvia Pintaris: Macht. Demokratie und Regionen in Europa: Analysen und Szenarien der Integration und
Desintegration (Marburg: Metropolis Verlag, 1996), p.29.
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criteria 191. The selection and balance of criteria, of course, change with the geographical,
social and historical setting. The most definitive characteristics of these regions are that they
are geographically defined (on the grounds of historical precedent, judicial agreement or
popular will), they tend to be areas of territory within present-day nation states (although,
once again, they can theoretically overlap national borders 192) and are located between
historical, cultural, linguistic or economic dividing lines. Such a definition is necessarily
broad, as each individual region is formed by original constraints and developments.
Moreover, many of the movements and parties that have been categorised as 'regional'
often refer to themselves as 'national', defending long-held national traditions (be they
cultural, historical, quasi-mythical or linguistic), with the aim of achieving separation,
autonomy from, or simply greater recognition within, a more or less centralised state.
r '
Basque, Catalonian, Quebecois, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Breton and many other forms of
national movement profess to protect and enhance the rights and culture of 'nations' of
peoples who historically perceive themselves as being different from the 'foreign' state and
elites who govern them from the centre.
From a methodological point of view it is not clear what analytical tools and devices are
applicable to illustrate 'regional specificity' and 'regional uniqueness'. This is something that
this work aims to help rectify. Erwin Fink et al conceptualise this problem in the German
case:
can the region be simply identified with German territorial states such as Saxony
or Bavaria? Or should such a definition reflect the more sophisticated analytical
tools that have only recently been applied to regional studies? These methods
(among others), which have been adopted mainly from the social sciences, are
used to consider how identities are constructed through language, ritual and
regional and local ways of life (both entrenched and dynamic) 193.
When applied to the case of eastern Germany in particular, one must be clear what one
is and what one is not trying to analyse. This work does not attempt to show that eastern
191 David B. Knight: 'Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism', in
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Volume 72 Number 4,1982, pp.514-531. '
192 An example of this is to be found in the Basque country, where Sabino Arana y Goiri, the founding fathe~of
Basque nationalism, synthesised the geographical extension of the Basque land as "Zazpiak-bat" (seven mto
one). By this he was indicating that the four provinces on the Spanish side and the three 'departements' in
France should be united in the formation of a free Basque homeland. See Daniele Conversi: The Basques. The
Catalans and Spain (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), p.53.
193 Erwin Fink et a1.: 'Memory, Democracy and the Mediated Nation: Political Cultures and Regional Identities
in Germany, 1848-1998', in German History, Volume 17Number 2,1999, p.259.
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Germans have no common ties with western Germans. This is patently not the case'". Over
and above the common factors of language and history (prior to 1945), Germans from east
and west display deep cultural and social similarities. This is not to say that the social,
economic, cultural and political environments in the new and old Lander are synonymous - as
it is clear that differing identities and societal constellations exist not just between states and
regions, but also within them. Western Germany is not a homogeneous societal unit and
regional disparities are clearly evident'". This is also the case within eastern Germany!" .
. These developments are by no means limited to Germany alone, as even the most cursory
.glance at societies in the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Canada, France, Belgium and so forth
amply illustrates.
Identity formation is, however, a process that takes place on a number of different
levels. Local and regional identities do not necessarily sit uneasily with national or even
cross-national identities - even if the process of identity adoption/creation often takes uneven
amounts of time and different passages before it is widely accepted. In the German case,
regional diversity and uniqueness has deep historical roots, and the German nation-state is in
itself a relatively new construction placed over previous constellations of regional variety.
Dialects and accents, as well as other forms of regional identification, remain strong to this
day. The creation of a societal cleavage along the former inner-German border has, however,
engendered a process of identity formation that cross-cuts other previously prevalent salient
mobilising issues. Territorial identification has hence became an issue in political debate, as
eastern German citizens recognise factors that link them (and inevitably exclude others -
principally their western brethren) together.
Before creating a tool that enables the essence of the eastern German regional space and
identity, and its political articulation, to be unpacked, it is necessary to discuss how other
regional parties have created space for themselves in national party systems of the western
194 At the time of unification, and in the first few months of 1990, many observers were astounded at how
quickly and easily eastern Germans appeared to be adapting 'to the new western liberal democratic state which
they were about to join, as eastern Germans expressed political attitudes that were sometimes even more liberal
and democratic than those of their western German counterparts. See Laurence McFalls: 'Shock Therapy and
Mental Walls: East Germany as a Model for Post-Communist Political Culture?' in After the Wall: Eastern
Germany Since 1989 (Boulder: Westview, 1998), p.149.
195 For example, Bavarians are clear and unambiguous in their territorial identification with their Land, just as
they are clear that they are not Rhinelanders or from the Pfalz. Northern Germans from states such as Lower
Saxony or Schleswig Holstein also have a clear self-appreciation as being from the northern areas of the country
- and subsequently as not being from, for example, Baden, Hesse or The Ruhr area.
196 For example, within Mecklenburg West Pomerania, Mecklenburgers and citizens of West Pomerania are
clear in their identification to one particular part of their Land. something that is also politically evident in the
differing ways that they vote (see Nikolaus Werz & Jochen Schmidt (Hrsg.): Mecklenburg-Vorpommern im
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world. Only by de-constructing regional party success can one analyse whether the PDS fits
the broader European pattern of successful regional parties: and it is for this reason that
section 2.3. moves on to begin classifying the different regional parties that are (or were) in
existence.
2.3. Understanding Regional Parties and Regionalism
Classifying regional parties is not a straightforward task. Their heterogeneity ensures
that they remain a diverse group and, electorally speaking, they tend to remain "little more
than an irriiant'r", Lieven De Winter has, however, attempted to classify regional parties
with regard to the demands that they make on the state - and this approach does appear to be a
helpful way of classifying regional parties political will and ambition. It becomes evident that
regional movements and parties can make many forms of regional demands on a state. As a
general rule, these demands tend to limit themselves to one of the three areas of culture,
economics or politics (although a combination of all three may be evident). As a result of
this, regional parties have tended to range from parties that lobby within the existing
constitutional system for cultural recognition or economic resources, to campaigning for
forms of regional autonomy or even separatism and the creation of a 'new' nation-state. De
Winter regards the defining demand of a regional party's programme as a "political
reorganisation of the' existing national power structure, for some kind of self-government".
He therefore proposes a classification of regionalist parties based on the radicalism of the
demands they make. De Winter claims that protectionist regional parties represent a
particular constituency (usually an ethnic or cultural community) that is of a unique character
and as such claims to merit unique treatment. This often takes the form of cultural demands
being met within the framework of the existing nation-state. The second grouping of
autonomist parties are likely to accept power-sharing, provided that their particular region is
seen to be given some form of 'special' status. The Sudtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) is a prime
example of this. To some extent, the Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC) and
the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) in the Basque Country fulfil this criteria, as although
they do not exclude independence as an option, they settle in practice for autonomy.
Wandel - Bilanz und Ausblick (Munchen: GUnther Olzog Verlag), 1998). There are also, to name another
example, strong historical ties particularly linking Saxons to their Land.
197 Derek. W. Urwin: 'Harbinger, Fossil or Fleabite? 'Regionalism' and the West European Party Mosaic', in:
Hans Daalder & Peter Mair (eds.): Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change (London: Sage,
1983), p.250.
74
Chapter 2 Regions and Regional Parties - An Analytical Framework
National-Federalist parties, meanwhile, seek a clear territorial re-organisation of the nation-
state. A number of the Belgian parties, as well as the Lega Nord, Sinn Fein and Herri
Batasuna are examples ofthisl98• ,
The PDS can be classified as a protectionist party, as it seeks to protect and enhance the
interests of eastern Germans without demanding a reconfiguration of state structures. This
having been said, the PDS has, on occasion, articulated demands for specific structures that
would enhance the representation of eastern Germans. The PDS calls for a new constitution,
while stressing new forms of 'direct democracy' 199. Latterly, the PDS has also called for the
new Lander to be given special constitutional rights with regard to vetoing policies that are
seen as being in contravention of the Einheitsvertrag (Unification Treaty)2oo. Classifying the
PDS in this way does not, however, reveal a great deal about the methods and means that the
PDS has adopted in achieving electoral success in eastern Germany. Even the most cursory
glance at the PDS's election results indicates that it is much more at home in eastern Germany
than it is in the west - making it a regionally strong party. This, even if just at a superficial
level, makes it a party that is comparable with other regional political parties. The PDS is
obviously articulating/forwarding/representing and/or defending interests and issues that are
of particular political salience in the eastern states. It is for this reason that it fares so well in
this region of Germany. This work aims to illustrate what these regional particularities and
unique traits are. But if the nature of regional political mobilisation in Germany is to be
adequately conceptualised, it is important to examine the rich mosaic of regional parties that
exist in the rest of the democratic world.
2.3.1. Regional Parties in the Democratic World
Regional parties in the democratic world have traditionally been seen as
ethnonationalist parties that seek to defend the interests of a particular ethnic group that is
indigenous to a region of a nation-state. The range and scope of 'ethnic parties' is
surprisingly large, and in 1991 Lane, McKay and Newton talked of 44 such entities in western
198 See Lieven De Winter: 'A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral, Office and Policy Success of
Ethnoregionalist Parties', in Lieven De Winter & Huri Tursan (eds.): Regionalist Parties in Western Europe
(London: Routledge, 1998), pp.204-205.
199 PDS (1993): op. cit. p.13.
200 PDS Parteivorstand: Rostocker Manifest. Fur einen zukunftsfiihigen Osten in einer gerechten Republik
(Berlin: Parteivorstand der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus, 1998), p.8.
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Europe20l• In a more recent analysis, Hearl, Budge and Peterson have analysed 118 regions in
Europe, concluding that 33 of them have specifically 'ethnoregionalist' parties. They note
that in 14 of these regions, the ethnoregionalist vote is divided over several parties, while in
the other 19 one single ethnoregionalist party exists202• Urwin, meanwhile, claims to have
pinpointed 115 regionalist parties within 17 countries in the period since 1945203• Lijphart,
furthermore, contends that while some countries have party systems where ethnic parties do
not play significant roles in political life, all countries 'remain ethnically divided to some
extent - hence the latent potential is always there204•
However, as these figures demonstrate, analysing regional parties, and the factors that
spawn them, can also turn into a conceptual minefield. The terms 'ethnoregionalist',
'regionalist', 'ethnonationalist', 'nationalist' and 'regional' are all used to describe the same
phenomena (i.e. regionally restricted political parties). Furthermore, as was mentioned above,
a strong tendency remains towards over-playing the importance of some form of ethnicity in
the success of regional parties. De Winter and Tursan, in their excellent analysis of regional
parties in Europe, explicitly describe regional parties as,'ethnoregionalist', stressing the ethnic
fundament that underpins their success/'". However, this terminology fits uneasily when
applied to prominent parties like the Lega Nord in Northern Italy, who base their political
claims on a group solidarity that has little to do with ethnicity. This point is even conceded in
the Italian case, with Marco Tarchi pointing out that:
The claim of identity based on ethnicity and supported by folklorist forms of
action (assemblies, demonstrations, graffiti written in dialect, costume parades)
reduced them ( ... the original Northern Leagues ... ) to cultural epiphenomena and
isolated them from the socio-economic interests of the 'people', who in fact
lacked the common ethnic or linguistic traits that these movements sought to
represent'?'.
201 Jan-Erik Lane, David Mckay & Kenneth Newton: Political Data Handbook: OECD Countries (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.125-132.
202 Derek Hearl, Ian Budge & Bernard Peterson: 'Distinctiveness of Regional Voting: A Comparative Analysis
across the European Community Countries (1979-1993)', in Electoral Studies, Volume 15 Number 2, 1996,
~.175.
03 Derek W. Urwin (1983): Hans Daalder & Peter Mair (eds.): op. cit. p.228.
204, Arend Lijphart: 'The Power-Sharing Approach' in Joseph V. Montville (ed.): Conflict and Peacemaking in
Multiethnic Societies (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), p.491. While Lijphart may be taken to this argument
farther than is perhaps necessary, it is clear that modem-day nation-states are not normally home to
homogeneous ethnic groups. For this reason plural societies tend to have larger or smaller minority groups
within their national borders. Within Europe, it is perhaps only Portugal and Iceland that can be regarded as
anything like exceptions to this rule. See David B. Knight: 'Territory and People or People and Territory,', in
International Political Science Review, Volume 6 Number 2, 1985, p.249.
20S Lieven De Winter & Hurl Tursan (eds.) (1998): op. cit.
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This work aims to correct the imbalance in academic discourse that overplays the ethnic
element of regional consciousness, and it is for this reason that the term 'regional party'
(rather than 'ethnoregionalist') is preferred. This stems from the fact that while many
regional parties incorporate separate ethnic identities into their political platforms, ethnic
influences are not the primary motivational factors behind all regional parties. Group identity
is not necessarily 'ethnic' - as the above mentioned case of the Lega Nord illustrates.
This work consciously aims to avoid falling into the trap of becoming too abstract (as is
often the case when the attempt is made to incorporate too many factors and considerations
into the study of differing regional phenomena), while at the same time aiming to avoid the
curse of generalisation that too close a concentration on too few cases results in. Based on an
extensive view of the literature on regional parties in the democratic world, this study will
attempt to set out the key characteristics that underpin regional party success/'", and facilitate
successful regional mobilisation. For this reason, the typology invoked is split into two parts:
the first section, discussing the problem of 'what differentiates a region from the whole?',
provides the foundations for the second part of the typology on the nature and mobilising
forces of regional parties themselves. The typology will enable the author to both identify the
social, political, economic and psychological differences between the new Lander and the old
Lander, as well as to illustrate how the PDS is the political representation of this. The outline
of the typology is set out below:
A TypoloiY of Reiionalism and how Reiional Parties Mobilise Reiional Particularity
Structural and Causal Factors Inherent in Reiionalism
• Cultural Variables
• Socio-Economic Variables
206 Marco Tarchi: 'The Lega Nord' inLieven De Winter & Huri Tilrsan (1998): ibid. p.144.
207 'Success' is defined differently by different parties. It is clear that, over and above their policy claims, some
parties regard long-term stability in the party system as 'success', while others have more quantifiable goals,
whether they be articulated in electoral terms (i.e. the CSU in Bavaria aims to achieve (at least) 50 per cent of the
popular vote), or in policy terms (i.e. the preservation of cultural rights like the PC strives for in Wales). Some
parties (like the SNP in Scotland) have ultimate goals (which in the case of the SNP involves Scottish
independence), but in the short-medium term have to settle for incremental progress (like the creation of a
Scottish Parliament). De Winter conceptualises this by placing regional parties into one of four categories, based
on election results over three successive elections. Hegemonic Parties manage to win an absolute majority of
votes on their particular region. Large Parties represent substantial minorities (between 25 per cent and 50 per
cent) of the electorate. Medium-Sized Parties gain between 15 and 25 per cent of the votes, and Small Parties
record only a small minority (less than 15 per cent) of votes. See Lieven De Winter (1998): in Lieven De Winter
& Huri Tursan (eds.): op. cit. pp.212-214.
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A~ency Factors in the Mobilisation of Re~ionalism
• Party Leadership
• Party Organisation
• Party Policy
Each of the factors in the typology will be individually discussed, showing how
particular parties exploit fault lines to their electoral advantage. It is not implied that regional
parties only gamer support as a result of individual mobilising factors, but rather that key,
regionally salient issues act as catalysts of support. In reality, complex and unique
combinations of these factors contribute to territorial cleavage/'" formation, and subsequently
the development of regional movements that articulate territorial sentiment. It is not the aim
of this study to explain why similar societal developments in one particular territory lead to
particular party formation, while in other regions the 'national' parties are able to absorb such
a challenge. The individuality of every case study would in itself make this a mammoth task
to undertake. Rather, this chapter aims to highlight the criteria that regional parties have to
fill if they are going to be successful. It will not stipulate that the fulfilment of such criteria in
anyone area automatically means a regional party will receive popular support.
2.3.2. Regional Parties and Approaches to Political Regionalism
The study of political regionalism appeared to acquire a new lease of life m the
academic world after the 1960s. In line with the pioneering work of Stein Rokkan and
Seymour Martin Lipset, issues of territorial uniqueness, and the factors that lead to it
developing and prospering, became mainstream topics of discussion amongst political
scientists. This is particularly true in terms of the concepts of centre and periphery, which,
even if problems still surround their usage209, remain important vehicles for the study of
208 For an initial analysis into cleavage formation in western, industrialised society, see Seymour M. Lipset &
Stein Rokkan: Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives (London: Macmillan, 1967).
209 The centre-periphery paradigm may have enjoyed undeniable popularity in the last thirty years, but it has not
been without its critics. It has been rejected on the grounds that it is relatively simple in its nature and it has only
weak explanatory value: centres and peripheries can be perceived as being everywhere, and centres are more
than likely to have some sort of periphery attached to them just as peripheries can often have some form of
centre. However, such criticisms tend to be based on an over-expression of geography, to the exclusion of other
supplementary ways of conceptualising centre-periphery relations. What may, in fact, be of primary importance
may be distances in economic, cultural, social, ethnic, political or psychological, as well as geographic, terms.
For a fuller discussion of this and other criticisms of the centre-periphery model see Yves Meny & Vincent
Wright: 'General Introduction', in Yves Meny & Vincent Wright (eds.): Centre-Periphery Relations in Western
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territorial politics toda/10• By employing the concepts of centre and periphery one can begin
to appreciate how the dominant cultural positions of ?entres influences and conflicts with the
subject culture that has tended to characterise peripheries - and hence how the relationship
between the two can shape territorial identifications in nominally peripheral areas of a state.
The relatively uncomplicated nature of the terms has led to centres and peripheries
being employed to refer to both territories and population groups in a given nation-state"! ,
and analysts have subsequently used often quite different criteria in classifying territories and
populations as either peripheral or central. Within this context, it is clear that further
differentiation is necessary if the terms are to be usefully employed. In terms of space and
distance, two types exist: one physical, the other social and cultural. Stein Rokkan termed
one a geographical space and the other a membership space. The membership boundary
tends to be much firmer than the geographical boundary: you can cross the border into a
territory as a tourist, trader or casua1labourer, but you will find it much more difficult to be
accepted as a member of the pre-eminent core group within the territory'", In areas where
the interaction between the centre and the periphery is dominated by the core culture, and the
interests of the dominant group predominate, it is clear that any peripheral identity will have
only limited structural opportunities for reproduction. Yet the glue of a historically defined
regional culture213, whether this be based on (most frequently) language, religion or other
unique cultural stigmata can still be cohesive enough to support peripheral identitiesi" (see
section 2.4.1.1.).
Centres can be minimally defined as privileged locations within a territory" s.
Identifying centres involves locating where institutions are based, where resource holders and
elites meet, where established arenas exist for deliberations and decision-making as well as
where elites and the mass of the citizenry come together for collective reaffirmation of their
own identity (in whatever form this may takeil6• Centre-building intrinsically involves the
Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp.I-9.
210 Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle & Derek W. Urwin (eds.): State Formation. Nation-Building and Mass Politics in
Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.l09.
·211 It is important to make the distinction between territorial centre-periphery distinctions and those that are
based on ethnic-cultural contrasts. One can, for example, talk of an imported proletariat as a 'socio-cultural'
periphery even though it is resident in a central area. Regardless of whether the terms are used in connections
with territories or people, it is important that the geographical content remains visible in some form otherwise
the dichotomy becomes indistinguishable from other societal conflicts.
212 Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle & Derek W. Urwin (eds.) (1999): ibid. p.104.
213 For an detailed discussion of the meaning of 'regional political cultures', see Richard Simeon & David 1.
Elkins (1980): op. cit.: pp.31-76. ;
214 Derek W. Urwin (1985): op. cit. p.162.
2IS Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle & Derek W. Urwin (eds.) (1999): op. cit. p.llO.
216 Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle & Derek W. Urwin (eds.) (1999): ibid. p.ll1.
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privileging of one site over another and by expanding so 'much effort in the creation of the
centre that future generations feel bound to retain the location as a centre as a result217• The
reasons for the choice of that particular site may no longer be valid, or they may even have
been arbitrary from the very beginning, but once a number of institutions, fora, arena and
monuments have been created, the opportunity costs of creating a 'new centre' become very
high indeed. This leads the centre to exert considerable, often dominant, influence over the
more outlying parts of the territory.
Peripheries, meanwhile, tend to be subordinate to the authority of the centre. The centre
tends to represent the seat of authority, and the periphery those geographical locations at the
furthest distance from the centre, but still within the territorial border of the state218• Specific
characteristics are implicitly attributed to peripheries: a periphery is normally dependent, with
little control over its own fate and possessing minimal resources for the defence of its
,
distinctiveness against outside pressures. Wars and conflicts may have led to particular
territories being conquered and (imperfectly) incorporated into the larger nation-state. Those
officials who administer the day-to-day affairs of these peripheral areas are likely to have the
interests of the centre at heart and place them over and above those of the indigenous
population. In the classic centre-periphery model, peripheries also tend to have poorly
developed economies, at the extreme either a subsistence economy standing outside the
territorial network of economic exchanges and trade, or one that is dependent upon a single
commodity that is sold in distant markets over which the periphery itself will have little or no
contror'!", Finally, the classic model of centre-periphery relations regards peripheries as
having a marginal culture: without unified and distinctive institutions of its own, its culture
will tend to be fragmented and parochial. Though not fully integrated into the overall system
of communications and identity that is dominant across the politically defined territory, its
ability to resist absorption by the latter remains weak and precariousii", These are obviously
ideal-type characteristics which may not apply in all particular cases. They do, however,
draw attention to the fact that peripherality can exist in three distinctive domains of social life:
in politics, in economics and in culture221•
The development of the centre-periphery framework in the 1960s and 1970s led issues
such as social and cultural difference, income disparities and the unequal distribution of
217 Harold Innis: The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), pp.92-131.
218 Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle & Derek W. Urwin (eds.) (1999): op. cit. p.l13.
219 Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle & Derek W. Urwin (eds.) (1999): ibid. p.113.
220 Stein Rokkan, Derek Urwin, Frank H. Aarebrot, Pamela Malaba & Terje Sande: Centre-Periphery
Structures in Europe: An [SSC Workbook in Comparative Analysis (Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1987), pp.35-40.
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wealth to be increasingly discussed in explicitly territorial terms222• Although territory in
itself is a neutral concept, it becomes politically significant as a result of the interpretation and
the values which a population ascribes to it - be they ethnic, historical, linguistic or for other
reasons223• Territory can, therefore, quickly become a concept generated by people organising
space for their own aims - a fact that the centre-periphery framework helps to highlight. In
I
the 1960s political elites, realising the malleability of territory, therefore began to increasingly
mobilise peripheral feelings of distinctiveness within the political process. The rise (although
not necessarily their creation) to prominence of regional movements throughout Europe in
this period, based on the political articulation of interests (be they cultural or socio-economic)
specific to that region, is living proof of this. Furthermore, the centralising and modernising
tendencies of modern-day capitalism have further increased the salience of peripheral
identities. Elite actors within (national) dominant cultures have encouraged national political
integration, yet these processes also paradoxically contribute to an increasing awareness of
ethnic consciousness, and a growth in the desire for identification and membership in a
community less distinct and impersonal than national society224.
It is within the context of the centre-periphery debate discussed above that a number of
authors have proceeded to develop theories of territorial mobilisation that explicitly stress the
importance of centre building and central domination in spawning political regionalism. The
importance of structural dynamics have, often, been seen as being paramount in determining
human behaviour within given regionsf". These approaches stress that particular social,
economic and/or political environments (or structures) come together. to create peripheral
uniqueness. This happens at a number of different levels, and can take the form of economic
uniqueness, cultural specificity (most often in the form of a separate language) or historical
difference. At the political level, it is regionally based political parties that act as agents of
structural specificity, fostering and reflecting territorial consciousness and regional
identification+". This is principally as such resources are inherently passive - i.e. they
221 Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle &Derek W. Urwin (eds.) (1999): op. cit. p.l13-114.
222 Yves Meny: 'The Political Dynamics of Regionalism: Italy, France and Spain', in Roger Morgen (ed.):
Regionalism in European Politics (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1987), p.3.
223 Jean Gottman: 'The Evolution of the Concept of Territory', in Social Science Information, Volume 14, 1975.
f;.29. .
24 Yves Meny (1987): op. cit. p.5.
225 This is not meant to imply that proponents of such approaches would necessarily describe themselves as
'structuralists'. On the contrary, it is simply an ontological point on the positions which they implicitly take up
within the structure-agency debate - in other words their tendency to privilege structures over agents. See Colin
Hay: 'Structure and Agency', in David Marsh & Gerry Stoker (eds.): Theory and Methods in Political Science
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p.l93.
226 John A. Agnew: 'Structural and Dialectical Theories of Political Regionalism', in Alan D. Burnett & Peter J.
Taylor (eds.): Political Studies from Spatial Perspectives (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), pp.27S-289.
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represent potential more than anything else - and it takes catalysts and agents to articulate this
potential in the political arena227.
Largely structural theories of uneven economic development across a given state228,or
of internal colonialismi'" or of ethnic competitionr'? all claim, in their different ways, to
account for regional mobilisation. Tom Nairn, for example, produces, particularly in the light
of the SNP's success in Scotland in the 1970s, a thorough economic explanation of the
importance of international capitalism in dictating the differing political environments of
regions within Britain. He perceives Scotland's then weaker economic base as leading to a
general growth in the dissatisfaction with the 'British' parties, and as such a rise in nationalist
sentimenr'", Michael Hechter uses structural terminology in a different way arguing that
states like the United Kingdom (and, it can be argued, post-1989 Germany) have been built
and 'integrated' by a process of domination by a central or core (ethnic) group. The centre
dominates political, economic and cultural activity to the detriment of the, periphery.
Peripheral areas subsequently remain disadvantaged or exploited, and local cultures, while not
disappearing, are subject to a systematic battering by that of the dominant group232. This has
been well summarised by Peter Wagstaff when he notes that: "centralisation of power, often
perceived from the margins as internal colonialism, is the factor which provokes regional
dissent and the desire for a distinctive voice,,233.
A different structural analysis can be drawn from the competition between differing
'ethnic' groups in western Europe. Structural processes and constraints of modernisation
dictate that ethnic groups are forced to compete for the same rewards and resources, as a
result of the growing interconnectedness of what were once territorially and economically
separate peoples. Put another way, the increasing integration of regional economies into the
227 Derek W. Urwin (1985): op. cit. p.162.
228 The uneven economic development that results from international capitalism has been seen as the driving
factor behind particular regional political developments, see Tom Nairn: The Break-up of Britain. Crisis and
Neo-Nationalism (London: Verso, 1981). George Hoffman has encapsulated the commonly held perception in
this approach by observing that "modernisation and industrialisation in many multinational societies has an
uneven impact on a country's regions and has contributed to regional consciousness". See George W. Hoffman:
'Regional Policies and Regional Consciousness in Europe's Multinational Societies', in Geoforum, Volume 8
Number 3,1977, p.122. .
229 For further analysis see Michael Hechter: Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Michael Hechter: 'Internal
Colonialism Revisited', in Edward J. Tiryakin & Ronald Rogowski (eds.): New Nationalism of the Developed
West (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp.17-26.
230 Charles Ragin: 'Ethnic Political Mobilisation: The Welsh Case', in American Sociological Review, Number
44, 1979, pp.619-634. .
231 Tom Nairn (1981): op. cit.
232 Michael Hechter (1975): op. cit.
233 Peter Wagstaff: Regionalism in Europe (Oxford: Intellect European Studies Series, 1994), p.12.
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capitalist system has given nse to a resurgence in regional movements'". Regional
mobilisation occurs in order to 'fight for the cause' and to defend a particular regional
distinctivenessi".
While these approaches undoubtedly contribute to the understanding of the nature of
political regionalism and the nature of centre-periphery politics, structures alone cannot cause
predictable and specific political outcomes of regional party success .. The notion that a region
and a people are in a peripheral position within a society does not in itself mean that political
regionalism and regional political parties will necessarily be salient. While regional parties
do take advantage of structurally advantageous societal and economic conditions that
peripheral positions spawn, it is clear that structural factors only assist in understanding how
regional parties are successful at the polls, as, as agents within the political process, it is the
regional parties themselves that need to articulate and mobilise potential voters in the political
arenas236• Hence structures merely help to define the potential range of options and strategies
of actors. The structural theories briefly mentioned above have exacerbated specific territorial
grievances or particularities, and as such increase the propensity for a regional party to
develop. This is because each specific regional environment provides a unique set of
objective conditions in which different combinations of interests are defined within different
cleavage structuresi'". Social and political action is contextualised within the structural
contexts in which it takes place.
The distinction between structure and agency is revealed in the typology outlined in the
previous section. The first part of the typology highlights the structural factors that help to
differentiate a regional space from the broader nation-state. Without the structural
background of a regional space, where citizens exhibit a clear territorial identity, regional
parties will not be able to mobilise political support. The second typology highlights the
agency factors, illustrating how regional parties act as agents in the political process. The key
division between structure and agency is one of the reasons that a two-part typology needed to
be created in order to test the key hypothesis.
A party system that allows for the growth and stimulation of new and challenging
voting habits is, of course, also necessary in allowing the expression and instrumentalisation
234 Yves Meny (1987): op. cit. p.5.
23S Charles Ragin (1979): op. cit.
236 Colin Hay (1995): op. cit. p.l89.
237 The cleavages that exist in modem-day democratic societies are still usually based on the traditional societal
conflict lines of class, religion and centre-periphery. Their particular importance in a given polity, however, can
and does vary immensely, as a result of their interaction with other regionally salient political issues, debates and. ,
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of regional sentiment+", This process has two dimensions: firstly, 'traditional' parties are
perceived as being unable to represent regional groupingsi". Secondly, regional political
consciousness must be strong enough to prompt political mobilisation around a territorial
cleavage. Other cross-cutting cleavages may also dictate that even in areas where a
considerable degree of regional consciousness is evident, it has rarely manifested itself in a
particularist regional voice (as was the case in Scotland, for example, up until the last thirty
years). It is for these reasons that the dynamics of party system change need to be analysed,
as this offers the key to when and how regional parties are able to cement themselves within
national party systems.
2.3.3. Regional Parties and the Roots of Party System Development
A brief overview of the place of regional parties within the literature of party system
development is necessary to illustrate how hard political scientists have found it to capture the
reasons for their continued existence. Regional parties are seen as somehow unique and
different and have not easily fitted into broad theories of European party system
developmenr'", .Aside from the studies by Hoffmanr", Levi and Hechter242, Rokkan and
Urwin243, Newmarr'" and, latterly, De Winter and Tiirsan245, the literature on regional parties
remains uneven in both scope and method, and is largely descriptive. Regional parties are
seen as interesting little anomalies in the party systems of western European states.
On the surface, regional parties do indeed appear to be heterogeneous, and it is clear
that communist, socialist, social democratic, Christian democratic and far-right 'party
families' have more in common across international frontiers. Most regional parties are small
in size, they do not share a common train of economic thought and do not have a particularly
dividing lines. For a detailed discussion on the nature and types of cleavages with western democracies see Jan-
Erik Lane & Svante Ersson: Politics and Society in Western Europe (London: Sage, 1999), pp.37-75.
238 Maurice Duverger: Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State (London:
Methuen, 1964).
239 Giovanni Sartori (1976): op. cit.
240 Ferdinand Muller-Rommel: 'Ethnoregionalist Parties in Western Europe: Theoretical Considerations and
Framework of Analysis', in Lieven De Winter & Hurl Tursan (eds.) (1998): op. cit. pp.l7-27.
241 George W. Hoffman (1977): op. cit.
242 Margaret Levi & Michael Hechter: 'A rational choice approach to the rise and decline of ethnoregional
r.0litical parties', in Edward A. Tiryakin & Ronald Rogowski (eds.) (1985): op. cit. pp.128-146 .
. 43 Stein Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin: Economy, Territory, Identity: The Politics of Western European
Peripheries (London: Sage, 1983). See also Richard Rose & Derek W. Urwin: in Hans Daalder & Peter Mair
(eds.) (1983): op. cit. pp. 221-256. .
244 Simon Newman: 'Ethnoregional parties: a comparative perspective', in Regional Politics and Policy,
Volume 4, Summer 1994, pp.28-66.
24S Lieven De Winter & Hurl Tursan (eds.) (1998): op. cit.
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common view of how society should be structuredi". The only genuine commonality is their
claim upon the state: they identify themselves with, and act (they claim) on behalf of,
territories and groups that do not coincide with state boundaries.
In order to begin to appreciate the place of regional parties within European polities, an
understanding of the parameters of party system development in general is necessary. Lipset
& Rokkan's attempts to unpack the complex nature of party system formation throw much
light on the mechanics of party competition across western Europe today. Interests, values
and ideologies in European politics are linked in complex ways to produce a series of
identifiable currents and trends that span European politics as a whole. Each of these has a
recognisable social base and usually a common body of doctrinaire thought, that manifests
itself in a rich variety of national, regional and local ways. Lipset & Rokkan conceptualised
this in 1967 and came to see the party system as a dependent variable that has developed as a
result of the freezing of cleavages that have long-held traditions within society. They
highlight four main societal cleavages, stemming from one of the two great revolutions (the
so-called national revolution and the industrial revolution), of centre/periphery, state/church,
land/industry and owner/worker. In the words of Lipset and Rokkan:
... the party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the
cleavage structures of the 1920s ... the party alternatives, and in remarkably many
cases, the p,arty organisations, are older than the majorities of the national
electorates' 7. .
Universal suffrage and the final inclusion of all adults within the democratic process left
little (or no) scope for new cleavages to be formed and/or mobilised upon. It is for this reason
that the parameters of party competition are perceived as remaining broadly as they were in
the 1920s248• This does not mean that the same parties exist, but simply that the same
cleavage divides exist and they continue to shape the party system. In recent years there has
been a mountain of scholarly works pointing out, however, that party systems are no longer as
'frozen' as Lipset and Rokkan once propagated/'". The materialist/post-materialist divide
246 Derek W. Urwin: 'Perspectives on the Conditions of Regional Protest and Accommodation' in Stein Rokkan
& Derek W. Urwin (eds.): The Politics of Territorial Identity (London: Sage, 1982), p.426.
247 Seymour M. Lipset & Stein Rokkan (1967): op. cit. p.SO.
248 Stefano Bartolini & Peter Mair (1990): op. cit. p.S7.
249 See for instance Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan & Paul Allen Beck (eds.) (1984): op. cit. For evidence
of empirical support of this position see Richard Rose & Derek W. Urwin: 'Persistence and Change in Western
Party Systems since 1945', in Political Studies, Volume 18Number 3, 1970, pp.287-319.
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across the industrialised world has added another dimension to the debate25o, as well-
educated, increasingly affluent citizens are perceived to be interested in, and politically
mobilised around, 'new' cleavage-issues (Le. the environment, peace etc.). In the particular
case of Germany, meanwhile, the complexities of the unification and transformation processes
have sown the seeds of another (territorial) cleavage divide (see chapter three).
Giovanni Sartori has challenged the body of work that regards the party system as a
dependent variable, and he refers in his numerous works to the party system as an
independent variable, with the underlying tenet being that of party controli". This implies
that societal changes do not necessarily set the parameters of a party system and that changes
only occur to the extent that parties lose their ability to set the agenda and subsequently lose
their own influence on the system. In Sartori's words:
A freezed (sic) party system is simply a party system that intervenes in the
political process as an independent system of channelment, propelled and
maintained by its own laws of momentum252•
Given institutional structures and electoral mechanisms provide clear constraints on,
and incentives to, political parties, but it is leaders who choose which political space to
occupy, which ideological orientation to pursue and what political strategy they wish to
employ. Parties react to the environment around them, and the rise and fall of new parties
indicates that parties are sometimes unable to react in such a way as to remain dominant over
all political processes in a given state.
Sartori's work would imply that the existence of a regional party in eastern Germany
results from the inability of the 'western' parties to represent the differing strands of societal
opinion in eastern Germany or to set the agenda for political discussion, as the momentum
that generally leads to party system adaptation cannot overcome the unique challenge of
anchoring itself to a 'new' society. Western German parties have been unable to
250 See in particular Ronald Inglehart: The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among
Western Publics (Princeton: University Press, 1977).
251 Giovanni Sartori: 'The Sociology of Parties: A Critical Review', in Otto Stanuner (ed.): Party Systems.
Party Organisation and the Politics of the New Masses (Berlin: Institut fur Politische Wissenschaft an der Freien
Universitat, 1968), pp.1-25; Giovanni Sartori: 'From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology', in
Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.): Politics and the Social Sciences (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp.65-
100; Giovanni Sartori (1976): op. cit.
252 Giovanni Sartori (1968): op. cit. p.2l.
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institutionalise political representation to so that eastern German-specific sentiment is fully
incorporated into political discourser".
Radical societal transformation has influenced the factors underlying political.
mobilisation, as (western) parties fail to grasp the specific nature both of the transformation
process and the legacy of forty years of state socialism. If party systems mould themselves to
societies over the course of time, then Sartori's arguments remain strong, with eastern
Germany offering the almost unprecedented case of a unique set of political constellations
being moulded onto another polity. The West German party system was placed onto a
fledgling democracy that had contributed neither to the systems development nor its efficacy -
and as such had found it difficult to adjust to a 'foreign' political way oflife.
The role of societal cleavages, particularly with relevance to the East German case,
depends on the relationship between society and party competition. New conditions of
electoral competition dictate an increased propensity for change in political constellationsi".
This relationship has to be derived, at least during the initial stages of a society's development
or configuration, from a polity's historical specificity - and in particular from the issues that
trigger off the initial processes of mobilisation and politicisation. Hence a regional party in
eastern Germany, articulating new-found interests and issues, fulfils a function in the German
polity that 'all-German' parties have difficulty doing. This work hypothesises that the PDS
has crafted this role for itself within the context of social, economic and political change, and
that the transformation process has caused a realignment of the party system in as much as an
eastern German regional party has stabilised itself in the 'new' political environment.
Wide-ranging and thorough (as well as often being complex) though such party system
analysis is, literature on party system change still remains unable, however, to offer reasons
for the very existence and proliferation of regional movements. That they are there, and are
embedded in the cleavage structures of certain societies, is not disputed, but generally the
reasons for this and for their expansion remain less clear-cut. Urwin contends that the
majority tend to be products of the 'national' revolution that created, redefined and stabilised
state structures across Europe. Parties like the Sudtiroler Volkspartei in Italy, as well as, the
Siesvig Parti in Denmark255 are excellent examples of this. They fit into the party system as
253 Christopher S. Allen: 'Germany and the Comparative Political Party Experience: Sclerotic or Dynamic
Institutions', in Christopher S. Allen (ed.): Transformation of the German Political Party System: Institutional
Crisis or Democratic Renewal (New York: Berghahn, 1999), p.17.
254 Stefano Bartolini & Peter Mair (1990): op. cit. p.147.
25S Derek W. Urwin (1982): in Stein Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin (eds.): op. cit. p.429. Urwin does concede that
. not all regional parties result from this period of a state's history. The particular examples that he uses for this
are the Front Democratique dei Francophones and the Rassemblement Wallon in Belgium.
87
Chapter 2 Regions and Regional Parties - An Analytical Framework
articulators of clearly defined ethnic groups which ended up on the 'wrong' side of ethnic
boundaries in the period of 19th century state-building. It is clear that the extended suffrage
facilitated the organisation of parties for the protection of minority and territorial interests.
Greater territorial communication and interaction were also evidenr ", But this democratic
extension also facilitated other vote-mobilising factors such as class awareness. Clashes
between 'peripheral' specifics and 'central' demands or influences also lead in certain cases to
regional mobilisation. Language was traditionally the most salient of these clashes, and
education and culture in general often provided high profile arenas for battle.
This brief review highlights the difficulties that analysts have had in classifying regional.
parties. No systematic method has been developed for analysing the factors that underpin
their existence. And those authors that have discussed regional parties in any great depth
often place too much stress on the importance of ethnicity in prompting territorial
mobilisation. It is clear, however, that in order to be politically successful regional parties
have to wrestle agenda setting functions from the major parties. Given the advantages that the
national parties possess, this can be a difficult task. Secondly, they have to be able to
politically exploit latent territorial identification (that is frequently spawned by structurally
unique factors) to their advantage, stressing how they, and they alone, represent the interests
of the indigenous population. The territorial cleavage divide has to be pronounced enough to
prompt voters to cast their votes on these grounds, in the belief that the regional party is
acting in their best interests. The typological analysis offered in section 2.4. further elaborates
on this. It goes some way in filling the hole in the academic discourse by pinpointing the
factors that contribute to the creation of a territorial cleavage divide, before illustrating how a
regional party then acts on these to establish itself in the party system.
2.4. A Typology of Regionalism and how Regional Parties Mobilise Regional
Particularity
The typology of is split into two sections in order to illustrate the differences between
structures that facilitate the advent of regionalism and agents that enable regionalism to find
political expression. Section 2.4.1. and section 2.4.2. outline the two key structural variables
that foster a regionally distinct political environment, while sections 2.4.2.1 - 2.4.2.3.
highlight the methods and means that distinguish regional parties in their articulation of this
regional difference.
256 Derek W. Urwin (1982): ibid. p.429.
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2.4.1. Structural and Causal Factors Inherent in Regionalism
The two factors discussed below contribute to conceptualising what a 'regional space' is
- or, put another way, an area where a regional party may be able to stabilise itself within a
regional party system. They are structural factors which a regional party may instrumentalise
in order to illustrate how the territory where it is active is different from the nation-state as a
whole. A regional space can be defined as the sum total of complex structural interactions
within society that come together to create a unique political space in a given communication
area. On account of differences in historical background, constitutional constraints and/or
economic imperatives regional spaces can take very different forms. However, the
importance of territory ensures that political competition functions in a different way to that
of the larger nation-state of which the territory is a part. In political terms, nationwide parties
are not able to encapsulate regional specificities into their programmes and platforms - and, as
such, territorially specific can parties rise to prominence as advocates of regional interests.
The examples of regional spaces, and regional parties that are active in these spaces,
that are noted below are not exhaustive. Cases discussed are done so primarily for their
illustrative value, and are not meant to be seen within a comparative context. Every case is
too different, and there remain too many individually unique variables to conduct a
comparative study on the nature of all regional spaces. Hence comparative judgements need
to be necessarily guarded. None the less, the broad underlying variables that lead to processes
of regional space creation can be summarised under these two broad headings.
2.4.1.1. Cultural Variables
Cultural variables frequently play an important role in explaining the existence of
distinct regional spaces. The nature of these cultural variables can be wide and varied and
they can therefore range from territorial identifications to the existence of an indigenous
language and from historical specificity to important and distinct regionally specific symbols
and characteristics.
The nature of the peripherality outlined in section 2.3.2. can contribute to the creation of
a unique territorial identity. Even where regions possess negligible institutional frameworks
through which to exert influence in the wider nation-state, the medium of culture and ethnic
difference may ensure that distinct forms of territorial identifications remain clearly evident.
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Territorial identities may well be strengthened and sharpened on account of economic
difference, but generally it is within the cultural context that they are based. Cultural
identities stem from that fact that people are naturally tied to their territory through the
process of socialisation that they go through as residents of that particular territory. More
precisely, they identify with their kin, with their language as well as other cultural-ethnic
traditions that often differentiate them from other citizens of the larger nation-state.
Territorial identifications - a key component of a regional space - are prevalent across many
regions of Europe and the democratic world, and it is clear that many exist within the context
of a cultural movement that is based on (ethno-)cultural difference.
The terms 'ethnicity' and 'culture' are, however, frequently used and abused in both
popular and academic discourse, and the understanding and application of both terms can
differ greatly from study to study. This is because the nature of both ethnicity and culture
remain highly contestedi". Without wishing to enter the debate on the precise meanings of
the two concepts, this work adopts an approach that identifies ethnic identities as being
grounded in the belief that the group has its roots in a common ancestry, and notions of
community are based both on birth and a shared native culture258• Some authors have
described ethnicity as the key structural variable upon which all regional parties mobilise
supporr'" and it remains uncontested that ethnic claims lie at the root of much regionalism
and therefore regional party success, not to mention territorial identity formation. This stems
from the fact that ethnicity is indeed a powerful motor of identity creation.
Culture, while often used interchangeably with ethnicity, is understood here to mean to
be a pattern of experiences, opinions, evaluations, knowledge and attitudes that exist in
connection with a distinct social system. 'Indigenous' or 'unique' cultures can and do
develop, or exist, more or less independently from other cultural systems within a given
society (in the case of a nation-state). When discussing the nature of territorial identification,
the notions of ethnicity and culture, defined as they are here, can and do frequently over-lap,
and while authors may argue about the exact nature of the identification that they are
2S1 Stuart Hall & Bram Gieben (eds.): Formations of Modernity (Cambridge: The Open University, 1992).
258 Andreas Staab: National Identity in Eastern Germany - Inner Unification or Continued Separation?
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), p.l27. The term ethnicity is derived from Ethnos, the Greek word for
'nation', and is seen as characterising common descent. Objective blood relationships do not necessarily have to
exist, rather it is a subjective belief in a common line of descent which helps to define an 'ethnic identity'. It is
for this reason, that, in the words of Max Weber, ethnic group identity is unique in that it is a presumed identity.
See Max Weber: Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by GUnther Roth & Claus
Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p.389.
259 See for example Derek W. Urwin (1982): in Stein Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin (eds.). "The salience and
consciousness of group membership is variable over time. but always some kind of ethnicity lies at its base" op.
cit. pA28.
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discussing, one thing does normally remain clear: the identification, be it ethnically or
culturally based, is almost always territorial in its nature. The identity relates to a history, a
set of events, people, practices, traditions, myths and legends that are related to a distinct
piece of territory''". And it is this territorial identification that differentiates the region from
the larger nation-state of which it is a part.
The territorial mobilisation of ethno-cultural difference in the form of ethnonationalism
is widespread across Europe. Historical identities have been crystallised over long periods of
time and some continue to sit uneasily within the present institutional structures within which
they find themselves'?'. This is more overtly the case in the southerly and eastern comers of
the continent, but ethnic tensions are still visible in other western European states. The
examples of ethnic minorities being evident in a region of a state, and as such leading to the
citizens of the region creating identities and allegiances with that territory, are therefore
numerous262,' Many 'ethnonationalist' regional parties are also in evidence across Europe,
\ .
seeking national liberation from a (perceived) illegitimate and unjust central authority. They
use the territori~l cleavage within a state to further ethnonationalist aims and a large number
of regional/national parties have arisen on the basis of ethnic origins and sentimentsi'",
focusing on intrinsic rights to justice and self-determination for a (persecuted) ethnic
community, Or as Smith phrases it,ethnically based parties seek "the restoration of a
,
degraded community to its rightful status and dignity" and through the aim of a separate
political existence the "goal of the restoration and the social embodiment of that dignity,,264.
The use of the term 'ethnic' has, until relatively recently (i.e. the 1970s), found little
resonance in the academic world, and tended to be widely ignored26s, However, this
260 The Welsh Eisteddfodau, for example, are unlikely ever to take place in the English border towns of
Chester, Shrewsbury or Hereford, just as the Scottish Highland Games will not normally be seen in the cities of
Carlisle, Newcastle or Durham. They remain cultural events that are intrinsically tied to their territory of origin.
261 The uneasy place of Corsica within the French political system, the Northern Irish question within the UK
and the Basque problem within Spain are all representative of the uneasy place of historically defined
communities within contemporary nation-states.
262 The number of minuscule regional parties that exist across western Europe are testament to this. Many
ethnic regional parties exist as they find themselves on the 'wrong side' of national boundaries. Governments
are often quick to recognise this, and in many cases special electoral rules are employed to enable the interests of
the minority (ethnic) group to be articulated. Examples of this include the Sudschleswiger Wahlerverband,
which has attempted to defend the cultural rights of Danes in South Schleswig and the Slesvig Parte; which does
the same for the German population on the Danish side of the border. The Slesvig Parte; has been noticeably
successful in doing this, and in 1978 it was claimed that 85 per cent of German identifiers supported the party,
while 91 per cent of its support is derived from the party's German identification. Figures quoted in Stein
Rokkan & Derek W. Urwin (1983): op. cit. p156.
263 David B. Knight (1982): op. cit. pp.514-531.
264 Anthony D. Smith: 'Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separation', in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 2
Number 1, 1979, p.22.
265 Walker Connor: 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', in Journal of International Affairs, Volume 27,1973,
pp.l-21.
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imbalance was seemingly redressed through the 1970s, even to the extent where it was
claimed that ethnicity was over-used as an explanatory tooe66•
But over and above academic discussions as to the applicability of the concept, it is
beyond doubt that ethnic consciousness has proven a powerful force in, firstly, fostering
group identities, and, secondly, in mobilising groups of people to protect or enhance their
ethnic integrity, or uniqueness, as well as their particular historical and/or cultural
backgrounds and interests in the form of a party with the aim of specifically protecting their
interests. Forms of mobilisation vary: militant ethnonationalismi'" is evident in a number of
states, ranging from the terrorist tactics of the Provisional Irish Republican Anny (and its
political wing Sinn Fein) in its attempt to achieve Union with the Republic of Ireland, to
Herri Batasuna (HB - and its often alleged representation of similarly brutal ETA activists)
with its aim of constructing a separate Basque state outside the central authority of Spain and
France.
The Basque case is, however, an excellent example of the complex political nature that
ethnic identification (and regional party support) can take. Just because one perceives oneself
as a member of a specific ethnic group, this by no means ensures uniformity of political will.
Greenwood highlights five examples of differing Basque political orientation, ranging from
attempts to achieve political autonomy within a federated state or as semi-autonomous
provinces, to outright separatism for all of the seven traditional Basque regions in the form of
a 'Basque Nation-State'. Other self-proclaimed Basques look more towards a withering of
European states altogether, and the creation of a Europe made up of ethnic groups, while as a
result of centuries of adverse political experience some display agnosticism and cynicism
towards any form of political settlement. Greenwood also mentions a final group of Basques
who, at the time of writing, were more or less favourable to what was then the regime268•
These widely differing forms of ideology and political strategy go much beyond the
appreciation of one's Basque identity, and hence it should be no surprise that alongside the
all-Spanish parties there are a number of Basque nationalist parties. As Raento notes, "the
relative unity of Basque nationalists no longer exists, instead they have been divided into
266 See Pierre Louis Van den Berghe: 'Ethnic Pluralism in Industrial Societies: A Special Case?', in Ethnicity,
Volume 3 Number 3, pp.242-2SS.
267 The term 'Ethnonationalism' originally dates back to writings by Walker Connor in 1973. By this he means
"internal discord predicated upon ethnic divergence" and calls for self-determination by an ethnic group. For
more analysis of this concept see Walker Connor (1973): op. cit. p.2; Walker Conner: 'Ethnonationalism in the
First World: The Present in Historical Perspective', in Milton J. Esman (ed.): Ethnic Conflict in the Western
World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp.19-4S; Walker Connor: Ethnonationalism: The Quest for
Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
268 Davydd J. Greenwood (1988): op. cit. pp.85-86.
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mutually antagonistic groups,,269. In theory, these groups all share the original nationalist
ideal of an independent, territorially unified and Basque speaking state based on a clear
structural divide between Basques and 'others'. The reality is, however, that the Basques are
bitterly divided over what 'national self-determination' should mean, how this should be
achieved and who can legitimately decide this and how27o• It is even the case that 'one-
province' populist parties have grown within provinces in the Basque country". The Partido
Nacionalista VascolEusko Alderdi Jeltalea (PNVIEAJ) has emerged as the strongest force in
the Basque Country, drawing in conservative and Catholic Basques, alongside the smaller
Eusko Alkartsauna (EA). The traditionally weak nature of the Spanish parties has increased
their preponderance to split or simply vanish272 - as was illustrated when the EA broke away
from the PNV over inner conflicts within previous PNV governments. This has tended to
create problems in regional government, as decisions adopted by a PNV leader have not
always coincided with those of an EA President of the Basque government273• None the less,
both parties support the Spanish state, and accept the general goal of autonomy as a means of
satisfying their ambitions for Basque self-determination, In alliance with the all-Spanish
PSOE (socialists) they have been able to form governmental alliances in the Basque
autonomous region274• BB was only established in 1979 and has tended to appeal to
disaffected youth, and in particular to the urban unemployed'"; It is part of the Basque
National Liberation Front (MNLV - as is the terrorist organisation ETA) and sees its principle
aim of liberating the Basque homeland from Spanish control.
Ethnonationalism, of course, does not necessarily sought separation from the centre, and
some nationalist movements (often the more successful ones) prefer to seek a 'better deal' for
their region and their people. The Catalan Convergencia i Unio (CiU), an electoral coalition
that successfully embraces Christian Democracy, liberalism and socialism, is a case in point
here. Since the legalisation of political parties in Spain in 1975, the CiU has dominated
269 Pauliina Raento (1997): op. cit. p.191.
270 Pauliina Raento (1997): ibid. p.191.
271 Raento uses the examples of the Christian-conservative Union del Pueblo Navarro (UPN) and its splinter
group the Convergencia de Democratas Navarros (CON) in Navarra, as well as the Unidad Alavesa (UA) in
Alava. Pauliina Raento (1997): ibid. p.192.
272 The Union de Centro Democratico (UCD) dominated the formative years of Spanish democracy, winning
two general elections (in 1977 and 1979), but successive election defeats in 1980 and 1981, as well as persistent
internal conflicts, led the party to implode, and it disappeared from the party political map in 1981.
273 Gabriel Colome & Lordes Lopez-Nieto: 'The Spanish Political Parties from Fragmentation to Bipolar
Concentration' , in Piero Ignazi & Colette Ysmal (eds.): The Organisation of Political Parties in Southern
Europe (London: Praeger, 1998), p.243. . .
274 Chris Ross (1996): op. cit. pp.487-S06.
27S Michael Keating: State and Regional Nationalism. Territorial Politics and the European State (London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p.230.
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Catalan politics, consistently seeking more autonomy for Catalonia within the centralist
Spanish state, emphasising the importance of a flourishing Catalonian language and cultural
development within broad, Spanish structures. As one author puts it, the CiU "seeks the
maximum power for Catalonia with the minimum trauma for the rest of Spain,,276.
In the eastern German case, Marc Howard has even forwarded the provocative thesis
that the structural dynamics of the transformation process in Germany have spawned an
eastern German ethnicity, based on cultural and value beliefs underpinning 'Eastern
Germanness'J". Although controversial, Howard's argument is based on his very broad
definition of ethnicity, and, if this were to apply to other regions of the world, the number of
ethnic groups would be truly immense (see section 3.2.2.1. for a further discussion of this
phenomenon in eastern Germany).
It is clear that ethnonationalist political parties specifically use culture as a mobilising
tool. Certain values are represented by many members of a group, they provide similar
emotional linkages and arouse similar active tendencies. With this in mind, members of this
group have the experience of sharing ideas, sentiments and desires278• A number of regional
parties have grown out of cultures that long pre-date the modem state, as is the case in both
the Basque Country and Catalonia where both cultures are bound by traditions and languages
that clearly divide them from their Castilian neighbours. They have struggled for centuries to
retain their ethnic identities in the face of modernisation and state-enforced assimilation -
something that reached a peak during the Franco dictatorship/". External pressure to alter or
suppress peripheral uniqueness in fact often served the purpose of crystallising this cultural
core, and strenuous efforts were made to defend these core principles. Evidence of this can
also be found in Scotland where the development of a Scottish consciousness had much to do
with the attitudes and behaviour of the English. National institutions like the education
system and the system of law have helped them to persist, as Scots of all walks of life learn to
appreciate ingrained and institutionalised cultural difference within the United Kingdom.
Culture can and does act as symbolically integrative (through the use and acceptance of
myths, symbols etc.) and as a basis for solidaristic political mobilisation against a collectively
perceived threat or degradation. Clive Hedges has stressed .the "crucial cultural
276 Charles E. Ehrlich: 'Federalism, Regionalism, Nationalism: A Century of Catalonian Political Thought and
its Implications for Scotland in Europe', Space and Polity, Volume 1Number 2, November 1997, p.213.
277 Marc Howard (1995a): op. cit. pp.119-131.
278 Florian Znaniecki: Cultural Sciences (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1963), p.85.
279 For an excellent discussion on the origins and development of politics and culture in both the Basque
Country and Catalonia, see Daniele Conversi (1997), op. cit.
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underpinnings" of nationalist ideology in places like Wales and Northern Ireland280 and it is
clear that many of the founding fathers of fledgling nationalist movements were primarily
cultural nationalistsi" who perceived their national culture as being threatened by state
centralisation. As the state offered the best opportunity of defending and protecting their
particular culture and value system, cultural nationalists saw the necessity of aligning
themselves with political nationalists in order to reach the central state - hence many
regenerative cultural programmes were formed in political terms. In Catalonia, for example,
only by forming alliances with the economically hegemonic business classes could adequate
financial support be gained, and as a result cultural arguments were framed in such a way as
not to harm the vested interests of economic elites. The cultural movement of the
~Renaixen~a' (dating from the 1840s to the 1870s) proved the ideal basis for nationalism to
become more widespread, as the lost freedom of Catalonia and the renewed concept of ethnic
identity prospered under the guidance of a cultural revival.
An extremely important cultural variable that often contributes to the creation of a
regional space is an indigenous regional/national language. An ability to speak such a
language also frequently acts as a cornerstone of a territorial identity. Languages that are only
spoken by residents of a particular territory can be very obvious identity markers, due to the
natural creation of 'in' (i.e. those who speak or comprehend the language) and 'out' (those
who do not) groups. However, the experiences of the Basque Country and Wales282, where
less than fifty per cent of the citizenry speak the national language, illustrate that one does not
have to be a speaker of Basque or Welsh to be clear and decisive in ones self-appreciation as a
citizen of that region/nation. But it is none the less obvious that the existence of a unique
language does act as an identity marker for a large number of people within these territories.
Hearl, Budge and Peterson have, by using multiple regression analysis (taking into account
the size of a region, population, sectoral unemployment, regional GDP, the degree of
autonomy etc.), illustrated that only the presence of widely spoken language, and to a much
280 Clive Hedges: 'Problems in Combining Labour and Nationalist Politics: Irish Nationalists in Northern
Ireland', in R.l.lohnston, David B. Knight & Eleonore Kofman (eds.) (1988): op. cit. p.l02.
281 Cultural nationalists had/have no or little interest in achieving an ethnically or culturally homogeneous
nation-state. Their interests lay much more in preserving their right to speak a language, to celebrate festivals
etc. Political Nationalists, on the other hand, saw value in breaking with the centre completely, and creating a
nation-state within which such cultural expression could freely find voice. Their political goals were voiced in
relation to the centre, and principally in their wish to have nothing to do with it.
282 It is only relatively recently that English has risen to be the main mode of communication of Wales. lenkins
claims that Welsh remained the customary means of communication throughout the 19th Century and as late as
1890 roughly 60 per cent of Welsh citizens spoke the traditional language. In earlier periods (i.e. the 161h and
17th centuries) the figure is likely to have been around 90 per cent. See Philip lenkins: A History of Modern
Wales 1536-1990 (London: Longman, 1992).
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lesser extent the degree of overall unemployment and industrial employment, are significant
determinants of what they describe as ethno-regional voting283• This implies that although it
is difficult to draw hard and fast conclusions, support for regional-nationalist movements
appears to be based more on cultural than material grounds - and subsequently that socio-
economic structural models of voting behaviour are not suitable for explaining regional
political mobilisation.
It would be misleading, however, to place too much stress on the importance of.
language at the expense of other elements of cultural uniqueness when discussing the creation
of a regional space. Collective memory, a unique history or a simple sense of belonging are
also often a common motivator behind calls for the defence of cultural difference and the
creation of territorial identifications - and it is for this reason, for example, that non-Welsh-
aki . . fWI' identify lv with h . . 284 B 285spe mg CItizens0 a es contmue to I enti very strong y WI t err nation . asques ,
Catalonians/'", Flemingsi", Scots288 and South Tyrolians289 (to name but a few) see
themselves principally as citizens of the region/nation where they live. This contrasts
strongly with the state level identity of, for example, Northern Italians290, most Walloons"
283 Derek Hearl, Ian Budge & Bernard Peterson (1996): op. cit. pp.179-180.
284 Charles Ragin (1979): op. cit. pp.619-634; Phillip Rawkins: 'Living in the House of Power: Welsh
Nationalism and the Dilemma of Antisystem Politics', in Edward J. Tiryakin & Ronald Rogowski (eds.): New
Nationalism of the Developed West (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp.294-314.
285 There are numerous works on the history and development of Basque identity and Basque nationalism. See
for example Stanley G. Payne: Basque Nationalism (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1975); Robert P. Clark:
The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1979); Chris Ross:
'Nationalism and Party Competition in the Basque Country and Catalonia', in West European Politics, Volume
19 Number 3, July 1996, pp.488-506; Pauliina Raento: 'Political Mobilisation and Place-specificity: Regional
Nationalist Street Campaigning in the Spanish Basque Country', in Space and Polity, Volume 1 Number 2,
November 1997, pp.191-204; Daniele Conversi (1997): op. cit.
286 See Chris Ross (1996): ibid. pp.488-506; Daniele Conversi (1997): ibid.
287 See Lieven De Winter: 'The Volksunie in Flanders', in Lieven De Winter & Huri Tursan (eds.) (1998): op.
cit. pp.28-50; Lieven De Winter & Patrick Dumont: 'Belgium: Party System(s) on the Eve of Disintegration?',
in David Broughton & Mark Donovan (eds.): Changing Party Systems in Western Europe (London: Pinter,
1999), pp.183-206.
288 For a particularly good analysis of national sentiment in Scotland and the SNP's place in this, see John
Agnew: 'Models of Spatial Variation in Political Expression: The Case of the Scottish National Party', in
International Political Science Review, Volume 6 Number 2, 1985, pp.171-196; See also Alice Brown et al.:
Politics and Society in Scotland (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).
289 For an excellent account of the development and current position of the Sudtiroler Volkspartei see Anton
Holzer & Barbara Schwegler (1998): 'The Sudtiroler Volkspartei: A Hegemonic Ethnoregionalist Party' in
Lieven De Winter & Hurl Tursan (eds.): op. cit. pp.158-173.
290 Carlo E. Ruzza & Oliver Schmidtke: 'Roots of Success of the Lega Lombarda: Mobilisation Dynamics and
the Media', in West European Politics, Volume 16Number I, 1993, pp.I-23; Benito Giordano: 'A Place called
Padania? The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of Northern Italy', in European Urban and Regional
Studies, Volume 6 Number 3, July 1999, pp.215-230.
291 Jo Buelens & Ruth Van Dyck (1998): 'Regionalist Parties in French-Speaking Belgium', in Lieven De
Winter & Hurl Tursan (eds.): op. cit. pp.51-69.
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and Swedes in Finland292, emphasising how processes of identity creation take differing forms
in differing spatial environments=",
Regional symbols and characteristics often play key roles in (re)defining cultural
movements and territorial identities and they contribute to their successful passage through
generations. These symbols can be wide and varied, and only have genuine meaning to
certain groups within society. They can be particular historical events that are remembered
and celebrated, flags or symbols that taken on unique meanings, parades, processions,
marches and so forth that have grown to be carriers of very distinct regional identities within
the broader regional space. This is as group customs, traditions and institutions serve as a
means of excluding those not perceived of as being within the 'in' community. They sustain
special routines and foster feelings of distinctiveness, intrinsically excluding those who are by
definition members of the 'out' community'?'. It is here that nationalism and regionalism
clearly overlap as symbolic places, boundaries and frontiers often have a key place within the
context of both national and regional self-appreciation.
Examples of the importance of tokens of national and regional identity are numerous, as
they remain at the core of the psychological attachment that citizens have to particular
territories and peoples. In recent times, the most salient and globally recognisable example of
a people attempting to defend a key symbol of their regional/national identity concerned the
importance of the Kosovo region to Serbs, on account of it being widely perceived as the
cradle of the Serbian nation. Nationalists and ultra-nationalists have used the retention of
Kosovo within Serbia as a cornerstone of their political platforms, subsequently leading to the
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s295• The extreme importance of the territory of
Kosovo as a symbol stems from the regions position as the heartland of the Serbian nation in
the 1th, 13th and 14th centuries as other parts of the Balkans (some of which were controlled
by Serbs) were being successfully over-run by, amongst others, Bulgarians, Hungarians,
Byzantines and Romans. When Turkish tribes overran Serb forces at the Battle of Kosovo
Polje on the 28th of June 1389 it marked the end of the glorious years of Serbian rule in
Kosovo and came to be seen as a pivotal moment that heralded centuries of harder times for
the Serbian peoples. It is for this very reason that the Battle of Kosovo Polje and the territory
292 Derek W. Urwin (1983): in Hans Daalder & Peter Mair (eds.): op. cit. pp.221-256 .
. 293 Lieven De Winter (1998): in Lieven De Winter & Hurl Tursan (eds.): op. cit. p.216.
294 Colin H. Williams: "Identity through Autonomy: Ethnic Separatism in Quebec", in Alan D. Burnett & Peter
J. Taylor (eds.) (1981): op. cit. p.397.
295 For reasons of clarity, the term 'Yugoslavia' is used in this context to refer to SFRY - or the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as it was before the wars of the 1990s led to the breakaway of Croatia, Slovenia,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina.
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of Kosovo IS so sacred within Serbian folklore, and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic
undoubtedly articulated popularly held sentiment when he stressed that the retention of
, .
Kosovo as a part of the Serbian nation was not (and never would be) an issue that was up for
negotiation - as the symbol ofKosovo went to the very heart of what it meant to be a Serb296•
While it is clear that all nations within nation-states297 are built around national myths
like that mentioned above, it is also the case that regions are also susceptible to myth-making
- as the process is intrinsic in formulation of communities and 'we' identities. And it is
certainly not merely a Balkan preserve to regard historical symbolism with such importance in
modem day politics. Northern Irish politics, for example, is littered with references to past
events and, particularly in recent years, the issue of where Northern Ireland's fraternal orders
- The Orange Order, The Apprentice Boys of Derry and the Royal Black Institution - are
allowed to march has come to be of great symbolic importance to the Loyalist, Unionist,
Republican and Nationalist communities. Although only a relatively small number of
marches are regarded as contentiousf", the symbolic importance of these occasions ensures
that they are now high profile political exercises. The yearly scenes of violent disorder at the
Drumcree church illustrate how the symbolic marking of historical events by marching
through the streets of Northern Ireland's main cities (in the so-called 'Marching Season',
lasting from the beginning of May until the end of August) has therefore come to be seen as a
litmus test, for the strength of the Protestant faith in Northern Ireland. Many hundreds of
marches take place up and down the province, culminating on the 12th of July when William
of Orange's protestant victory at the Battle of the Boyne in 1689 is proudly commemorated.
Not all regional symbols and characteristics are so intrinsically divisive as the marches
in Northern Ireland. The antics of secessionists in Northern Italy are treated with almost mild
amusement by most other Italians, as 'Padanians' continue to mobilise around the Padanian
296 For a succinct analysis of the history of Kosovo and what it means to the Serbian nation, see http://www.
cia.gov/cialdilproductslkosovolhistory .html
297 While this thesis does not aim to dissect the mobilising forces behind specifically national movements, it is
clear that many regional parties refer to themselves as nationalists and as such the two concepts clearly overlap,
The creation of regional and national identities are therefore closely entwined in many sets of circumstances.
The external contexts of these identities distinguishes whether they are seen as national (Le. Wales, Catalonia,
Scotland and so forth) or regional (Northern Italy, South Tyrol and so on). .
298 They are 'contentious' as the route that they take leads the Protestant marchers through predominantly
Catholic areas. March organisers claim that the routes are 'traditional' and were originally mapped out when
Protestants were in the majority in these areas. Catholics, meanwhile, stress that changing social demographics
mean that some of the areas through which Protestants want to march are now overwhelmingly Catholic, and as
such the marches take on a triumphalist tone, as they often commemorate historic Protestant victories over
Catholics. Subsequently Catholics have often organised counter-demonstrations and have vociferously
campaigned for certain marches to be re-routed.
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flag299 and even around a (self-proclaimed) Padanian state. There have been clear attempts to
foster an identity in theNorthern provinces ofItaly by 'creating' the instruments of state-hood
- although this has met with what can best be described as mixed success. While the sense of
identity of Northern Italians in Padania is strong in that it is clear and distinct in its
expressions of disdain for southern Italians, there is little positive identification with the state
of Padania3°O. Furthermore, although the issues that these Northern Italians are articulating
about the nature of the Italian state are taken very seriously by Northerners and Southerners
alike, their attempts to create a Padanian state and create symbols of 'Padanianism' are looked
upon with distinct intransigence.
Regional symbols are particularly important for the continuation of territorial identities
in times of repression - as they often provide the only legal (or if illegal, largely undetectable
or non-extinguishable) method of preserving regional cultures and the relationship between a
territory and its population. Symbols act as a glue that holds together societies that are
undergoing processes of forced assimilation with a dominant culture. Both the historic
nations of the Basque Country and Catalonia fall into this category, as the repression that the
Francoist regime placed upon them was in many ways counter-productive, as it lent symbols
of nationalist culture (and particularly language) far greater importance and significance than
they would have otherwise acquired.
It is not always. the case, however, that cultural difference is mobilised in the political
arena. In Galicia, for example, the masses have scarcely been disturbed by the activities of
linguistic nationalists, primarily as the region has a long history of alignment with Madrid.
Hence despite the existence of a G~lician cultural movement and despite the nationalists best
efforts, all-Spanish parties have persistently been able to dominate Galician politics.
This illustrates that cultural variables have to both cross-cut other societal cleavages if
they are to be salient enough to promote political mobilisation. The very existence of distinct
cultural phenomena and of unique territorial identifications based on this is sometimes not
enough to spawn a regional party defending or promoting this territorial uniqueness. This is
the case even if ethno-cultural factors continue to play important roles in crystallising
territorial diffetence. Although an identity may exist and be widely held, it must be politically
salient if it is going to be the basis for political mobilisation. It must be seen as more
important than other traditionally strong cleavages like social class and religious
299 The League's symbol became the warrior Alberto da Giussano juxtaposed onto a profile of Lombardia. It is
a historical-mythological reference to the oath of Pontida and to the Battle of Legnano where the towns of
Padania rallied together to defeat the emperor Frederick Barbarossa. See http://www.leganord.org/englbrief.htm
300 Benito Giordano (1999): op. cit. pp.215..,230.
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denomination. The agents who seek to give voice to territorial identity must also have
opportunity structures (in terms of resources, organisation and so forth - see section 2.5.) that
allows them to be heard within the political process. The successful regional parties (as is
discussed in section 2.5.) are the ones who have become most adept ,atfulfilling this role.
2.4.1.2. Socio-Economic Variables
Socio-economic variables are also key structural factors in creating unique regional
spaces. This is particularly true when the economic 'system' is seen to be failing its citizens,
or the citizens of a particular region, and social tensions arise as a result. This can be in a
radical and abrupt way, as happened in Italy at the beginning of the 1990s, or it can be rather
more subtle and slow moving, as was the case in Scotland in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.
Furthermore, if changes in the socio-economic base correspond, however roughly, to the
parameters of a coherent set of cultural values (see section 2.4.1.1.) then the effects of these
changes are be amplified considerably - as regional identification becomes apparent in a
number of different spheres within society. It is for this reason that the most successful
regional parties are those that exist in regional spaces where culturally unique societal traits
are linked and interwoven with economic difference.
Regional parties have often not been slow to make political capital out of the claim that
the national government has mismanaged a region's economic assets - whether this be as the
region is economically under-developed (Scotland) or economically more advanced (western
Canada, northern Italy)301. The key variable, however, remains the same: citizens grow
uneasy and dissatisfied in the region or state within which they live, as the 'system' does not
respond to their needs and demands, and/or the economic outputs fail to meet their
expectations - prompting new or renewed territorial cleavage divides to come into existence.
Citizens of regions with a superior socio-economic status have been just as liable to
exhibit regional consciousness as citizens from economically weaker regions. Subsequently,
Europe's more affluent regions have often been where regional identifications and territorial
cleavages have been most prominent (Flanders, Brussels, Bavaria, Northern Italy, South
Tyrol, Catalonia and the Basque Country). The affluent position of these regions within their
301 This can find actual articulation in a number of different ways. The SNP and the Reform Party of Canada
have stressed the 'centre's' waste of oil reserves, for example, while the Northern League has enthusiastically
bemoaned the South's waste of northern taxes. See David F. Patton (1998): op. cit. p.Sl0.
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nation-states have prompted citizens to tend to regard themselves (often correctly) as net
contributors to the nation's wealth, and as such are sceptical/critical of the central
administration's redistributive fiscal and monetary policies. They perceive their diligence as
being wasted on other less hard-working, even parasitic, citizens of other regions - hence a
sense of popular discontentment arises within a particular territory. The case of Northern
Italy and the Lega Nord is the most explicit modem example of this. Such developments
illustrate that goals of increased self-governance and/or autonomy are rational not just in
cultural terms, but also in fiscal and monetary terms, as groups of people come to view
territorial reorganisation/representation as being beneficial to their economic and social well-
being302•
Northern Italy has witnessed the rise of a territorially defined party in recent years
primarily on the basis of socio-economic variables prompting regional political mobilisation.
The Lega Nord has established itself as the articulator of popular protest in northern Italy,
directed principally at the inefficiencies, inadequacies and plain corruption of the Italian
state303• The formation of a specific community in northern Italy long predates the existence
of the Lega Nord, just as it also outdates the unification of Italy in the late nineteenth century.
The community that the Lega represents have long displayed social and economic
characteristics different from their southern counterparts. Robert Putnam has eloquently
detailed the rise of a civic community in northern Italy, dating back to the eleventh century,
and the existence of 'social capital' that saw northern Italians have more trust and belief in
themselves and in the society within which they lived304• This did not necessarily lead to
economic affluence and a peaceful life, but it always set the northern areas of the peninsula
apart from those in the south30s• This 'civicness', with its horizontal societal relationships and
flourishing civil society, has been seized upon by the Lega as a basis for their calls for the
creation of a separate state (Padania306), or, at the very least, an institutional reorganisation
within Italy. Southerners are viewed as a money-grabbing, lazy and contemptible group, who,
through their (alleged) control of the governmental process in Rome, proceed to squander
hard earned Northern money. ~he Lega has successfully mobilised considerable amounts of
302 Lieven De Winter (1998): in Lieven De Winter & Huri Tursan (eds.): op. cit. p.216.
303 Philip Daniels (1999): 'Italy: Rupture and Regeneration', in David Broughton & Mark Donovan (eds.): op.
cit. p.77.
304 Robert D. Putnam: Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
30S Robert D. Putnam (1993): ibid. p.124.
306 After the LN's success in the 1996 elections (in September 1996), the party felt confident enough to
unilaterally declare the 'new state' of Padania as being independent from Italy.
101
Chapter 2 Regions and Regional Parties - An Analytical Framework
support around their calls for Northern solidarity'?', justice for Northern Italians and the right
to group self-determination and self-rule.
The existence of a civic community coupled with dissatisfaction at the redistributive
economic policies of the central Italian state prompted the Lega to actively manufacture a
group identity and a feeling of community in northern Italy for its own political ends. The
group identification had long been apparent, but it needed a political actor to mobilise it
around a clear set of policy preferences (see also section 2.5.2.3.). The LN has succeeded in
politicising a regionalist cleavage which cross-cuts the left-right axis formed by the two
'poles' that have risen to dominate the nascent Italian party system. The LN's electoral
constituency is relatively stable, being based on combined socio-economic interests and the
manifestation of a territorial identity. The LN subsequently sees little direct need either to
moderate its policies (which can border on the racist on occasion) or to seek to re-enter
electoral alliances/'".
Regions that suffer detrimental side-affects as a result of socio-economic change can
also develop strong regional consciousness. More often that not, this has once again been
linked with an expressly cultural understanding of one's own identification (i.e. in Wales309
and Scotland), but it is also clear that the weaker economic position of, say, Scotland vis-a-vis
England (and in particular when linked to the discovery of North Sea oil) prompted a much
increased sense of regional injustice. This once again illustrates that regional consciousness is
most likely to be embedded in regions where cultural uniqueness and material difference
combine to reinforce each other.
The process of globalisation is likely to further extenuate systemic disparities across
regions, as processes of economic and social change can play decisive roles in spawning
political regionalisrrr'!", International capital is much more fluid than it has ever been before,
and global multi-nationals have the ability to invest or withdraw from particular regions in a
very short space of time. Regional economic development is, in many places, growing ever
more dependent on inward investment from multi-national companies who have the power
and scope to fundamentally alter the social and economic development regions. Directly
linking this to a growth in regional consciousness is, at the moment, not possible, but it is
307 The LN is particularly successful in Lombardy (where it polled 24.6 per cent of the vote in 1996) and in the
North-East (27.6 per cent in 1996), although it remains well represented across all of Northem Italy.
308 This may, of course, change over time, as the fledgling Italian party system continues to change and
develop. The LN certainly saw no reason to align itself with either of the two ideological groupings at the 1996
election, and it clearly benefited from the independence that this offered it. Philip Daniels (1999): op. cit. p.92.
309 Philip Jenkins, in particular, claims that 'Welshness' is expressed above all through linguistic and cultural
patriotism. See Philip Jenkins (1992): op. cit. p.66.
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likely that in the future changing social and economic relationships will be fundamentally
affected by the increasingly global nature of international capitalism.
Rapid socio-economic change has also proven to be a catalyst for political regionalism
to develop. However, only rarely since political parties established themselves in the fabric of
western polities have such processes been rapid and sustained enough to engender radically
different constellations of political parties. Lipset & Rokkan's 'freezing hypothesis'
illustrated how the influence of the two revolutions led to a crystallisation of support in many
western European polities around the four major social cleavages. Yet, although social
change has consistently been taking place''!', it has rarely been rapid enough, or drastic
enough, to prevent the major parties from adapting to the new political environment. For
social change to prompt the rise of a regional space, the effects have to be explicitly regional
in their nature - and they have to challenge the way of life and/or economic well-being of the
community in a radical and new way. Although this has not occurred frequently in the past, it
does happen over time - and the globalisation of economic activity would indicate that there
is likely to be an increased propensity for it to happen more frequently in the future.
Catalonia, for example, experienced an influx of immigrants in the 1960s (owing
principally to its advantageous economic environment), spawning both drastic social and
cultural change. Although Catalonian nationalism has traditionally been both more' moderate
and cultural than many other forms of ethnic nationalism, it remained clear that the 'new
nationalism' of the 1960s spilt over from its intellectual basis into the population at large - a
process that the rapidly de-legitimising dictatorship could not stem312• The changes that were
underway within society as a result of large-scale immigration crystallised Catalonian self-
perceptions further in their struggle to preserve their own identity and cultural heritage - and
as such the parties that came into being in 1975 had little trouble mobilising Catalonians
along this renewed territorial divide.
The process of economic modernisation within the Basque Country is also a clear
example of a case where regional consciousness was sharpened as a result of demographic
changes within the population. This modernisation was not merely an economic matter - it
touched every level of society. The Basque people became "proletarianised'i" and young
310 Yves Meny (1987): op. cit. p.4. .
311 An example of this is the steady change of balance between people living and working in rural
environments, and those living in urbanised areas. Over the course of the twentieth century this change has been
unrelenting - but it has not been rapid enough to throw major parties out of sync. In the words of Sartori, the
. ~arty system has acted as a system of channelment, adapting to changing political circumstances.
12 Daniele Conversi (1997): op. cit. p.140.
313 Daniele Conversi (1997): op. cit. p.48.
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Basques found themselves being displaced from the countryside to the cities. Immigrants also
flooded the country from Castile (already seen as the princi~al oppressor in ,many Basque
eyes), providing clear competition for Basques in search of work and a new role within
Basque society. The issue of language was quickly relegated to a side issue (Le. the Basques
were now speaking the same language (Castillian Spanish) as the immigrants against whom
they were competing) and the question of social background rose in prevalence. Despite the
fact that the first unambiguous nationalist political organisation (the PNV) did not appear
until 1895, Basque nationalism underwent a renaissance and was the clear beneficiary of this
change in societal structure, as the issue of immigration saw Basque nationalist leaders (and
principally Sabino Arana y Goiri) abandon cultural nationalism in many of their political
statements. As Conversi notes:
Modernisation can be seen as a fatal wound for which Basque nationalism
claimed to the cure - appearing as a providential alternative to this chaotic human
scenario+".
This process of a change in the social structure, further re-enforced by another wave of
immigration in the 1960s and 1970s, continued to shape Basque politics in the years after the
fall of the Franco dictatorship, as the PSOE (the Spanish socialists) continued to achieve
higher levels of support amongst (poorly paid, working class) immigrants. This prompted the
PNV to continue to view immigrants as the chief manifestation of Spanish infiltration into
their nation - and as such as the main threat to the PNV's party-nation identity3ls.
Regional Parties make good use of regional disparities in economic wealth when
creating a unique political platform (see section 2.5.2.3.). They tend to do this in one of two
different ways: they may recognise that a region is visibly less affluent than the nation-state,
and therefore lobby and fight for a redistribution of econoinic resources for the benefit of the
regions citizens. The 'economic system' is seen as letting down the territories' citizenry, and
a regional party will demand that the central government take action to rectify this imbalance.
Alternatively, regional parties recognise that their region is both rich and affluent, and they
subsequently seek to defend their wealth in the face of attempts by other (national) actors to
redistribute it. The LN is the most celebrated example of this, and, on occasion, some of its
politicians have gone as far as claiming that Southerners are so keen to get their hands on
314 Daniele Conversi (1997): ibid. p.48
315 Chris Ross (1996): op. cit. p.493.
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Northern Italian wealth that Northern Italy should leave the Italian state altogether in order to
prevent this.
Examples of other regional parties using the tool of economic disparities to cement or
improve their places in a political system are widespread. -The SNP, for example, although
created as long ago as the late 1920s, was only able to make genuine electoral process as the
British state proved unable to deliver economic prosperity to Scotland. The diminished
effectiveness of territorial management helped the Nationalists to gain popularity in the,
1960s, and again in the 1980s and 1990S316• Nationalist claims in Scotland subsequently tend
to be based on distinctly practical arguments about institutions, accountability and (economic)
policies and rather less on ethnicity and cultural distinctivenesst'".
The party system in Scotland, although superficially the same as it has always been, can
no longer legitimately claim to give Scots a regular chance of being on the 'winning side' -
hence the failure of the system to accommodate Scots economic and political interests has led
to the rise in the support for the SNP. Class and partisan dealignment, though initially slow,
has certainly gone furthest in Britain's peripheral regions, as is emphasised by the failure of
the Conservatives to win any seats in either Wales or Scotland in the 1997 election. The
Conservative Party is increasingly identified with the South of England while Labour has
been caught between the two stools of maintaining its Scottish base and recapturing support in
the South of England - as was emphasised with the election of Tony Blair as Party Leader in
1994.
The crisis of Keynesian Welfarism highlighted intrinsic value differences between the
Scots and English. Michael Keating stresses that antagonism in Scotland is still linked to a
class basis, and is directed not specifically at the English318, but rather at the English political
Bstablishmenr'!". This may in part be correct, but opinions in Scotland on the subject of the
English do not always bear this out - as Scots themselves appear to believe that fellow citizens
display 'anti-English' sentiments. A poll conducted in June 1999 by Scottish Opinion for the
Daily Record, for example, highlighted that 66 per cent of Scots questioned agreed with the
statement that 'many people in Scotland are anti-Bnglish'F".
316 The SNP polled less than 15 per cent of the vote in the 1980s, increasing this to 21.5 per cent in 1992. At the
1994 European elections the SNP registered its higher ever proportion of the vote - 32.7 per cent.
317 Michael Keating (1996): op. cit. p.182.
318 Very small and insignificant fringe groups like Siol na Gaidheal, English Watch and Settler Watch did
attract attention in the 1980s for their anti-English rhetoric and for attacks on property, but all main nationalist
~arties and movements have firmly repudiated them. Michael Keating (1996): ibid. p.183.
19 Michael Keating (1996): ibid. pp.173-17S.
320 'Scots reveal anti-English sentiment': The Independent: 29 June 1999, p.1l.
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Hence the SNP has challenged the hegemonic status of the major parties, as a territorial
reconfiguration of British politics offered them a stronger role in representing Scottish
material interests.
Other forms of material disparity include the embourgeoisement of western society that
has also led to the weakening of traditional cleavages. As workers have attained greater
material wealth, and as general increases in prosperity have been achieved, traditional socially
mobilising variables have decreased in salience. This leaves the field open for other factors to
challenge their position as key determinants of the vote. As De Winter has observed:
Ethnoregionalist parties were more successful in introducing the new cultural and
regional sources of identity because their offer referred to dormant or lower-order
identities. These are the product of pre-modem cleavages: the opposition of local
and regional cultures against the introduction of a homogeneous national culture
by the centre, which is associated with a larger movement towards
homogenisation (in economic, financial, ~udicial, military, diplomatic terms)
linked to the emergence of the nation-statef .
This analysis therefore shows that regionalist parties do not, as a rule, tend to profit
from radical political or economic change unless the effects are territory-specific or the
regional party happens to be in a particular advantageous starting position (i.e. the Lega
Nord's criticisms of the Italian state as functioning on cronyism and corruption were given
particular credence by the gift (in political terms) of judicial processes being concurrently
launched by the Italian judiciary into the exact same allegations).
Section 2.4.1. has outlined a broad framework suitable for unpacking the factors that
contribute to the creation of a 'regional space' in which cultural and socio-economic factors
combine to engender territorial difference. This section has highlighted that such spaces exist
on the basis of a structures that facilitate the creation of territorial cleavage divides that cross-
cut other cleavages within the larger nation-state. It is the cross-cutting nature of this
cleavage that lends the region/nation its unique status. Citizens of the regional space
recognise the boundaries of their core territory, even if this is only implicit (as is the case in
Northern Italy) and non-institutional. A clear set of cultural variables will be evident that
distinguishes the regional space from the larger nation-state, often leading to the creation and
, reproduction of a unique territorial identity. This sense of 'uniqueness' becomes amplified if
is reinforced by clearly definable socio-economic differences - both in terms of advantageous
321 Lieven De Winter (1998): in Lieven De Winter & Huri Tursan (eds.): op. cit. p.218.
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and disadvantageous economic positions vis-a-vis the larger state, and it is these regions
where regional identities are strongest and regional spaces most pronounced.
2.4.2. Agency Factors in the Mobilisation of Regionalism
Having seen how structural variables contribute to the creation of regional spaces, it is
time to turn to the role of agents in making sense of these variables within the political
process. Section 2.4.2.1 - 2.4.2.3. illustrates how regional parties use the resources at their
disposal to articulate territorial difference in mobilising political support on the basis of
territorially exclusive political issues, sentiments and values. As agents within the political
process they exhibit a number of characteristics that differentiate them from the 'national'
parties and enable them to 'tap into' the regional uniqueness that is characterised by the
cultural and socio-economic variables discussed above.
2.4.2.1. Party Leadership
Groups of regional elites have to translate the language of difference into
understandable capital, in order for the citizens of a region to become aware of their
'differentness'. A conscious or sub-conscious regional identity will not prove strong enough
to provoke political articulation at the regional level if the elites within the region do not
clearly and succinctly argue the case for making it a salient electoral variable. The
manifestation of a territorial cleavage divide within society has to become the key
mobilisational variable in the battle for votes - otherwise regional issues will remain just one
set amongst many. Elites need to create a regional/nationalist reinterpretation of a past
history, of an economic situation, or of some other form of territorially salient issue, before
presenting it·to the populace in an accessible way322. It can be that, of course, regional elites
try vociferously to do this - but fail as a result of a lack of enthusiasm from the indigenous
group. But without an elite acting on regional uniqueness, the symbols, sentiments and
characteristics discussed above are highly unlikely to shape voting behaviour.
Although it is by no means true that a single individual has to fulfil this role, it has been
noticeable that prominent personalities like Sabino Arana y Goiri in the Basque County, and
much more recently Umberto Bossi in Italy, have had a fundamental influence on their
regional political movements. Charismatic and multi-functional leadership (in that one figure
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takes on a number of the most important functions within a regional party) frequently occurs
in the nascent period of nationalist/regionalist party development - something that is most
visible in Catalonia, where Jordi Pujol still remains a dominant figure in the CDC323• Other
regional parties display similar characteristics: to name but a handful:
• The Volksunie in Flanders was dominated by one ifits founding fathers, Frans van der Elst,
for over twenty years.
• Accomplished orator Francois Perin led the Rassemblement Walloon for a considerable
number of years.
• Plaid Cymru changed profoundly under the 36 year tutelage (1945-1981) of long-time
leader Gwynfor Evans.
• The SVP was led by Silvius Magnago from 1960 to 1989, and he had a decisive influence
in pushing for greater autonomy.
• The Union Valdotaine also had a long time leader (Luciano Caveri), who was prominent in
dictating W direction from 1945 to 1973.
• Eusko Alkartsauna (EA) is led by Carlos Garaicoetxea - one of the most dominant figures
in post-Franco Basque politics324•
Harmel and Svasand have defined the initial stages of party development as requiring a
leader that can successfully display and mould together creative, communicative and
charismatic skills. Regional parties are in particular need of these characteristics on account
of their general need to generate a broader ideological appeal. The characteristics that Harmel
and Svasand discuss enable the leader/the party to shape and effectively communicate the
party's message and it would appear that a large number of regional parties have been the
beneficiaries of such a form of leadership32s.
Yet as and when parties develop and stabilise it is clear that the nature and style of
leadership often changesf". As the initial leaders vacate their positions it is vital that the
regional movement remains organisationally strong, strategically focused and united (Le.
factionalism is avoided - although this is not always possible). This ensures that the party
322 Colin H. Williams (1981): Opecit. p.395.
323 Chris Ross (1996): Opecit. p.498.
324 Lieven De Winter (1998): in Lieven De Winter & Huri Tiirsan (eds.) (1998): Opecit. p.222
32S Robert Harmel & Lars Svasand: 'Party Leadership and Party Institutionalisation', in West European Politics,
Volume 16, 1993, p.74.
326 Lieven De Winter (1998): in Lieven De Winter & Huri Tiirsan (eds.) (1998): Opecit. p.223.
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does not lose sight of its goals and avoids the temptation of descending into internal conflicts
of direction and ideological outlook. This is what Harmel and Svasand describe as the second
stage of leadership. The third stage is one of gaining credibility and reliability, particularly in
terms of coalition formation and, where applicable, governmental performance. It is not
inconceivable for leaders to see their parties through all three of these phases. De Winter
claims that the founders of Rassemblement Walloon, the Front Democratique des
Francophones, Plaid Cymru, the Lega Nord and the Convergencia i Unio (CDC) in Catalonia
were all still in leadership. positions as their respective parties reached the stage of
Regierungsflihigkeit (the ability to govern)327.
While it is clear that all parties need effective elites, for regional parties they remain of
particular importance. They have to convince the public at large that they have a
cultural/territorial identity worth politically articulating over and above other societal
cleavages. Arana in the Basque country is probably the most successful example of this, as he
even managed to invent the key components of mythical Basque nationhood (Le. the name,
the flag and the national hymn). It is imperative that elites demonstrate to the wider electorate
why and how the centre is 'discriminating' against the region in question by offering
regionally specific answers to the questions that they themselves very often help to ask.
Leaders embody the very nature of the project by being charismatic, visible and intellectually
sharp.
The discussion in section 2.3. has already illustrated that although the structural
dynamics of party system development alone can not dictate that a regional party will prosper,
it is imperative that their is a place within that party system for a regional party to find a
niche. If the 'national' parties are able to dictate and control political activity and debate, by
setting the political agenda or adapting their own programmes to the challenge that regional
parties offer, then it is unlikely that regional parties will be able to muscle in. But if the
dynamics of a situation offer the chance for regional expression, then it is imperative that
regional elites grasp the opportunity, or the regional issues will remain under-discussed and
relatively unimportant.
2.4.2.2. Party Organisation
In order to mobilise regional uniqueness, regional parties tend to display flexible,
decentralised organisational structures. Following on from this, decentralised party structures
327 Lieven De Winter (1998): in Lieven De Winter & Hurl Tiirsan (eds.) (1998): ibid. p.223.
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tend to facilitate the prioritisation of policy over office hOlding328• Strom argues that the more
that decision-making within a party is decentralised, the greater will be its prioritisation of
pursuing the defence of policy positions rather than pragmatic attempts to achieve
governmental participation. Structures that are designed to give the grass-roots membership a
sizeable say in deciding a party's policy will be likely to constrain its elites' scope for
adopting electorally optimal policies (and thus maximising their chances of election to office).
They are also likely to attract more activists to the party in the first place.
Regional parties have displayed a marked tendency to have de-centralised organisations
- even if this is often still under the tutelage of one charismatic and respected leader.
Regional parties see the necessity of increasing their 'embeddedness' within their region, and
as such see increased value in a motivated and enthusiastic membership. For this reason
regional parties tend to be strong at traditional campaigning (i.e. door-to-door canvassing,
manning information stands and so forth). The membership tends to have disproportionate
opportunities to take part in party activities and to fulfil representative functions. In the
Basque Country, for example, the PNV has explicitly stated that all of the decisions that are
taken within the party are to made with the principle of subsidiarity in mind329•
Organisational structures therefore tend not just to be vertical, but also horizontal, as
parties attempt to maximise political gain by involving as many members in positions of
responsibility as is possible. Such an open and flexible party organisation, with the increased
possibility of formal political participation on all levels of the hierarchy also produces a high
level of political commitment. It has, therefore, become a trait of regional party activity that
activists are highly energetic, motivated and visible (if often inexperiencedj '", Hence
regional parties often give the impression of being nearer to the citizen than other parties, as
they have active and enthusiastic memberships pushing a uniquely regional policy line.
Regional parties often embed themselves into the regional culture by being active in
other societal groupings. In regions, for example, where the indigenous language is perceived
as being under threat, regional parties will seek to infiltrate and support pressure groups that
actively seek to defend it. Where regional identities are strong, regional parties will seek to
'spread their net' over a wide variety of regionally specific organisations, so as to contribute
to the civic and cultural life of the region. This is particularly true where parties have a large
328 Kaare Strom: 'A Behavioural Theory of Comparative Political Parties', in American Journal of Political
Science, Volume 34 Number 2,1990, pp.576-579.
329 Beatriz Acha Ugarte & Santiago Perez-Nievas: 'Moderate Nationalist Parties in the Basque Country', in
Lieven De Winter & Hurl Tursan (eds.): Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (London: Routledge, 1998),
p.98.
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number of cultural nationalists, but it is evident in areas where 'political nationalism' remains
dominant. If regional identification exists, regional party activists realise that they will be the
only ones actively articulating this is in the political arena - hence a broad network of aligned
groups within society ensures that the articulation of this message is clear, widely heard and
inclusive.
2.4.2.3. Party Policy
Although it is obvious that all political parties have policies and strategies, it is
noticeable that regional parties have frequently been seen to stress the importance of a
coherent and relatively narrow set of 'core' territorially specific policies. In contrast to other
major parties who tend to represent nationally salient societal cleavages (as, for example, is
the case in Great Britain where the Labour Party has traditionally represented the working
classes regardless of whether the workers concerned live in England, Scotland or Wales, or
the DC did for Catholics across the whole of Italy), regional parties clearly take advantage of
cleavages that either divide or differentiate the region from the national polity. This can be
done in many different ways331and it is often the case that these key pillars of the territorially
defined party's programme generate the electoral and activist base on which the party thrives.
The rise in the late 1980s and 1990s of regional leagues in the North of Italy is certainly
an example of this, and provides one of the most surprising and contradictory challenges that
any of the 'traditional' political forces across western Europe find themselves facing. The
salience of the loosely formed set of core regional policies that they articulate, based on calls
for a territorial re-organisation of the Italian state, generates widespread and heterogeneous'
support - forcing traditional political forces firmly onto the back foot.
The electoral successes of the Lega Nord most certainly have to be seen within the
context of the rapid and complex changes that the Italian political system has undergone over
the course of the last ten years332. The underlying dynamics of the end of the Cold War (see
above), sub-cultural change within Italian society, institutional degeneration, economic
stagnation and widespread (and high profile) corruption have completely changed the context
within which political competition in Italy now takes place. This environment has proved
330 David F. Patton (1998): op. cit. p.S l l.
331 Examples of 'Big Ideas' that are promoted by regional parties range from nationalist rhetoric, to language
preservation and protection (particularly in Wales, Catalonia, Flanders and Quebec) or attempts at hindering the
frocess of cultural homogenisation (as has periodically been the case for many regional parties).
32 Martin J. Bull & James L. Newell (1993): op. cit. pp.203-206.
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fruitful for parties and movements willing to advocate change, as Forza Italia, Rete and the
Northern Leagues, amongst others, have illustrated.
The Lega 's strategy has centred around attempts to introduce radical decentralisation of
the Italian state, and in particular the introduction of forms of self-government in northern
Itall33• Much of the often eccentric discourse in northern Italy centres on the (perceived)
illegitimacy of (money grabbing, parasitic) Southerners ruling over the dynamic North. As
Bull & Newell summarise, the 'Big Idea' of the Lega centres around a "distinctive mixture of
xenophobia (towards immigrants and Southerners) and hostility towards the corruption and
efficiency of a centralised state, colonised by clientelistic political parties in Rome, but
subsidised by Northern taxes,,334.
The Front Democratique des Francophones (FDF) has essentially only ever had one
idea - defending the interests of the Francophone residents of Brussels. It was formed in
1963 with this sole purpose in mind. It enjoyed a meteoric rise in popularity in the late 1960s,
when the it rose to be the strongest party in Brussels. Since the mid-1980s, however, it has
attracted less popular support (although its voter base does remain stable) - generally around
the 11-12 per cent mark. The FDF's voters, however, remain spread over differing
ideological and religious groupings, ensuring that FDF support remains noticeably
heterogeneous - apart from the common bond of the French language+".
Other regional parties also display a core group of policies, that are regionally specific
and subsequently distinguish them from other (national) political parties. They can be based
on the claims of cultural nationalists or more, as the LN does, socio-economic in nature - or of
course an amalgam of both of these. The programmatic direction of regional parties is,
however, inherently place-specific in nature, even if, as a result of governmental participation,
they are also. forced into holding positions on 'national' areas of policy (as happened in
Belgium). The FDF in Brussels, however, remained a party that consisted of people with
widely varying ideological backgrounds (liberals, socialists, Catholics) united by one
common goal: the defence of the interests of the Francophone citizens of Brussels. The
Volksunie and RW have also, if from a somewhat wider political platform, articulated key
policy concerns on the subject of language recognition (for the Volksunie) and the defence of
cultural rights in a linguistically divided state. This has latterly got to the point where no
333 Tom Gallagher: 'Regional Nationalism and Party System Change: Italy's Northern League', in West
European Politics, Volume 16Number 4, October 1993, pp.616.621.
334 Martin J. Bull & James L. Newell (1993): op. cit. p.2l3. J
335 Jo Buelens & Ruth Van Dyck (1998): in Lieven De Winter & Huri Tiirsan (eds.): op. cit. p.56.
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national parties exist in Belgium, as the cultural divide between Flanders and Wallonia has
spawned two party systems.
Constitutional, democratic forms of ethnic nationalism have also been in abundance in
other regions, as parties such as the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern
Ireland strives to consolidate its base in Northern Ireland's Catholic community. Such
movements attempt to mobilise more cross-class support, and hence the formulation of
broader platforms based on left-of-centre support (as is the case with the SDLP), or support
from the centre-right (as with the PNVIEAJ). This support is something that all broad based
movements require, even if they still clearly possess a core, place-specific set of policies that
are aimed at furthering the interests of a specific community.
2.5. Exploring the Typology in a German Context - Bavarianism and the CSU
Having created the analytical tool with which regional spaces and regional parties can
be conceptualised, this section employs a truncated version of the typology within the German
context by analysing the case of Bavaria and the CSU. This is as Bavaria and the position of
the CSU will act as a benchmark for the analysis of the PDS that is conducted in later
chapters. The typology can therefore be tested to illustrate how regional spaces (and regional
parties that articulate regional difference) have developed within the confines of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
2.5.1. Structural and Causal Factors inherent in Bavarianism
Bavaria has long been viewed as a state in Germany where the 'political clocks ticked
differently'Y". Although this polemical observation tells us, in reality, little about the
ideological, economic, social and political particularities of life in Bavaria, it is clear that their
is also a modicum of truth in such a claim. This section aims to illustrate exactly what this
truth is.
Bavaria is not just one of Germany's oldest states, it is one of the oldest states in
Europe. Its long history dates back to the sixth century337 and throughout all of the
336 Willy Brandt, annoyed at the idiosyncrasies of Bavarian politics and Bavarian politicians, first coined this
well-known phrase during his tenure as Federal Chancellor. It has since become a popular cliche used to
emphasise Bavarian cultural and political uniqueness.
337 Peter James: 'The 1998 Bavarian State Election', in Representation, Volume 36 Number I, Spring 1998,
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tumultuous events in German history its borders have remained largely unchanged. The
crystallisation of these borders post-1945 within the Federal Republic has ensured that the
'Free State of Bavaria' has continued to be an object that even the most historically apathetic
Bavarian will be able to associate with.
However, this is not meant to indicate that Bavaria is one monolithic social, economic
and cultural territory. Within the state there are regions that have very clear identifications
and self-perceptions. Some regions are renowned for being more conservative, others are
traditionally regarded as more liberal, while culturally Bavaria has a number of distinct
undercurrents. This is mirrored in other regional spaces such as, for example, the Basque
Country, where differing cultural and economic traditions have also long been in evidence.
Bavaria is, however, largely perceived to be a unitary political unit - and there is no question
that Bavaria is a conspicuous core territory that is widely perceived (by both Bavarians and
other Germans) as being a unique political communication area338• This is due in no large
part to the successful process of cultural and political homogenisation that the CSU has been
active in pursuing - as section 2.5.2. of this work will illustrate. Bavaria remains the largest
of Germany's sixteen federal states in terms of territory, and the second largest in terms of
population behind Northrhein Westphalia339• In many ways Bavaria and Bavarians pride
themselves on their Eigenstiindigkeit (independence) and their unique history. This ensures
and reproduces the belief that Bavaria is special and unique amongst German states. This has
led to a clear and unambiguous Bavarian identity developing, and it is for this reason that the
case of Bavaria is used as a German example against which the typology created in chapter
two will be employed. The reasons for the creation and stabilisation of a Bavarian identity
within a Bavarian regional space are discussed below.
'Bavarianism' is mobilised in the political arena by the regionally concentrated
Christian Social Union (CSU). Unlike the PDS (and the vast majority of other regional
parties) the CSU consistently polls majorities of the regional vote. Although there have been
times when the CSU has not polled a plurality of the vote340, the CSU bases its claim that it is
'Bavaria's Party' on the fact that it continues to register such high and consistent levels of
electoral support. This makes the CSU one of the most successful of all regional parties in the
democratic world.
f·98. .
38 AlfMintzel: in Dieter Oberndorfer & Karl Schmitt (eds.) (1991): op. cit. p.125.
339 Northrhein Westphalia has approximately 17 million inhabitants, while Bavaria has around 12 million.
340 An example of this was the 1994 European elections when the CSU only polled 48.4 per cent.
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2.5.1.1. Cultural Variables
The nature of German history and the federal system of governance have facilitated the
development of regional cultures in contemporary Germany - and it is clear that regionally
unique sets of social and political circumstances have helped to create a patchwork of
regionally identities across the length and breadth of the German state. The sense of
territorial identity that is evident in Bavaria is perhaps the most explicit example of this. As it
appears today, it is the culmination of a gradual process of homogenisation that has been
ongoing over at least the 180 years of Bavaria's territorial intactness'?'.
Since 1945 Bavaria has been through an extremely rapid modernisation and
secularisation process - ensuring that traditional (often religious) beliefs, customs and
I
attitudes co-exist with high-technology based industry and high standards of living. The
historical roots of Bavaria's Staatstradition and Bavaria's rapid advances. in economic
prosperity have enabled Bavarian political elites to shape post-industrial society in a
decidedly regional (Bavarian) way - permitting specifically Bavarian uniqueness to remain
prevalent in all aspects of political and social life.
The Bavarian Lebenswelt and identity are best seen as a conglomeration of a number of
phenomena'V:
• Due to the nature of the Bavarian economy and the traditional family and social linkages
that Bavarians have fostered, many Bavarians remain what Mintzel describes as
Kleinbiirgerlich (petit bourgeois).
• Bavaria is a largely rural state. This once again tends towards traditional conservative
societal and family structures in local communities.
• Despite the rapid modernisation of the last forty years, Bavarians remain intrinsically (and
irrationally) worried about elements of 'new-ness'.
• Bavarians are at times (ultra-) Conservative. Their political leanings are built on the
bedrock of religiosity (most predominantly Catholicism, but also Protestantism) and
conservative traditionalism - subsequently Bavarians are popularly perceived as being
more to the political right than citizens of other federal states.
• In Altbayern in particular Catholicism remains a potent force. This bestows a strong
religious, conservative culture on the indigenous population.
341 Alf Mintzel (1991): ibid. p.131.
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• Conversely, in Franken and other mainly Protestant areas there can exist a harsh anti-
Catholicism.
The brief list above indicates that, up until the late 1950s, Bavarian culture and self-
appreciation was littered with 'anti-attitudes', as Bavarians (and particularly those in
Altbayern) remained beset by what Mintzel saw as a clear inferiority complext'", This is best
encapsulated in a package of 'anti-attitudes' that Bavarians were widely perceived as holding.
These included:
• Anti- Big City
• Anti- Big Industry
• Anti- Liberal
• Anti- Prussian
• Anti- Intellectual
• Anti- CatholiclProtestant (either/orr'"
The underlying inferiority syndrome transformed itself with the advent of the 1960s,
and quickly metamorphosed into a confident pride in Bavarian Eigenstdndigkeit, as well as its
economic affluence. Hence worries about inferiority have given way to an almost belligerent
confidence in all things Bavarian, as traditional Bavarian conservatism co-exists with
modernity, making Bavarian culture a unique hybrid. Such cultural uniqueness is
subsequently replicated in the identity of many Bavarians.
Bavaria also remains the most strongly religious region of Germany. The Catholic
Church has been a considerable force in shaping the social and cultural life of the Bavarian
people, and large numbers of Bavarians still take part in church activities. The Catholic
Church has traditionally had a very close relationship with the Bavarian state and with
Bavarian people, stemming from the times of the House of Wittelbach in the Middle Ages.
Between 1047 and 1057 three Bavarians were appointed Pope, and until Bavaria became a
kingdom in '1806 it was virtually 100 per cent Catholic345, Only when Protestant Franken
joined Bavaria did Protestantism gain a foothold within the Bavarian state346,
342 For a fuller analysis of this see AlfMintzel (1991): ibid. p.168.
343 AlfMintzel (1991): ibid. p.168.
344 AlfMintzel (1991): ibid. p.168.
345 Peter James (1999): op. cit. p.98. ,
346 For a detailed breakdown of the number of Catholics in Bavaria and Germany as a whole see Statistisches
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With a population that is so predominantly Catholic, it is hardly surprising that the
Catholic Church plays such an influential role in Bavarian social and cultural life. Bavarian
political representation has also illustrated this. The Bavarian Patriots Party was the first
manifestation of political Catholicism around 1850, and this was followed by the Catholic
Centre Party (Zentrum) and, between the wars, the Bavarian People's Party (Bayerische
Volkspartei) - the immediate predecessor of the CSU. Many Catholics continue to view the
CSU as 'their' party, even though great efforts were made after the Second World War to
establish an inter-denominational party and the relationship between Catholicism,
Bavarianism and the CSU remains very close. In the 1998 election, for example, 58 per cent
of Catholics voted CSU, while of the regular church goers the figure was 77 per cene47•
There are, however, also a considerable number of Protestants in Bavaria - roughly 25
per' cent of the population, Bavaria registers the highest proportion of Protestant church-
attendees of any of the German Gliedkirche348• Protestants (and especially the church going
ones) do also support the CSU in large numbers. This is as Bavarian culture is strongly
shaJ;>edby (conservative) religious values - and the CSU both encourages and represents this
within the political arena.
2.5.1.2. Socia-Economic Variables
Since the Second World War Bavaria has experienced a process of rapid SOCIO-
political change. . In less than two decades (the 1950s and 1960s) Bavaria was transformed
from a largely agrarian state to a predominantly industrial one. Bavaria is thus unique in the
FRG as it experienced a relatively late transition from a society that was dominated
predominantly by agriculture, crafts and small trades to those industries widely regarded as
both industrial and post-industrial. In the years up to 1945 processes of industrialisation were
concentrated mainly in the urban focal points of Nuremberg, Augsburg, M':ffiichand North-
East Franconia, while post World War II this base was broadened to include many more
previously rural districts. Mintzel has observed that of the 100 agrarian districts (Kreise) that
existed in 1939 only 17 (out of a combined total of 191) remained 'agrarian' in 1977,
illustrating the rapid process of industrialisation that has taken place in recent years349•
Bundesamt (1996): op. cit. p.99.
347 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen quoted by Peter James (1999): op. cit. pp.98-99.
348 Statistisches Bundesamt (1996): op. cit. p.98.
349 Alf Mintzel: 'The Christian-Social Union in Bavaria: Analytical Notes on its Development, Role and
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This rapid socio-political change is reflected in the proportion of the working
population that is employed in the agricultural sector in Bavaria. The proportion fell steadily
from 37.2 per cent of the labour force in 1946 to a mere 13.2 per cent in 1970. This is in stark
comparison to the percentage of people employed in the industrial and craft sector, which rose
from 33.6 per cent in 1946 to 48.9 per cent350• The 'tertiary sector' (comprising public and
private services) subsequently gained in importance and whereas in 1946 only 15.7 per cent of
the population were employed in this sector, by 1970 this figure was 23.8 per cent351•
As processes of rapid social and economic change were underway the CSU was able
to act as force of stability and continuity. This is as the party realised that the social and
economic landscape in Bavaria was outdated and in need of drastic overhaul. The CSU's
primary achievement was in managing these processes of modernisation (as the Bavarian
Staatspartei) in such a way as to minimise the inherent social disruption that this could have
caused352• Bavarians themselves were aware of the need to regenerate and restructure their
economy, but were keen to preserve the traditional social structures and societal linkages that
are so important to the Bavarian way of life. The middle-classes were, therefore, carefully
protected from the harsher elements of economic transformation, as small and medium sized
firms received state support and clear protection in their battle to compete with their larger
competitors.
This rapid and widespread process of technological and industrial advancement has
ensured that Bavaria remains an affluent state. It has also ensured that a form of social
agreement came into existence between the middle classes and the large industrial firms
which has lasted in the years after the rapid economic transformation. Hence economic
transformation ensured not only that Bavaria remained socially conservative (i.e.
advantageous territory for a Christian-Social party) but also affluent and devoid of major
industrial fault-lines between the middle classes and industrialists - once again providing a
sound political basis for the CSU to build upon. Hence Bavarians are consciously aware and
proud of the advancements that have been made since World War II in the economic sphere.
Rapid (and controlled) modernisation have brought together disparate groups within Bavarian
society under the banner of 'Bavarianism' - ensuring that the already strong sense of
Bavarian identity has been re-enforced through common experiences of economic affluence.
Success', in Max Kaase & Klaus von Beyme (eds.): Elections and Parties (London: Sage, 1978), p.194.
350 AlfMintzel (1978): ibid. p.196. .
351 AlfMintzel (1978): ibid. p.196.
352 Stephen Padgett & Tony Burkett (1986): op. cit. p.l19.
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The CSU has been an active and influential actor in transforming Bavaria from a largely
agricultural state to one that is now regarded as a modem, high-technology based region.
While it is clear that the globalisation of economic activity and the nature of the knowledge
economy have forced every government within Germany to fundamentally change the way it
regulates the economy, the CSU has actively encouraged rapid transformation in a way that
no other party has. Furthermore, the CSU has concomitantly remained true to its conservative
roots and has not neglected the traditional values that it has also espoused such as the
importance of family, of Bavarian patriotism and Christianity (and principally
Catholicismr'i".
The 1957 CSU government was the first to actively attempt to transform Bavaria's
economic landscape. Although the CSU stresses the importance of the free market, it is clear
that Bavaria's economic rejuvenation was not achieved as a result of market forces alone.
Strategic subsidies and a clear tendency towards economic intervention helped to protect the
more fragile parts of the Bavarian economy. This enabled small and medium size firms to
remain economically viable and, importantly for the electoral chances of the party, to provide
a sound social base for improving CSU support at the polls.
The outstanding success that the CSU has achieved in helping to promote regional
prosperity is unique in Germany today. The CSU supported and encouraged processes of late
industrialisation that have enabled economic prosperity to become widespread. Citizens of
Bavaria recognise the key role that the economic policies of the CSU have played in
permitting this to take place. Rarely has any region been so effectively modernised in such a
smooth and orchestrated fashion and yet avoided considerable social and economic
dislocation in some shape or form,
In view of the Bavaria's rapid economic transformation the CSU has adopted defensive
policy positions that aim to retain as much as is possible of Bavaria's wealth. While CSU
politicians have drawn short of calling for Bavaria to cease all payments that aim to
recompense poorer federal states, section 5.1.1. illustrates that it is frequently CSU politicians
who threaten to cut Bavarian payments towards the Landerftnanzausgletch if the CSU
government perceives (frequently eastern German) state governments to be squandering the
contributions. Such comments are, of course, treated with contempt by eastern German
politicians as, firstly, it is not for the CSU to decide who governs where and what they do
with their funds and, secondly, Bavaria itself has only recently turned into a 'giver' state and
has, as such, made use of exactly the same payments for most of the post-194S period.
3S3 Theo Waigel (CSU): in Hanns Seidel Stiftung (1995): op. cit. p.65.
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2.5.2. Agency Factors in the Mobilisation of Bavarianism
Given that these structural factors differentiate Bavaria from the other German states, it
is now time to turn in detail to the political actor that articulates this in the political process:
the Christian Social Union (CSU). The CSU has not just taken electoral advantage of these
differences, it has often played an active role either in extenuating them or in mobilising them
to its advantage. It is for this reason that the CSU has so successfully defended 'Bavarian
interests' within the political process.
Within Germany the CSU is a unique political party. It remains a regional party that, on
account of its relationship with its sister party, the COU, is still able to playa clear role in
federal politics. It has also successfully integrated itself into the social fabric of its state and
has come to be seen as being synonymous with Bavaria and Bavarianism. The CSU has
successfully learnt to articulate 'the tenets of Bavarianism within federal and regional politics
to such a degree that it is now regarded as a democratically legitimated Staatspartei.
Having outlined the nature of Bavarianism in section 2.5.1. the following section
applies the typology outlined in section 2.4.2. to the case of the CSU. It illustrates that the
CSU uses the structural variables evident in Bavarian society for its own ends - electoral
success arid the retention of power. The CSU has been successfully because it appeals to a
broad cross-section of the electorate on the basis of a territorial cleavage divide outlined in
2.5.1. Section 2.5.2. therefore highlights the methods and the means by which the CSU
successfully acts as the agent of Bavarian uniqueness within the political system.
2.5.2.1. Party Leadership
Strong and confident leadership is not something that the CSU has lacked over the
years. In Franz Josef Strauss, the long-time leader of the party (1961-88), the CSU possessed
one of the most charismatic and belligerent politicians of the post-war era. This mirrors the
position of a large number of other regionalist/nationalist parties who have benefited from the
clear strategic thinking and charismatic leadership of one individual person.
The leadership style of Strauss was of particular importance not just in galvanising
Bavarians to vote for 'their' party, but also in the CSU's relationship with its sister party, the
COU. While the COU moved away from the charismatic/authoritarian style of leadership that
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was evident under Konrad Adenauer, the CSU experienced what amounted to a reversal of
this process3S4• Strauss was a belligerent and enthusiastic speaker, who encapsulated the very
nature of politics in his home state. Yet in its formative years after World War II, the
leadership of the CSU tended to be much less bellicose and the leadership subsequently
changed hands a number of times3ss• But on his election to the CSU leadership in 1961
Strauss enthusiastically shaped the party in an image based very much on the strong
leadership he offered. Not even the period of CSU opposition at the federal level (from 1969
until 1982) could weaken his hand. and the fact that the CSU was no longer in the federal
government actually, ifanything, reinforced his domineering style ofrule356•
A look at the history of the CSU leadership reveals that it was only under Strauss that
the charismatic role of chairman achieved quite the status it has now. Strauss' national
political role allowed him considerable political freedom and a free hand to be a Bavarian
voice in the grand politics of state. This went down well both with the CSU's regional
politicians (who felt that they had considerably more freedom if Strauss remained active at the
national level) and Bavarians in general. who saw Strauss as something of a strategist and
'big-game player' .. Strauss made implicit (and occasionally explicit) claim to being the
supreme architect of policy within the CSU: subsequently revealing his decidedly elitist view
of internal party democracy - as a result of which party congresses took on something of a
plebiscitary character. The CSU rank and file realised that Strauss had the ability to mobilise
the Bavarian electorate (although it is worth remembering that he did not often find such
popular resonance in other parts of Germany) - and thus in spite of the occasional rhetorical
faux pas and political scandal he commanded (and received) great loyalty from the foot
soldiers in his CSU base.
Strauss, in contrast to Edmund Stoiber, the current chairman of the CSU, was not able
to dominate the regional political scene to nearly the same extent - something that Stoiber is
able to do, on account of his role as the Bavarian Ministerprdsident. Stoiber is keen to stress
that he is not interested in becoming Federal Chancellor'" on account of the fact that, for him,
the job of Bavarian Ministerprdsident is the highest accolade that any Bavarian can aspire to.
354 Geoffrey Pridham: Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and
Ofposition, /945-/976 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p.315.
3S Josef Muller (1945-49), Hans Ehard (1949-55) and Hanns Seidel (1955-61) did not, for various reasons,
possess or develop the same commandeering leadership styles that both Strauss and Stoiber have in recent years.
Muller was too preoccupied with attempting to create a cross-denominational Bavarian variant of the CDU,
while both Ehard and Seidel placed considerably more emphasis on their positions as leaders of the Bavarian
refional government. See Geoffrey Pridham (1977): ibid. p.317.
3S Geoffrey Pridham (1977): ibid. p.315.
357 He has definitively ruled this out on a number of occasions. See for example 'Worte der Woche', in Die
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Stoiber is just as rhetorically powerful as Strauss and also commands a loyal base of party
support - even though his political remit is much more regional than federal.
Bavarian leaders have, on occasion, revelled in attracting attention and controversy,
and it is beyond question that Bavarian leaders have manufactured a freedom for themselves
that other Ministerprdsidenten cannot (or do not) make use of. Robert Leicht, writing in Die
Zeit, has summarised Stoiber's skill at using every ounce of available political capital and
ensuring that every political opportunity is exploited to the full - all with the principal aim of
making sure that Bavaria's voice is heard:
The Bavarian Prime Minister feels almost compelled to seek Bavarian
Sonderwege ... (special ways) ... the principals that led to the debate concerning
crucifixes in classrooms will be replicated over the abortion issue and 'paragraph
218', just as they will be when the issue of German-Czech compensation comes to
a special vote .... The Bavarian government does not give a damn about Karlsruhe
and Bonn, about the Bundestag or the Bundesregierung (Federal Government). If
other politicians were to treat the Rechts- und Staatsordnung (system of laws and
governance) with such disdain, then Stoiber and his supporters would be the first
to denounce them as Verfassungsfeinde (enemies of the constitution) ... 358.
The CSU is therefore a party that has grown used to clear, unambiguous and politically
strong leadership. Franz-Josef Strauss helped to shape both the role of the CSU in federal
politics as well as the setting of parameters for electoral success in the Bavarian arena. The
CSU membership has grown accustomed to seeing its leaders launch occasionally scathing
attacks on federal politicians and the federal government, and the party faithful remain (as a
rule) highly supportive of its leadership.
2.5.2.2. Party Organisation
The CSU makes the very most out of the resources at its disposal. When compared with
the other political parties in Bavaria it has a large and enthusiastic membership (see below) as
well as the material resources to spread its activities across the length and breadth of Bavaria.
Furthermore, the de-centralised nature of the German political system enables it to empower
members at the lower levels of micro-politics. This in tum offers members considerable
incentives to take part in political activity, hold minor political office and feel they are making
Zeit, 21 March 1997, on http://www.archiv.zeit.de/datenlpagesl1997113/wowos.txt.19970321.html
358 Robert Leicht: 'Bayem: Stoiber pfeift auf Bonn und Karlsruhe', in Die Zeit, 31 May 1996, on
http://www/archiv.zeit.de/datenlpagesl1996/23Ibayem.txt.19960531.html
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a genuine contribution to the CSU's political success. Section 2.5.4. hypothesised that the
empowerment of members within the political process was much more likely to lead to parties
stressing policy issues in preference to office holding issues, and while it is clear that the
hegemonic position of the CSU is something that the party fiercely defends, German
federalism allows CSU (as well as other party) politicians at all levels to have a meaningful
effect on the way that their local communities are run.
In spite of this diversity, the CSU has also benefited from belligerent and charismatic
leadership. Section 2.7.2. illustrated threw more light on this phenomenon. It is, however,
clear that Franz Josef Strauss in particular was fortunate when he came to power that the CSU
had overcome its period of internal crisis in the mid-1950s and had already successfully
completed the organisational reforms that would allow it to become the dominant force in
Bavarian politics. It is against this background that Strauss was able to consolidate his
position (and the position of subsequent Chairmen) within the CSU party hierarchy.
The reasons for this surround the jolts that the party suffered in the late 1940s and early
1950s, when competition with the Bavarian Party as well as the creation of a four-party
governing coalition (that did not include the CSU) threatened the very existence of the
party3S9. The CSU leadership realised that, over the long-term, in order to secure and/or
extend its influence in Bavarian politics the CSU needed a broad organisational substructure
that stressed social integration and political inclusiorr'f", Or, as Mintzel has phrased it:
A well-organised party anchored in all Bavaria's political communities and
equipped with efficient machines was itself regarded as an important stabilising
factor in social and political development'?'.
Hence the CSU has made a concerted effort to increase its membership and broaden the
span of its organisational scope. In 1955 the CSU membership was around 35,000, but by
1970 it had quadrupled to 140,000362, Through the 1980s and 1990s the CSU stabilised its
membership around the impressively high figure of 170/180,000 and it remains by a
considerable margin the largest membership party in Bavaria363•
The CSU central party machine increased in terms of full-time employees from 14 in
359 For a detailed account of the CSU's development in its formative years see Winfried Becker: 'Grundung und
Wurzeln der Christlich-Sozialen Union' in Hanns-Seidel Stiftung (1995): op. cit. pp.69-108; Christoph Henzler:
'Die Cbristlich-Soziale Union in den ersten Nachkriegsjahren', in Hanns-Seidel Stiftung: op. cit. pp.l 09-162.
360 AlfMintzel (1978): op. cit. p.204.
361 AlfMintzel (1978): ibid. p.20S.
362 AlfMintzel (1978): ibid. p.20S.
363 See Hanns-Seidel Stiftung (1995): op. cit. p.713.
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1955 to over 200 in 1972364, In the late 1970s the CSU had 120 offices across the length and
breadth of Bavaria, compared to the 42 of the SPD, illustrating the depth of the organisational
framework that the CSU had been able to compile36S, This costly process of 'rearmament'
within the CSU was conducted from the General Secretariat and the Provincial Executive
Committee Management with virtually a total exclusion of the conventional organs of
membership representation. All the organisational efforts 'from above' were aimed least of
all at simultaneously extending democratic participation by members. The main organisation-
policy aim was in turning the CSU not only into a mass party in the sense of having a large
following of voters, but also into a mass membership party. This served the purpose of
increasing the density of its organisation and membership throughout the whole of Bavaria
and of creating, among other things, a reservoir of new, up and coming, political potential. In
the 1990s the CSU was the envy of all other parties in Germany, as it continued to maintain a
dense organisational network. The 2918 Ortsverbdnde, 110 Kreisverbiinde and 44
Bundestagswahlkreisorganisationen366 enabled, as far as possible, every political community
in Bavaria to be permeated organisationally and ensures that Bavarian citizens are mobilised
for the CSU's political aims367,
The internal structure of the party has remained authoritarian-oligarchic. Important
decision-making processes are seldom initiated via the organs of membership representation
(meetings of members or meetings of representatives) and transmitted upwards. On the
contrary, such initiatives are launched in the party's top management and in the CSU
parliamentary group in the Bavarian Landtag, as well as in the parliamentary Fraktion in
Bonn. The elected delegates are generally reduced to mere legitimators of decisions which
have long since been made elsewhere. In the words ofPridham:
CSU Congresses have primarily performed an acclamatory function, acting as a
trampoline for Strauss's ... (the leader of the CSU at the time) ... political
gymnastics, with his major policy speech and re-election as chairman being the
highlights of the occasion368,
A clear hierarchy exists within the party and the CSU remains the most authoritarian
major party in Germany today, Members and conference delegates tend to follow a
domineering group of leaders (or leader, in the cases of Strauss and Stoiber) and populism is
364 AlfMintzel (1978): op. cit. p.20S.
365 AlfMintzel (1978): ibid. p.192.
366 Peter Losche: Kleine Geschichte der deutschen Parteien (Berlin: Kohlhanuner, 1994), p.124.
367 AlfMintzel (1978) op. cit. p.208.
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used as a mobilisational tool within the party. These tendencies are supported by excellent
lines of communication between the upper echelons of the party and the grass-roots level.
However, although the organisational make-up of the CSU is a clear help in channelling party
control upwards towards the leadership, the CSU's communal politicians are also able to
enjoy a great deal of autonomy in their particular local spheres of influence. This facilitates
member participation in the political process and offers the ideal spring-board for voter
mobilisation as elections approach.
2.5.2.3. Party Policy
The CSU's core set of regional policies has largely been outlined above. As a modem
Volkspartei, the CSU offers a prime example of a party integrating different political cultures,
religious orientations and social attitudes under the banner of territorial uniqueness'?", When
this is coupled with the economic affluence that CSU governments have overseen, it is clear
why the CSU has become synonymous with Bavaria and Bavaria with the CSU. The CSU
has successfully conceptualised the differing (and, on occasion in the past, conflicting) tenets
of Bavarianism within one coherent political platform - a not inconsiderable achievement
given the diverse nature of Bavarian politics and culture when the CSU was formed in 1946.
Its success at doing this has ensured that no party has shaped the modem history of Bavaria to
anything like the same extent as the CSU has - and this has ensured that the CSU continues to
be perceived as Bavaria's advocate within both the regional and national political arenas.
The core set of policies is based on Christian values, conservative interpretations of
concepts such as the nation, the role of the woman, abortion, the right to asylum, the role of
the family and the importance of religion and economic modernisation. This big idea
corresponds with the socio-political community that the CSU has itself helped to create in the
Bavarian regional space.
The CSU has carefully moulded its 'big idea' to encapsulate all that is popularly
regarded as positive by Bavarians. This naturally stems from the influence that the CSU has
had, as the long-time governing party, in shaping and moulding the Bavarian political and
economic environment. But the CSU has proven itself flexible and politically astute in
articulating this. Its ideology does, at times, appear arch 'conservative' in its social policy,
yet it can also be surprisingly progressive in adapting to economic and political change. The
368 Geoffrey Pridham (1977): op. cit. p.317.
369 Peter Losche (1994): op. cit. p.122.
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underlying current of right-wing opinion is played up within the popular press to distance the
CSU from the CDU and to help in establishing a unique profile that separates it from its sister
party. But the underlying conservatism evident in the CSU is frequently in stark opposition to
its pragmatic practical nature. The CSU realises that its 'big idea' involves it continuing to
achieve hegemonic status in Bavarian elections - and in order to do this it must adapt and
respond to rapid political and economic change. Bavarians wish to retain their affluence and
wealth compared to other Germans, and the CSU is wise enough to realise that it must
encourage investment, economic dynamism and pragmatism in order to achieve this aim. The
CSU balances the interests of different economic groups (the middle classes, the self-
employed and big business) as well as carefully protecting the interests of agricultural
producers. This shows how the 'big idea' encompasses protecting the economic interests of
the most productive sectors of the economy without causing social instability. From the
1950s and 1960s onwards Bavarian politicians have proven themselves to be open towards
the future, ready to adapt and accept new technological advancements, ready to embrace new
forms of development and 'Zukunftsindustrien', as well as the necessity of societal change..
Edmund Stoiber also appears very much to accept this motto, as he synthesises calls to protect
and court traditional Bavarian beliefs and customs, alongside the pragmatic embracing of
modernisation and economic advancement.
The success of being economically progressive while socially conservatism has
prompted a number of cliches to common into popular parlance that aim to describe this
unique combination. "Laptops and Lederhosen, Kruzifix and Kapital, High Tech and
Muttergottes" may all be meant as flippant representations of this reality, but they do
encapsulate the Bavarian 'big idea' very succinctly.
The CSU mobilises support on account of both of the distinct variables discussed in the
typology. This is clear evidence that the CSU is successful because it understands the nature
of Bavarian identity and of what it means to be Bavarian. It has created a political platform
that combines the socially conservative and reactionary elements of Bavarian culture with the
modernism that is required to acquire and sustain material prosperity. The CSU has taken
what would initially appear to be diverse groups within Bavarian society (Catholics,
Protestants, the middle classes, those working in agriculture and so forth) and brought them
together in one political Heimat. The CSU has skilfully transformed the nature of group
identities in Bavaria by manoeuvring traditional ones to one side and replacing them with a
clear Bavarian identity. In particular, the CSU has succeeded in taming the age-old animosity
between Protestants and Catholics by creating a political culture and a cross-denominational
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party with which all Bavarians can identify. This is one of the CSU's major achievements
and its success in overcoming the traditional split between Bavarian Catholics and Protestants
and developing a cross-denominational base have proved to be the fundaments of its
continued political success370• The CSU has bridged the divide within Bavarian society
between the confessions - even if Catholics still support the CSU in greater numbers than
Protestants do. The first leader of the CSU, JosefMiiller, fought, in the end successfully, for
.a party that was iiberkonfessionell (and "a party that was characterised by liberal, civic
virtues based on the Christian Weltanschauung,,371)- and it is the broad, conservative nature
of the CSU's appeal that has enabled so many Bavarians to see it as the representative of the
Bavarian state both internally (in Bavarian politics) and externally (in federal politics). The
CSU is therefore seen as being synonymous with Bavaria and Bavarians - just as Bavarians
view the CSU as 'their' party and 'their' political advocate. The CSU has manufactured a
lasting and coherent territorial identity. In the words of former leader Theo Waigel "the
Bavarian identity is a priceless possession of the CSU' and the CSU has succeeded in
associating itself with the Bavarian state and the articulation of Bavarian territorial sentiment
through its long tenure as Bavaria's party of governmenr'". Bavaria is, thanks to the efforts
of the CSU, a state where diverse groups of citizens express a clear territorial identification as
Bavarians.
The CSU takes advantage, as other regional parties do, of its excellent party
organisation and the good fortune it has had in possessing strong leaders. It has developed
and dense network of branches and members and no other party in Bavaria is able to compete
with the efficiency of the CSU's organisation. Activists are given plenty of opportunity to
take part in political work and to stand for the CSU on elected bodies, even if the policy
making structures of the Land party remain top-down. Members of the CSU are used to
leaders dominating party affairs, and in Franz Josef Strauss and Edmund Stoiber the party has
developed two of the most charismatic and rhetorically able politicians of recent times.
This is in spite of the fact that Bavaria is far less homogeneous and uniform than it may
sometimes seem. Bavaria has three historico-political tradition zones. As a result of its
genesis at the beginning of the 19th century the present state of Bavaria includes Franconia,
Swabia and Old Bavaria. But in contrast to its Bavarian predecessors and opponents, the
370 Both the Bavarian Party (in the immediate post-war period) and the Bavarian Peoples Party (during the
Weimar Republic) have, at different times, mobilised considerable portions of the Bavarian vote. The same can
also be said for the Catholic Zentrum party. They were never, however, able to expand over and above a narrow
(and often divided) Catholic base.
371 'Die Parteivorsitzenden der Christlich-Sozialen Union', in Hanns-Seidel Stiftung (1995): ibid. p.682.
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CSU has learnt to extend its political reach over these traditional boundaries and to represent
Bavarians as a territorial community. Theo Waigel has summarised this thus:
Since its inception the CSU has understood itself as a genuine Volkspartei
(peoples party), within which all sociological groupings have the opportunity to
find a political home. The programme of the CSU offers something to all sections
of the Bavarian population - to women and men, to employers and employees, to
those in the middle classes, the self-employed as well as those who work on the
land and those who work in the public services373•
The CSU is also a clear beneficiary of its dual role as a federal and a regional party374.
It can exert influence on both federal and regional politics in a way that belies its relatively
small (nationally speaking) portion of the vote. The platform that the CSU is able to exploit
allows it, in the words of Edmund Stoiber, to "keep Bavaria strong as well as to storm
(,sturmen J Berlin ,,375.
The dual role of the CSU is important as on the one hand it remains a regional party,
only competing for votes, members and resources in Bavaria. It has enjoyed an almost
unbroken period of governance and gives forceful voice to the conservative and parochial
tenets of Bavarian identity within the Bavarian regional space. These points make it
indisputably Bavaria's party. But the CSU is also able to vocally articulate territorial
sentiment in the federal arena on account of its unique relationship with the Cnu. The CSU
is not merely the Bavarian subsidiary of the Christian Democrats: it is a separate party that
comes together with the CDU in the same Fraktion (parliamentary party). The cnu and the
CSU may both regard themselves as centre-right, but they do have slightly different policy
orientations and ideological standpoints. The CSU, reflecting its Bavarian constituency, sees
itself as providing a counterweight to the more liberal wing of the CDU. It sees itself as a
conservative party: something that the majority of member of the CDU would clearly not
wish to describe the CDU as376. The CSU is therefore able to give voice and authority to
Bavaria's conservative identity within the framework of a nationally powerful political
organisation (the CDU/CSU Fraktion in the Federal Parliament).
37Z Thea Waigel (CSU): in Harms-Seidel Stiftung (1995): op. cit. p.61.
373 Thea Waigel (CSU): in Hanns Seidel Stiftung (1995): ibid. p.23.
374 Alf Mintzel: 'Conservatism and Christian Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany'. in Zig Layton-
Henry (ed.): Conservative Politics in Western Europe (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp.145-146.
37S Edmund Stoiber (CSU): 'Worte der Woche', in Die Zeit, 21 January 1999, p.2.
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2.6. Concluding Remarks
Chapter two has created a typology consisting of two parts suitable for analysing the
core hypothesis of this work: that the PDS has been (and is) politically successful as a result
of mobilising specific eastern German sentiment. The first part of the typology
conceptualises what is meant by the term regional spaces and how cultural and socio-
economic variables come together to create cross-cutting territorial cleavages with a larger
nation-state. Socio-economic and cultural phenomena come together to foster regionally
unique spaces. The next chapter of this work (chapter three) employs the typology to eastern
Germany, enabling the cultural and socio-economic differences between eastern and western
Germany to be conceptualised. The typology will be used as an analytical tool to illustrate
that, like numerous other regions in the democratic world, eastern Germany is a region with a
sufficiently strong sense of differentness and identity to be able to support a regional party.
The second part of the typology illustrates the manner and means that regional parties
employ in mobilising territorial uniqueness. The forms of party leadership, organisation and
policy that regional parties possess and/or advocate enables them to give voice to the regional
uniqueness that was highlighted in the first part of the typology. Regional parties act as
agents in the political process who make specific use of the territorial cleavages that structural
variables help to create with a given society.
The chapter closed by testing the typology (in a somewhat truncated fashion) in the
German case of Bavaria. It illustrated that Bavaria can be conceptualised as a regional space
on account of the differing identifications that Bavarians express and as a result of the value
and attitudinal differences that exist between Bavaria and the rest of Germany. Both cultural
and socio-economic factors come together to produce what can best be defined as
'Bavarianism'. The CSU has possessed charismatic leadership, impressive organisational
structures and a core group of regionally specific policies that have enabled it to shape itself
as 'Bavaria's party'. The CSU has managed to gain a position of hegemonic power on
account of politically encapsulating Bavarian uniqueness and voicing it within the national
and regional political arenas.
The discussion in this chapter has also illustrated that the development and
consolidation of parties representing regional interests is characterised by a multitude of
differing, over-lapping and often original constellations of factors. Regional parties have
successfully moulded these into a strategy emphasising territorial differences between region
376 S htep en Padgett & Tony Burkett (1986): op. cit. p.120.
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and centre. The party has to mobilise a form of group identity, or regional identification, in
order to create a niche for itself within the political life of that region. The party has to use
the varying historical, social, economic, political and cultural tools at its disposal to articulate
territorially salient issues that exist on account of a territorial cleavage divide within the
political arena.
Therefore it is possible to summarise that the self-perception of a community and the
subjective demarcation of 'in groups' and 'out groups', based on the development of
cleavages within nation-states, fosters a consciousness enabling communities, firstly, to be
created, and, secondly, to see themselves as regionally distinct and either in need of political
representation or open to the claims of regional parties who bring regional consciousness to
the fore. It is legitimate to stress the historical bases of such perceptions, although it remains
possible for enigmatic and intelligent elites to foster such perceptions in ways to suit
themselves. But, in whatever guise they ensue, a 'feeling of togetherness' and identification
with a group and/or region is of paramount importance if regional parties are to be electorally
successful.
The second part of the typology will be employed in chapters four and five. At the level
of both rhetoric and policy, 'the PDS has been successful as a result of its articulation of
unique eastern German sentiment (which is shown to exist in chapter three). By employing
the typology in the final two chapters of this work it will be illustrated that the PDS is in a I.
unique position: its political strengths are in the areas where eastern German preferences and
attitudes differ from those of western Germans. In terms of party organisation and political
rhetoric the PDS is also able to exploit advantages that are unique to it (i.e. its decentralised
party structures, high membership, links to the GDR and so forth), and where other western
parties are at an immediate disadvantage. Chapters four and five therefore illustrate that, like
other regional parties, the PDS uses regionally specific political factors to its advantage.
However, before this can be done, a conceptualisation of eastern German uniqueness needs to
be completed. It is for this reason that the next chapter concentrates on illustrating how and
why eastern Germany/eastern Germans differ from western Germany/western Germans.
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Chapter Three
3. The Creation of a Regional Space and the Process of Identity Creation in
Eastern Germany
3.1. Introductory Remarks - The Dual Influence of pre-1989 Socialisation and
post-1989 Collective Experience
The initial chapter of this work highlighted that the PDS is a very complex
phenomenon. It stressed how a number of approaches are applicable to the study of
the PDS - but also that a study based principally on an understanding of the PDS as a
regional party is notably lacking. The second chapter carried this argument further,
discussing the place of regional parties within the literature on parties and party
systems, before developing a tool suitable for investigating the hypothesis that the
PDS has stabilised itself as such a regional party - a two-part typology of regional
spaces and regional parties. This two-part typology offers a suitable analytical
framework for, firstly, evaluating the development of a societal cleavage between
eastern and western Germany and, secondly, enabling the author to illustrate why the
PDS has become a regional party articulating particular feelings of regional
distinctiveness.
The third chapter of this work will employ the first part of the typology
created in chapter two to illustrate how an eastern German regional space and a form
of eastern German regional identity have developed. It will show that a territorial
cleavage divide exists in Germany between eastern and western Germany. Chapter
. two illustrated that at the base of regional party success is a clear territorial
identification - which regional parties are subsequently able give voice to within the
political arena. This chapter therefore deconstructs the fundaments of the eastern
German Trotzidentitat within the framework outlined in chapter two, illustrating that
value differences, culturally unique factors, the socialising effects of life in the GDR
and the situational effects of the transformation process have helped to foster a unique
eastern German identity.
The terminology that is used to understand these processes of identity creation
can, however, be complex, as well as sometimes plain contradictory. 'Eastern
German identity' is a phenomenon that goes under a multitude of different
pseudonyms, and subsequently is understood to mean different things. Some
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. commentators talk of 'solidaritdt' (solidarity), or more specifically of an
'Ostidentitat' (eastern identity) or 'ostdeutschen Wir-Bewufitsein' (eastern German
consciousness), while others prefer terms like "Irotzidentitiit' (identity of defiance),
'Abgrenzungsidentitdt' (an identity of demarcation), 'Ost-Trotz' (eastern
contrariness), 'Ostbewufitsein' (eastern consciousness), 'neues ostdeutsche
Selbstbewufitsein' (new eastern German consciousness), 'Ost Lebensgefuhl' (Eastern
feeling for life) or simply 'Ostalgie' (eastern nostalgia) or 'Nostalgie' (nostalgia).,
While all of these definitions have their merits, this work's preferred definition is
'identity of defiance', as it accurately describes the reactionary instincts that have
drawn Easterners together. Eastern Gennans377 consciously recognise that they
belong to a section of society to which not all Germans belong. Eastern Germans are
not western Germans, And vice-versa. This can become evident in the form of a
negative attitude towards western Germans, or can simply be a placid recognition that
one is a resident of the one of the states in the new Lander. It is also, most
importantly, underpinned by widespread value differences, attitudinal commonalities
and feelings of community and solidarity. This chapter will empirically illustrate this.
As Rolf RieBig (amongst others) has pointed out, however, a new sense of
regional solidarity does not mean that eastern German consciousness is a monolithic
construct. As he puts it:
When measured against the Federal Republic as a whole, the East is a
specific social and communication area. In this sense it is a relative entity.
This is, however, the only common denominator that binds the East
together. It is different to the Wese78•
The 'we' feeling stems originally from the collective experience, and the
- socialisation effects, of having lived under the SED dictatorship in the years up to
1989. This is coupled with the situational particularities of living through the
transformation from state socialism to capitalism - and all the complex
dissatisfactions that this has fostered379• Taken together, these two processes have
contributed to the creation of a specific regional space, a specific regional culture and
377 As with 'eastern German identity', the concept of who in fact 'eastern Germans' are also causes
definitional problems. The Federal Statistical Office will, for example, define the term in a different
way to political scientists and sociologists. For the purpose of this work, eastern Germans are taken as
being those citizens who lived in t1ieGDR and are currently residents of the five states of eastern
Germany and eastern Berlin.
378 RolfRieBig: 'Der Osten will nicht verachtet werden', in Die Tageszeitung, 23/24 May 1998.
379 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit.
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a specific regional identity that differentiates eastern Germans from Westerners. As
Lothar Fritze eloquently puts it:
An eastern German identity has arisen out of a combination of typical
characteristics from life in the GDR, similar difficulties under the new
societal circumstances and similarities in interests that have arisen from
the dissipation of the euphoria that originally surrounded unification. This
identity ... is, seen genetically, a reaction to collective Subalternitdt ...
seen functionally it is a protective wall against dreaded social and moral
de-classification, as well as a medium of articulation for common eastern
German interests38o•
Over and above arguments about the validity of the various definitions of
eastern German 'differentness', it is clear that commentators are discussing a
phenomenon that, despite its pervasiveness, remains inherently difficult to quantify.
No one definition adequately reflects the multi-dimensional phenomena that this
regional group identification has come to represent. Furthermore eastern German
socio-cultural values are not homogenous. It is clear that the processes of
socialisation in, for example, the villages of rural West Pommerania were (and still
are) very different to those of citizens of industrial Saxony. The level of education
that a citizen receives will also playa role in shaping value structures just as it clear
that different generations of citizens in eastern Germany may have considerably
different beliefs, values and attitudes on account of their life experiences. This is
particularly true when one remembers that an 80 year old eastern German pensioner
will have experienced the social, political and economic uncertainty of the inter-war
years, twelve years of Nazi dictatorship and the Second World War, the life and death
of the GDR and the transformation processes. that followed unification in 1989.
Eastern Germans are therefore not taken to have a uniform set of opinions, values and
attitudes/'". Carsten Zelle has illustrated this empirically by demonstrating that
certain groups within eastern Germany are affected by the two processes of
'socialisation' and 'situation' in"different ways. Former servants of the GDR regime,
as one would perhaps expect, have much stronger socialist tendencies than other
eastern Germans, and as such tend ideologically much more towards the PDS. This is
380 Lothar Fritze: Die Gegenwart des Vergangen. Uber das Weiterleben der DDR nach ihrem Ende
(Weimar: Bohlau, 1997), p.l07.
381 See Katja Neller: 'DDR-Nostalgie? Analysen zur Identifikation der Ostdeutschen mit ihrer
politischen Vergangenheit, zur ostdeutschen Identitat und zur Ost-West-Stereotypisierung", in Jurgen
W. Falter, Oscar W. Gabriel & Hans Rattinger (Hrsg.): Wirklich ein Volk? Die politischen
Orientierungen von Ost- und Westdeutschen im Vergleich (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2000),
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further strengthened if they have been exposed to unemployment post-1989. This is
in contrast to eastern Germans who had little contact with the disgraced GDR regime,
and particularly those who have also been lucky enough to retain their jobs throughout
this period, who generally remain more 'liberal' in their Weltanschauung".
Arzheimer and Klein, meanwhile, have illustrated the socio-cultural attitudinal
differences that such differing experiences can lead to in a lucid fashion, highlighting,
by employing multivariate analysis, that younger eastern and western Germans
(between the ages of 18 and 24) have in fact very similar attitudes, orientations and
belief structures. This is particularly true of those citizens in this age bracket who
have been well-educated, indicating the importance of formal education in installing
liberal democratic values383• Arzheimer and Klein also illustrate that older eastern
German citizens, who had genuine life experiences in the GDR (and beforehand), tend
to be much more reticent in their support for democratic institutions, political parties
and the liberal democratic system in general. Eastern Germans do not, therefore,
possess a homogeneous set of values and beliefs (see sections 3.2.1.2., 3.2.2.2. and
particularly 3.2.2.3. of this work for an in depth analysis ofthisi84• In many respects
it is also clear that the attitudinal preferences of eastern and western Germans are
similar - most want to earn money, to drive bigger and faster cars, have families and
to go on holiday to warm destinationsi'". They speak a common language and, to a
large extent, they have a common history.
However, historical memory and lived experience ensure that every eastern
German possesses his/her own GDR within themselves, and this helps to shape and
characterise their behaviour and substantiate the territorial cleavage divide between
East and Wese86• For Easterners, the GDR remains the object against which the
pg.571-602.
2 Carsten Zelle: 'Socialist heritage or Current Unemployment: Why do the Evaluations of
Democracy and Socialism Differ Between East and West Germans' in German Politics Volume 8
Number I, April1999, pp.12.-14.
383 See Kai Arzheimer & Markus Klein: 'Gesellschaftliche Wertcrientierungen und
Staatszielvorstellungen im Ost-West-Vergleich', in Jurgen W. Falter, Oscar W. Gabriel & Hans
Rattinger: Wirklich ein Volk?Die politischen Orientierungen von Ost- und Westdeutschen im Vergleich
(Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2000), p.396.
384 See also Kai Arzheimer &Markus Klein (2000): ibid. pp.364-396.
38S Laurence Falls has argued that eastern Germans have adapted to the post-modern, post-industrial
world that they were thrown into in a very short period of time. For McFalls, the process of cultural
unification is actually over: but very few people have actually 'noticed yet. See Laurence Falls: 'Die
kulturelle Vereinigung Deutschlands: Ostdeutsche politisiche und Alltagskultur vom real existierenden
Sozialismus zur postrnodemen kapitalistischen Konsumkultur', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,
B1112001,pp.23-29.
386 The effects that the GDR has had on post-unification political behaviour and attitudes in the East
prompted Der Spiegel to dramatically claim that "in the East the GDR is more alive than ever - just
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present reality in the FRG is measured - and this remains true for the former industrial
worker in Saxony, the former dissident, the former party functionary and the former
Stasi informer. The GDR represents lived history and a common past, and. it is
irrelevant what social and political positions citizens previously adopted.
Furthermore, the social integration of Easterners and Westerners since 1989 has not
been the process of slow and continuous 'coming together' that most people expected
in 1989: instead it has been characterised by what Stephen Kalberg calls "tension,
disjuncture, discontinuity, conflict, contempt, dislocation and discontent't'", The
'coming together' has been nothing of the sort. Western Germans, whether they
realised it or not, were not willing to accept that their understanding of how political,
economic and social life in a 'united Germany' was to be conducted should
substantially change. They remain(ed) sure of their identity and saw no need to
question any of the underlying tenets of it. For western Germans there tend to remain
only Germans - and Germans have the traits and characteristics that they ascribe to
themselves as western Germansi'", It was for eastern Germans to learn how to
become like western Germans, not for citizens of both German states to reassess their
positions and come together in one new nation-state. Easterners were clearly not
expected to continue to display differing cultural and psychological orientations to
Westemers=". For this reason the rise and stabilisation of an eastern German identity
of defiance is often seen as either a continuation of a socialist heritage, nostalgic looks
back to the certainties of an expansive welfare state or a conscious rejection of '
western German norms and values39o• Or, in the words of Dietrich Muhlberg:
The differences evident in the identity of eastern and western Germans are
based on the fact that Westerners see no reason to question their
perceptions of themselves and the basis of their identity; but they expect
eastern Germans to finally get over their problems (i.e. the wall in the
head, the consequences of the SED dictatorship) and become 'normal'
Germans (i.e. to learn to be democrats) and to become culturally more
without the socialism". Although the author does not necessarily agree with these sentiments, it is clear
that the GDR is still a reference point against which current political, economic and social norms are
measured. See 'Das rote Gespenst' in Der Spiegel, Nummer 10, 1999, p.22.
387 Stephen Kalberg: 'The Far Slower and More Conflict-Ridden Path to German Social Integration:
Toward a Multi-causal, Contextual and Multidirectional Explanatory Framework', in German Politics
and Society, Volume 17 Number 4, Winter 1999, p.35.
388 Dietrich Miihlberg: 'Kulturelle Differenz als Voraussetzung innerer Stabilitat der deutschen
Gesellschaft?', in Berliner Debatte INITIAL, Volume 11Number 2, 2000, p.54.
389 Dietrich Muhlberg (2000): ibid. p.47.
390 Lothar Probst: 'Oat-West Differenzen und das republikanische Defizit der deutschen Einheit', in
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B41-42/1998, p.4.
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chic (Le. to get rid of their bad habits) ... 391
As the sections within this chapter illustrate, misunderstandings and
misconceptions of this sort have provided the basis for the invigoration of collective
consciousness in the eastern states.'
Regional identities are, therefore, not constructed in coherent, systematic
ways. Each regional identity is constructed differently and the building blocks stem
from a region's historical, political, cultural and economic specificity. This is as true
for eastern Germany as it is for every other region in Europe. It is therefore logical
that some factors play a particularly defining role in some regions, but not in others
(Le. language in Catalonia, but not in Northern Italy), whilst other factors often only
come into play in very particular cases (i.e. religion in Northern Ireland and Quebec).
The principal characteristics that have enabled a regional space to develop and a
regional party to sustain itself in eastern Germany stem from the social, political and
economic differences between individuals in the eastern and western Lander, brought
on by the differing socialisation processes in the GDR and the FRG, and the perceived
'colonisation'I" of the GDR that has taken place since 1989. This territorial cleavage
is the reason that economics, politics and cultural life have taken different forms in
eastern and western Germany since 1989. This chapter will illustrate that, as an
eastern German identity of defiance exists, and enough regionally mobilising
variables compliment it, eastern Germany is structurally fertile ground for a regional
party to prosper.
3.2. The Stabilisation of an 'Identity of Defiance' in Eastern Germany
It is imperative that the existence of an eastern German 'identity of defiance' .
is placed in the societal context of life before 1989 as well as of life after unification.
As Carsten Zelle has observed, "it is not only socialisation ... (in the GDR) ... that has
391 Dietrich MUhlberg (2000): op. cit. p.S4.
392 The term colonisation has been used both in popular discourse and in academic discussion. For a
particularly vivid account of the so-called process of colonisation see Wolfgang Dumcke & Fritz
ViImar (Hrsg.): Kolonialisierung der DDR (Munster: Agenda Verlag, 1995). Michael Benjamin, a
Communist Platform member on the PDS executive, speaks for a similar group of thinkers when using
the term Ansch/uj3 to describe unification. They consciously invoke memories of the AnschlufJ between
Germany and Austria in 1938, indicating their rejection of the capitalist state and society within which
they now live. See Michael Benjamin: Ostdeutsche Identuat und ihre sozialen Grundlagen. Gedanken
uber linke Politik (Berlin: Marxistisches Forum der PDS, Heft 6, 1996a).
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influenced value structures post-1989. but also the present ... (economic, political and
social) ... situation,,393. It is therefore not an issue of 'ingrained' primordial linkages
and perceptions, but rather "context dependent situation specific constructions,,394.
The eastern Trotztdentitiit has been rapidly created as a reaction to events and
processes. In the words of Stojanov and Sandmeier Easterners experience
"Fremdheitsverhdltnissen" ("feelings of strangeness") as they continue to struggle to
view the German state, institutions and practices as truly their own39S •
. Though it is undoubtedly true that eastern Germans are affected by the
processes of socialisation and transformation to differing degrees, one can still
justifiably claim that the two processes have combined to become a motor of identity
creation as they affect, in some way, the vast majority of Easterners. Zelle himself
admits that more eastern Germans than western Germans remain in favour of
'socialism'J" - and his attempts to link this to a weaker economic position seem to
393 Carsten Zelle: 'Soziale und liberale Wertorientierungen: Versuch einer situativen Erklarung der
Unterschiede zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschen', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B41-42/98, p.34.
Zelle and authors such as Thomas Gensicke have developed this approach as a synthesis of two
'traditional' approaches towards conceptualising the effects of GDR socialisation (see also Thomas
Gensicke: Die neuen Bundesbiirger: Eine Transformation ohne Integration (Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag, 1998), p.193) on eastern Germans. The first 'traditional' position emphasised the importance
of the FRG in the lives of eastern Germans. Stolen 'glances over the wall', in the form of FRG
television or visits from relatives meant that a 'virtual western socialisation' was perceived as
concurrently taking place alongside the socialist one propagated by the SED (see for example Hans-
Joachim Veen: 'Innere Einheit - aber wo liegt sie? Eine Bestandsaufnahme im siebten Jahr nach der
Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B40-41197, p.23). The political
socialisation of Easterners in the GDR did not, therefore, represent a serious challenge to attempts to
create a united political culture in Germany as Easterners were well aware of how the institutions and
the political discourse in the FRG functioned. The opposite position to this stressed that socialisation
in the GDR had to have an effect on the political orientations of Easterners. Voices like those of
Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen quickly raised sceptical voices about the ability of Easterners and
Westerners to overcome the 'Wall in their Heads', hypothesising that forty years apart would inevitably
mean that Easterners and Westerns would need a considerable period of time to grow back together.
See Martin & Sylvia Greiffenhagen: Ein schwieriges Vaterland (Munchen: List, 1993). In recent years
the 'situational' approach has grown in prevalence, as authors such as Gert Pickel have stressed that
differing social and economic environments in East and West influence citizens in different ways (see
Gert Pickel: 'Eine ostdeutsche "Sonder-Mentalitat acht Jahre nach der Vereinigung? Fazit einer
Diskussion urn Sozialisation und Situation', in Susanne Pickel, Gert Pickel & Dieter Walz (Hrsg.):
Politische Einheit - Kultureller Zwiespalt? Die Erkldrungen politischer und demokratischer
Einstellungen in Ostdeutschland vor der Bundestagswahl1998 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1998),
pp.157-177). For a more detailed review of these positions see Katja Neller (2000): op. cit. pp.575-
576.
394 Rudolf Woderich: 'Gelebte und inszenierte Identitaten in Ostdeutschland', in Identitiiten in
Europa, Welt Trends. International Politik und vergleichende Studien, Nummer 15, Summer 1997,
f9~3'Chr' S' & S Co S dmei Z' hili' D·' . I' . hIStOV tojanov tetan an eier. ' u emer vernac assigten imension postsozia isnsc er
Transformation: (Re- )Modernisierung als Fremdheitsverhaltnis', in Lars Clausen (Hrsg.):
Gesellschaften im Umbruch: Verhandlungen des 27. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft for
Soziologie in Halle an der Saale (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1996), p.231.
396 The term socialism in eastern Germany is often seen to refer back to 'real existing socialism' of the
GDR, whereas in other countries the term tends to have a more theoretical foundation. This is a unique
problem that public opinion research agencies have to take into consideration when asking eastern
137
Chapter 3 The Creation of a Regional Space and the Process of Identity Creation in Eastern Germany
slightly miss the point that a broad cross-section of the eastern population regardless
oj economic positions has both more favourable leanings towards socialism and also
expects the state to be more active in everyday economic life (see section 3.2.2.4.).
This is a direct result of the processes through which Easterners, from all social strata,
and of all political persuasions, have lived. Where Zelle is correct though is that his
(impressive) analysis will only ever offer suggestive explanations, as proving causal
linkages between such complex societal phenomena verges on the impossible. The
fundamental point does, however, remain valid: eastern and western Germans have
developed different identities, albeit with a number of similarities, as a combined
result of the two processes highlighted: socialisation and situation.
Provocative and stimulating though such analysis is, it is clear that debates
around the issue of 'eastern German identity' have tended to take place within a
vacuum as far as other works on identity creation in other regions are concerned. The
east~rn German case is, for largely understandable reasons, seen as unique and not
applicable for cross-national study. The analytical framework constructed in section
2.4. offers a vehicle that permits an attempt to be made at redressing this balance.
Section 3.2. applies the analytical tool of a typology of factors that contribute
to regional identifications arising in the specific case of eastern Germany. There are a
number of key facets of eastern regional identification - and the typology enables
these to be drawn out and conceptualised. Chapters four and five move on to
illustrate that it is these facets of eastern uniqueness that the PDS successfully
mobilises within both the eastern German regional, and the federal political,
environments.
3.2.1. Cultural Variables
Ifwe choose to define culture as the sum total of ways of living built up by a
group of human beings, that is both widely understood and transmitted from one
generation to another, then elements of a distinctive culture are clearly evident in
eastern Germany todai97• As Dietrich Muhlberg puts it, "it goes without saying that
Germans to offer opinions on what is obviously a very loaded term.
397 It is, of course, anything but clear what political culture actually is. This is not a debate that this
work necessarily needs to go into, so for greater analysis of the definitional problems when discussing
political culture see Max Kaase: 'Sinn oder Unsinn des Konzepts 'Politische Kultur' fllr die
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cultural differences irritate ... (the relationship) between eastern and western
Germans, even if ... (Easterners and Westerners) are linguistically and ethnically
united',398.Before elaborating on what exactly these differences are in concrete terms
(sections 3.2.2.3 - 3.2.2.5.) it is important to place them within the context of the
processes of socialisation that lives in the FRG and GDR offered. When interwoven
with the lived experience of social, economic, political and psychological
transformation in the 1990s, it is clear that the parameters of a unique eastern German
social, political and cultural community have been created.
Humans instinctively react to the environments in which they find themselves.
This is just as true for a poor, homeless alcoholic as it is for an affluent, upwardly-
mobile stockbroker. The structural conditions of a human's existence are evaluated
(even if at only the 'most superficial level) and the opportunity structures that are at
hand are used to make an individual's life more bearable/pleasurable.
Hence it is self-explanatory that a set of SUbjective orientations developed
within the GDR in response to the constraints of life in East Germany. These were
shaped and re-shaped by the conditions of life under the SED dictatorship. A similar
process occurred in the FRG, only this time the norms, values and attitudes of
Westerners were moulded by a very different political, social and economic system.
In the eastern German case, McFalls has described such a process as "a
creative historic, social and psychological response to the structures of real existing
Socialism,,399.However, it is clear that these 'responses' were crafted specifically for
life in an authoritarian dictatorship, not a free-market, liberal society. The structures
(the institutions) of the present German state are not wholly in sync with the agents
(the orientations vis-a-vis these institutions)4oo. This is as a result of the two
phenomena mentioned above: socialisation and situation'?'.
Hence it is valid to talk of a set of eastern German attitudes and norms in the
Vergleichende Politikforschung, oder auch: Der Versuch, einen Pudding an die Wand zu nageln', in
Max Kaase & Hans Dieter Klingemann (eds.): Wahlen und Politisches System: Analysen aus An/aft der
Bundestagswahl 1980 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983), pp.144-171. For a discussion of the
concept in the context of German unification see Dietrich Muhlberg: 'Beobachtete Tendenzen zur
Ausbildung einer ostdeutschen Teilkultur', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Bil/200t, pp.30-38.
398 Dietrich Muhlberg (200t): ibid. p.30.
399 Laurence H. McFalls (1995): op. cit. p.I40.
400 Detlev Pollack: 'Trust in Institutions and the Urge to be Different: On Attitudinal Change in
Eastern Germany', in German Politics, Volume 8 Number 3, December 1999, p.82; See also Gabriel
Almond & Sidney Verba: The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes to Democracy in Five Nations
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).
401 Carsten Zelle: 'Socialist heritage or Current Unemployment: Why do the Evaluations of
Democracy and Socialism Differ Between East and West Germans' in German Politics Volume 8
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years before 1989. 'East German consciousness' in its pre-1989 form had, however,
little to do with the concept of the 'socialist national consciousness' that the SED
attempted to create, principally because the SED's attempts at manufacturing an East
German identity were based on the fusion of two incompatible concepts: class
consciousness and national consciousnessf". But a distinctive 'East German identity'
did begin to take shape even if it did not necessarily correspond to the official
'socialist national consciousness' that the SED continued to invoke403• The true
extent of the value differences between eastern and western Germans have only
become visible in the pre-Wende era - as the institutions and structures that governed
East German lives were swept away and West German ones replaced them404•
Cultural lag, so it was widely perceived, prevented Easterners from embracing
new societal norms quickly, as the adoption of new systems of governance does not
,
inherently encourage rapid cultural adaptation to these norms. In short, culture needs
time to 'catch up'. The Sozialvertrag (social contract) that existed between governors
\
and governed in many central and eastern European countries no longer exists and
many of the consistent variables of pre-1989 life (the certainty of employment, the
existence of a broad, if paternalistic and limited, welfare state, the egalitarian nature
of society and so forth) have been rendered obsolete4os• Elements of the (unwritten,
but widely understood) 'social contract' enabled citizens in the GDR to pursue
private, material interests in exchange for complicity with the regime's socialist
aims406• They did this in a 'private sphere' that has widely been termed the 'society of
niches' (Nischengesellschaft), away from regimented and authoritarian public life407•
This was allowed to take place as the state demanded a form of conditional loyalty
from the citizenry, where if the citizen was prepared to perform the rituals that the
state required of it (and kept any grumbles to the confines of the 'private' sphere) then
the state would leave the citizen to pursue their own private goals in peace''",
Following unification, Easterners found themselves in a quantifiably different
Number 1, AprilI999, pp.1-20. .
402 Joanna McKay: The Official Concept of the Nation in the Former GDR (Brookfield, Vermont,
USA: Ashgate, 1998), p.23.
403 Gebhard Ludwig Schweigler: National Consciousness in Divided Germany (London: Sage, 1975),
fo.l
4
. Heiner Meuleman: Werte und Wertewandel. Zur Identitat einer geteilten und wieder vereinten
Nation (Munchen: Leske und Budrich, 1998).
40' John Ishiyama (1995): op. cit. pp.147-166. Yanqu Tong: 'Mass Alienation Under State Socialism
and After', in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 28 Number 2, June 1995, p.2IS.
406 Jonathan Grix (1998): op. cit. pp.4S-S0. .
407 GUnterGaus: WoDeutschland Iiegt (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1983), pp.1S6-165.
408 Jonathan B. Grix (1998): op. cit. p.43.
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structural environment, for which the 'niche society' and 'social contract' were
obsolete. Given the fundamentally different structure of capitalist society, the
challenges of transition could not now be met by retreating back into niches. The
state would not provide work and security in return for silent compliance - as the
mechanics of capitalist society demand active participation in securing and shaping
one's own future. Capitalism in the unified Germany requires the active articulation
of one's interests in the form of open and proactive action. Individuals in eastern
Germany have had no experience of pluralist interest articulation and of competitive
daily lifestyles, and as such cannot be expected to adapt to the differing societal forces
around them overnight. The society of niches in the GDR offered inadequate
preparation for life in a capitalist, competitive society. These processes are
diametrically opposed to the socialisation processes that East Germans were publicly
exposed to before 1989.
The socialisation process, and the apparent atomisation of an individual's
existence within East German society, created a powerful motor of rapid identity
creation in the early 1990s. The collective consciousness in eastern Germany is an
adaptation strategy in the face of the problems and conflicts that unification has
created409• The collective experience of having to come to terms with the societal
contours under capitalism quickly fostered solidarity with other Easterners who were
experiencing similar difficulties?",
As well as being exposed to the socialising influences (institutions,
propaganda, every day experiences and so forth) of life in the GDR, Easterners have
experienced a difficult transformation of their economic, social and political structures
to new ones that remain less well received than they do in the West (see section
3.2.6.). The euphoria that greeted unification was quickly replaced by disillusionment
as the capitalist FRG proved unable to meet all the demands that the Easterners put on
it. These disappointments ranged from high-rates of unemployment and the
subsequent loss of personal esteem that this entailed, to the de-grading of personal
existences in the GDR. Furthermore, in 1990 it appeared that Easterners tended to
take the Unification Treaty at its word. Despite the widespread wish for a rapid
abolition of the GDR, Easterners still widely perceived the unification of the two
409 Helga A. Welsh, Andreas Pickel & Dorothy Rosenberg: 'East and West German Identities - United
and Divided', in Konrad H. Jarausch (ed.): After Unity - Reconjiguring German Identities (Oxford:
Berghabn Books, 1997), p.13S.
410 Dieter 'Y.:'alz& Wolfram Brunner: 'Das Sein bestimrnt das BewuBtsein (Oder: Warum sich die
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Germanies as a coming together of two states as equal partners in search of a joint
future. In reality, Easterners soon realised that this was far removed from the truth.
Very little from the GDR was seen by western Germans as being worth retaining, and
East Germany was effectively joining the FRG in much the same way that the
Saarland had done in 1957411•
Easterners have frequently been described, as well as popularly perceiving
themselves as, "immigrants in their own Land'.412. This refers, however, to
psychological orientation and not physical position. Feelings of second class
citizenship and immigrant status remain evident on account of the perceived status
that Easterners see themselves as occupying in the FRG.· The West German state
expanded to become the all-German state -:- yet even though the population of
Germany jumped by a fifth overnight, the structures of the new state were not able to
adequately mould themselves to the demands, wishes and wants of Germany's new
citizens. Hence dissatisfaction with the 'ready-made state' quickly ensued413•
The psychological de-classification of eastern Germans has indeed affected all
Easterners as it has hit (simultaneously) the upper, middle and lower echelons of
eastern societyl". The upper echelons of GDR society (the academic world, the
military, those who worked for or were close to the SED power-centres, the
bureaucracy and so forth) were almost immediately deprived of the positions they had
in the GDR, as the state that they had served for many years served went out of
existence. Although frequently able to re-build their lives in an economic sense, they
remained forever deprived of the power and privilege that they once possessed in the
GDR. In the middle classes (or what can best be understood as middle classes), the
industrial and agricultural base of the GDR was crushed by the demands of global
competition. Companies that were perhaps capable of restructuring their enterprises
in order to modernise and remain competitive with western firms were closed
down415, just as were many of the more inefficient and non-viable eastern
Ostdeutschen als BUrger 2. Klasse fiihlen'), in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B51/97, p.13.
411 Helmut Meier, Bodo Reblin & Erhard Weckesser: Die Schwierigkeiten der Ostdeutschen
Bundesbilrger zu werden (Dresden: Clara Weg Verlag, 1995), p.19.
412 The existence of such feelings has been widely documented in both the academic world and the
popular press. For a particularly lucid discussion of the issue see Dieter Walz & Wolfram Brunner
(1997): op. cit. pp.6-20; See also Peter Pulzer (1992): in Gordon Smith et al (eds.): op. cit. pJ25.
413 Richard Rose & Christian Haerpfer: 'The Impact of a Ready-Made State: East Germans in
Comparative Perspective', in German Politics, Volume 6 Number I, Apri11997, pp.100-121.
414 Michael Vester: inMichael Vester, Michael Hoffman & Irene Zierke (eds.) (1995): op. cit. pJO.
41S Prior to the currency union of July 1990, the Bundesbank estimated that between 50 per cent and
70 per cent of eastern German firms could 'survive' the transition to a social market economy. In the
event, barely 25 per cent did. This is no doubt due to the over-optimistic expectations that West
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manufacturers, Facharbeiterlnnen and the technically able were, therefore, deprived
of their positions and were forced to seek work in industrial sectors where they often
had neither the relevant competencies nor experience. At the lowest levels of GDR
society the effects of rapid de-industrialisation were obvious as companies were
forced to layoff nearly three million people in the course of just over twelve
months416 - throwing above all women, those with less qualifications, foreigners and
the less socially mobile out of productive employment. That many citizens have since
found employment is not the point. Their lives were fundamentally changed
overnight and many of the old securities were taken away. Rainer GeiBler has
conceptualised this by stressing that social mobility in the eastern states has been at
best horizontal, but often vertical - and vertically downwards, as the Absteiger ('those
on their way downwards') have descended from positions of power and influence to
lower-ranking positions within German society''", Although this clearly affected
1
different citizens, in different positions on the social ladder, in different ways, it did
affect the vast majority of Easterners in some shape or form418,
Hence the eastern identity of defiance is therefore characterised by 'backs-to-
the-wall' defensive undertones that stem from the psychological process of adaptation
to a new state. The very structure of the eastern German population has been
radically transformed in a very short space of time. This is a phenomenon that
Westerners have not experienced because of their 'stable' position within German
society. The extension of the FRG has also involved incorporating a population with
very different social attitudes and experiences - spawning feelings of 'immigrant
status' within Easterners towards what is ostensibly their own country''".
Germans had of the East German economy, which was in a much worse condition than the East
German figures had led western observers to initially believe. See 'One Year of German Monetary,
economic and Social Union', Deutsche Bundesbank (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report,
July 1991), pp.18-30 quoted in Stephen Padgett: in Gordon Smith et a1.(eds.) (1992): op. cit. p.192.
416 In October 1990 9.2 million Easterners were in employment, whereas by December 1991 this
figure had plummeted to 6.2 million. See 'The Eagles Embrace', in The Economist, 30 September
1995, p.22.
417 This, once again, is not a reflection of material circumstances within eastern Germany, but rather
subjective self-understandings. It goes without saying that citizens who are unemployed, are on job
training schemes, in early retirement (Vorrahestandlen have experienced a reduction in their social
status, but GeiJ3lerclaims that over and above these groupings in 1996 83 per cent of Easterners who
have experienced a Niveauwechsel ('a change in their position within society') have gone downwards.
See Rainer Geil3ler: Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands: Zur gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung mit einer
Zwischenbilanz zur Vereinigung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1996), p.245.
418 Michael Vester (1995): op. cit. p.30.
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Table 3
The Percentage of Easterners who view themselves as Second Class Citizens
Date Percentage
December 1990 87
May 1991 84
November 1993 78
July 1994 74
October 1995 69
March 1996 74
May 1997 80
It is against this backdrop that attitudinal and value differences over a broad
array of issues have stabilised. The complex interaction of pre- and post-1989
combined experiences have therefore seen a significant proportion of Easterners
develop differing attitudes to Westerners. These differences range from foreign
policy, health and welfare, the role of the state in general, the social and political
system of the FRG and the nature of German democracy to attitudes to the GDR and
the past. This was so much so that the ISDA and EMNID public opinion research
organisations explicitly concluded, in 1994, that "one cannot speak of a levelling out
of attitudes across eastern and western Germany", as eastern preferences were
quantifiably different to those of Westemers'f". On a number (although not all) of
key issues eastern Germans display quantifiably different value preferences than
western Germans and it is as a result of these that a cultural eastern identity exists421 •
The PDS, as chapters four and five illustrate, is uniquely strong in representing this
eastern political difference by filling the 'representation gap'.
3.2.1.1. Towards an Eastern German Ethnicity?
One of the most common forms of territorial identification, as was seen in
section 2.4.2., has tended to be that which is based on belonging to an ethnic grouping
that is resident in (or claims it should be resident in) an ethnic homeland.
Conceptualising eastern Germans as an ethnic group is, however, of little assistance in
419 Geoffrey K. Roberts (1991): op. cit. pp.373-404.
420 Rainer Ferchland et al: Ost-West-Wahlanalyse 3. Ergebnisse einer reprasentativen
gesamtdeutschen Bevolkerungsbejragung in Zusammenarbeit mit EMNID Bielefeld (Berlin: Institut fur
Sozialdatenanalyse e. V. (lSDA), Nr. 17, 1994), p.35.
421 RudolfWoderich (1997): op. cit. p.82.
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understanding the nature of the eastern German identity - and the vast majority of
academic analysis has refuted the idea of an eastern German ethnicity based on
primordial ties, choosing rather to stress notions of a culturally distinct eastern
political environment based upon more 'transient' phenomena. The one notable
exception to this broad consensus remains the provocative analysis forwarded by
Marc Howard, hypothesising that by viewing eastern Germans as an ethnic group one
is able to better understand the differences between Easterners and Westerners422•
Although Howard openly admits that the concept of ethnicity verges on the
indefinable, he claims that ethnic groups do rise and fall, and that ethnic groups base
their claims on common histories and a coherence of attitude through common
symbols423• Howard claims that although eastern Germans do not substantially differ
from western Germans on the grounds of race, language or religion, Easterners
constitute a separate group that largely remains together as one unit424, is territorially
fixed and possess powerful emotional linkages, including a combined past and values
~d continues to struggle in opposition to a clear and quantifiable other425•
Curiously, particularly in view of the challenging nature of the hypothesis he
posits, Howard subsequently proceeds to undermine his own argument. He claims
that ethnicity is not, after all, the ideal vehicle for understanding the processes of
identity creation in the eastern states as ethnic differences will not separate Germans
from East and West in the longer-term. This appears logical, as ethnicity was actually
the key argument underpinning German unification. Howard, however, eliminates the
long-term applicability of using ethnicity as an explanatory tool as, firstly, the number
of citizens who will have lived through state-socialism is shrinking. Secondly, he
claims that the transformation process will, at some undefined point, come to an end.
And thirdly western German hegemony is likely, once again at some point in the
future, to be 'levelled out' as Easterners come to be 'equals' in terms of positions of
influence, accumulated wealth and popular perception426•
This work does not dispute that as time goes on fewer and fewer people will
422 Marc Howard (l995a): op. cit. pp.119·131; Marc Howard: •An Eastern German Etlmicity?
Understanding the New Division of Unified Germany'. in German Politics and Society. Volume 13
(Winter 1995b). pp.49.70.
423 Marc Howard (1995a): ibid. p.l24. See also Daniel Bell: The Winding Passage: Essays and
Sociological Journeys, 1960·1980 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt Books, 1980), p.196.
424 A survey conducted by Der Spiegel in 1994 revealed that 80 per cent of eastern Germans would,
given the opportunity, prefer to remain resident in the eastern states rather than in the western ones.
See Der Spiegel, Nummer 33, 1994, p.111.
425 Marc Howard (1995a): op. cit. p.l24.
426 Marc Howard (1995a): ibid. p.129.
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be able to recall real-existing state socialism, but it does challenge the second and
third of Howard's concluding points. The economic transformation process has in
many ways been completed, as the s~ctures and mechanisms of the social market
economy (with one or two notable exceptions) are (and have been for a number of
years) in place427. That these institutions may function differently (Le. the system of
collective bargaining, the differing patchwork of interest groups within society and so
forth) is now a reflection of a divergent reality not an on-going transition. Eastern
Germany remains an economic area that under-performs in comparison to western
Germany - and this also needs to be seen as an expression of post-unification
normality, not transition, and is likely to remain so for a very long time to come428.
Eastern German civil society and politics are also running along a different track to
that in western Germany. The socialising effects of life in the SED dictatorship have
combined with experiences of the transformation process from state socialism to
capitalism to create substantial distrust of the FRG's institutions and the politicians
and elite actors who are active within them. The effects of unemployment and social
insecurities have strongly hindered the development of a civic community along the
lines of that in western Germany. Eastern Germans are much more likely to tum
inwards towards family members and close acquaintances rather than become
involved in the wider civil society429.
The societal cleavage that exists between eastern and western Germans is
indeed built upon differing cultural foundations: but as Howard's attempts have
indirectly shown, this is not on the basis of an eastern German ethnicity, rather as
eastern Germany has seen the crystallisation of an eastern German communication
area and civil society, functioning around an Ost-Gefiihl (eastern feeling) and an
427 Lothar Spath forwards a particularly lucid account of the problems that are besetting the eastern
German economy. He sees the economic problems of the East as a possible catalyst for economic
reform in Germany as a whole. Lothar Spath: Bliihende Phantasien und harte Realitaten: Wie der
. Umschwung Ost die ganze Republik veriindert (Munchen: Econ & List Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998),
ffs·90-91.
8 Productivity remains at a persistently lower level than that of the western German economy, and
the prospects of the eastern German economy reaching these western levels in the foreseeable future
appear slim. Hallett & Ma predict, using data that at the time of writing looks increasingly over-
optimistic, that the productivity gap between East and West will take many years to close. As they
observe "if western productivity continues to grow at 2 per cent per annum. and if the East starts with
productivity at 26 per cent of the Western level, then the East will need 20, 30 or 40 years to catch up if
its productivity grows at 9.1, 6.7 or S.S per cent respectively". Hugh A. 1. Hallett & Vue Ma: 'East
Germany, West Germany, and their Mezziogiomo Problem: A Parable for European Economic
Integration', in The Economic Journal, Volume 103, 1993, pp.417-418.
429 Jonathan Grix (1999): op. cit. p.16.
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eastern Trotzidentitdt, The next section of this work empirically illustrates what the
cultural elements of this identity are.
3.2.1.2. The Past as the Present
The management of memory in the FRG, and particularly in the eastern states,
has been one of the most contentious issues in post-unification liennany430. The
debate has often been tinged with bitterness and recrimination and Easterners have
found themselves having to defend their existences pre-1989 in a way that many never
expected they would have to at the time of unification. Easterners have also openly
reflected on the characteristics in their past that differentiate them from Westerners -
in an attempt to re-legitimise their own lived experiences.
Communicative memory in eastern Germany is informal, non-structured and
inclusive, occurring and re-occurring through the everyday interaction of eastern
German citizens. It is an interchange of direct memory of the recent past through the
prism of the collective''". Cultural memory, the type of which much younger eastern
Germans are likely to possess, is much less spontaneous than communicative
memory, and relies on perceptions of the past rather than experience. Hence eastern
Germans across the age spectrum are in possession of pictures and assumptions about
all aspects of the GDR, even if they differ, firstly, from reality, secondly, from the
perceptions of other Easterners and thirdly, and most importantly, from Westerners-
on account of Westerners having no or much reduced linkages to the GDR.
Humans are inherently 'forgetful,432 and one should not consider memory of
, ,
the GDR as a mirror image of the past as it really was, but rather as a re-construction
viewed through the prism of the present. Memory is, by its very essence, a creative
430 Jan Assman has chosen to stress two distinct ways in which memory is transmitted between
societal groups and between generations. 'Communicative Memory' is a shared memory of the recent
past. This is obtained through the social interaction of citizens who actively remember the events.
'Cultural Memory', according to Assman, is a formally constructed version of past events - which
intrinsically leaves itself open to manipulation by groups within society (for example intellectuals, the
media, politicians and so forth). See Jan Assman: Das kulturelle Gedachtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und
politische Identitiit in fruhen Hochkulturen (Munchen: Verlag C.H.Beck, 1999). For further analysis of
this in the West German context see Caroline Gay: Reshaping the Myth: National Memory
Management, Vergangenheitsbewaltigung and the Dialectic of Normality in Post-War West Germany
(Birmingham: University of Birmingham, MPhil Thesis, 2000).
431 Caroline Gay (2000): ibid. p.8.
m As Freud once said, man needs to forget in order to remember. Wolfgang Thierse, the President of
the Bundestag also referred to man as a "Vergessendes Lebewesen" in comments on the construction of
a memorial to murdered Jews in Berlin. See Wolfgang Thierse: 'Vorwort' in Michael S. Cullen (ed.):
Das Holocaust Mahnmal: Dokumentation einer Debatte (Zurich: Pendo Verlag, 1999), p.9.
147
Chapter 3 The Creation of a Regional Space and the Process of Identity Creation in Eastern Germany
process433, deliberately selective and often conditioned through the prism of an
individuals attitude to current reality - hence the GDR that Easterners possess in their
minds will be unique to them, rather than a true reflection of reality. No society or
community exists in a vacuum and historical memory forms an important part of
individual self-understanding. As the Federal President Roman Herzog observed in a
speech on 9 November 1998, "living without remembering means to live without an
identity and therefore without orientation,,434- hence the uniqueness of memory
divides Easterners from their western counterparts as it forms a fundamental part of
their self-appreciation.
Such differences m self-perception are more evident in the considerable
proportion of the population that continues to regard itself as eastern German. As a
result of the lack of an eastern German ethnicity (see section 3.2.2.1.), citizens of the
eastern states do not have an ethnic or national identity to call into their consciousness
on account of their feelings as 'outsiders' in the Federal Republic. This has led to a
conscious distancing of western Germans, who are perceived as holding attitudes and
norms that are at odds with those of eastern Germans. These differences are most
evident in debates over social equality and individual freedom, the past (Le. the
GDR), socialism versus capitalism and in conceptions of Germany's place in the
world.
Easterners remain strongly averse to what they perceive as western Germans
dictating to them about, firstly, their past and, secondly, how they should lead their
lives in the present. In 1995, 97 per cent of Eastern Germans were of the opinion that
only those who had lived in the GDR had the right to mitreden on the subject of what
it was like43s• Easterners are also much more likely to view the GDR in generally
more positive terms than western Germans (see table 4). In 1994 only 9 per cent of
western Germans thought that the GDR had more good sides than bad, whereas 39 per
cent of eastern Germans did so. Even fewer western Germans thought that this was
the case in 1998 (6 per cent), and while it is true that fewer Easterners also thought
this to be true (36 per cent), it is clear that over a third of all Eastern Germans still
remained of the opinion that the GDR had more positive sides than negative ones.
. When one also considers that many more Easterners (36 per cent in both 1994 and
1998) thought the good and bad sides roughly matched each other (of Westerners,
433 Caroline Gay (2000): op. cit. p.12.
434 Quoted in Caroline Gay (2000): ibid. p.7.
43S 'Stolz aufs eigene Leben', inDer Spiegel: Nurnmer 27,1995, p.49.
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only 18 per cent thought this in 1994, 16 per cent did so in 1998), meaning that
roughly two-thirds (75 per cent in 1994 and 72 per cent in 1998) of all eastern
Germans were not prepared to condemn the GDR as having more bad than good
sides.
Table 4436
Attitudes to the GDR in Eastern and Western Germany in 1994 and 1998 (per
cent)
GDR had more good than bad sides
1994 1998
West East West East
Disagree Completely 43 12 50 9
Tend to Disagree 24 15 21 16
Both good and bad 18 36 16 36
sides
Tend to Agree 6 22 5 25
Agree Completely 3 13 1 11
Middle Value 2.33 3.21 2.22 3.29
These figures highlight just how the issue of the GDR splits contemporary
German society. The extremely defensive mentality of eastern Germans stems from
the (perceived) dominance of western German actors within the institutions of the
enlarged FRG and their prominent position in all decision-making arenas. Westerners
have also been highly prominent in the institutionalised process of
Vergangenheitsbewdltigung (coming to terms with the past). The institutionalised
processes of 'working through' the history of the GDR have been very much 'top-
down' and dominated by western Germans, and as such Easterners have felt distanced
from the processes. Furthermore, the perceived lack of any questioning of the
drawbacks and mistakes of West Germany/the present FRG have given the impression
that Easterners need to question all aspects of their lives, while Westerners do not.
Westerners are consequently perceived as passing judgement on Bastemers':".
Easterners are in possession of the experiences of life in the SED dictatorship
that Westerners are not. This has led them to develop values and cultural orientations
that lead them to have differing policy preferences and ideological orientations. In the
436 DFG-Projekt 'Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wahlerverhalten im
vereinigten Deutschland 1994 und 1998', in Katja Neller (2000): op. cit. p.580.
437 Geoffrey K. Roberts: "Emigrants in their own Country': German Reunification and its Political
Consequences', in Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 44 Number 3, 1991, pp.373-404.
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words of Peter Bender, Easterners remain "unknowing socialists,.438, as GDR
socialisation leads Easterners to demand more from the state than western Germans,
to value the egalitarian welfare system of the GDR and to see the virtues of full
employment (see section 3.2.2.3. and 3.2.2.4). Easterners see dangerous (in their
minds) parallels to their lives in the GDR, in which leaders and those in positions of
influence remain far-removed from society and the people 'at the bottom,439.
The Abwertung (downgrading) of life in the GDR has prompted Easterners to
defensively attack many of the norms that are taken for granted by western Germans.
Easterners react to the sidelining of their previous existences in the GDR by
bemoaning deficiencies in the western German political, economic and social system
and by granting certain institutions and processes from the GDR a much higher status
of approval than they ever had pre_198944o. The paternalistic welfare state, the job
security and the lack of unemployment are all highly regarded as a result of their
existence (no matter how inefficient or ineffective) in the GDR. The anti-
militarist/anti-fascist rhetoric of the SED also appears to have been upgraded into
suspicion of NATO and the organisations of the international capitalist system (see
section 3.2.2.5.). In response to their perceptions of political, economic and social
inferiority within a united Germany, eastern Germans have therefore regained their
solidarity and their identification with, if not pride in, the GDR.
Over 90 per cent of Easterners are of the opinion that they must take more
responsibility for their own future - this is a direct result of the large number of
western Germans that have come eastwards to help embed and (re)build the
institutional and economic structures of the eastern states''". Over 70 per cent of
Easterners also believe that the Westerners are no longer needed to control and direct
the eastern transition process442• The methods by which unification was achieved and
implemented have ensured that western Germans set the parameters for the everyday
lives of eastern Germans. When this is coupled with their demographic dominance, it
appears that a perpetuating process has been set in motion, where western Germans
dominate political debate throughout Germany. As such eastern Germans are keen to
blame their current disadvantageous economic situation (in terms of lower wage
438 Peter Bender: Unsere Erbschaft. Was war die DDR • was bleibt von ihr? (Hamburg: Luchterhand,
1992), p.2S.
439 Thomas Koch (1997): op. cit. p.97.
440 Dieter Walz &Wolfram Brunner (1997): op. cit. pp.13-19.
441 'Ein neues Selbstbewulitsein im Osten', in Wochenpost, 2 October 1996, pA.
442 Wochenpost (1996): ibid. p.4.
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levels and higher unemployment) on the method and mode of economic
transformation - and inherently on the western German actors who directed it. Rarely
is eastern Germany's economic plight diagnosed principally to be a result of the
moribund East German economy that had to be transformed in 1989443• Opposition to
what is widely perceived as the equivalent of an occupying regime (namely the 'new
masters' from western Germany) is therefore common and often intense, just as is the
discourse of blaming the 'Wessies,444 and such sentiments form a key part of the
eastern German Trotzidentitiit.
3.2.1.3. Germany and its Relationship with the Outside World
Eastern attitudinal difference is evident across a broad base of issues and
policy questions. Attitudinal differences were perhaps most starkly revealed in mid-
1999 on the issue of the Kosovo War, when eastern and western Germans viewed the
participation of German soldiers in an international crisis situation in very different
ways44S. In the words of Michael Stognienko, "the NATO strategy was viewed much
more critically in eastern Germany than in the western states ... and Easterners and
Westerners appear to remain far from each other apart,,446. Opinions on the emotive
issue of Kosovo may well have been highly charged, but the development of regional
. differences in opinion on the subject of, for example, NATO, the deployment of
German troops in out-of-area activities and attitudes to Americans illustrate that the
. 443 See Daniel Hough: "Made in Eastern Germany': The PDS and the Articulation of Eastern German
Interests', in German Politics, Volume 9 Number 3,2000, pp.l2S-148.
444 Claus Offe: Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience (Oxford:
Polity Press, 1996), p.180.
44S For example, an opinion poll conducted by Forsa at the end of March 1999 indicated that 25 per
cent of western Germans were against the participation of the Bundeswehr in the NATO attacks on
Yugoslavia, whereas 55 per cent of eastern Germans opposed it ('Kritik am Krieg wlichst': Schweriner
Volkszeitung, 31 March 1999). By the beginning of May these differences remained evident as 44.4
per cent of Westerners compared to 21.5 per cent of Easterners supported the attacks. 20 per cent of
Westerners and 42.4 per cent of Easterners rejected them ('PDS: Mehrheit gegen die NATO Angriffe'
Emnid survey in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3 May 1999, p.2). A further Ernnid survey
published on the 8th of May 1999 continued to highlight the view that eastern Germans were more
sceptical towards German involvement in Kosovo, revealing that only 30 per cent of western Germans
wanted to see the air-raids ending, while 49 per cent of eastern Germans preferred this option (see
'Umfrage: Deutsche halten Koalition trotz des Kosovokrieges rur stabil', in Die Welt, 8 May 1999,
f4':)'In spite of writing these words, Stognienko does not believe that an East/West divide has stabilised
over the longer term, and he puts the divisions in levels of support down to the lingering anti-western
(i.e. anti-NATO) sentiments of a population socialised in the GDR and the troubled experience of
living through such a rapid process of transformation. See Michael Stognienko: 'Der Krieg in den
Kopfen: Wie der Kosovo-Einsatz die Deutschen trennt und eint', in Lothar Probst (Hrsg.): DifJerenz in
der Einheit: Ober die kulturellen Unterschiede der Deutschen in Ost und West (Berlin: Ch. Links,
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legacy of the Cold War may be more evident than many analysts initially believed
was the case. For example, in 1993, 59 per cent of western Germans favoured
Bundeswehr participation in internationally controlled missions. Only 35 per cent of
eastern Germans did S0447. Table 5 illustrates that eastern Germans are less
appreciative of Americans - something that, one would presume, is a legacy of the
anti-American rhetoric of the pre-1989 years.
Table 5448
"As a general rule, do you like Americans particularly or are you not very fond
of them?"
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Yes, I like No, I don't Yes, I like No, I don't
Americans like the Americans like
Americans Americans
1991 51 22 37 23
1993 44 23 31 28
1996 53 18 34 22
Table 6449
UN Missions involving Bundeswehr troops (July 1996, in per cent)
Total Western Eastern
Germany Germany
I agree that the Bundeswehr should take part 29 32 19
in out-of-area activities on behalf of the UN,
under the supreme command of NATO, just
as other countries do
The Bundeswehr should not take part in acts 44 45 39
of aggression iKampfeinsatzes, rather just as
a part of a peace keeping force
I am against every participation of 18 14 32
Bundeswehr soldiers in activities outside of
NATO territory
No Answer 9 9 10
Total 100 100 100
The Kosovo conflict was not the only area of international activity where the
1999), p.73.
447 Rainer Ferchland et al (1994): op. cit. p.5.
448 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate KOcher: Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie /993-97
(Milnchen: K.G.Saur Verlag, 1997) p.1106.
449 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate KOcher (1997): ibid. p.1143.
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opinions of eastern and western Germans differed. The participation of Bundeswehr
troops in UN peacekeeping missions has been persistently viewed in much more
sceptical terms, Similar sceptical attitudes towards the role of NATO are also evident.
The propensity of Germans in the new Lander to offer less support to an active
Bundeswehr is further highlighted if one takes specific policy scenarios into
consideration. The debate surrounding the placement of NATO and German soldiers
in Bosnia was such an issue:
Table 7450
The Stationing of Bundeswehr Troops in Bosnia
"Do you believe that it is correct that German troops are taking part in the
NATO force in Bosnia, or should German Troops not be involved?" (September
1995)
Total Western Germany Eastern Germany
I agree that 45 50 25
German troops
should take part
I think that 43 38 64
German troops
should not be
involved
Undecided 12 12 11
Total 100 100 100
The above data would indicate that Easterners tend to possess more negative
attitudes and value judgements towards institutions of the international security
framework and particular to Germany's role with this. The increased emphasis on
'peace' and the non-German participation in international military activity have their
roots in pre-1989 socialisation and the general disillusionment with the 'western
world' as a result of the harsh introduction to it 'that many eastern Germans have
received. It is not, however, the intention of this work to analyse the precise reasons
for these attitudinal differences. The intention here is simply to illustrate that
coherent patterns of attitudinal difference exist and how they have influenced the
'worldview' of a large section of the eastern German populace.
It is clear that before unification Germans in both the FRG and the GDR, in
spite of some remaining similarities, were well advanced in the process of developing
450 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate Kocher (1997): ibid. p.1147.
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separate identities within their states'", Hence, despite initial prognoses indicating
that accession to the Federal Republic at the level of societal adaptation would be a
relatively smooth process, it should be no surprise that eastern Germans in particular
have found the process both challenging and, at times, dismaying. It is obvious that
the vast majority of East German citizens wished to see 'their' state disappear, but it is
just as obvious that everyday life within the confines of the East German dictatorship
has left indelible marks on the East German populace - that have made incorporating
oneself into new societal structures at times difficult452• This is not to say that forty
years worth of 'indelible marks' have not been left on West Germans, but rather that
socialisation within East Germany has proven very ineffectual preparation for life in
the Federal Republicf".
3.2.1.4. Eastern German Symbols and Characteristics
Cultural identification can also be demonstrated in other less explicit ways
than those mentioned above. Hence despite the death of the GDR, regional symbols
and characteristics remain much in evidence in the new federal states today, and they
have come to form an important part of the eastern German cultural landscape. They
take a number of different and varied forms (ranging from novels such as 'Am
kurzeren Ende der Sonnenalle' or 'HeIden wie wir', to eastern German products, and
even internet sites dedicated to eastern Germany and the GDR454) and are often seen
as relatively uncontroversial ways of expressing nostalgic feelings towards a citizens'
own past455• Eastern Germans have clearly experienced a combined past,
differentiating and separating them from their western German counterparts - and this
is particularly so as it is often such a controversial and contested issue. The
durchgaucken456 of officials and feelings of second-class citizenship have left eastern
451 Konrad H. Jarausch (ed.) (1997): op. cit. p.8. .
452 Mary Fulbrook: "Wir sind ein Volk'? Reflections on German Unification', in Parliamentary
A/fairs, Number 44, 1991, pp.389-404.
4 Laurence H. McFalls (1995): op. cit. p.140.
454 Many such sites now exist, but two of the most popular are http://www.ddr-alltagskultur.de and
http://www.ossiverband.de
455 Katja Neller (2000): op. cit. p.571.
456 'Durchgaucken' is a quasi-derogatory term that illustrates the need for all state officials in eastern
Germany to have been cleared of (excessive) Stasi connections. Joachim Gauck was the official placed
in charge of sifting through the mountains of Stasi files that were not destroyed in the dying days of the
GDR, and, as such, if one has been 'durchgegauckt', then one can consider oneself free of the worry of
being accused by Gauck (as the symbol of the institution) of co-operating too intensely with the East
German secret police.
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Germans on the defensive, in that they have to defend their pre-1989 existences in a
way that they never expected457• Western Germans, of course, are not required to do
this458• Historical particularity is, therefore, a clear characteristic that underpins the
process of eastern German regional identity formation.
Symbols of 'eastern Germanism' are also evident in other areas of everyday
life. The arguments concerning the trivial (or so one would have thought) issue of the
Ampelmdnnchen (the little men who are on the red and green lights at pedestrian
crossings) in the mid-1990s came to epitomise the lingering cultural clashes that were
evident in reunified Germany459. Eastern Germans found such issues and examples as
ideal prisms through which to reject the imposed uniformity that the western German
system of bureaucracy and order was often perceived as placing them under.
The Trabant, to use another example, is no longer a car that is widely despised.
Of the 3.2 million that were produced in Zwickau over the course of 30 years460, I.S
million were, in the mid-1990s, believed to still be on the roads across central and
eastern Burope'?'. Once perceived as being destined for rapid extinction, fan clubs
and societies have rapidly sprung up all over eastern Germany in order to celebrate
the continued existence of what was once the butt of many western German jokes462•
Eastern goods in general are sold in numbers that few would have predicted in 1989.
Duckenfield and Calhoun do not shirk from describing the renaissance of eastern
German products and icons as further contributing to "the creation of an eastern
Germ~n cultural identity't463. Th~y see the buying and selling of East German icons
as an attempt to create and express an independent eastern identity without the need to
457 See Peter Pulzer: 'Political Ideology', in Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl &
Stephen Padgett (eds.): Developments in German Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992),
pp.303-326; Peter Pulzer: German Politics 1945-/995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p19;
See also Dieter Walz & Wolfram Brunner (1997): op. cit. pp.l3-19.
458 Although the very fact that this is the case rankles with many eastern Germans, as they remain
under the perception that unification should have seen the coming together of two equal states, and not
the AnschlufJ one onto another (see chapter five of this work for more analysis of this).
459 Mark Duckenfield & Noel Calhoun: 'Invasion of the Western Arnpelmannchen', in German
Politics, Volume 6 Number 3, December 1997, pp.54-69. For information on the (ongoing) campaign
to save the Ampelmannchen see http://interactive.de/ampel.html
460 Trabants were produced for thirty two years, from 1958 until 1990.
461 John Dornberg: 'Five Years After Reunification - Easterners Discover Themselves', in German
Life, December 1995/January 1996.
46 In February 1998 there were still 378,000 Trabants registered in Germany. 140,000 of these (37
per cent of all Trabants) were in Saxony. This may be as Zwickau, where Trabants were produced, is
situated in this state. The Trabant does, however, clearly have fans elsewhere - and even North Rhine
Westphalia has a registered 4,300 Trabants within its state borders. See Berliner Morgenpost, 23
February 1998. Furthermore, many clubs and societies have sprung up in support of the Trabant.
According to one (by no means all-inclusive) source, 123 such societies exist. See
http://www.trabinet.de.
463 Mark Duckenfleld & Noel Calhoun (1997): op. cit. p.54.
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form costly political organisations and groupings or the submission to existing
institutional formulas464• Eastern Germans have refrained from exploiting the new
institutional structures that have been imported from the West, or the channels of
collective action that a nascent civil society offers them, when wishing to display
dissatisfaction with particular policy choices imposed upon them. Eastern Germans
appear to lack the self-confidence in their own identity to want to do this as they
continue to search for, shape and re-shape the norms and values that differentiate
them from western Germans. Hence one sees the peculiar phenomenon of the market
acting as a prism through which this regional particularity is expressed.
This stems from the vast differences that were evident in the consumer worlds
of the FRG and the GDR pre-1989. Having initially shunned eastern products in late
1989 and early 1990 in order to 'Test the West', eastern Germans quickly saw value
in reversing this trend as and when they perceived the West as not being all that they
had expected of it. Conrad Lay hints at the fundamentals behind such a phenomenon
by observing that:
The line that divided Germany for forty years was a division into two
differing goods worlds. This was not just emphasised in two politically
divergent ideologies, but rather in the lowly spheres of everyday life: in
food and drink, in Jeans and TV sets, in coffee, refrigerators and gherkins,
so in many of the things that cultural historians describe as 'material
culture' 465. _
Long before the East was opened up to the West in 1989 and 1990 it was clear
that Eastern Germans knew and recognised western products, if only through the
much publicised 'Pdckchen von driiben' ('packets from over there') and from
infrequent visits. The extent of this is naturally somewhat difficult to quantify but
statistics like the estimation that between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of all the coffee
that was drunk in the GDR stemmed from the FRG illustrates how focused on West
German products East Germans could be466•
,With the fall of the Berlin Wall Easterners wanted the long sought after
opportunity to forget their own imitations and alternatives to the genuine western
464 Mark Ouckenfield & Noel Calhoun (1997): ibid. p.5S.
465 Conrad Lay: 'Oer Siegeszug der Ostprodukte - Zur Mentalitiits- und Produktgeschichte der
deutschen Vereinigung'. On http://www.oeko-net.delkommunelkommune 1-97/tlay197.html
466 'Jacobs Kronung', in particular, took on the status of being the most loved coffee imported from
the West, carrying with it implicitly positive political propaganda. http://www.oeko-net.de/
kommunelkommune 1-97/tlay197.html
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articles. Freedom became something tangible that could be eaten, tasted, smelt, put
on, bought and owned. Even goods such as bread, milk and fresh produce were
bought from western German producers, as the sales of eastern German goods
plummeted. Western German produce was seen to be epitomising the Easterners
wishes to forget their own dreary goods and lifestyles, and to start to live as their
western brethren were doing.
These concepts of western material hegemony did not, however, last long. In
concrete terms, this is evident in the wide variety of 'eastern goods' that have since
made a comeback. Psychologically, Easterners were totally unprepared for
Westerners to be so dismissive of anything that had its roots in eastern Germany -
including, of course, almost all products that had been made in East Germany. The
ambivalence of western Germans towards eastern products came to be seen as an
indictment of the hard work, often in trying circumstances, that East Germans had
invested in building their lives pre-1989. Hence the idea of 'Test the West' came to
an end almost as quickly as it had commenced and in 1990 eastern Germans started to
return to buying their own Ostprodukte.
The proportion of eastern Germans preferring to buy goods that are locally
produced increased from 67 per cent in 1991 to 82 per cent in 1993467. In 1995 a
mere 53 per cent of respondents said that they would buy products on the basis of
quality and price, whereas 45 per cent said that wherever possible they bought eastern
products. A mere 2 per cent preferred western German products above eastern
German ones468. The range of Ostprodukte and eastern brand names that have come
back onto eastern German shelves is subsequently wide and diffuse - Florena cream,
Spee and Fit washing liquids469, Rotkappchen champagne'I'', Spreewald gherkins,
Foron refrigerators, Club Cola, Bautzener mustard, Burger crispbread, Nordhauser
Korn (schnapps), f6 cigarettes and Radeberger beer to name but a handful - and the
strategies with which many of them are marketed play on the concept of eastern
German togetherness and the combined feelings of identity that many Easterners
continue to feel for one another. "Der Osten hat gewdhlt: Kathi" (The East has voted:
467 'Wehre dich taglich': Der Spiegel, Numrner 52, 1993, pp.46-49.
468 'Stolz auf's eigene Leben': Der Spiegel, Numrner 27, 1995, p.42.
469 Spee and Fit remain the market leaders in the eastern German cleaning substances market. See
Thomas Ahbe: 'Ostalgie als Laienpraxis', in Berliner Debatte INITIAL, Volume 10 Number 3, 1999,
p.89.
470 2.9 million bottles of Rotkappchen Sekt were sold in 1991. This figure rose to 5.7m in 1992, to
10m in 1993 and to 17m in 1994. See 'Stolz auf's eigene Leben', Der Spiegel: Number 27, 1995,
p.59.
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Kathi) is one of the advertising slogans used by eastern Germany's leading producer
of Backmischungen, explicitly referring to the products territorial and historical
anchorage. Karo cigarettes declared an "Anschlag auf den Einheitsgeschmack" in
1991, as they attempted to win back market share from their western German rivals?",
One of Club Cola's slogans is yet more explicit - "Club Cola - unser Cola", referring
expressly to its past heritage, before continuing "Von einigen beliichelt, ist sie doch
nicht tot zu kriegen: Club Cola aus Berlin" ("Belittled by some, it's not for being
wiped out: Club Cola from Berlin"t72. This echoes sentiments felt by many eastern
Germans - defend yourselves and do not be scared to fight back in the face of western
German dominance. Philip Morris, the biggest producer of cigarettes in the world,
employs two differing strategic approaches in eastern and western Germany.
Marlboro is the market leader in the West, while f6 is in the new Lander. As the
Philip Morris Press Office in Munich has been quoted as saying:
F6 stands for the good, and the trusted,' from days gone by and helps to
express eastern German identity confidently. F6 does not stand for
misunderstood conservatism, but rather a piece of eastern German cultural
history that is represented through the smoking of this cigarette,
something that in the last few years has become a meaningful part of
identity formation for the citizens of the new Lander. The open and
demonstrative identification with one's own taste as the expression of a
newly developed eastern German consciousness therefore finds expression
in the smoking habits of the citizens of the former GDR473•
Despite the fact that the quality and the methods of production have changed
considerably, and that f6 is owned by a world-wide company that has no roots in the
eastern states, the powerful emotional message is clear. The cigarette is 'one of ours'
that does not want to tum western German - and we are pleased about it. The
marketing strategy for such products is always similar - the brand name is retained,
even if the outward appearance is modernised, while the quality is improved to
western standards. Therefore both continuity and tradition are retained, while
simultaneously expressing the new Lebensgefiihl (mindset) of the post-1989 era474,
The coffee market is perhaps the most extreme example of Easterners
expressing their own territorial preferences. Before 1989 up a large amount coffee
471 See Rainer Gries: 'Der Geschmack der Heimat. Bausteine zu einer Mentalitlitsgeschichte der
Ostprodukte nach der Wende', in Deutschland Archiv, Nummer 10, October 1994, p.1049.
472 Conrad Lay (1997): op. cit., pJ.
473 Quoted inConrad Lay (1997): ibid. p.4.
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that was consumed in the GDR stemmed from West Germany - yet by the end of 1998
Rostfein GmbH expected that Rondo! coffee, the most popular of the GDR brands,
would sell over 6000 tonnes (making it the third most popular brand available in the
eastern states)475. Such examples of a revival in eastern products are numerous, and it
is clear that the days of western supremacy purely on the grounds of heritage are long
over. When questions of subjective quality and taste arise, eastern German products
are very much at the forefront of eastern German minds. This does limit the type of
regional product to everyday goods and some slightly less common luxuries476- but
the eastern German realises that his/her choices in the new shopping centres are
decisions with clear subjective undertones, and although eastern products have strong
historical significance, they are also vehicles for actual opinions.
It has become clear that eastern Germans do not wish to obliterate the GD~
totally from their minds. Their present day picture of it may not match the reality of
what it was really like, but it was, none the less, home for forty years - and as such
many eastern Germans have no or little wish to see it completely written out of
history. The symbols and characteristics mentioned briefly above are clear examples
of how this historical memory is still relevant in identity creation and articulation
today.
3.2.2. Socio-Economic Variables
The second variable within the typology created in chapter two concerned the
importance of socio-economic variables in helping to foster a territorially specific
form of identification and a regional space. It is to the nature of these socio-economic
variables that this work now turns.
474 Conrad Lay (1997): ibid. p.5.
47S Rostfein GmbH had reckoned that in 1997 they were likely to sell between 100 and 200 tonnes of
Rondo! The company were forced to rapidly expand as a result of this renaissance, and in 1997
Rostfein doubled their number of employees from 40 to over 90. See 'Rostfein Kaffee feiert 90
jahriges Jubilaum': Rbstfein Gmbh, Pressematerial, 1998.
476 'Regional products' are still very much on offer in the literary world from publishing houses such
as Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf (based in Berlin), Eulenspiegel Verlag (also based in Berlin) and
Faber & Faber (Leipzig). These institutions have published many books that are specific to life in both
the GDR and in the eastern states. ORB and MDR also show a considerable number of East German
films and television series, ensuring that memories of life in the GDR are accessible should citizens
wish to take advantage of them.
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3.2.2.1. Economic Disparity Between Eastern and Western Germany
Economic dislocation in the East has left the new Lander in a weak and, even
in the long-term, economically disadvantageous position. And, as section 2.4.5.
illustrated, sustained economic disparity is frequently a catalyst for the creation of
distinct regional identities. This economic difference has contributed to the process of
identity formation in the East in that it has left many citizens deeply unsatisfied with
the economic system within which they live, as it is the economic system that is seen
as not responding to the needs of citizens of the eastern states. Eastern Germany is a
territory that remains an economic laggard. This alternative development has its roots
primarily in the ineffectiveness of the GDR's planned economy, as well as in the
strategies of economic transformation adopted in the post-1989 period.
Figure 1477
Unemployment in Eastern and Western Germany (in percent)
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Figure 1 illustrates the differences in rates of unemployment that are evident
between eastern and western Germany. Following the collapse of most of the labour
intensive industries that existed in the GDR, the eastern states are afflicted with
477 Institute for Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt for Arbeit (JAB), Kurzbericht,
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pockets of severe structural unemployment. Furthermore, even in the pockets of
eastern Germany that were sheltered somewhat from economic meltdown, the
transformation from state-socialism to capitalism has caused considerable chaos in the
job market. The weakness of the eastern economic base has ensured that the majority
of Easterners have, at the very least, been forced to change jobs since reunification,
while most have had to suffer periods of unemployment. Given that unemployment
did not exist in the GDR the social and psychological affects of this are amplified
greatly as Easterners find themselves unable to enjoy the respect being in employment
is seen as offering.
Table 8478
Net Income per Month in Germany (in per cent)
Germany Western Germany Eastern Germany
Per Main Per Main Per Main
H'hold Earner H'hold Earner H'hold Earner
Under 1,000 OM 1 2 1 2 2 3
1,000 - 1,249 2 3 2 2 3 7
1,250 - 1,499 3 5 2 3 5 12
1,500 - 1,749 3 7 3 5 5 13
1,750 - 1,999 5 9 5 8 6 16
2,000 - 2,499 11 18 10 17 14 24
2,500 - 2,999 12 17 11 18 14 12
3,000 - 3,499 13 13 13 15 16 7
3,500 - 3,999 10 8 10 10 10 3
4,000 - 4,999 15 8 15 9 13 2
5,000 - 5,999 11 5 12 5 7 1
6,0000M + 14 5 16 6 5 x
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average (OM) 3,845 2,949 3,995 3,151 3,264 2,160
The promise of economic prosperity is, despite relative increases in individual
prosperity, widely seen as being negated upon - as western Germany continues to
enjoy economic affluence that is far greater than that in the East. Table 8 illustrates
how western Germans still earn more, on average, than eastern Germans. The fact
that levels of prosperity in eastern Germany are much higher than they were pre-1989
Nr.l/26 Februar 1999, p.ll. '
478 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate Kocher (1997): op. cit. p.12.
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is irrelevant: eastern Germans continue, as they have done throughout the period since
unification in 1990, to measure their economic (as well as social and political)
position in comparison to Westerners and not citizens of the other former state-
socialist countries. And it is this direct comparison that leads so many Easterners to
be dissatisfied with their economic position within the FRG. Table 8 and Figure 2
illustrate this more precisely.
Figure 2479
The Opinions of Eastern Germans Towards the Standards of Living in Eastern
Germany
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479 Emnid: Urn/rage und Analyse, Heft 3/4, 1999, p.7.
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Figure 3480
The Opinions of Western Germans Towards the Standards of Living in Eastern
Germany
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Dissatisfaction with the economic outputs of the social market economy has
led Easterners to be much more critical of the economic system. Section 3.2.2.4.
illustrates that this has been conceptualised internally by Easterners in more positive
interpretations of socialism and the role of the state, as these institutions offer the
prospect of greater material security and lower unemployment. Many Easterners do
admit that they themselves are better off than they were pre-1989, but there is a
widespread belief that eastern Germans per se are still suffering from economic
disadvantages vis-a-vis Westerners.
3.2.2.2. Egalitarianism, Socialism and The Roll of the State
A strong undercurrent of the eastern German cultural identity touched upon
above surrounds egalitarianism. Easterners are perceived both as looking back with
'rose-tinted glasses' to the GDR and 'up-grading' the state-socialist system that is
480 Ernnid: Umfrage und Analyse, Heft 3/4,1999, p.7.
] 63
Chapter 3 The Creation of a Regional Space and the Process of Identity Creation in Eastern Germany
now perceived in a better light than it ever was while it existed481, The 'upgrading' of
certain GDR institutions should not, however, be taken as a form of collective
amnesia towards the negative aspects of the SED dictatorship, rather it is a self-
interested preference for the social welfare system and security that the GDR (in
hindsight) offered482, The weaker economic base in the eastern states has also meant
that many more citizens have experienced a period of unemployment and social
insecurity since 1989 - phenomena that were largely unknown in the GDR. It is for
this reason, it is hypothesised, that Easterners naturally tend to aspire towards more
social equality and that they support greater government expenditure on 'social' issues
- as it is they who will directly benefit483,
Citizens of the western Lander, meanwhile, tend to show a heavy
predominance towards the values of 'freedom' or 'individualism', Between 71 per
cent and 80 per cent of the population of western Germany said, in 1995, that the
concepts of freedom, freedom of speech, Rechtstaat and democracy were very
important to them, However, the Sozia/staat, social justice and a lessening of the
income differentials were regarded by a mere 40 per cent of the western population as
being of great importance, The picture in the eastern Lander was somewhat different.
Between 57 per cent and 61 per cent believed the 'freedom' variables were very
important, while 62-67 per cent regarded the second grouping as being of great
importance484,
The preference for egalitarian ideals has also been reflected in assessments of
the concept of 'socialism', Despite experiencing real-existing socialism in the GDR,
Easterners have considerably greater appreciation for the ideal of socialism than their
western counterparts, and they also associate many more positive facets of life with it.
By 1998 as much as 26 per cent of the eastern German population even regarded
communism as a positive concept485,
481 For a particularly thorough analysis of this phenomenon see Helga A, Welsh, Andreas Pickel &
Dorothy Rosenberg: inKonrad H. Jarausch (ed.) (1997): op. cit: pp, 103-136,
482 Alison Mahr & John Nagle: 'Resurrection of the Successor parties and Democratisation in East-
Central Europe', in Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 28 Number 4, December 1995,
p.294.
483 Carsten Zelle (1998): op. cit. p.34.
484 Carsten Zelle (1998): ibid. p.2S.
48S Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.46.
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Table 9486
Are you in Favour of Socialism in Principle? (eastern Germany, in per cent)
Yes No
December 1992 22 49
September 1994 33 40
May/June 1998 41 36
A direct comparison between the opinions of eastern and western Germans at
the time of the 1994 and 1998 federal elections shows that considerable disparities
exist in their evaluations of socialism. In 1994 only 21 per cent of Westerners had
any sort of positive attitude towards socialism as a concept, whereas 58 per cent of
Easterners did so (see table 10). In 1998 these figures had hardly changed, with 22
per cent of Westerners and 59 per cent of Easterners regarding socialism in a positive
way.
Table 10487
Attitudes to the Socialism in Eastern and Western Germany in 1994 and 1998
(per cent)
Q. Do you Agree with the Statement that 'Socialism a Good Idea?'
1994 1998
West East West East
.Disagree Completely 28 10 30 6
Tend to Disagree 17 8 17 11
Uncertain 25 20 24 22
Tend to Agree 14 25 15 31
Agree Completely 7 33 7 28
Middle Value 2.97 3.88 2.89 3.85
If one explicitly asks the question within the context of the failed socialist
experiment in the GDR, then the differences remain just as apparent. They also
remain surprisingly consistent over time, illustrating that their is a clear and distinct
ideological divide between Westerners and Easterners over the issue of socialism (see
Figure 4).
486 Peter Christian Segall et at (1999): ibid. p.43.
487 .DFG-ProJekt 'Politische Einstellungen, politische Partizipation und Wahlerverhalten im
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Figure 4488
Is Socialism a good idea that has been improperly carried out in the past (per
cent)?
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Although Easterners are aware of the (perceived) shortcomings of the
contemporary German institutional and political framework (see section 3.2.2.3.), a
particular factor is seen as crucial in regard to the fostering of the majority of tensions
between Easterners and Westerners: the overriding dominance of capitalist economic
structures'f". Subsequently Easterners continue to hold attitudes that are socialist in
nature - even if Easterners themselves are not actually aware ofthis49o.
vereinigten Deutschland 1994 und 1998', inKatja Neller (2000): op. cit. p.S80.
488 ALLBUS 1991-1994 and 1998, KSPW-Studien 1995 and 1996. See Katja Neller (2000): op. cit.
~.S79.
89 Stephen Kalberg (1999): op. cit. p.39.
490 Thomas Koch (1997): op. cit. p.97.
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Table 11491
'What could be the correct way forward for Germany? That the state takes a
more active role in shaping the economy, or that the individual shows more
initiative and initiative is better supported?' (September 1998, in per cent)
Population Total Western Eastern
Germany Germany
That the State takes a more 21 15 42
active role in the economy
That more personal initiative 64 70 39
(Eigeninitiative) is supported
Undecided 15 15 19
A considerable number of Easterners appear highly sceptical of the ability of
the market to solve society's problems. Not only would a majority of Easterners
rather see a more active state, but a third also prefer to see companies being owned by
the state: in order, one presumes, to stop their owners from making exaggerated
profits (see tables 11 and 12). This is not replicated at all in western Germany, where
only 8 per cent of Westerners prefer to see companies in public ownership. Three-
quarters of Westerners prefer firmsto be privately owned, compared to 38 per cent of
Easterners.
Table 12492
'What is better, companies belonging to the state or companies being privately
owned?' (September 1998, in per cent)
Population Total Western Germany Eastern
Germany
Companies belonging 13 8 32
to the state
Companies being in 68 76 38
private ownership
Undecided 19 16 30
Socialism is also ascribed more positive values than it was when the GDR
collapsed. This stems from the chastening experience of experiencing the
transformation process and the realisation of the flaws/problems of contemporary
capitalism.
491 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.42.
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Table 13493
Under the Concept of 'Socialism' one thinks of •.•(eastern Germany) (per cent)
1990 1995
Bureaucracy 82 35
Outdated 74 46
Communism 69 63
Undemocratic 66 39
Peaceful 62 77
Egalitarianism 58 47
(Gleichmacherel)
Camaraderie 43 75
Justice 27 50
Progressive 25 41
Welfare for all 25 49
The Future 19 42
Freedom 16 33
Capitalism, while certainly not wholeheartedly embraced by Easterners In
1990, is not something that Easterners positively identify with in the late 1990s either.
Table 14 highlights how, over the course of five years, Easterners continue to
associate 'negative' features with capitalism.
Table 14494
Under Capitalism one thinks of •••(eastern Germany - per cent)
1990 1995
Profit 98 95
Entrepreneurship 95 83
Efficiency 93 75
Advancement 86 60
Economic Crises 83 92
Success 81 60
Exploitation 77 91
Class War 77 75
Freedom 65 37
Democracy 48 33
Welfare for all 29 6
Justice 26 7
The eastern German preference for increased state activity, socialism in
general and their feeling that they, as Easterners, are in a position of institutionalised
492 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): ibid. p.43.
493 Allensbacher Archiv, Deutschland Umfragen: June 1990 and NovemberlDecember 1995.
494 Allensbacher Archiv, Deutschland Umfragen: June 1990 and NovemberlDecember 1995.
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inferiority has lead many Easterners to particularly critical of what they see as the
apathy of the central government in BonnlBerlin. This in spite of clear attempts to
alleviate economic dislocation in the East through tools such as the
Solidaritdtszuschlag (solidarity supplement), Liinderfinanzausgleich (financial
equalisation mechanism between states) and the huge financial investments that have
been made in eastern German infrastructure and the eastern German business
environment. Easterners still clearly believe that, as a peripheral group away from the
'centre' of western Germany, the central government is not doing enough to improve
standards of living in the East and to achieve financial equality with the West. Figure
5 illustrates this explicitly.
Figure 5495
In its attempt to achieve equality of living standards in Eastern and Western
Germany is Bonn doing too little?
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
o
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~R' cl « ~ , cl ~' , , cf ~' ~ R' cf
f::)e <:>e ~Il) ~~ f::)e'Q <:>0 ~Il) ~.§'f::)e'Q <:l ~Il) ~~ ~e (:l
I.... _, ...... '.................... ~--.- ... ~ ----..
l' :+
- - - - - -- --- --1- ..... ---
-+- Eastern Germany
-- Western Germany
This section has therefore illustrated that Easterners possess attitudes and
orientations that remain largely socialist in nature and egalitarian in their expectation.
While freedom is widely accepted as a positive ideal, Easterners stress the need to
achieve a greater parity of living standards in the FRG - principally as they view
themselves as being the group who would benefit from such parity. The experience of
seeing the SED dominate economic, political and social life in the GDR has not
dissuaded the majority of Easterners that the state needs to take an active role in
shaping the economic environment. This is in clear opposition to the dominant beliefs
of western Germans, who have grown up with and a used to the state playing a
495 Ernnid: Umfrage und Analyse, Heft 3/4, 1999, p.9
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restricted (if still clearly defined) role in economic and social affairs.
3.2.2.3. Institutional Transfer and the Uneasy Acceptance of Democratic
Structures
Lived experience has led Easterners to distance themselves from the
institutions of the Federal Republic. This has become a clear tenet of the eastern
German identity of defiance. Institutions and formal organisations of collective action
need both to be formally embedded and supported within the broader socio-cultural
environment - if they are not, then there remains the inherent risk of the institutions at
best functioning poorly and at worst failing and collapsing (or being overthrown)
altogether .. Political cultures are not seen as changing quickly to new institutional
settings and for this reason the institutional landscape of the FRG is viewed positively
by Westerners, who have grown up and got used to the system over many years. The
assumption when institutional export to eastern Germany is discussed is therefore that
patterns of behaviour, routines and mental states of mind,will struggle to take root in
the differing socio-cultural environment of eastern Germanyt", And it appears
correct that lower levels of trust in politics, politicians, institutions and processes are
clearly evident in the eastern states. Easterners remain unconvinced about western
German democracy, even if they remain supporters of democracy as a system of
governance'i". Western German democracy is not seen to respond and reflect the
views and interests of eastern Germans, as it is perceived as functioning on a western
German agenda. Institutions clearly need to 'grow out' of a given society, and the
direct placement of West German institutional structures has not ensured their
acceptance and efficient functioning in the East. Western institutions need .to be
anchored in traditions, routines, attitudes, expectations and experiences that are not
automatically created with the institutions themselvest". Numerous public opinion
surveys have further confirmed the assumption that eastern Germans subsequently
have less confidence in democracy as a whole499•
496 Detlev Pollack: 'Trust in Institutions and the Urge to be Different: On Attitudinal Change in
Eastern Germany', in German Politics, Volume 8 Number 3, December 1999, pp.81·102.
497 Detlev Pollack & Gert Pickel: 'Die ostdeutsche Identitat- Erbe des DDR-Sozialismus oder Produkt
der Wiedervereinigung?', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B41·42/98, p.17.
498 Detlev Pollack: 'Das Bedurfnis nach sozialer Anerkennung. Der Wandel der Akzeptanz von
Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft in Ostdeutschland', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B13/97, p.3.
499 There are numerous works that investigate this question in detail. One of most comprehensive is
Dieter Fuchs, Edeltraud Roller & Bernhard We6els: 'Die Akzeptanz der Demokratie des vereinigten
Deutschlands', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B51-97, pp.3.12 .
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Such a distance from the institutions of the FRG stems from the high
expectations that Easterners had when the GDR acceded to the FRG, and the
subsequent disappointments that ensued when these expectations were not met. The
cynicism that many Easterners felt pre-1989 has been re-called back into the
consciousness, and as such Easterners remain sceptical about the ability of the FRG's
institutional structures to fulfil their needs. Hans-Joachim Maaz has exhibited the
most extreme elements of this by observing that "instead of Honecker we now have
Kohl, rather than the SED we now have the 'Treuhand ",soo. Although perhaps a little
excessive, Maaz encapsulates the disillusionment and distance that many Easterners
still feel towards their new state.
If Helmut Kohl's legendary promises of' flourishing landscapes had been
fulfilledso1, of course, then it is likely that the political landscape in the eastern states
would now look very different. This is because when the political and/or economic
'system' is seen to be failing its citizens, or the citizens of a particular region, social
tensions arise - inevitably having an effect on the political system. This can be in a
radical and abrupt way, as happened in Italy at the beginning of the 1990s, or it can be
. rather more subtle and piecemeal as was the case in Scotland in the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s. Furthermore, if changes in the socio-economic base correspond, however
roughly, to the parameters of a coherent set of cultural values (see section 3.2.2.2)
then the effects of these changes can be amplified considerably - as regional
identification becomes apparent in a number of different spheres within society. It is
for this reason that the most successful regional parties are those that exist in regions
where unique cultural and societal traits are linked and interwoven with economic
difference - such as eastern Germany.
The transformation process that has taken place in the eastern states has
caused regional identification to take root for reasons to do with the method and
manner of the transformation process. Unlike the other former Communist states of
central and eastern Europe, the GDR did not need to create new political and
economic structures from scratch. Even before the unification of the two Germanies
on the third of October 1990, when the western German institutional structures.were
officially expanded eastwards to incorporate the GDR, it had become clear that East
SOO Hans-Joachim Maaz: Das Gestilrtzte Volk oder die verunglackte Einheit (Berlin: Argon Verlag,
1991), p.28. .
501 See footnote 138 for the exact wording of Kohl's famous promise of the forthcoming 'flourishing
landscapes' in eastern Germany.
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Germany was not going to attempt its own 'third way,502. No original or independent
strategies were to be invoked. .The West German system was, one or two noticeable
exceptions apart, to become the all-German system.
Systemic inefficiency, in the sense that eastern Germans are quantifiably
unhappier than western Germans (see below) with democracy, the social-market
economy and the institutional arrangements within the Federal Republic, therefore
distinguishes the eastern German 'regional space apart from one that exists in western
Germany.
The transfer 'en masse' of the West German institutional system503onto the
territory of the GDR was the quickest and easiest of the differing processes of
transformation to complete'?', As a result of being able to watch West German
televisiorr'", of occasional visits to West Germany, or perhaps of having relatives in
the Federal Republic, many East Germans were surprisingly familiar with the societal
system and much of what went on in the FRG. Hence it came as no surprise that they
embraced the newly expanded institutions remarkably quickly.
Politically at least, East Germany was effectively annexed by West
Germany'". Therefore, like most parts of West German life and culture, the Federal
S02 Unlike in Britain, the 'third way' in Germany has traditionally been seen as the theoretical
alternative between socialism and communism. However, the meaning of the term has changed in
Germany through the 1990s, and it does now tend to be understood in a much more Clintonian or
Blairite sense.
S03 The term 'institution' is meant here to be a very wide-ranging concept, incorporating bodies such
as political parties, trade unions, industrial, agricultural and employer associations, guilds, churches,
clubs and societies, cultural and sporting organisations etc. that come together to form the complex
network of organisations that comprise a functioning civil society and liberal democracy.
S04 There are numerous works that dissect the transformation process in detail. Alongside authors that
have already been mentioned, see Scott Gissendanner & Jan Wielgohs: Conference Report: 'Einheit
und Differenz - The Transformation of East Germany in Comparative Perspective', in German Politics,
Volume 6 Number 2, August 1997, pp.181-189; Die real-existierende postsozialistische Gesellschaft
(Berlin: Wissenschaftlich Konferenz der Brandenburgischen Landeszentrale filr politische Bildung,
Gesellschaft fi1r sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Publizistik GmbH, 1994); Claus Offe (1994):
op. cit; Karl-Rudolf Korte: Die Chance genutzt? Die Politik zur Einheit Deutschlands (Frankfurt am
Main: Campus Verlag, 1994). For a more critical view of the transformation process see Wolfgang
Dumcke & Fritz Vilmar (Hrsg.) (1995): op. cit.
sos The picture that West German television offered East Germans, despite giving them insights into
the material prosperity on offer in the Federal Republic and to the state's institutional structures, was
later revealed to be inadequate in preparing them for 'die realexistierende Bundesrepublik'. The
positive image of material wealth and democratic freedoms was in stark contrast to the economic
insecurity and sense of helplessness that eastern Germans found themselves experiencing post-1989.
S06 Within the West German Grundgesetz (Basic Law) two possible mechanisms existed for uniting
the two states. Article 146 left the way open for the drawing up of a new constitution, with possibly a
new assembly and probably a referendum to pass the document into law. This article was created in
the very event of a reunification becoming possible, and gave the impression of two equal partners
coming together in one state. However, Article 23 enabled states or territories to 'accede' to the
Federal Republic, and this was the route the Saarland took into the Federal Republic in 1957. This
method was, effectively, a legal and constitutional annexation, and was the option Helmut Kohl and his
coalition partners, many argue to serve their political purposes, used to unify the two countries.
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Republic's political parties, pressure groups, trade unions, employers' associations
etc. all extended their structures eastwards. Indigenous political development was
largely strangled, as western actors and methods dictated the entire process. Hence
the fact that the western German system enjoys only uneasy acceptance should not be
too surprising. Only when the 'system' has moulded itself onto the unique contours
of eastern German society and reacts to its needs and requirements will Easterners
perceive the system as not being akin to a Fremdkorper ("foreign body").
Contrary to popular belief, as early as 1990 East Germans displayed a
reluctance to view the political and institutional framework of the FRG as being
perfect. Only 13.2 per cent of Easterners were of the opinion that West German
political and societal structures should be transferred en masse to the eastern states,
while 82 per cent thought that sections of the West German institutional structure
were Verbesserungsbediirftig (in need of improvementj'". In 1992, 65 per cent of
Easterners thought that Germany still needed a new constitution, while in 1993 this
figure had risen to 72.9 per cent. A mere 3.4 per cent of Easterners thought in 1993
that the Grundgesetz in its present form was a sufficient document for Germany in the
1990S508•
The expansion of the West German party system remains a prime example of
'systemic inefficiency'. The West German political parties all expanded eastwards, as
a rule by firstly aligning themselves with their eastern counterparts (that were once
members of the umbrella coalition supporting the SED) and then by effectively taking
them over. The SPD was the only major exception to this rule, as it attempted to build
a base from scratch that was cleansed of any SED members - something that in
hindsight was a key mistake in strategy. The citizens' movements and the concept of
Round Tables quickly lost political relevance, as the institutional structures of West
Germany became the institutional structures of the new united state. This prevented
any organic, region-specific development (with the exception of the PDS, and, to a
lesser extent of Alliance 90) from taking place. A party system that had developed
over forty years in West Germany, moulding itself to the societal contours of that state
and adapting as and when issues and cleavages rose and dropped in salience'", was
S07 1058 Eastern Germans were asked in the surveys. See Helmut Meier, Bodo Reblin & Erhard
Weckesser (1995): op. cit. p.6 for further analysis and details.
S08 22.3 per cent of Easterners were of the opinion that a modified and updated Basic Law was
necessary, and that if this took place then the need for a new constitution would be alleviated. Helmut
Meier, Bodo Reblin & Erhard Weckesser (1995): ibid. p.19.
S09 The rise of the Green Party in the 1980s is a clear example of a party arising to represent a clear
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suddenly expanded to include the new Lander - an area with very different social and
political backgrounds.
At the national level, the inner-policy making circles of the Federal
Government, and hence those institutions that were (are) at the very heart of the
policy making process'!", remained exempt from adaptation, and as a result the
administrative structures and personnel of those responsible for relations remained
firmly intact. The transformation process, once loosely sanctioned in the
Volkskammer elections of March 1990was an external exercise carried out by western
elites, with remarkably little active input from the East.
The quality of a democracy hinges not only upon citizens' sense of being
represented, but also their perception that the political elites govern effectively'!'.
Only when both of these prerequisites are met will the institutional patchwork of a
state be widely supported. This is not something, according to popular wisdom, that
can either be forced or rushed and as such the direct placement of institutional
structures does not necessarily ensure their acceptance and efficient functioning. This
is not just true for economic structures, but is also the case for democratic structures.
Numerous public opinion surveys have confirmed the assumption that eastern
Germans have less confidence than western Germans in democracy as a wholes12•
The rapid incorporation of the GDR into the FRG has not spawned widespread
appreciation of the democratic system as it functions in Germany today. Easterners
had grown used to being sidelined from the political process in the GDR, as the state
paid all but lip-service to the ideas and opinions of the masses. Despite the
introduction of democratic structures the high expectations of Easterners that
democracy and freedom would enable them to achieve personal fulfilment have
proven misplaced. Once again, the hopes of the unification period have not been
fulfilled, and patterns of disenfranchisement and disillusionment that existed in the
GDR quickly came back into the consciousness of many eastern Germans.
segment of the electorate. This development was not instantaneous, and illustrated that as and when
parties fail to rise to the challenges of systemic change and societal preference, then opportunities arise
for other political actors to enter the arena.
510 The Federal Ministry of Economics (Bundesministerium fUr Wirtschaft), the Finance Ministry
(Bundesministerium fUr Finanzen), the Foreign Ministry (Auswartiges Amt) and the Chancellor's
Office (Bundeskanzlei) are principally meant here.
SII Herbert Kitschelt et al: Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-
Party Cooperation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.345.
SI2 For a thorough discussion of this issue see Dieter Fuchs, Edeltraud Roller & Bernhard WeBels
(1997): op. cit. pp.3-12.
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Table 15513
Q: "Is the democratic order that we have in Germany the best way of organising
a state ("Staatsform"), or is there another that is better?" A: Democracy in
Germany is the best 'Staatsform' (in per cent)
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1990 81 41
1991 77 34
1992 .. 78 41
1993 75 32
1994 79 35
1995 70 28
1997 69 23
The experience of Western Germans with democracy is much more positive
(tables 15, 16 and 17). Westerners tend to associate it with both freedom and material
prosperity. This is in spite of the scepticism that the democratic order was faced with
throughout the formative years of the FRG, and rests on the system being able to
'prove itself. Easterners do not see the western German democratic order, imposed
as it was from outside, as being the optimum mode of governance. They do not tend
towards rejections of democratic systems per se, as the experience of a highly non-
democratic form of governance remains too close at hand. They are, however, clear
, in their belief that the German model of governance needs an overhaul. Culturally
distinct suspicions of political elites tend Easterners towards more direct forms of
democracy, just as Easterners are eager to achieve more 'economic democracy' (in the
sense of increased representation of the working classes in employment).
Table 16514
Q: "Is the democratic order that we have in Germany the best way of organising
a state ("Staats/orm"), or is there another that is better?" A: There are others
that are better (in per cent)
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1990 8 19
1991 11 29
1992 6 20
1993 8 30
1994 6 25
1995 13 33
1997 11 37
m Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate KOcher (1997): op. cit, p.657.
"4 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate KOcher (1997): ibid. p.657.
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Table 17515
"Is Democracy as it is practised in the FRG the best form of state organisation?"
Western Lander Eastern Lander
Yes 76 31
Other forms exist 9 28
Not Sure 15 41
There are also clear differences when the issue of the Gesellschaftsordnung
(the ordering of society) is analysed. Eastern Germans remain persistently less-
satisfied with the ordering of society within the FRG, as the tables below illustrate.
Table 18516
Do you agree with the following statement? "I am convinced that our society is
heading towards a large crisis. Politics as it now as is not going to solve these
problems. We will only be able to do that if our political system fundamentally
changes"
Agree Disagree Undecided/Do not
know
Population 43 33 24
Western Germany
1986 16 61 23
1988 25 48 27
1995 30 50 20
1997 39 36 25
Eastern Germany
1995 41 36 23
1997 59 18 23
Table 19517
"Is society ("Gesellschaftssystem") in the Federal Republic just or unjust?" (in
percent)
Germany Western Germany Eastern Germany
Yes, it is just 42 48 19
No, it is not just 33 28 53
Undecided, do not 25 24 28
know
SIS Gerald R. Kleinfeld (1995): op. cit. p.248.
Sl6 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate Kocher (1997): op. cit. p.652.
m Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate Kocher (1997): ibid. p.645.
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The uneasy acceptance of West German institutional structures is visible in the
spheres of pressure groups, trade unions and other forms of societal organisation, as
they inevitably take time to develop 'into' the system!". Eastern Germans are neither
as appreciative of the political system as they were when East Germany vanished, nor
when taken in comparison to western Germans. The dissatisfaction with the political
model of government in Germany today acts as an identity 'creator in as much as
sentiment in the East follows a broad, underlying, less positive trend towards the
political system than is the case in western Germany. This does not implicitly mean
that the current institutional system needs, from an eastern German point of view, to
be overthrown - rather that new, specifically eastern German concerns have to be
suitably addressed in order for wider acceptance to follow.
Table 20519
"How proud are you personally of Germany's democratic institutions?"(1997)
(per cent)
Western Germany Eastern Germany
1993 1993
Not Proud 1 4.6 10.6
2 10.3 22.0
3 30.5 41.8
4 36.0 20.7
Very Proud 5 18.5 4.9
Politically articulating dissatisfaction with the transformation process has been
difficult for all of the parties that stem from West Germany. Eastern Germans remain
passive observers of politics and economics that is perceived to be running on a
western German dominated agenda. This agenda stems from the numerical
superiority of western Germans just as much as their prominence in many positions of
influence. Western political parties are often, therefore, seen as being part of the
problem, as table 21 helps to illustrate.
SI8 Wendy Carlin: 'The New East German Economy: Problems of Transition, Unification and
Institutional Mismatch', in German Politics, Volume 7 Number 3, December 1998, pp.14-32.
519 Thomas Blank (1997): op. cit. p,43.
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Table 21520
Trust in Political Parties (on a scale ranging from -5, indicating no trust at all, to
+5, indicating very high trust) in Western and Eastern Germany
1992 1993 1995
The 'New' Lander -0.95 -1.26 -0.50
The 'Old' Lander -0.18 -0.52 +0.07
Table 22521
A Comparison of the Trust in Institutions in Eastern and Western Germany
(1993)
A great deal Quite a lot of Little trust No trust at all
of trust trust
East West East West East West East West
Church 6 13 6 13 36 33 39 24
Police 5 12 30 54 55 29 9 5
Laws 10 12 30 45 47 35 13 8
Bundeswehr 5 11 31 34 41 44 23 11
NATO 2 8 18 41 45 39 35 12
Bundestag 4 4 19 30 50 49 27 17
European 2 4 24 29 45 49 29 18
Community
Administration 1 2 17 26 61 55 21 16
Newspapers 2 3 15 32 55 51 27 13
Data published by Emnid also reveals that not only do Easterners have lower
levels of trust in institutions and organisations in the Federal Republic, but those
Easterners who express such sentiments most clearly are more likely to vote for the
PDS. PDS supporters distrust all of the named institutions, with the perhaps expected
exception of the Trade Unions, to a greater extent than the supporters of other parties.
Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate how the PDS reflects such sentiments in its political work.
520 S .urveys 'Emstellungen zu aktuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik' (IPOS), 1991-1993 and 1995. In
Dieter Fuchs et al (1997): op. cit. p.9.
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Table 23522
Party Preferences and Trust in Institutions: Percentage of Party Supporters
Expressing Trust in the Given Institution (September 1999)
CDU SPD FDP 8'90 PDS
Bundestag 53.8 47.8 31.9 59.3 28.4
Police 85.5 80.5 62.5 76.5 56.8
Parties 24.4 26.7 15.5 15.1 10.5
Trade 49.5 63.7 46.7 56.6 '51.8
Unions
Constitut- 84.2 72.9 84 82.6 58.8
ional Court
Federal 40.5 41.5 22.1 45.5 18
Govt
Justice 76.7 63.8 63.2 67.1 38.8
System
Army 86.3 72.6 61.2 58.8 46.9
Verfassung 71.5 63.7 55.9 65.7 16.6
-sschutz
Companies 56.5 48 64.1 44.9 17.8
In the words of Claus Offe, ships only sail in waters of suitable depth, and in
the waters of what was the GDR the institutional ship of the FRG may indeed run
agroundf". Offe may be being unduly over-dramatic but anti-establishment sentiment
widely felt in eastern Germany indicates the ground that still has to be covered.
Dissatisfaction with the economic and political institutions of the FRG is
therefore much more widespread in the East than it is in the West. Easterners do not
exhibit the same amount of trust in the institutional framework of the FRG as
Westerners do. The economic and political system is viewed in a more negative light,
as Easterners continue to express dissatisfaction with the efficacy of the institutional
framework within which they now live.
3.3. Electoral Behaviour in Eastern Germany: The Stabilisation of a Regional
Party System
Eastern German uniqueness has found expression in the nature of the regional
party system that has developed in the eastern states. The stabilisation of the PDS as
an eastern German regional party, the presence of the DYU in two legislatures, the
521 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Renate Kocher (1997): op. cit. p.667.
m Ernnid: Urn/rage und Analyse, 11112, 1999, appendix.
S23 Claus Offe (1994): op. cit. p.46.
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virtual non-existence of the FOP and B90/Greens has ensured that three 'relevant' (in
the Sartorian sense) parties are evident in all of the six eastern legislatures with the
exception of BerlinS24• This is in stark contrast to the eleven western legislatures,
where the POS is not represented at all and the FOP and Greens (and occasionally the
Republicans) consistently fight to achieve more than 5 per cent of the popular vote.
The existence of two 'regional party systems' has ensured that the nature of party
competition and party interaction is very different in eastern and western Germany.
The reasons for such a differentiation lie in the ability of the western parties to
incorporate the differing eastern German attitudinal and value positions, as illustrated
in this chapter, into their political platforms. Yet many authors who posited social-
psychological models of electoral behaviour around the time of the Wende,
hypothesised that, as the two Germanies came together, the western parties were
likely to find virgin electoral territory in the eastern states and to dominate political
activity theres2s• Easterners had had no direct experiences of the western system of
political interest articulation and eastern German society was not likely to be rooted in
the mosaic of cleavage divides that characterised western German political and
electoral competition - yet the western parties were clearly convinced that they could
mould and shape such apparently rootless terrain to their advantageS26• If they had
succeeded in doing this, then it is likely that the West German party system would
have simply expanded and become the 'German party system'.
Following the Volkskammer elections of March 1990, and certainly after the
Federal Election of October 1990, it did appear that the initial predictions
(hypothesising that the western parties would be able to successfully move Eastwards)
were largely proving to be correct. At these elections Eastern Germans gave the
impression that they had quickly and easily aligned themselves to the contours of the
West German party system. The challenge of adapting to a new political environment
also appeared to have been met by the western parties with remarkable ease and in a
remarkably short period of time. Although Alliance 90 and the POS survived the
S24 The Greens are not politically influential in the eastern part of the city, but their strong presence in
western Berlin has ensured that they continue to achieve parliamentary representation in the Berliner
Abgeordnetenhaus. .
m Wilhelm Burklin & Markus Klein: Wahlen und WlJhlerverhalten - Eine Einfiihrung (Opladen:
Leske und Budrich, 1998), p.168.
'26 Within this mosaic it is, however, clear that two cleavages have traditionally been of particular
salience in the Federal Republic: the religious and the class cleavage. See Bernhard We13els:
'Gruppenbindungen und Wahlverhalten: 50 Jahre Wahlen in der Bundesrepuhlik' in Markus Klein,
Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Ekkehard Mochmann &. Dieter Ohr (Hrsg.): 50 Jahre Empirische
Wahlforschung in Deutschland (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), p.I32.
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expansion of the western party organisations - their presence did not have any
significant effect on the nature of the party system that developed. A combination of
'quasi-party identification'Y' with the western parties, fostered both by limited
exposure to the western political system pre-1989 (principally through the medium of
West German television/") and the effective profiling of the former Blockfloten in
1990, had assisted Easterners in coming to terms with the western political system and
in making sense of their new environmenr'f".
Initial elections therefore indicated that the western parties had indeed been
able to channel the interests of the former citizens of the GDR into their political
platforms. The promise of economic affluence, representative democracy and
individual freedom were widely perceived as being sufficient to anchor the western
parties into eastern' German civil society. However, the ability of the western parties
to continue setting the agenda and articulating the particular concerns of eastern
Germans did not continue in the same inevitable fashion that these initial
developments had led most analysts to predict. Easterners soon came to resent the
dominance of these foreign bodies within their political landscape, particularly as the
socio-economic cleavages that had developed over years in the West had not been
'mechanically transferred' to the East530• Popular disillusionment with the political
process (or Politikverdrossenheit'+s subsequently grew across the eastern states.
Elections that have taken place since 1990 have revealed that the initial
alignments of the eastern electorate were weaker than had perhaps been initially
anticipated - and it can plausibly be argued that Easterners remain in a state of
,
S27 Carsten Bluck & Henry Kreikenbom: 'Die Wahler in der DDR: Nur issue-orientiert oder auch
r:arteigebunden?', inZeitschriftfiir Parlamentsfragen, Number 22, 1991, pp.49S-S02.
28 The level of knowledge that Easterners possessed was certainly high, although as the 1990s
progressed it became apparent that it was mostly of a superficial nature. See Uwe W. Gehring &
Jurgen R. Winkler: 'Parteiidentifikation, Kandidaten- und Issueorientierungen als Determinanten des
Wahlverhaltens in Ost- und Westdeutschland', in Oscar W. Gabriel (Hrsg.) (1997): op. cit. p.480.
529 Dieter Roth disputed the existence of' quasi-party identifications' in the March 1990 Volkskammer
elections, describing the electoral behaviour of Easterners as "issue voting in almost its purest form".
However, after the 1990 election the existence of superficial party alignments was widely accepted.
See Dieter Roth: 'Die Wahlen zur Volkskarnmer in der DDR. Der Versuch einer Erklarung', in
Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Number 31 1990, pp.369-393.
530 Cornelia Weins: 'The East German Vote in the 1998 General Election', in German Politics,
Volume 8 Number 2, August 1999, p.SO.
S3l The term 'Politikverdrossenheit' dates back to the early 1990s and a debate sparked by then
President Richard von Weizsacker's criticisms of the German democracy. For a discussion of this in
its broader context see Gregg O. Kvistad: 'Parteienverdrossenheit? Whither the German Party-State in
the 1990s?', in Peter H. Merkl (ed.): The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty: The End of a Century
of Turmoil (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.173-185.
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prealignment rather than one of genuine alignrnent532• The initial alignments of voters
with parties in the East produced a reversal of the traditional western European class
alignment, as the working classes tended towards the CDU rather than the SPD. This
original tendency has dissipated over the 1990s, even if eastern Germans continue to
exhibit differing voting patterns in comparison to their western German
counterparts533• Electoral volatility remains higher than in the West (see below), as
Easterners appear more prepared to vote for the party which they perceive to best
represent their interests at a given time534. Pollack and Pickel claim that in 1998 only
56 per cent of eastern Germans saw themselves as 'psychologically attached' to a
party, whereas 72 per cent of Westerners did S0535. Falter, Schoen and Caballero
forward slightly different figures, but never the less make the same point when they
claim that in 1998 37.8 per cent of Eastern Germans have no party identification
whatsoever (compared to 26 per cent in western Germany), Their survey analysis
also highlights that not only do fewer Easterners have strong or very strong party
identifications than Westerners (24 per cent versus 32.4 per cent), but that the length
of time that citizens possess such orientations is much shorter in the eastern states
than it is in the West. Given that citizens of the GDR had no (or little) direct contact
with the western German political parties before 1989 and that party identifications
take significant amounts of time to develop, this should in itself not be too surprising.
but the fact that only 24.4 per cent of Easterners (compared to 55.9 per cent of
Westerners) possess sustainable party identification over "many years" indicates the
considerable psychological differences are still very much in evidencer".
Over the course of the Federal and State elections of the 1990s Easterners
therefore developed sustainable patterns of electoral volatility. This is illustrated by
S32 Russell 1. Dalton: •A Divided Electorate', in Gordon Smith et al. (eds.): Developments in German
Politics II (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p.44.
533 Alan Ware (1996): op. cit. p.237.
534 The proportion of the vote that each of the three main parties receives is also much broader in the
eastern states than it tends to be in the western states. Examples from Mecklenburg West Pomerania
highlight this. In the Landkreis of Demmin the CDU polled 51.7 per cent in the last communal
elections, while it only registered 14.6 per cent in Schwerin II. The SPD registered 12.3 per cent in
Rugen II, but 48.8 per cent inWismar. The PDS is also susceptible to this phenomenon, although not
to the same extent as the CDU and SPD. For example, whereas the PDS polled 36.4 per cent in
Schwerin II, it only managed 16.3 per cent inMecklenburg-Strelitz, See Dieter Wenz: 'Ein Land fur
Wahlergemeinscheften', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 12 June 1999, p.16. For a detailed
breakdown of the election results in Mecklenburg West Pomerania see
http://www.mvnet.de/inmv/stalalwahllkommunalwahlen.htm
m Detlev Pollack & Gert Pickel (2000): op. cit. p.l24.
536 Jurgen W. Falter, Harald Schoen & Claudio Caballero: 'Zur Validierung des Konzepts
'Parteiidentifikation' in der Bundesrepublik', in Markus Klein, Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Ekkehard
Mochmann und Dieter Ohr (Hrsg.) (2000): op. cit. p.247.
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the fact that in 1998 31 percent of Easterners (compared to 21 per cent of Westerners)
voted for a different party than they had done in the previous federal election (in
1994)537. Despite these clear tendencies towards electoral volatility, PDS supporters
remain more likely to continue to support their party over a longer period of time.
Over the course of the 1990s support for both the CDU and the SPD rose and declined
in alarming (for the parties concerned) fashion, as both the state elections of 1998/99
and the Federal and European elections over the same period have illustrated. The
CDU, in particular, suffered heavy losses in eastern Germany in the late 1990s, with a
mere 58 per cent of those who voted for it in 1994 remaining loyal to the party in
1998538.At the 1998 election the CDU vote was down 15.3 per cent in Saxony, 12.1
per cent in Thuringia, 11.5 per cent in Saxony Anhalt, 9.3 per cent in Mecklenburg
West Pomerania, 7.7 per cent in Berlin and 7.3 per cent in Brandenburgr". Even the
SPD, despite its considerable gains in eastern Germany in 1998, actually polled less
votes in Brandenburg than it did in the 1994 federal election54o.The PDS, meanwhile,
has maintained a clear bedrock of support over this entire period541. In eastern
Germany at the end of 1990, 35· per cent of PDS voters defined themselves as
'committed party voters', while only 15 per cent of CDU and 11 per cent of SPD
voters regarded themselves as such. The Alliance 90/Greens (30 per cent) and the
Republicans (27 per cent) had more committed supporters than the two main
Volksparteien''", By 1993, 62 per cent of PDS supporters regarded themselves as
having a strong party identification, while only 36 per cent of CDU voters and 24 per
cent of SPD voters saw themselves as strongly committed to their partyS43. At the
1998 federal election the number of PDS supporters with a strong and durable party
identification remained largely unchanged (61.7 per cent) - ensuring that the PDS
S37 Cornelia Weins (1999): op. cit. p.S1.
S38 Cornelia Weins (1999): ibid. p.Sl.
539 Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.13.
540 The SPD polled I.S per cent less in the federal election of 1998 than it did in the election of 1994.
Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. pp.l2-13.
541 This was largely put down to the high identification that the servants of the former regime had with
the PDS. While these citizens were still alive, it was largely expected that the PDS would retain a
highly loyal electoral base. Following the elections of 1994, 1998 and 1999 this analysis has had to be
revised, as the PDS, firstly, attracted broader sections of the electorate to its side, and then managed to
retain them over a number of years. This was well illustrated in Saxony in 1999, where the POS won
over 48,000 Saxons who had not voted in 1994,42,000 who had voted for the SPO, 21,000 former
COU voters and 13,000 voters from the Alliance 90/Greens. See Peter Porsch (POS): 'Unsere Zukunft
liegt nicht in der Gegenwart anderer Parteien, sondern in einer Partei als Netwerk demokratischer
Bewegung', Speech at the sixth Landesparteitag of the POS in Saxony, in PDS Pressediensl, Numrner
2, 14 January 2000. See also http://www.pds-online.de/pressedienst/0002/09.htrn
542 Klaus von Beyme (1993): op. cit. p.106.
543 Viola Neu (1994): op. cit. p.l.
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remained, by a considerable distance, the party with the most loyal support in the
eastern states544• The 1998 election also illustrated that the PDS is able to attract
.voters from all other parties - not just the ideologically adjacent SPD (from whom the
PDS garnered an extra 80,000 votes) and the Alliance 90/Greens (who saw 40,000
voters leave them for the PDS in 1998545). This is illustrated by the 90,000 CDU
voters who shifted their preference from the Union to the PDS between 1994 and
1998546•
Despite the large increase in the SPD's proportion of the vote at the 1998
electionr", the PDS still retained a higher percentage of voters than the SPD was able
to. 82 per cent of those who voted for the PDS in 1994 did so again in 1998, while
only 80 per cent of SPD supporters did so - a fact that, when the impressive expansion
of SPD support is taken into account, highlights just how loyal the PDS's voter base
remains. As Infratest Dimap observed after the state elections of 1999, the PDS, in
stark contrast to both the SPD and the CDU, has a large, committed and enthusiastic
group of supporters - making it a strong and resilient political opponent in the eastern
states.
The PDS is not only ideologically anchored in eastern German society, it
is also sociologically and organisationally rooted there. The relationships
of (eastern) voters to the western German parties are rather more unstable,
and traditional loyalty to a particular party plays a less important role in
dictating voter support548• '
The PDS is not seen as part of the western German dominated political system
- and as such the PDS has been able to mobilise support as a result of being a part of
eastern German society. "Virulent" disappointment with "western Germany, with the
Federal qovernment and with Bonn politics" enables the PDS to politically articulate
the dissatisfaction evident with parts of the transformation process, just as the PDS
can concurrently defend life pre_1989549• These were not issues when the western
544 Katja Neller & Oscar W. Gabriel: 'Die Deutsche Nationale Wahlstudie 1998', in Markus Klein,
Wolfgang Jagodzinski, Ekkehard Mochmann und Dieter Ohr (Hrsg.) (2000): op. cit. pp.553-555.
54~ Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.36 and p.42.
546 If just the eastern states are considered, the PDS actually gained 130,000 votes off the CDU.
Infratest Dimap (1998): ibid. pp.36-37.
547 The SPD increased its proportion of the vote in eastern Germany from 31.5 per cent in 1994 to
35.1 per cent in 1998. The CDU lost 11.2 per cent, while the PDS increased its overall proportion by
1.8 per cent. The extreme right, following its weak showing in 1994, was also able to register a
considerable increase: 3.7 per cent, as these parties improved from 1.3 per cent to exactly 5 per cent.
See http://www.statistik-bund.de/wahlen
548 Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.l l.
549 Infratest Dimap (1998): ibid. p.ll.
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parties competed in the original elections after unification in 1990. The new and
different electoral market that the processes of socialisation and situation have
brought about are ripe for a home-grown party to mobilise such territorial uniqueness.
Whereas in previous years disenchanted voters chose to abstain from the electoral
process, the 1998 elections illustrated an increased willingness to engage in politics.
While turnout at the 1998 election remained lower in the East (80.1 per cent) than in
the West (82.8 per cent), this represented a 7.5 per cent increase on the 1994 figure550•
And the PDS was able to benefit from this, as 44 per cent of its voter increase
between 1994 and 1998 came as a result of a successful mobilisation of previous non-
voters5S1•
Eastern German elections, with the notable exception of the PDS and its
supporters, remain characterised by voter mobility between the parties as well as
significant non-participation. This is based upon a lack of clear and consistent
(social) alignments between citizens and the SPD, the CDU and the smaller parties552•
A third of Easterners changed party preference from 1994 and 1998, while only 69 per
cent of citizens actually voted in both electionsf". Citizens only build up party
alignments over time, as they perceive a party to be consistently representing their
interests. This is usually the case as cleavage divides stabilise within societies, and as
parties mobilise around them. The nature of the cleavage divides in eastern Germany
are, firstly, only very shallow, and, secondly, one of the major divides is the territorial
one between East and West - from which only a specifically eastern German party can
benefit.
The political environment in eastern Germany is also characterised by a
.markedly high degree of secularisation. While over 60 per cent of western Germans
regard themselves as being a member of one of the Christian denominations, less than
30 per cent do so in the eastern states (see section 3.2.5). This has (had) key
repercussions for the CDU in particular, as the CDU has traditionally relied on a
550 Infratest Dimap (1998): ibid. p.21.
551 Of the 430,000 people who voted for the PDS in 1998 but had not done so in 1994, 190,000 came
to the party after not having voted at all in 1994. The right-wing parties, having started from a very
low starting base, also mobilised considerable numbers of non-voters, as, unsurprisingly, did the SPD,
who took advantage of the widespread feelings that governmental change was necessary. See Infratest
Dimap (1998): ibid. p.36.
SS2 Matthias Jung & Dieter Roth (1998): op. cit. p.9.
SS) Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.38.
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religious (and especially Catholic) fundament for supportSS4• While it is true to say
that those Easterners with religious beliefs still tend in large numbers towards the
CDU, it remains clear that this does not lend the CDU the structural advantage that it
has traditionally done in the western states. Conversely, the atheist heritage of the
PDS has prevented it from making any significant inroads into Christian elements of
society, and the number of Christians who support the PDS is very smaUsss.
3.4. Reinventing Eastern German Self-Understanding
By employing the first part of the typology developed in chapter two, it has
been illustrated that eastern Germans display quantifiable differences in opinions,
attitudes and self-perceptions in a number of key areas that differentiate them from
those of western Germans. These differences have prompted Easterners to
consciously distinguish themselves as Easterners arid have helped to ~tabilise the
cleavage divide between eastern and western Germany.
Cultural variables play an important role in shaping the eastern German
identity of defiance. The combined effects of being exposed to life in the GDR and of
having experienced the transformation from real-existing socialism to the social-
market economy ensure that Easterners exhibit differing values and attitudes to
western Germans in a number of key areas. Easterners have quantifiably different
attitudes to the past, and particularly to life in the GDR and 'what it was really like'.
Easterners remain sensitive to what they perceive as judgmental attitudes by
Westerners and are disappointed at the apparent willingness of western Germans to
erase the GDR from memory. This leads them to retrospectively upgrade a number of
aspects of life in the GDR that they previously did not perceive as being particularly
important. It also gives Easterners the impression that they must justify their lives in
the GDR, while Westerners are not required to undergo such rigorous processes of
Vergangenheitsbewdltigung.
Attitudes of anti-Americanism and scepticism towards the role of German
forces in international peacekeeping affairs are also widely visable. The Kosovo War
554 At the 1998 Federal Election the CDU polled 47 per cent of the Catholic vote, and 33 per cent of
the Protestant vote across Germany. 21 per cent of those with no affiliation voted for the CDU.
Figures from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e. V. on http://www.aicgs.org/wahlen/elect98.htm
S5S 1 per cent of Catholics and 2 per cent of Protestants voted for the PDS in 1998. 16 per cent of
those with no religious denomination did so. There is an AG Christlnnen (Christian Working Group)
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of 1999 illustrated this most explicitly, although eastern Germans were just as
sceptical about the role that German forces played in Bosnia in the early-mid 1990s.
Eastern Germans remain highly sceptical of the role and function of a post-Cold War
NATO and strong pacifist tendencies demarcate Easterners from Western Germans.
In cultural terms, the most 'proactive' rejection of western German norms can
been seen in the rejuvenation of unique eastern German symbols and characteristics.
These range from the defence and preservation of small and relatively unimportant
icons from GDR times such as the Ampelmannchen or the Trabant car, to explicit
attempts to support, through the prism of the market, uniquely eastern German
products in the all-German market place. The rejuvenation of brands once explicit to
the GDR has subsequently been surprisingly widespread and successful.
Socio-economic differences between the eastern and western states are also
important contributory factors in the stabilisation of an eastern German identity of
defiance. Even the most cursory glance at the economic statistics reveals that eastern
Germans are, in comparison with western Germans, more likely to be unemployed,
more likely to earn less and the standard of living remains lower. However, it is not
just the bear facts of the economic situation that act as a motor of identity creation:
more important still is the widespread perception of economic inefficiency and
uncompetitivness than Easterners perceive as existing in the eastern states. Even
those Easterners who consider themselves as having profited from unification, and the
transition to a market economy, still to tend to view the general situation of Easterners
as being much more negative than it actually is. Furthermore, this imbalance appears
likely to continue into the foreseeable future, as the eastern German economy and
eastern standards of living remain behind those in the West. The importance of this
economic cleavage is amplified as eastern Germans entered the FRG with the explicit
expectation of 'living like Westerners' - so although the majority of eastern Germans
are wealthier than they were in 1989, they have not achieved parity with western
Germans. When this is combined with the widespread social dissatisfaction caused by
the perceived Abwertung (downgrading) of eastern German lives pre-1989, it is clear
that latent potential exists for a different set of political interests to be articulated.
Chapters four and five tackle this point explicitly.
within the PDS, although both its membership numbers and influence remain predictably small. See
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e. V. on http://www.aicgs.org/wahlenlelect98.htm
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The perceptions that the differential economic performance has spawned has
contributed to Easterners' supporting policies that would offer greater egalitarianism
within Germany today. The value of individual freedom remains important, but there
is an increasing perception that more emphasis needs to be placed on equality. Such
support for' egalitarian ideals has contributed to an increased appreciation of the
concept of socialism in the eastern states. Citizens are broadly supportive of a more
increased roll for the state in orchestrating and controlling economic activity. All of
these characteristics stem from the complex, inter-twined phenomena of having lived
in a state where such values were, even if very imperfectly, operationalised, as well as
the having lived through the uncertain process of social, economic and political
transformation that were set in motion by the process of unification.
This chapter has illustrated that eastern German perceptions and attitudes
differ in a number of key ways to those of western Germans. It has illustrated what
the territorial differences are in terms of values culture and socio-economic variables
- and it is these differences that, so it is hypothesised, the POS has been able, and has
sought to, articulate within the political arena (see chapters four and five).
So far this thesis has therefore discussed the different approaches adopted
when analysing the POS and highlighted the lack of sufficient research into the POS
as a specifically regional party. The second chapter of this work developed a
typology of the factors behind the development of a regional space as well as
illustrating how regional parties successfully mobilise these variables. It also
illustrated how the Bavarian CSU have long functioned successfully on the basis of
their articulation of regional-specific interests in Germany's South-East. This chapter
has discussed the process of identity creation that has taken place in the eastern states
by using the typology outlined in chapter two to illustrate why an eastern German
identity of defiance is now evident. It has also illustrated where eastern Germans
have differing attitudes and values and where differing normative beliefs exist.
Chapters four and five will employ the second part of the typology in detail to
examine the case of the POS, illustrating how the POS's activities in eastern Germany
have enabled it to mould itself into a flexible organisation, representing the interests
and beliefs of a broad cross-section of eastern German society.
188
Chapter 4 The Capacity of the PDS to Mobilise Eastemness
-,
Chapter Four
4. The PDS an a Successful Regional Party I: The Capacity of the
PDS to mobilise Easternness.
4.1. Introductory Comments
Having discussed the nature of regional party success and eastern German self-
understanding, chapters four and five move on to illustrate how the PDS has moulded itself
into an articulator of eastern German uniqueness. Chapter three illustrated that ail eastern
German identity of defiance has stabilised in the eastern states, and chapters four and five
illustrate how the PDS is the only party that is both able and willing to express this
'differentness' within the political arena. In order to effectively do this, the second part of the
typology (section 2.4.2.) will be employed over two chapters. Party leadership and party
organisation will be discussed wholly in chapter four. Chapter four will also highlight how
the PDS has benefited from its structurally strong heritage in articulating cultural and socio-
economic eastern uniqueness. Chapter five takes the discussion of the PDS's policy package
a step further by analysing how the PDS has created a detailed policy package that
corresponds with the key tenets of eastern German uniqueness that are outlined in chapter
three. It illustrates that the PDS is able to actively make policy for eastern Germany.
The final two chapters of this work therefore look specifically at what the PDS says,
how it says it, what it does, how it is represented and the general manner and method that the
PDS invokes in articulating territorial uniqueness. By doing this, one can see that the PDS is
a party that is comparable with other regional parties. The PDS, like other regional parties in
western democracies, understands its electorate well, and skilfully adapts itself to the
environment that has helped to spawn it. .
Chapter four illustrates how the PDS leadership has skilfully the party to make it
attractive to all citizens from all echelons of eastern German society. It also illustrates that the
PDS, despite its ageing membership, is in an organisationally advantageous position vis-A-vis
the other parties. Chapter four also highlights that, once these two criteria have been taken
into account, the PDS has a sound platform from which to articulate eastern German
uniqueness within the political arena. The PDS benefits and takes advantage of a number of
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structurally advantageous phenomena that grant it the capacity to mobilise Eastemness. The
PDS is the only party with the capacity to mobilise a significant portion of the eastern
electorate that feels underrepresented (as Easterners) in the political process. It is the only
party that survives as a result of the East-West cleavage - and it is this cleavage, cross-cutting
all others, that forms the key motor both of identity creation and political orientation in the
eastern states - and this is exactly where the PDS's strengths in the eastern political
marketplace lie. As a result of its heritage and regional roots, the PDS has successfully found
a niche for itself as the Anwalt der Ostdeutschen (advocate of eastern Germansr'".
Chapter five carries this argument further by discussing the PDS's policy package.
This illustrates how the PDS acts on behalf of eastern Germans in concrete policy questions.
The PDS attempts to make policies for Easterners. Regional parties advocate uniquely
regional interests as a result of their deep roots and their understanding of differing regional
value structures and attitudes. The policies that the PDS espouses, like the policies of all
regional parties, are differentiated from those of the other parties by their expressly territorial
form - and their representation of explicitly territorial sentiment.
Chapter five therefore concentrates on the PDS's policy package and the stress that the
PDS itself places on articulating uniquely eastern German policies. Not only does this policy
package set the party aside from other political parties, it represents a broad current of societal
sentiment (as revealed in chapter three) in the political process. Chapter five reveals that it is
in the areas where eastern German popular sentiment differs from that in western Germany
that the PDS has developed policies that differentiate it from its competitors and subsequently
reflect uniquely eastern German preferences. It is for this reason that other policy areas
(pensions, the environment, tax issues and so forth) are not directly elaborated upon (although
they are touched on implicitly at times), as although the PDS has policy proposals in all of
these areas, they do not reflect the uniquely eastern German sentiment that chapter three
illustrated exists.
Both chapters build on the notion that the western German parties have lost the power
{
to set the agenda in the East, and with it their 'control' of the political system. The natural
tendencies of parties dictate that they attempt to control the political process, by channelling
the requirements of diverse groups within society into their programmatic positions. This is
of key, strategic, importance to the PDS - as it is vital if new political parties are going to be
able to create a place for themselves in everyday political discourse that they wrestle agenda
SS6 lIse Spittman (1994): op. cit. pp.673-674. Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.10.
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setting functions away from the 'major' partiesss7• The electoral viability of 'new' parties
therefore depends initially on possessing the capacity to reach the electoral thresholds
imposed by the electoral system - and the chances of new parties doing this are largest when
there is a large increase in the size of the electorate, a new clientele emerges (defined in either
social or attitudinal terms - see chapter three and sections 4.2., 5.1.1. and 5.1.2.), a particular
set of events activate an existing social or attitudinal group and loyalties to (or alignments
with) the established parties decliness8•
4.2. Leadership
Curiously, the very lack of a clear and definable eastern German regional elite does
not hinder many citizens in the new Lander in their self-appreciation's as 'eastern Germans'.
This is not what the original typology outlined in chapter two implied. It was hypothesised
that regional elites are needed to articulate regional specificity and to instrumentalise
territorial uniqueness. Elites are, so it was argued in chapter two, required to mobilise
regional sentiment and awareness and to indirectly prevent political action being based upon,
'national' issues and variables. Charismatic leaders are important in ensuring that a regional
party remains visible and i~ the public eye. This puts extra emphasis on charismatic and
articulate elites to tell people just why a regional party is needed within a particular political
system.
In the context of eastern Germany, the reverse has happened. The explicit lack of an
elite articulating eastern German territorial specificity ensures that a vacuum exists when it
comes to expressing eastern German particularity. Western German politicians and
businessmen are perceived as ruling eastern Germany, and eastern Germans themselves see
very few of their brethren in elite positions within society. Elites are seen as distant and
selfish in exploiting their positions of power. Apart from the legacy of the Stasi, East
Germany is widely seen at the popular level as having been 'erased from German history' -
and with it the lives and existences of its citizens, regardless of what they did pre-1989. This
form of anti-identity in eastern Germany has not been articulated in a coherent fashion and as
a result it is often multi-faceted and contradictory - hence it has become all the more
SS? Giovanni Sartori (1968): op. cit. pp.I-25.
SS8 Hugh Berrington: 'New Parties in Britain: Why Some Live and Most Die', in International Political Science
Review, Volume 6 Number 4, 1985, p.449.
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pervasive as Easterners have their own personal perceptions of what it means. Open
articulation and propagation of this would have required a clear and coherent concept of what
was meant by 'eastern German identity' (see section 4.4.) as well as lucid definitions of what
differentiates eastern Germans from western Germans. This is something that, in the first ten
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has been difficult as a result of the differing perceptions
that eastern Germans had of the concept of eastern identity. For some it is blatant protest at
the economic and social climate in the East today - so a reaction to the high expectations that
many had at the beginning of the 1990s and of the East's economic underperformance when
compared to western Germany. At the other extreme, it is a clear defence of a number of
aspects of the GDR and what it stood for. For the majority though, it is somewhere in the vast
sea of middle ground between these two polls.
However, with the onset of lingering economic under-performance and of perceptions
of cultural difference that have come to stabilise themselves in the new Lander, it is clear that
the territorial divide has 'settled down'. This is something that is further elaborated upon in
chapter five of this work, where the nature of the PDS's representation of eastern German
uniqueness is discussed.
It remains beyond question that eastern Germans are underrepresented at the highest
levels of authority in the German state. The judiciary is predominantly staffed by western
Germans, just as the upper ranks in most larger businesses are. At the political level,
Professor Dagmaar Schipanski (CDU) failed in her attempt to become President of the
Federal Republic in June 1999559,a move which many would have welcomed in order to have
symbolically shown high eastern German representation within Germany. The election of
Angela Merkel to lead the CDU early in 2000 did appear to represent a shift in emphasis
Eastwards, although in reality very few Easterners remain in prominent positions in political,
economic or cultural spheres. Wolfgang Thierse «SPD) the President of the Bundestag), and
a handful of other party politicians (such as Claudia Nolte (CDU)560, Vera Lengsfeld
(CDU)561,Paul Kriiger (CDU)562,Stephan Hilsberg (SPD)563,Richard Schroder (SPD)564and
S59 This, it must be stressed, was as a result of party political factors and had nothing to do with her eastern
German biography. '
S60 Claudia Nolte was elected on the land list from Thuringia and has been an MP since 1990. She was Minister
for the Family, Pensioners, Women and Youth between November 1994 and October 1998.
S61 After deportation (to the UK) in 1988, Vera Lengsfeld returned to the GDR on the day the wall came down
(9 November 1989). She became a member of the Alliance 90/Green Party, sitting in both the Volkskammer and
the Bundestag from 1990. She very publicly left the Alliance 90/Greens in December 1996 to join the CDU.
S62 Paul Kruger, a Mecklenburger from Neubrandenburg, was Minister for Research and Technology between
May 1993 and November 1994 and was deputy leader of the CDU/CSU Fraktion in the Bundestag from 1994 to
1998. He also published an influential paper on how the CDU could profile itself better in the eastern Lander in
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Markus Meckel (SPD)565) have national profiles, but they are the exception to the rule that
sees western Germans remaining in the political ascendancy. Often they are perceived as
token 'Ossis' in a western German dominated political world. Hence the concept of 'eastern
German elites' remains noticeable by its absence566.
Despite the lack of a definable 'eastern German elite', it remains clear that political
competition in the eastern states is strongly influenced by personalities, and the nature of
political debate is structured more by powerful personalities than it is in the West567. In a
society where the parameters of political competition are not deeply ingrained, the importance
of personalities in shaping political debate and party competition increases. This has been
evident in a number of elections in the eastern states since 1990. The Landtagswahlen in
Saxony and Brandenburg in 1994 in particular highlight this. The elections fell on the same
day and the political and economic environments in the two states were, when viewed
objectively, very similar568. Yet two different parties registered absolute majorities - based
principally on the positive ratings of their leaders - Manfred Stolpe and Kurt Biedenkopf.
Biedenkopf in particular was an "unbeatable trump card" in not just the 1994, but also the
1999 electionf", 71 per cent of all Saxons said that they would prefer Biedenkopf as to
continue as Saxony's Prime Minister in 1999 while a mere 5 per cent favoured his SPD
opponent Karlheinz Kunckel. An amazing 89 per cent of Saxons were of the opinion that
Biedenkopf had carried out his functions as Prime Minister well - of which 96 per cent of
CDU supporters, 88 per cent of SPD supporters and even 82 per cent of PDS supporters were
satisfied with Biedenkopf's work570. His popularity has much to do with Biedenkopf's strong
defence of 'Saxon' interests and his successful profiling of himself against western
heavyweights like Helmut Kohl. Biedenkopf, a largely unsuccessful western CDU politician
1996 and as a result considerably increased his profile regionally. He is, however, one of very few other eastern
German politicians to be widely known at the national level.
S63 Stephen Hilsberg has been a member of parliament for Bad Liebenwerda and Finsterwalde since 1990. He
was a founding member and first speaker of the SPD in 1989 and 1990.
S64 Richard Schroder was a founder member of the SPD in East Germany.
S65 Markus Meckel, a former Foreign Minister of the GDR, has been MP for Prenzlau, Angermunde, Schwedt,
Templin and Gransee since 1990. He is well known for his long-held (at least since the 1970s) political
opposition to the East German regime and his role in helping to found the SPD in East Germany in October
1989.
566 Gerhard Schroder's cabinet has two more eastern Germans in it, although neither are in possession of high
profile portfolios. They are Christine Bergmann (Family) and Rolf Schwanitz (Staatsminister im Kanzleramt um
den Aufbau Ost).
567 Max Kaase: 'Is there a Personalisation in Politics? Candidates and Voting Behaviour in Germany', in
International Political Science Review, Number IS, 1994, pp.211-230.
568 This is in terms of economic indicators, as well as the social structure of the electorate.
569 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: 'Forscher: Biedenkopf uberragen', in Kolner Stadt Anzeiger, 18 November
1999,p.1.
570 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Wahl in Sachsen: Eine Analyse der Landtagswahl vom /9. September /999
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of the 1980s, has transformed himself into a Saxon Landesvater who has come to be
associated with the Saxon Land itself7).
In the Brandenburg state election of 1994 Manfred Stolpe was able to benefit from a
similar, if less statistically impressive, wave of popularity, 81 per cent of all Brandenburgers
wanted to see him continue as Minister President. Stolpe has been able to successfully refute
allegations that he worked alongside the East German secret police before unification,
subsequently profiling himself as an easterner who is having to struggle to make his way -
much as the broader electorate is. His 'Easternness' is seen very much as an electoral asset.
Even at the September 1999 state election, when the SPD was going through a period of
particular unpopularity, 58 per cent of Brandenburgers said that they would prefer
Landesvater Stolpe to continue as Prime Minister. A mere 13 per cent of citizens wished to
see the CDU candidate Jorg Schonbohm replace hims72.
While the PDS does not possess such widely popular figures, the reformers within the
party are,' in the eastern states, articulate, well-known and viewed largely sympathetically.
They are perceived as being politicians who stand up for particularly eastern German
concerns. The four main examples of this are Lothar Bisky, Andre Brie, Hans Modrow and,
of course, Gregor Gysi.
In the early 1990s Gysi became the most sought after talkshow participant in all
Germany. Gysi.has a wit and a telegenic nature that has enabled him to become the party's
figurehead, and PDS supporters and critics alike acknowledge the important role that he has
played in improving and modernising the PDS's image away from what tended to be seen as a
party of stuffy former SED functionaries. Gysi's impending departure both from his position
as leader of the PDS in the federal parliament (in the autumn of 2000) and his willingness to
leave the Bundestag at the 2002 election subsequently pose the question of how the PDS will
replace its figurehead and fill the void that he is bound to leave.
Lothar Bisky, leader of the party since 1993S73, has come to represent the reformist,
hard-working, down-to-earth nature of the PDS in eastern Germany, Bisky is not a
spectacular figure. His rhetorical skills are not like Gysi's. He enthuses less with charisma
and style, and much more with his dedication and his workmanlike manner. This has led to
(Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1999), p.38.
571 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1999): ibid. p,42.
m Forschungsgruppe Wahlen: Wahl in Brandenburg: Eine Analyse der Landtagswahl yom 5. September 1999
~Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 1999), p.3S.
73 Bisky also plans to stand down from his position as Vorsitzender in 2001, although he has shown every
inclination to work within the parties structures in his other capacities as, amongst other things, leader of the
PDS in Brandenburg and leader of a Commission looking into the party's programmatic renewal.
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him being known as the "good man of the PDS"S74, or even the "Integrations-Opa" (father of
integration) within the party, on account of his success at mediating between the party's
different wings and ideological orientations'", This has appealed to the eastern electorate
after much of the hope and anticipation of the immediate unification period dissipated'".
Bisky also receives credit on account of being regarded as aufmupfig (rebellious) pre-1989.
As Vice-Chancellor of the Filmhochschule in Potsdam he fought for films to be shown in the
GDR that SED bureaucrats were vehemently against. He was also known to be 'pro-
Gorbachev': ensuring that as the Wende approached Bisky was viewed as anything other than
a hard and fast SED die_hards77•
Andre Brie, the long-time election manager of the PDS who left this position to
become a Member of the European Parliament in the Summer of 1999, is a much more
controversial figure within the party, but this has not detracted from his public profile as a
reforming intellectual. Brie seeks to move the party away from its more dogmatic tendencies
and to break with the traditional ideological rigidity of MarxistlLeninist political thought.
Brie is not scared to break internal taboos (particularly with regard to criticisms of the
GDRs78), and his election campaigning and his tendency to throw light on controversial issues
have ensured that the PDS remains focused on the problems of (eastern) Germans today, and
not just on ideological disputes behind closed doors. Hans Modrow, the PDS's Honorary.
PresidentS79, represents a very different figure to that of Andre Brie. Modrow represents the
traditionalist wing of the party, and his presence is often seen as being of comfort to the
stalwart membership of the PDS that was socialised in the GDR. He symbolises the defence
of active participation in the GDR's societal structures, and a strong reluctance to condemn
the GDR per se. He reassures the conservative membership that the reforming leadership will
not go too far in abandoning left-wing principles - and Gysi, Brie and Bisky are well aware
574 See' Rente statt Revolution', in Saddeutsche Zeitung, 3 April 2000, p.ll.
m See 'Und ewig lockt die Weltrevolution', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 6 April2000, p.3.
576 Despite not winning a Direktmandat in the 1998 federal election, Bisky was able to register 7.3 per cent
more 'first' votes in the seat of Kopenick-Treptcw than the PDS's proportion of the 'second' votes. This is quite
a considerable achievement, only bettered amongst PDS politicians by Gregor Gysi in Hellersdorf-Marzahn
(14.1 per cent), Christa Luft in Friedrichshain-Lichtenberg (9.5 per cent) and Petra Pau (9.1 per cent in the high
profile seat of Mitte-Prenzlauer Berg). Citizens of these constituencies were prepared to vote for the PDS with
their first, constituency vote, while switching to other parties with their second, 'proportional' vote. This
indicates both active vote-splitting for tactical reasons and a likely resonance with the candidate. See Infratest
Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.91.
S77 See 'Rente statt Revolution', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 3 April2000, p.11.
578 Sarah Wagenknecht and Andre Brie (1996): op. cit. For a particularly detailed account of Andre Brie's
position within the PDS see Eva Sturm (2000): op. cit. pp.SI-96. For a discussion of Andre Brie's most
controversial statements on the GDR and socialism today, see Andreas Fraude: 'Die PDS in der Berliner
Republik: Die 1. und 2. Tagung des 6. PDS-Bundesparteitages', in Deutschland Archiv, Nummer 2, 1999, p.174.
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that alienating Modrow is likely to disillusion many of the rank and file. However, Modrow's
public appearances are carefully orchestrated and there is a clear division of labour between
Modrow, Brie and the other member of the PDS leadership. Modrow's support across broad
sections of the membership is not necessarily reflected in the population at large: although
this does not appear to have directly affected the electoral performances of the PDS in the
eastern states580•
During the 1998 election campaign the PDS continued its long-time strategy of
fielding high-profile candidates in strategic constituencies. Following the author Stefan
Heym's successful campaign in Berlin Mitte in 1990581, the PDS once again attempted to
persuade high profile candidates to stand on its 'open lists'. The most prominent of these was
Gustav-Adolf'vTave" Schur, who became the Spitzenkandidat of the PDS in Saxony in 1998,
as well as the direct candidate in Leipzig South. Schur, a popular former cyclist, remains a
well known figure in the eastern states582 and the PDS clearly attempted to use Schur to
increase the party's popular profile. Schur was openly aware of his symbolic importance to
the PDS, and he made no secret of his willingness both to call on his sporting background and
to profile himself as a man of the (eastern German) people583• Schur conceptualised this by
observing that:
I know about life here ... (in eastern Germany). Those people in Bonn don't, and
they are the one ones who want to make our decisions for us - to decide what is
good for us and what is bad for us ... These people ... (in Bonn) ... who decide for
the Eurofighter, who are prepared to spend millions on military intervention in
Bosnia while they simultaneously rip huge holes in the welfare system, they are
579 Hans Modrow, the last Leader of the GDR, is also one of the 6 strong PDS group that sits in the European
Parliament.
S80 Eva Sturm (2000): op. cit. p.316. One could conceivably argue that the PDS would have been able to
increase its vote by even greater amounts in 1998 and 1999 if Modrow and the 'traditionalists' within the party
had been less visible, but there is, of course, little way of ever substantiating this assumption. On the contrary,
very few political commentators outside PDS circles predicted that the party would perform as well as it did in
1998 and 1999, so assuming that the PDS would have performed even better had it pursued a different electoral
strategy appears impossible to empirically substantiate.
S81 Heym was not a member of the PDS, rather he stood on one of the PDS's open lists. Heym's position as a
leading intellectual in the GDR, as well as his standing as a respected author, granted him a high profile in the
campaign to win, possibly, the most high-profile constituency in Germany. The PDS attempted to attract another
high profile candidate in Berlin Mitte in 1998, as it approached retired admiral Elmar Schmahling to stand on the
PDS's open list. Scbmahling was, however, forced to tum down this opportunity on account of questionable'
financial dealings that he had undertaken in the past.
S82 "Tave" is most widely known for his exploits in the Friedensfahrt (the Peace Race). Although the
Friedensfahrt has enjoyed something of a resurgence in the eastern states in the late 19908, the race enjoyed its
heyday in the years before the Wende. The Friedensfahrt traditionally went through Poland, Czechoslovakia and
the GDR, and was a magnet for the best riders from throughout the socialist world (and selected others from the
West). Schur not only won the event twice (in 1955 and 1959), he was also twice world champion and, in 1990,
was voted the most popular sportsman in the history of the GDR. See http://www.friedensfahrt.de
m Klaus Huhn: Der Kandidat (Berlin: Spotless Verlag, 1998).
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not going to bring me into line. My vision of a democratic socialism is very
reaI5"S4.
Schur has an excellent resonance with eastern Germans, as he represents a hero from a
bygone age. Despite having sat in the Volkskammer from 1958 to 1990, Schur is still
remembered for his sporting exploits and his positive contributions to the GDR sporting
environment. At information stands Schur remained an exceptionally popular figure in the
eastern states, as PDS supporters and critics alike came to see one of the legends of GDR
sport. Schur never claimed to be a great politician as such, rather he chose to emphasise his
hard working ethic and the importance of grass roots people working in the political process.
Schur is never likely to progress to the higher organisational ranks of the party, and a
number of commentators have claimed that the PDS will have to continue to look for new
leaders if it is to 'stabilise' itself (as opposed to 'transforming' itself, which is what it has
continued doing, according to this critique, since 1989585). Under the tutelage of Gysi and
Bisky the PDS has been on a continuous path of development with the aim of stabilisation
within the German party system586• The next few years will highlight how successful the
likes of Gabriele Zimmer, Petra Pau, Roland Claus, Helmut Holter and Dietmar Bartsch are in
fulfilling this task. Gregor Gysi is clearly aware of the role that both he and Lothar Bisky
have played in the PDS's development in the 1990s, but he has also articulated his concern
that the party move on from this base and stabilise itself within the German polity:
Iam of the opinion that Lothar Bisky and Ihave performed historically important
functions within the party that have enabled the PDS to successfully arrive in the
Federal Republic. The next generation are now faced with the challenge of
making the PDS a Bestandteil (component) within German societl87•
Despite (and often as a result of) its elderly membership, the PDS is also keen to
promote younger members of the party into the public limelight. Angela Marquardt, a young
punk from Mecklenburg West Pomerania, was General Secretary of the party for a number of
years, and she has retained a prominent place both within the Executive, and in the eastern
media. Marquardt, now also a member of the Bundestag, is one ofa group of young, eloquent
584 Tave Schur (PDS): in Maxi Wartelsteiner 'Tave kommt • und ist nicht mehr zu ubersehen', on
http://www.pds-online.de/disputl9S0S/39292.html and in PDS Disput, Number 8, August 1998.
58S For evidence of this approach see Gero Neugebauer: 'Die PDS zwischen Kontinuitat und Aufbruch', in Aus
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, BS/2000, p.44.
586 See Horst Kahrs: 'Was kommt nach den 'Reformen' in der PDST, in PDS Disput, Nummer 5, May 2000, on
http://www.pds-online.de/disputlOO05/03.htm
S87 Gregor Gysi CPDS):'Die PDS kann als Sekte untergehen', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 11April2000, p.S.
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and sharp-tongued PDS politicians who present a very different, alternative image to the
eastern electorate. As is often the case, the PDS is offering the populace something a little
different, and it is no coincidence that the PDS attempts to promote and support younger
politicians, in order to try and dispel its image as an 'old' party. At lower levels of political
representation the PDS also actively seeks to present a younger face in eastern state
parliaments, and in city and communal bodies. Roughly a quarter of the candidates on the
first 30 places on the PDS list for the Saxony state election in the Autumn of 1999 were under
35, while the average age offue candidates on the entire list was a mere 43588• The PDS lists
in other states have a similar age profile. Within the middle and upper echelons of its eastern
Land organisations the PDS is also able to call on a broad and gifted generation of 35-50 year
olds with considerable intellectual competencies", and more than two-thirds of the
membership ofPDS Kreis- and Landesvorstdnde are between the ages of 40 and 5059°. Most
of these elites came to prominence with very limited reform proposals as the GDR was
collapsing in the late 1980s. They tended to belong to well educated groups within society
who would, should the GDR have continued to exist, slowly have progressed into the
leadership hierarchy of the East German state. Yet, as the GDR imploded, they often showed
remarkably foresight in balancing tradition and modernisation by placing themselves at the
forefront of the efforts to regenerate and transform the SED into the PDS - and subsequently
giving themselves every opportunity to have a considerable influence on the party's future
direction. They are the clear evidence of the party's attempts to present both a much younger
public profile, and to offer younger citizens an opportunity to actively enter the political
process'?'.
The different ideological and historical backgrounds of the PDS elites therefore lends
the party a unique public profile. And it is the 'differentness' and the Easternness of PDS
politicians that allows them to most clearly articulate the feelings of many eastern Germans.
The PDS elites are adept at touching on broader undercurrents of opinion, whether this be in
an aggressive and witty way (Gregor Gysi), in a traditional, conservative fashion (Hans
Modrow), a straightforward, workmanlike way (Lothar Bisky) or in an alternative, almost
cheeky fashion (Angela Marquardt). PDS elites are not burdened by the responsibility of
having taken part in the governmental attempts to improve the eastern economic and social
588 'PDS-Vorschlag fUr die Landtagswahl', inNeues Deutschland, 18May 1999, p.5.
589 See Lothar Probst (2000): op. cit. p.12.
'90 Lothar Probst (2000): ibid. p.2S.
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landscape since 1989. And, despite talk to the contrary592, the PDS is not likely to allow itself
to become part of a federal coalition until at least the middle of the next decade - hence it can
afford the luxury of playing, for the most part, the role of the political Auj3enseiterS93 .
The PDS remains the clearest and most vocal advocate of what it (alongside many
Easterners) sees as blatant discrimination within Germany today, and it is the rhetorical
sharpness ofPDS politicians on such themes increases the party profile.
By virtue of its politicians in eastern Germany, the PDS remains both visible and
evident. The typology in chapter two suggested that some regional parties are built around
the personality and beliefs of one figure: and while this would be exaggerating the importance
of Gregor Gysi too much, it remains clear that he plays a pivotal function in fostering a quick-
witted, snappy image for the party. This is well complimented by poster campaigns and
election material594 as well as the other PDS elites around him.
4.3. Party Organisation
The PDS has a strongly hierarchical and de-centralised party structure. This offers the
PDS two key tools for maximising its presence and political effectiveness in eastern
Germany: firstly, its large and highly motivated base of members and activists is easily (and
'frequently) mobilised to conduct both official and unofficial (in terms of 'spreading the
word') party work, and, secondly, its considerable presence in eastern Germany's communal
parliaments and town halls, increasingthe PDS's visibility at the micro-levels of eastern
German political life.
The federal structures of the FRG offer PDS members/activists ample opportunity to
partake in political activity, and the PDS encourages its large membership to actively take part
591 For an analysis of the processes of elite renewal and the stabilisation ofa younger party elite in Mecklenburg
West Pomerania see Nikolaus Werz: 'Politische Parteien', in Nikolaus Wen and Jochen Schmidt (Hrsg.) (1998):
~.95.
92 See Klaus Halting: 'Die PDS schielt nach der Macht' in Die Zeit, 17 January 1997; 'PDS will im Bund bis
2002 Koalitionsfahig werden', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 6 December 1999, p.6; 'Minister Holter ragt Parteireform
an', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 9 November 1999, p.5; 'Die PDS vor ihrem Bad Godesberg' in Suddeutsche
Zeitung, 30 November 1999, p.4.
593 Interview, PDS MdL in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, 14May 1999.
S94 The PDS has become well-known for its eye-catching posters at election time. They have ranged from short
and simple messages like PDS: Cool!, PDS: Geil! (PDS: Sexy!), Euro?:So nichtl (Euro? Not like this!), Kohl
muft weg. Du muj3 her! (Kohl has to go, you have to join in!) to Drei Grande PDS zu wahlen: CDU, SPD und
FDP (Three reasons to vote PDS: CDU, SPD and FDP!) and Der Osten wlihlt links (The East votes left-wing).
The PDS also uses posters of its key personalities like Gysi and Angela Marquardt. Slogans have tended to
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in the political process. In eastern Germany, the POS has 6,506 Basisorganisationen (local
party organisations) meeting once a month. Membership numbers vary, and each
Basisgruppe discusses issues and problems that have been brought down from higher bodies,
before sending delegates to one of the 122 Kreis- Stadt- or Bezirksvorstdnde in order to
contribute in formulating policy proposals at the communal/local level and/or to discuss
issues that need to be dealt with at Parteitage (conferences). This gives members the
opportunity to actively shape and be involved with party activity. The Landesvorsttinden
(regional executives) also fulfil a mediating role in this process by formulating and co-
ordinating policy at the state level. The Vorstand (executive), comprising 18 members, is the
POS's highest organisational body, remaining largely responsible for the directing the party at
the federal level595. The POS also possesses both working groups and interest groups that
discuss policy issues (i.e. ecology, peace, socialism in Cuba and so forth), as well as
'Platforms', that are based on ideological orientation (Le. the Communist Platform, the
Marxist Forum). These enable members to take part in fora that contribute to the'
programmatic and policy development of the POS596.
The horizontal and vertical membership structures of the POS correspond with those
of other regional parties. They enable the membership to feel that they are contributing to the
party's success, and contribute to high levels of commitment and motivation. However,
highly committed memberships must also be, particularly in recent times, well supported by
effective campaigning at the regional and national level, so as to ensure the party has a
marketable image. And enthusiastic participation must not lead to internal disagreements as
to the big picture, as this inevitably leaves the impression that the party is split, or that it is
splintered into uneasy groups of factions. The PDS has (often) been perceived as being on the
brink of ideological break-up, as factionalism between ideological and pragmatic wings of the
party periodically get acted out. But the influence of a strong core leadership around Gregor
Gysi, Lothar Bisky, Andre Brie and Hans Modrow have garnered enough agenda setting
powers to continue to dictate general policy direction. This does not mean, however, that the
membership of the PDS are 'powerless'. Debates within party fora and at Parteitage illustrate
that the leadership often has to drag the membership along, and, as was evident at the MUnster
conference of April 2000, it is not unknown for the leadership to be defeated by the more
remain short and simple and have often give the impression of cheekiness, vitality and the PDS as a somewhat
different sort of party.
595 See Blickpunkt Bundestag - Forum der Demokratie, April 3/99, p.34.
596 For a detailed discussion on the work of these groups within the PDS, see Patrick Moreau (l998a): op. cit.
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conservative Basis (see section 5.1.6. for further analysis of the events at this particular
conference).
Over and above party structure, it is clear that the PDS makes very good use of the
advantage it possesses in terms of membership numbers, activist numbers, the use of modern
technologies and extra-parliamentary activity. Like other regional parties, the PDS is a
disciplined, hierarchically organised party. This has been very well illustrated both in
research conducted for this thesis, as well as in other works already published on party
structure and organisation in eastern Germany. The most effective and efficient study of the
organisational structures of the parties in the eastern states was carried out in 1995 researchers
at the Zentra/institut for sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung in Berlin (published in 1996)597.
Their detailed analysis of party structures and activities highlights that although membership
numbers, funding and facilities do not correlate directly to electoral success, they are helpful
in developing a public profile of a party and of making the party both visible and reachable at
key times. Their analysis has shown that the PDS competes and often surpasses even the
CDU in terms of effective party organisation - a factor that other regional parties are also able
to do. Regional parties have slick, organised and efficient structures. They are often
organisationally superior, or at the very least organisationally competitive, when compared to
their national competitors. Bundesgeschdftsfiihrer Dietmar Bartsch has emphasised that the
PDS uses its organisational structures all-year round and is visible not just as and when
elections are contested, when he claimed that "the PDS is not just a party for election day, it
is a party for everyday,,598. The PDS has a membership that is both high (even if numbers are
presently dropping) and active. The KSPW Survey has illustrated that not only does the PDS
possess more members than any other party in every eastern state (see table 24), but it also
registers better in the index they employ to show levels of organisation (table 25)599.
S97 Endbericht des Kommission ftlr die Erforschung des sozia/en und politischen Wande/s in den neuen
Bundeslandern e. V. (KSPW) Projekt 'Kreisparteien ': Organisation, Politik und Vemetzung der Parteien auf
Kreisebene in den ftlnf neuen Bundesldndem (Berlin: Freie Universitlit, Zentralinstitut fur
sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung, 1996).
S98 Dietrnar Bartsch: 'PDS: Kein Auslaufmodell', in Schweriner Volkszeitung, 16 April 1997.
S99 The level of organisation is measured as the number of members in a party multiplied by 100 and then
divided by the number of voters for that party. This enables one to see what percentage of a states population
each particular party is able to (actively) mobilise to its cause.
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Table 24600
Party Membership in the Eastern States as at 1 January 1995
State CDU SPD FDP Alliance 90/ PDS
Green
Mecklenburg 10,217 3,452 3,220 375 14,154
West Pomerania
Brandenburg 9,505 6,750 3,848 492 18,258
Saxony Anhalt 15,461 6,207 5,908 478 18,270
Thuringia 19,685 6,012 6,138 470 16,173
Saxony 22,932 5,304 6,635 1,007 32,853
Total 77,800 27,725 25,749 2,822 99,708
Table 25601
The Level of Organisation of Political Parties in the Eastern States at 1 January 1995
State COU SPD FOP Alliance 90/ POS
Green
Mecklenburg 0.7 0.3 0.2 , 0.03 1.0
West Pomerania
Brandenburg 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.03 0.9
Saxony Anhalt 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.02 0.8
Thuringia 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.02 0.8
Saxony 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.03 0.9
Total 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.03 0.9
The POS is able to call on the services of more citizens of every eastern state than any
other party except the COU in Thuringia. This is a key explanation as to why the PDS is
viewed as being both more visible and more active. Table 26 highlights how the POS is a
broad base of Kreisparteien each with a substantial membership.
600 KSPW-Projekt (1996): op. cit. p.4l.
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Table 26602
The Strength of Membership at the Kreisebene in the Eastern States - 1995 ( per cent)
Members COU SPO FOP Alliance 901 PDS
Green
Up to 40 0 0 1 84 0
41-180 5 39 53 16 1
181-400 21 42 43 0 18
401-700 33 19 3 0 42
Over 701 41 0 0 0 39
This is particularly true when one considers the organisational ratings of the SPO, the
party against which the POS is competing most vigorously for votes. The most recent data
reveals that the POS remains the party with the best organisational scores across the new
states.
/
Table 27603
Party Membership in Eastern Germany 1995-1998
Alliance SPD FDP CDU POS
90/Greens
1995 2,827 27,177 24,569 71,804 101,033
1996 2,753 26,863 21,212 65,923 102,976
1997 2,949 27,441 16,213 67,703 96,097
1998 3,150 27,527 15,590 61,046 94,447
Table 28604
The Level of Organisation of Political Parties in the New States 1995-1998
Alliance SPO FOP COU PDS
90/Greens
1995 0.02 0.20 0.18 0.53 0.74
1996 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.48 0.76
1997 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.50 0.71
1998 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.45 0.72
601 KSPW-Projekt (1996): ibid. p,42.
602 KSPW-Projekt (1996): ibid. p,4S.
603 Bundesgeschaftsstellen der Parteien, December 1998.
604 Own calculations.
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Table 29605
Party Membership in the cnu, spn and pns in each of the Eastern States
State cnu spn PDS
1996 1997 1996 1997 1997 1998
Brandenburg 7,927 7,974 6,778 6,868 ea 15,000 14,950
Mecklenburg 9,150 8,729 3,311 3,470 11,926 10,614
West Pomerania
Saxony 19,205 18,516 5,989 6,091 ea 25, 000 24,333
Saxony Anhalt 12,567 12,130 5,123 5,233 13,861 12, 107
Thuringia 17,074 16,342 5,662 5,589 12,950 12,210
In order to understand the importance of these figures, one must also consider exactly
who the members of the party are. It is not just the case that the PDS has quantifiably more
members, but also that it is able to mobilise more of them, more often than the other parties.
This is of great importance when one considers how vital face-to-face contact at the grass
roots level is in the eastern states - and is a weakness that Angela Merkel, the leader of the
Christian Democrats, admits her party will have to live with over the long-term. As she has
observed: "We simply have not been able to build sustainable bridges to the most important
societal groups - the trade unions, the churches and other similar associations,.606 - as the
CDU is not able to ~obilise enough members to make itself widely seen. Of the PDS's total
membership in May 1997, a mere 2 per cent were 29 or younger, 7 per cent were 30-39, 24
per cent were 40-59 and 67 per cent were over 60 years of age607.While this is undoubtedly
worrying for the future Nachwuchs of the party608,the large number of retired and early-
retired members ensures that the Knochenarbeit of grass roots politics is well served609. The
PDS membership is exceptionally active and it their work that has enabled the PDS to
establish such a considerable presence in German micro-politics. As Dietmar Wittich has
observed "the public perception of the PDS at the grass-roots and regional levels is defined
60S Ute Schmidt: 'Sieben Jahre nach der Einheit: Die ostdeutsche Parteienlandschaft im Vorfeld der
Bundestagswahl 1998', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, BI-2/98, pp.49-S0. Nikolaus Werz and Jochen
Schmidt (Hrsg.) (1998): op. cit. p.97; Patrick Moreau (1998a): op. cit. p.97; http://www.pds-
online/sonnenklar/mitgliederzahlen.htm
606 Angela Merkel: in Dieter Wenz: 'Ostdeutsche Knochenarbeit', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7
October 1999, p.20.
607 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.122.
608 The PDS is under no illusions about this. For examples of this see 'Mangel an Mitgliedern plagt aile
Parteien im Land', in Schwertner Volkszeitung, 19 October 1995, 'StartschuB fUr Wahlkampf auf dem PDS-
Parteitag', in Schweriner Volkszeitung 23 June 1997..
609 Dieter Wenz: 'Ostdeutsche Knochenarbeit', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 October 1999, p.20.
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above all by the groups who have taken early retirement and pensioners. They are the ones
that are seen at public events and at the information stands,.610. There are 121 einschltigige
Basisgruppen in Rostock alone with approximately 2,600 members"!', and every one of the
groups serves one particular street or group of streets, ensuring that no letter box remains
devoid of PDS literature and information612• Leipzig, meanwhile, has 51 Ortsverbiinde and
Basisorganisationen and, at the beginning of 1999, a membership of 2,909 citizens. Of the
membership, 71.2 per cent were either 61 or over, and a mere 3.92 per cent were 35 or under-
once again indicating a reservoir of members who are likely to be able to dictate time to PDS
activities613•
Peter Christian Segall et al note that the electoral campaigning done by the PDS in
1998, as was also the case in 1994, was centrally organised and aimed at stressing the party's
appreciation of the needs of the 'everyday man'. As they observe: "the centralisation is
channelled into an almost militant activism by the PDS not only at the state and communal
level, but also at the micro-level in the new states. Such activism is only possible by virtue of
the political strength of the PDS at the regional levef'614. This is as the PDS is served by a
loyal, committed (often through personal linkages to the party fostered by many years of
activity within the party) and enthusiastic membership that is united in its activism as it (the
membership) remains convinced that it is doing the 'right thing'. Helmut Holter is certainly
very much aware of the importance of such Basisarbeit (grass-roots work), and he stressed
this in 1998 when he observed that:
the work of our members in chats over the garden fence, around the table in the
pub, while having coffee with friends, as well as the many different forms of
610 Dietmar Wittich: 'Zur Soziologie der Umwandlung der SED in die PDS' in Lothar Bisky et al (eds.) (1996):
op. cit. p.181.
611 Lothar Probst: oWerist die PDS? Einblicke in den Alltag einer postkommunistischen Partei', in Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 September 1997.
612 Dieter Wenz: 'Ostdeutsche Knochenarbeit', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 October 1999, p.20.
Interview with Dr. Christian Westphal, Kreisvorsitzender of the PDS Fraktion in Restock, 29 April 1999.
Lothar Probst indicates, however, that the figures quoted by Wenz refer to 1997, as by June 1998 the number of
Basisorganisationen had dropped to 105. See Lothar Probst (2000): op. cit. p.17.
613 Amazingly, 73 members of the PDS in Leipzig are 91 years of age or older! PDS Stadtverband Leipzig:
Mitteilungsblatt, Nummer 2/3, Mm 1999, pp.4-S. It is, however, worth remembering that the CDU is also a
party with what many would regard as an 'ageing' membership, even if this is not quite to the same extent as is
the case with the PDS. The average age of the CDU membership is, for example, 56, while only 15.7 per cent of
the membership is between 16 and 39. Of these only 1.8 per cent are under 24, while only a total of 4.7 per cent
are 29 or under. See Klaus Escher and Hildegard Muller: Empfehlungen zur Erneuerung der CDU (Bonn:
Pressekonferenz der CDU am 7 Oktober 1998), p.2.
614 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.7.
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engagement that the members of our party who are retired undertake, cannot be
regarded highly enough''". '
The PDS "Turborentner,,616 (literally translated to mean 'Turbo-pensioners') are
therefore a unique phenomenon in (eastern) German politics, as they remain a cohesive and
enthusiastic group of party servants the like of which other parties only dream of possessing.
Empirically proving that the PDS has an active and enthusiastic membership is,
however, not easy, as recording how many members man Infostdnde (information stands),
stuff letter boxes etc. is virtually impossible. But Lothar Probst, in his micro-study of the
PDS in Rostock estimates that in towns and cities with a considerable number of
Trabantenstddte't' the POS is at a clear and conspicuous advantage on account of its ability
to organise and mobilise its membership in an almost military fashion. Up to 500 of the so-
called Altgenossen ('old comrades') ensure that households in Rostock are regularly serviced
with PDS literature. The nature of the high-rise flats ensures that tens of thousands of
households can be reached within an impressively short period oftime618•
The KSPW Survey of 1995 also reveals data that indicates that member mobilisation
is high. The number of people who work for the POS in an Ehrenamtlich (voluntary) position
is a suitable indication of how the POS mobilises sympathetic supporters.
Table 30619
The Number of Ehrenamtliche Mitarbeuer/innen of Political Parties in Eastern Germany
in 1995 at the Kreisebene (per cent)
COU SPD FOP Alliance 90/ POS
Green
None 42 62 20 15 0
1-5 49 35 72, 78 29
6+ 9 3 8 7 71
615 Helmut Holter (PDS): in Lothar Probst: Die PDS; Zur Anatomie einer postkommunistischen Partei
(Schwerin: Paper given at a Konrad Adenauer Stiftung conference on the 10.3.98), p.l3. Also quoted in Dieter
Wenz: 'Ostdeutsche Knochenarbeit', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 October 1999, p.20. See also Dieter
Wenz: 'Ein Land fiir Wiihlergemeinschaften', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 June 1999, p.16.
616 Patrick Moreau: 'Der Durchbruch der PDS im 'Superwahljahr 1994' - Demokratie in der Krise', in Heinrich
Oberreuter (Hrsg.): Parteiensystem am Wendepunkt? Wahlen in der Fernsehdemokratie (Munchen: Olzog
Verlag, 1996), p.236.
617 Trabantensttidte are the suburban areas around many eastern German towns and cities where many high-rise
blocks of flats exist.
618 For a fuller analysis see Lothar Probst (2000): op. cit. p.17.
619 KSPW Survey (1996): op. cit. p.49.
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Ehrenamtliche work takes place where the parties are not in a position to pay
supporters to work for them, but the supporters are none the less willing to actively assist in
the parties activities. It is therefore clear to see that the PDS possesses an impressive human
reservoir of helpers. This, however, is not the only thing that contributes to organisational
efficacy. The KSPW survey highlights the strengths and weaknesses of all of the main parties
in the East in terms of election offices, fax machines, computers, printers and newsletters.
The PDS is seen, at the Kreisebene, to be making good use of the district newsletter (87 per
cent of the PDS Kreisparteien have one, compared to 37 per cent ofCDU and a mere 12 per
cent of SPD parties at this level620),even though it is not quite as ~ell catered for as the CDU
in other areas. Technologically, the PDS fares well (in terms of computers in offices and fax
machines'" I), as it does in terms of the number of Wahlkreisbilro and Geschiiftstelle.
However, the PDS is lagging in terms of Besoldete Mitarbeiterlinnen (paid employees), as the
CDU possesses at least one paid activist in 68 per cent of Kreise in eastern Germany, the PDS
does in just 31 per cent. This is, however, largely compensated for in the number of
Ehrenamtliche forces that the PDS is in possession of'22.
The PDS has also been eager to associate itself with numerous other associations
within eastern German civil society. The PDS sees advantages in spreading its scope of
influence as broadly as possible, and as such the party makes a concerted effort to be
prominent in everyday life in eastern Germany. According to Segall et al, the PDS "was and
,
remains ubiquitous in most of the structures of cultural and associational life in the eastern
states,,623 and examples of the 110 associational groupings which are affiliated to the PDS
include624:
• The Alternative Enquete-Kommission of Contemporary German History
• The Association of Anti-Fascists
• The Berlin Working Group of Tenants Associations (AGBM)
• Organisation for the Unemployed in Germany
• Federal Association on the Committees for Justice
• The German Peace Association (DFB)
• Interest Group for the Protection of the Social Rights of Former Functionaries of the
Armed Forces and Customs Officials of the GDR (ISOR)
• The Interest Group of Emeritus and Retired Teachers
620 KSPW Survey (1996): ibid. p.48.
621 KSPW Survey (1996): ibid. p.48.
622 KSPW Survey (1996): ibid. p.4S.
623 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.9.
624 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): ibid. p.S.
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Peter Porsch, the PDS leader in Saxony, has described the PDS's position within
eastern German civil society thus:
In the eastern states the PDS is deeply anchored in society. The party is known
through the faces of its politicians at the communal level, in the Wohngebiete
(residential areas), in the clubs and associations, in the trade unions and in the
Biirgerinitiative. In the East we are clearly the party for the Alltag, the party that
people feel they can approach625•
It is therefore clear that the organisational strength of the PDS offers it clear
advantages over its rivals. It has a large, well-disciplined membership, and has illustrated
considerable skill at anchoring itself into eastern German civil society. Furthermore, the 1998
federal election "revealed a clear mathematical correlation between the areas where the PDS
was very well organised and its best election results" - illustrating that it is a plausible
hypothesis that the PDS's efficient organisation is leading to improved election results626•
The PDS's organisational strengths have also enabled it to create a culture where
people look towards the party for support. As Thomas Lutze has observed:
election and regional offices as well as Landesgeschdftsstellen are genuine places
where citizens can head for when they need information and assistance. They are
places where those who are interested can simply pop by to drink a cup of tea or
coffee, or to borrow a book. They are not places that are somehow hard to find, or
large, expensive and imposing offices that on occasion might appear more akin to
an archive ... 627
For many Easterners the PDS is, in this sense, more than just a political party. It is a
point of reference in a confusing world. And the open and friendly manner in which the PDS
conducts itself represents, for many, a refreshing change.
It is not just the extra-parliamentary activity of the PDS that ensures that its message is
conveyed - the communal activity of the PDS is also a key organisational strength - as the
PDS's considerable presence at the micro-levels of political activity ensures that it remains
visible within the eastern German community. The PDS is enthusiastic both in its support of
initiatives that advocate increased communal independence, including in financial terms, and
625 Peter Porsch: 'PDS 2000 - Worauf es ankomrnt!', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 20, 19 Mai 2000, on
http://www.pds-online/pressedienstl0020/15.htm
626 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.9.
627 Thomas Lutze, PDS Landesgeschdftsfuhrer in the Saarland: 'Ohne Verstarkung an der Basis, keine Basis bei
den Wahlen', on http://www.pds-online.de/disputl9812/39759.html and in PDS Disput, Numrner 12, Dezember
1998.
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in its activities that support political activities at the communal level628• The PDS is well
aware that eastern Germans have little faith in the institutional structures that they were
presented with in 1990, and seeks to bring democracy and responsibility much nea~er to
citizens. It aims to show, by efficient and visible communal activities that it 'is Biirgernah
(near to the citizen) and effective in responding to calls for more political activity and
responsibility at the lowest levels in the German political system. The PDS itself phrases its
attitude to communal politics thus:
(Communal politics is) ... the defence of communal independence against the
detrimental communal politics pursued at the federal and state levels. By doing
this the PDS hopes to, on the one hand, secure genuine improvements for citizens
and, above all, the disadvantaged, and on the other hand support the
democratisation and modernisation of society in the pursuit of the vision of a
socially just and solidaristic world629•
In the Party Programme of 1993, the PDS also unequivocally states that:
The PDS stands for communal self-government as provided for by the
Constitution but not implemented in practice. We are committed to the right and
the real opportunity of communities, towns and districts to be able to administer
and organise growing parts of public affairs on their own account630•
In communal politics the PDS is well represented. Over 6000 eastern Germans sit in
communal parliaments as PDS representatives. At the end of 1997, 1074 PDS politicians
were active in Kreistage and Stadtrdte kreisfreier Stiidte, as well as the 195 politicians who
were active for the PDS in Berlin's Bezirksverordnetenversammlungen. In the 84 towns with
more than 25,000 citizens, the PDS has 911 seats, as well a further 5,000 seats in the
kreisangehorigen Stiidten und Gemeinden631• In total, the PDS had 191 Mayors as well as 2
628 In an analysis behind the practical reasons for the PDS electoral successes of 1998, Helmut Holter lists "das
kommunalpolitische Engagement" of the PDS as one of the factors behind the PDS's strong electoral
performances. Other things he mentions are the party's reputation as being a Parte; fir den Alltag, the clear
profile of the PDS, the PDS's role as a Hoffnungstrtiger and the effective election campaigning of the party.
Helmut Holter in a speech to the extraordinary state party conference in Sternberg, 10 October 1998. Honorary
President Hans Modrow echoed this at the 1999 Berlin Party Conference when he stated that clearing the 5 per
cent hurdle at the 1998 Federal Election was "a success/or the thousands of members who make the PDS visible
and viable at the communal level, and convincingly and enthusiastically represent the party in the day to day
affairs 0/ everyday politics". Hans Modrow (PDS): 'Parteitag soil unserer strategischen Debatte Inhalt und
Richtung geben', speech to the Berlin Party Conference of the PDS, 15 January 1999. See PDS
Disput/Pressedienst, Numrner 1,7 Januar 1999, p.3.
629 Heiko Grohe (PDS): •Anregungen und Vorschlage fUr die kommunalpolitische Arbeit der PDS 1998', in
Kommunal Spezial (Schwerin: Kommunalpolitsches Forum Mecklenburg-Vorpommern e. V, March 1998), p.6.
630 PDS (1993): op. cit. p.l6.
631 Heiko Grohe (1998): op. cit. p.5.
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Oberbiirgermeister, 73 of which were in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, 42 in Saxony Anhalt,
39 in Brandenburg, 20 in Thuringia, 13 in Saxony and 4 were in Berlin632• In 1998 the PDS
tried to offer specific support to its communal politicians (who often work for no financial
recompense) by organising various activities that aid them in learning from others and in
carrying out their duties in as efficient and effective way as is possible. These activities
ranged from a conference for mayors, two weekend seminars for leaders of PDS groupings in
communal parliaments, a Kommunalpolitische Konferenz in Leipzig as well as sittings of the
federal party with communal politicians=", These are all in addition to the 'communal-
political day' of the PDS (19 March 1998 in this case), when communal politicians were
invited to a special conference in Saxony Anhalt.
The highly mobile membership and considerable presence In eastern German
parliaments offers the party the perfect tool for establishing a strong presence on eastern
German streets. This fact is not lost on the PDS activists themselves. The January 1996 party
conference in Magdeburg settled on the motto of Kommunen stdrken, Gesellschaft von unten
verdndern (Strengthen the Communes, Change Society from below) and the PDS has
achieved greater visibility at the communal level not just because of the large number of
activists it mobilises at election times, but also because of the effort and enthusiasm that the
PDS puts into communal political activity all year round. As Heiko Grohe observes:
Without its politicians at the communal level, the PDS would clearly not be the
party that it is today ... competence, reliability and high personal commitment on
social issues have become in many places the trademarks of PDS communal.
activity''".
Dieter Kupfernagel, PDS Oberburgermeister in Sangerhausen, further stresses this:
I believe that it is in the communal political arena that the PDS can be at its most
effective. It can be there for the citizens635• .
And in Saxony Peter Porsch has claimed that:
Our political representatives in the communal parliaments have actively ensured
that the PDS remains visible, that everywhere in Saxony the PDS is seen to have a
face and that citizens are able to trust the PDS. The PDS's communal politics,
632 Heiko Grohe (1998): ibid, p.S.
633 Heiko Grohe (1998): ibid, p.6.
634 Heiko Grohe (1998): ibid, p.5.
635 Dieter Kupfemagel: in Die Zeit, 19 July 1997.
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with its emphasis of political activity being brought as near to the citizen as is
possible, is the basis of our success, and this is going to remain so in the future636•
The retention of as many jobs as is possible, Kindertagestiitten, Youth centres,
communal housing and libraries, fighting for affordable services, the support in questions of
rent problems and the building of safe houses for women and the abused are all areas where
the PDS retains a particular prominence at the communal level. It is precisely by doing this
that the PDS is able to take advantage of its strengthens: as a membership party, as a milieu
party as well as a pragmatic representative of eastern interests and of eastern protest637•
Furthermore the PDS has proven itself to be totally integrated into the parliamentary
procedures and mechanisms of communal governance. PDS politicians remain much more
pragmatic and sachorientiert than, for example, is the case at either the regional or federal
levels. PDS politicians are much less ideological and the PDS has carefully cultivated the
/
image of a party that is much more interested in finding solutions to problems than, in
,
ideological conflict638•
In Mecklenburg West Pomerania, the SPD-PDS coalition is seeking to reform
communal political activity in order to give communal authorities more power to control their
own affairs. The PDS actively campaigns against proposed forced amalgamation of
particularly small communes, claiming that while they are financially viable, it should be up
to the citizens of the communes themselves as to what happens to them639• This is part of the
PDS strategy of bringing democracy close to the citizenry, in order both to enrich democratic
activity as well as attempting to dispel some of the cynicism towards politics in general.
Article 182 of the coalition agreement clearly states that:
636 Peter Porsch (PDS): 'Unsere Zukunft liegt nicht in der Gegenwart anderer Parteien, sondern in einer Partei
als Netwerk demokratischer Bewegung', speech at the sixth Landesparteitag of the PDS in Saxony, in PDS
Pressedienst, Nurnmer 2, 14 January 2000. See also http://www.pds-online.de/pressedienstl0002/09.htm
637 Dirk Rochtus et al: Wer ist die PDS?: Zwei BeiMlge zu Programm und Profil einer postkommunistischen
Partei (Bremen: Institut fUr kulturwissenschaftliche Deutschlandstudien, Universitat Bremen, Heft 10, 1996),
r·9.
38 Lothar Probst (2000): op. cit. p.6.
639 Gabi Schulz (PDS): 'ZusammenschluB von Gemeinden darf nicht zu deren Last gehen' (Schwerin: PDS
Presseerklarung, PDS Pressestelle, Nummer 70,6 April 1999). PDS politicians in Mecklenburg West Pomerania
have, however, acknowledged that the unique structure of communal authority in Mecklenburg West Pomerania
means that there ate a large number of very small se/bsttlndige Gemeinden that remain too expensive to continue
financing. In mid-2000 there were 1008 Gemeinden, compared to just 544 in Saxcny - a state with a much
higher population. 440 of the Gemeinden in Mecklenburg West Pomerania have less than 500 residents living
there . a figure that both Arnold Schoenenberg and Klaus BOttger (both PDS Landtag MdL's) admit is far too
high. See 'Zu viele Gemeinden im Lande? Debatte tiber freiwilligen Zusammenschluss oder
Zwangsvereinigung', in Neues Deutschland, 11Apri12000, p.5.
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In the medium term, the coalition is striving to change the communal constitution
(Kommunalverfassung). Communes are going to be given more competencies, as
well as the opportunity to exert more control over their own affairs ... the right of
citizens' to be involved in the political process, as well as the use of
Biirgerinitiativen (citizens initiatives) will be expanded. The rights of Ortsteilen
(city districts) and their administrations are going to be broadened. Children and
young people will have the right to participate in communal activities that directly
affect them640. ,
The PDS works closely with the Kommunalpolitisches Forum (Communal-Political
Forum) in the eastern states. The Forum is open in its nearness to the PDS641 and aims to
conduct studies and hold seminars on social and educational issues for communal politicians,
as well as for the general public. Further to these attempts to educate citizens, the Communal-
Political Forum aims to defend and expand the power and scope of communes everywhere in
Germany.
The PDS is well aware that the communes in both the eastern and western states
(although this is particularly true in the East642) often suffer from acute financial shortages.
Both income tax and the Gewerbesteuer (trade tax) are no longer available as sources of
income to communes - yet the communes have been delegated more responsibilities from not
just the Land level, but also the Federal and European ones as well. If the communes are to
function properly, and to contribute to a reconstruction of trust in public institutions, then they
have to have a sound financial basis. As a result of this, the PDS proposed in May 1996 a
thorough reform of communal finances643• The PDS also attempted to acquire extra subsidies
for the particularly poor eastern communest". Having largely failed in 1996, the PDS
repeated demands in October 1999 for a fundamental reform of communal finance, in order to
enable the communes to stabilise their precarious financial positions64s• It has called for the
establishment of an Enquete-Kommission into 'Reform of Communal Finance' (Reform der
640 'Koalitionsvereinbarung IX. Selbstverwaltung der Kommunen ausbauen und ihre Leistungsfahigkeit sichern.
Abschnitt 1: Kommunalpolitik' in Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei
Deutschlands und dem Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Schwerin: Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
1998). See also http://www.mv-pds-ltf.delkoalitionliOOOOO.htm
641 Barbel Kozian (Vorsitzende des Kommunalpolitschen Forums Mecklenburg-Vorpommern e. V.):
'Jahresversammlung 1997 zog positive Bilanz', in 'Kommunal Spezial (Schwerin: Kommunalpolitsches Forum
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern e. V, March 1998), p.2.
642 According to the PDS spokesman on communal affairs in the Bundestag, Uwe-Jens Ressel, 50 per cent of
communes in both Saxony and Thuringia are insolvent (Zahlungsunflihig). See PDS im Bundestag
Presseerkltirung: Kommunalreforrn, Nummer 2070, 11March 1998.
643 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/4597.
644 PDS im Bundestag Presseerkltirung: Kommunalreforrn, Nummer 2070, 11March 1998.
645 'Einstieg in eine umfassende Reform der Finanzierung der Stadte, Gemeinden und Landkreise' (A
Comprehensive Reform of the Financing of Cities, Municipalities and Rural Districts). Deutscher Bundestag:
Drucksache 14/1302.
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Kommunalfinanzierungf'" in a further effort to strengthen their financial basis across all of
Germany. It has also attempted to increase financial support given directly to cities,
municipalities and rural districts647•
In particular the eastern German communes are dependent from the financial
payments given them by the Lander, since they have hardly any financial
resources of their own. With a fundamental and far-reaching finance reform, as
the PDS Parliamentary party proposes, the public purse would have to be
redistributed in favour of the communes'r",
The PDS is clear and consistent in its advocacy of the need to grant the communal
levels of government both more powers, and the financial power to effectively carry out their
work. The need for this is particularly acute in the eastern states, and the PDS works closely,
through its dense network of communal politicians and its links with organisations such as the
communal-political forum to try and improve the scope and efficiency of communal activities.
The PDS is adamant the subsidiarity should involve decision-making at the lowest political
level, with the aim of making political activity transparent and Biirgemah,
4.4. Party Policy
All parties attempt to develop a popular package of policies that they hope
differentiate them from other competitors in the political market place. Regional parties have
frequently been seen to stress the importance of a coherent and relatively narrow set of 'core'
policies that are uniquely specific to the territory they seek to represent. In contrast to the
major (national) parties, who tend to mobilise around nationally salient societal cleavages,
regional parties take advantage of cleavages that divide or differentiate the region from the
national polity. The territorial cleavage divide between the eastern and western states is
structural in nature, and it is the PDS that acts as an agent within the political process
articulating this structural difference. The PDS, like other regional parties, specifically
moulds its policy package to the social, cultural and attitudinal differences that make the
646. Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/984.
647 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/4597. Both of these motions were rejected, but the SPD and the
Alliance 90/Greens acknowledged the necessity of financial reform at the micro-levels of German politics.
Alliance 90/Greens did eventually call for the establishment of a commission of experts to investigate finance
reform for municipalities, and the SPD followed suit after the Saarland brought a similar motion forward in the
Bundesrat.
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people of its region unique. Section 4.4. illustrates how the POS does this is abstract terms,
while chapter five discusses the policy package that the PDS has developed in more detail.
4.4. The Capacity of the PDS to Mobilise Community: Eastern German Identity and the
PDS'
The Federal Republic of Germany swallowed the GDR whole. And now she is
causing the FRG to have quite a stomach ache!649 .
Chapter three illustrated that an eastern German identity exists and that it is
underpinned by common sets of value-judgements, cultural orientations and attitudinal
commonalties. A "widespread (verbreitete) Lebensgefiihl" exists in the eastern states650. A
process of identity creation has been of key importance in creating an environment where
socio-cultural and economic issues increase in political salience within a uniquely territorial
context: and the POS, as other regional parties do in other regions, articulate such uniqueness
within the political arena. The creation of a new eastern German sub-cultural within
Germany, spawned by the structural changes that followed unification, is actively represented
by the regionally concentrated PDS. The phenomena that underpin this are spawned by the
socialising effects of life in the GDR and by the experience of living through the transition
process from state-socialism to capitalism (see chapter three).
Empirical electoral research in Germany has long attempted to ascertain whether
citizens who express strong tenets of an eastern German identity regularly vote for the PDS.
Brunner & Walz have successfully illustrated that citizens who profess to possess a form of
eastern German identity are indeed more likely to vote for the POS. They claim that 85 per
cent of citizens who have voted for the party did so as the "PDS comes from the East, and is
the party which most clearly represents eastern German interests,,651. Detlev Pollack and
Gert Pickel, following their extensive works on eastern German identity and cultural
difference in Germany, claim that POS voters tend to be better politically informed and that
they possess a self-identification that is different from that of Germany as a whole (stehen in
648 Lothar Bisky (PDS): Speech at the Rostock Party Conference, 3 April 1998, in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer
15-16, 17April 1998, p.3.
649 Gregor Gysi (PDS): 'Das rote Gespenst', in Der Spiegel, Nummer 10, 1999, p.2S.
650 Infratest Dirnap (1998): op. cit. p.1O.
651 Wolfram Brunner and Dieter Walz: 'Zwischen Parteiidentifikation, Kandidatenbewertung und
Issueorientierung. Bestimmungsfaktoren der Wahlentscheidung 1998', in Gert Pickel, Dieter Walz und Wolfram
Brunner: Deutschland nach den Wahlen. Befunde zur Bundestagswahl /998 und zur Zukunft des deutschen
Parteiensystems (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2000), pp.92-93.
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einer gewissen Distanz zu einer gesamtdeutschen Identitiit)652 - i.e. they have an identity that
is characterised by their socialisation and life experiences in the GDR and, following
unification, in eastern Germany. This Abgrenzungsmentalitiit (mentality of demarcation) or
internaliserte Identitiitsbegrenzung (internalised limited identity) is specific to citizens of the
eastern states and PDS voters are highly likely to be citizens who express such identifications
most clearly653. They conclude by stating that:
the PDS is the clear beneficiary of the existence of an eastern German identity,
and the nature of this identification ensures that the PDS acts as a catch-all home
for voters who wish to give political voice to the subjective degradation of 'all'
eastern Germansr"
,
For its part, the PDS clearly attempts to make political capital out of its eastern
German heritage as well as what it sees as differences of attitude and experience between
eastern and western Germans. PDS politicians are rhetorically able and articulate the feelings
of eastern Germans, as illustrated in chapter three, in a unique fashion. The PDS' s successful
defence of the rights, interests and identity of eastern Germans forms the backbone of the
detailed policy package that is discussed in chapter five.
PDS politicians shy away from deliberately discussing what an eastern German
identity might be as they perceive that it will diminish the parties chances of developing into
an all-German party. The PDS's unwillingness to accept that the party's Westausdehnung
(westward expansion) has failed means that the PDS still concentrates considerable time,
effort and resources in a forlorn cause. In terms of eastern German identity, the PDS is very
flexible in its use of terminology: sometimes it talks of eastern German interests, on other
occasions PDS politicians may use terms like solidarity, inner unity, eastern experiences or
eastern uniqueness. In whichever way PDS politicians choose to phrase their arguments, it is
clear they are talking about the very processes of identification that were discussed in the third
chapter of this work. If the PDS were willing, as Ostrowski and Weckesser suggested in
1996655, to concentrate on what it does best (i.e. give specific voice to eastern Germans within
6S2 Detlev Pollack and Gert Pickel: 'Besonderheiten der politischen Kultur in Ostdeutschland als
Erklarungsfaktoren der Bundestagswahl 1998 und die Riickwirkungen der Bundestagswahlen auf die politische
Kultur Ostdeutschlands', in Jan van Deth, Hans Rattinger und Edeltrud Roller (Hrsg.): Die Republik auf dem
Weg zur Normalitat? Wahlverhalten und politische Einstellungen nach acht Jahren Einheit (Opladen: Leske
und Budrich, 2000), p.136. .
653 Detlev Pollack and Gert Pickel (2000): ibid. p.136.
654 Detlev Pollack and Gert Pickel (2000): ibid.. p.136.
655 Christine Ostrowski & Ronald Weckesser: 'Ein Brief aus Sachsen', in Neues Deutschland, 8 May 1996, p.l.
See page 60 of this thesis for further discussion of their ideas.
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federal and regional parliaments), then not only would the PDS be able to concentrate all its
efforts on its key strength, but it would also have a long-term perspective in eastern German
politics, as it hones its policy orientations to the specifically eastern environment. The PDS
realises that eastern German Trotzidentitat has come to be a protective mechanism against
feelings of being economically less-well-off, socially disadvantaged and politically
disregarded. As such, "the PDS is perceived, over and above its core electorate, as the
representative of eastern German interests ... and western Germans, who have until now
made decisions on behalf of all of Germany, must reconsider this state of ajJairs,,656.
PDS politicians are the only politicians who aggressively (and at times in a decidedly
populist fashion) articulate such a defence of eastern Germany as a whole. Two examples
here illustrate this. At the January 1999 Berlin party conference Gregor Gysi, the master of
the eastern German soundbite, observed that:
We have to make sure that the Federal Chancellor is serious about his promise to
make eastern Germany his key priority. Up until now I have not heard a single
substantial idea on this issue. I have heard neither how the Chancellor is going to
promote economic activity, let alone how he is going to achieve sustainable
ecological development, nor have I heard how he intends to create jobs in the
eastern states, not to mention the many other things that have not been
conceptualised ... I want to know: when is the Easterner who is on benefits, the
Easterner who has to pay the same prices as a Westerner, going to at least be able
to claim the same levels of social support? When is the Easterner who is
unemployed going to be able to claim the same levels of unemployment benefit?
When is the state, in the form of employees working in the public sector, going to
pay the same rates to Easterners as what it does to Westerners?6S7.
On the 31 March 1999, during a plenary session of the Mecklenburg West Pommerania
state Parliament, Helmut Holter demanded to know:
Where are the so-called 'flourishing landscapes'? Where is the equalisation of
living conditions between the eastern and western states? The promises made by
the CDU at the time of unification and at election times remain pure
Makulatur!658
656 Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.7.
657 Gregor Gysi: Speech at PDS Conference in Berlin, quoted in Neues Deutschland, 21 January 1999, p.l O.
658 Helmut Holter (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. MIirz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorporrunern: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 his 1998 (Schwerin: Landtag Mecklenburg- Vorpommern, 1998),
p.5163.
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No politician from any of the western parties can utter such words. The PDS knows
that it has not been responsible for any governmental decisions since 1990 - hence it devolves
itself of responsibility for the economic malaise and the social dissatisfaction in the eastern
states today. PDS politicians are able to articulate such widely held sentiments as they are not
constrained by federal considerations, and western Germans are seen to have made the
decisions that have led to the East's predicament (regardless of whether this is a true, or fair,
judgement or not).
While neither the PDS nor the other political parties openly propagate the existence of
an eastern German identity, it is clear that the PDS articulates region-wide feelings of
solidarity within the political process. Paradoxically, the PDS continues to stress that it is an
'all-German' force to the left of the SPD6S9, while simultaneously claiming the mantle of
being the only party that can adequately represent eastern German interests in the political
arena. In itself, this is not a paradox: but even the most cursory glance at the German party
political landscape reveals the PDS to be much more effective at being eastern German than
all-German. The PDS's strategy is, however, a paradox, as it strongly pushes its eastern
profile while stressing its keenness to broaden its influence in western Germany and rid itself
of its purely eastern German image. Yet it is its identity as an eastern German party that
dominates in terms of space and coherence of approach. As the 1998 election manifesto
claims:
The PDS is the party that for years has consistently represented eastern German
interests, thereby forcing the other parties to address eastern concerns. Every
form of discrimination of eastern Germans that has been conceptualised in the
federal parliament has been brought up at the behest of the PDS ... without the
PDS eastern Germany would not be mentioned in a political context in the
Bundestag at a1l66o•
In spite of claims in election programmes that the PDS unambiguously embraces
eastern German interests, little is said about the existence or articulation of eastern German
identity. This is principally as it is a divisive topic within the ranks of the PDS. Where
eastern German identity is discussed it is seen to be a result of the unavoidable conflicts, at
659 In 1998 the PDS claimed in its election manifesto that "the PDS is Germany's socialist party" in a clear
attempt to take the mantle away from the SPD. See http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenldokumentelbt-
wahlprogrammlpraeambel.htm - paragraph 3.
660 http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenldokumentelbt-wahlprogrammlpraeambel.htm
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both the moral and social levels, that Easterners have been forced to live through in the
process of the transformation of the GDR661.
The PDS is insistent and explicit in its articulation of eastern Germans self-perceptions
as being 'different' to West Germans, and of being able to contribute valuable experiences
towards the creation of a socially just, more egalitarian and 'fully employed' Germany'i'".
This is in terms of attitudes, expectations and values. The PDS demands both equal treatment
(in the form of an equalisation of wage rates, of greater access to employment, a recognition
of past achievements and qualifications and so forth - see chapter five) of Easterners in the
unified German state, as well as increased recognition of the GDR as being a part of German
history as a whole. It demands that the subjective differences between East and West be
respected and not seen as hindrances on the way towards 'inner unity,663.
The PDS articulates the identity of defiance in eastern Germany in that it retains a
distance from the fundamental principles of the FRG, as well as from a number of aspects of
the FRG's institutional structures. This distance is not based upon a rejection of the Basic
Law, but rather in radical changes to the functioning nature of both German democracy and
the social market economy. The PDS in Saxony, for example, states that:
... within a ever more interdependent European Union, the relationships between
the federal level within Germany, the regional level, the communal level and the
European level need to be re-conceptualised. Decisions need to be taken at which
ever level is most appropriate. A democratisation of the EU is a prerequisite for
this, just as democratic control of the EU is necessary ... it also remains obvious
that a democratic reconstruction of the German state is necessary if the state is to
once again enjoy popular support and if the citizenry is going to feel that the state
is actively articulating its interests664. .
Section 2.4.1.2. illustrated that changes in the economic structure of a region can alter
the fundaments of party competition in a given region. Regional parties have established
themselves in many western polities as a result of changes in the economic balance of a
nation-state. This may have left citizens of a region feeling economically disadvantaged,
661 Michael Benjamin: Ostdeustche Identittu und ihre sozialen Grundlagen. Gedanken uber linke Politik
(Berlin: Marxistisches Forum der POS, Heft 6, 1996a), p.13. See also Thomas Koch (1997): op. cit. pp.93-108.
662 In the Rostock Manifesto the POS specifically defines these particular experiences as equality for women in
the workplace, inter-disciplinarity in universities, experiences of greater solidarity in society, the benefits of job
security and so forth. See Das Rostoker Manifest, POS Parteivorstand (1998): op. cit. p.6.
663 Lothar Bisky (POS) articulated this by stating that "we want the people of eastern and western Germany in
the Berlin Republic to act as a stimulus for each other in the knowledge that they have clear cultural differences
... and these real-existing cultural differences should not be seen as a threat to anyone". Lothar Bisky, in a
speech to the POS party conference in Berlin, 18 January 1999 in Neues Deutschland, 18 January 1999, p.4.
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hence parties like, for example, the SNP in Scotland have grown to mobilise support based on
regional economic self-interest. At the other extreme, some regions have benefited from rapid
increases in regional prosperity, and regional parties have also incorporated this into their
political platforms. The Lega Nord is the most obvious example of this phenomenon.
The forces of global capital have also aggravated the processes of economic
regionalisation, as productive and economically efficient regions increase rapidly in
prosperity, while more peripheral areas struggle to attract the investment and modem
technologies needed to be able to adequately compete in supra-national markets. This also
changes the balance of political power within both nation-states and regions, as the 'winners'
.and 'losers' perceive their political priorities as shifting. These can lead to the formation of
new territorial alignments, based on new lines of economic interest.
The eastern states provide a unique example of a state-socialist regime and economic
order being replaced by social-market structures, as well as a liberal democratic political
institutions. The existence of West Germany ensured that the eastern states were presented
with a 'ready-made' state, and that institutional expansion took place speedily, and without
the need for discussions as to the mode and method of implementation''",
Section 3.2.2. illustrated, however, that the economic and political system of the FRG
has put down only superficial roots in the eastern states. The 'system' is not perceived as
functioning at optimum speed. While material prosperity has unquestionably increased,
Easterners do not accept the economic structures of the East as being able to fulfil their social,
political and economic needs. They do not wish to see the structures of the FRG overthrown,
but it is clear that amendments and alterations are required if eastern German interests are to
be funnelled into the political and economic process.
Economic change has clearly been one catalyst in fostering territorial identification
with eastern Germany. The PDS conceptualises this in terms of economic disadvantage and
social discrimination. These claims, as section 3.2.6. illustrated, find considerable resonance
in eastern Germany. As Ingrid Tschirch (PDS) has observed:
664 PDS Sachsen: 'Ein Land fUr die Menschen. Verlinderung beginnt vor Ort', Wah/programm 1999 (Dresden:
PDS, 1999), p.8.
66S Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer (1997): op. cit. pp.l00-121; Richard Rose, William Mishler and
Christian Haerpfer: Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1998).
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The economic and social divide between East and West is getting bigger, and it is
becoming a divide that is principally one of economic wealth. Unemployment is
double as high in the East, eastern German wages and pensions are only, on
average, at about 80 per cent of what they are in the West66 •
Calls for the equalisation of not just costs, but also wages and pensions are persistently
made by PDS politicians. Tschirch has once again observed:
78 per cent of eastern Germans are of the opinion today that both the Federal
Government and the Land Government in Mecklenburg West Pomerania are not
doing enough in their attempts to achieve an equalisation of living standards
between the eastern and western states. And the 78 per cent are correct. The
citizens of the eastern German Lander want equality - and not just verbally. They
have had enough of the much vaunted individual freedom that is only as great or
as small as someone's wallet. Differing wages for the same increases in living
costs, higher proportional rents in the East than in the West - all of this deepens
the rift. As such, all of the measures taken by the government in the name of
savings, their so-called 'reforms', whether they are in the area of health, in the
labour market or in the area of pensions, hit the East much harder than they do the
West, as the above mentioned lower wages still have to pay, for example, for the
more expensive medication or public transport?". .
Both the CDU and the SPD have attempted to reinvigorate the economic environment
in the eastern states, and while they are continued to be perceived as being in control of the
economy, the way is open for the PDS to openly articulate regional dissatisfaction. The
earlier sections of this chapter indicate that the PDS is highly proficient at doing this.
However, it is not just the high levels of unemployment, increases in economic
insecurity and so forth that have prompted a realignment of the party political system.
Political inefficiency, in the shape of under-representation at the federal level and
dissatisfaction with German democracy have only been articulated by PDS politicians.
Chapter five illustrates how the PDS has chosen to do this, and the proposals that the PDS has
for improving how the German political and economic system functions. In the economic
sphere, the PDS questions the capitalist imperative of the governing parties:
666 Ingrid Tschirch (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. Mlirz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: iur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.5167.
667 Ingrid Tschirch (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. M!irz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998): ibid. p.5167.
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the leading capitalist states are preoccupied with establishing a world order which
will consolidate their political and military predominance ... (and) ... we are united
in the resolute struggle against political muzzling, the dismantling of social life
and the destruction of human dignity. We are at one in striving for a world of
peace, freedom, social justice and democracy. Together we hold the opinion that
it is the capitalist character of modem socie~ that is causally responsible for
endangering human civilisation and culture ... 6 8
The PDS echoes eastern sentiments in that western German democracy ,and the social-
market economy are not as widely accepted as they are in the West. This is another key
fundament of the eastern German identity. The socialising phenomena of the GDR and the
experiences of the transformation process have dictated that many Easterners have much more
sympathetic impressions of socialism now than they did ten years ago - principally as they
look at their lives in the GDR through the prism of having experienced ten years within the
social market structures of the FRG. This has an important bearing on their attitudinal
approach to the structures and outputs of the FRG. More positive leanings towards socialism
have become key underlying tenets of the eastern Trotzidentitdt, and remain evident across
party lines and across the ideological spectrum. The PDS is the only party that actively
represents this in the political market, as it articulates the feelings of "unknowing socialists ..669
in the eastern states. The left-wing bias in the PDS programme therefore reflects a current of
underlying attitudinal difference between eastern and western Germans. Easterners expect the
state to play a much more active role in their lives - and particularly in times of high
unemployment and economic difficulty67o. They also bring with them attitudes that have been
sharpened as the during their time in the GDR. The PDS chooses to state it thus:
The socialist experiment in the GDR has left a crucial imprint on the biographies
of east German peoples. Their experiences embrace the abolition of
unemployment; far-reaching elimination of actual poverty; a comprehensive
social security system; significant elements of social justice, in particular a high
degree of equal opportunity in the education and health services as well as in
culture; new rights for women and youth?" .:
Hence the statist rhetoric of the PDS finds an echo not just amongst its own supporters,
but also amongst eastern Germans who, for reasons to do with the PDS's past, or the
668 PDS (1993): op. cit. pp.3-4.
669 Peter Bender (1992): op. cit. p.28 and p.116.
670 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Kocher (1997): op. cit.
671 PDS (1993): op. cit. pp.8-9.
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practicality of the PDS's policy alternatives, choose to vote for other parties. Chapter three
highlighted the importance of socialism in the make-up of the eastern Trotzidentitdt, as well
as the differences in value differences between eastern and western Germans. The
egalitarianism, the active state and increased appreciation of welfare provision that Easterners,
of all political persuasions, prefer, is only conceptualised by the PDS (see chapter five for the
policy approaches that the PDS uses in doing this). For many PDS voters, the PDS
subsequently forms a common denominator in terms of their general political orientation -
much as the Catholic church has traditionally done for the CDU in western Germany, and for
the CSU in Bavaria in particular672• By being broadly more supportive of socialism,
Easterners have (perhaps sub-consciously) taken on board an identity marker that is in direct
contravention of the prevalent sub-culture in western Germany - as well as being a clear
recognition of their state-socialist past.
The PDS is the only party that talks of life 'how it really was' in the GDR. It also
recalls selective recollections of the past. This may sound perverse to western ears, as it was
indeed the SED who ruled in dictatorial fashion over the GDR for 40 years. But the PDS is
the only party that is prepared not just to accept, but to also to actively defend much of the
normal, everyday lives of citizens of the GDR. The glue of common experience is strong in
shaping attitudes towards eastern Germans' new state. The PDS remains "a piece of 'Heimat '
that many eastern Germans do not wish to lose,,673. The fact that 97 per cent of Easterners are
of the opinion that only those who lived in the GDR have the right to mitreden on the
subject674 ensures that discourse ventured by the western parties frequently falls into the
category of Besserwisserei. The CDU and the FDP do not play-up their former existences as
Blockfloten, and the PDS remains in the unique position of having liveable experiences within
both the GDR and the transformation process that followed its demise. This gives it the
exklusiven Wissensbestdnden and unique experiences that are evident in the Trotzidentitiil7s -
just as it gives the party the credibility to selectively bring back elements of GDR everyday
life into the public consciousness.
The PDS is vociferous in its denunciation of western German Vormundschaft. The
vast majority of Easterners resent the overriding dominance of Westerners in the political and
economic life of their new state. This is one of the most obvious and publicly visible
672 Tobias Durr: 'Abschied von der 'inneren Einheit': Das Lebensgefilhl PDS und der alte Westen', in Blatter
fir deutsche und intemationale Politik, 11196,p.1352.
673 Every second eastern German would have regretted it if the PDS had not achieved parliamentary
representation at the 1998 Federal Elections. See Infratest Dimap (1998): op. cit. p.10.
67 'Stolz auf's eigene Leben': Der Spiegel, Number 27, 1995, p.46.
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elements of the eastern German Trotzidentitiit. The PDS, as an eastern German party, is
vehement of its criticism of this, as well as efficient in both its demands that this imbalance be
corrected and its suggestions of how this should be done (see chapter five).
It should therefore be of no surprise that PDS politicians from both the left and right-
wings of the party acknowledge the existence of a specific form of eastern German self-
understanding. Michael Benjamin, a former prominent member of both the PDS Executive
and the Communist Platform (KPF), once again argues that Easterners have (often sub-
consciously) taken on board socialist values, and this provides the fundament of eastern
German attitudinal difference676• The KPF and the Marxist Forum (MF) further discuss the
evidence of increased solidarity between eastern Germans with explicit reference to a positive
identification with the GDR. While the more extreme proponents of this approach like Sarah
Wagenknecht, Ellen Brombacher and Benjamin represent not just a small proportion of the
eastern German population, but also a clear minority from within the PDS, hindsight offers
them the opportunity to draw attention to solidaristic tendencies that were also evident pre-
1989677• Uwe-Jens Heuer from the Marxist Forum has observed, "under the rubble of the
GDR state, building blocks of a GDR identity are clearly visible,,678 - as Easterners see value
in recalling some of the more positive elements of life in the GDR. Although the opinions of
ideological members of the PDS's left-wing do not, as a general rule, enjoy wide public
acceptance, it is clear that when PDS politicians make points on the issue of eastern identity
they do reflect a broader cross-section of eastern German popular opinion. Benjamin has
been more populist than most in hispublic articulations of this, and one such example came in
one of his publications on GDR identity in the new FRG. He declared that:
675 Thomas Koch (1997): op. cit. p.96.
676 Benjamin's Marxist beliefs lead him to describe this territorial identity as a form of 'false' consciousness,
that will be replaced by 'genuine' class consciousness as, over time, workers realise their 'true' class interests.
See Michael Benjamin (1996a): op. cit.
677 Michael Benjamin and Sarah Wagenknecht are known in particular to hold very ambiguous positions on the
building of the Berlin Wall and the nature of the GDR's achievements and legitimacy. See for example Sarah
Wagenknecht: Kapital, Crash, Krise ... Kein Ausweg in Sicht? (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1998); Sarah
Wagenknecht and Andre Brie: Wie macht sick die PDS nicht uberflussig? (Berlin: Neues Deutschland, ND im
Club - Streitgesprach: Ein Tonbandprotokoll, 1996); Michael Benjamin (1996a): op. cit; Michael Benjamin: in
Lothar Bisky et al (eds.) (1996b): op. cit. pp.231-236; 'PDS Vorstandsmitglied verteidigt Mauerbau', in
Schweriner Volkszeitung, 25 January 1999, p.l; Michael Benjamin: '7. Oktober - war da nicht was?', in Junge
Welt, 7 October 1999, p.2. .
678 Uwe-Jens Heuer (PDS), in: Michael Benjamin (1996a): op. cit. p.l
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... Eastern Germany has become a long-term economically underdeveloped
region. It is dependent on the import of goods, technology and scientific
knowledge, it is demographically deformed, it is incapable of pulling itself out of
the economic malaise, it is ruled over by people not from the region and it is
discriminated against. If one conceptualises colonisation as the political,
economic and cultural dominance of a societal system over another679, then one
must concede that a number of very strong colonial parallels exist680•
The mainstream of opinion within the party is more pragmatic on the issue than left-
wingers like Benjamin and Heuer. The deep social, historical and psychological
particularities of life in the GDR and of the transformation process are accepted as having
spawned a complex feeling of community. Yet PDS politicians remain necessarily
circumspect in defining this in a detailed fashion - as the eastern Trotzidentitat is by its very
nature (at both the academic and popular level) not an easily definable construct.
PDS politicians are rhetorically very able, and they remain adept at reflecting the
ambiguities and contradictions that are inherent in the eastern Trotzidentitdt. They are skilled
at calling on indisputable feelings of solidarity that do exist between Easterners. Peter
Christian Segall et a1. summarise this accurately when they observe:
In the last analysis the PDS profiles itself as the defender of the past of every
single eastern German - not just the former members of the SED and the citizens
who worked in the public services in the GDR. The PDS does this by claiming
that the 'West' can only think and act destructively. The PDS instinctively plays
on the identity of eastern Germansf".
The undertone is not so much that citizens of the eastern states are poorer, rather that
they are both unequal (when compared to Westerners) and (they perceive themselves to be)
powerless. The PDS appeals to the sense of community that has (re)arisen in eastern
Germany. In this sense, the PDS is reactive rather than proactive, as it articulates the specific
characteristics of an eastern German's biography within the political arena. The PDS does not
wish to see the GDR regarded as a footnote in history, it does not wish to see Westerners tell
Easterners how life in the GDR functioned and what was right and wrong with it, and it does
not wish to see German politics existing over and above the needs and concerns of Easterners.
679 Wolfgang Dumcke and Fritz Vilmar provide the most authoritative interpretation of the colonisation thesis.
See Wolfgang Dumcke and Fritz Vilmar (Hrsg.) (1995): op. cit. p.19.
680 Michael Benjamin (1996a): op. cit. pp.l2-13.
681 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.43.
224
Chapter4 The Capacity of the PDS to Mobilise Easternness
The PDS is the only party that views the history of the GDR and the FRG on equal terms (see
also section 5.1.2.), and as such it is the only PartYthat is perceived in the electorate at large
as being a genuine Ostpartez0682•
Elections in Berlin since the mid-1990s, and particularly the state election in 1999, are
the starkest political illustration of this split German identity. Two parts of one city voted in .
fundamentally different ways. And this did not just happen in one election, it has happened
persistently in a series of election since unification in 1990683• This is because eastern and
western Germany have two pasts and two presents, and political activity functions on a very
different agenda in the two societies as a result of this. The PDS has therefore come to be a
very normal political representation of eastern difference.
The PDS does, however, often give the impression of talking about Easterners as one
entity, even though the PDS is always at pains to admit that the eastern states and Easterners
themselves are (correctly) highly heterogeneous in their attitudes and beliefs. PDS leaders
are, however, skilled at elaborating on how different the eastern states are from the western
ones. This is in both present day perception and structure, as well as through lived
expenences. Their speeches are often rich in thematic variety and high on rhetorical skill.
And while PDS politicians do not necessarily seek to worsen the divide, PDS politicians are
more than willing to tell Easterners what brings them together and what differentiates them
from western Germans. Helmut Holter gave a good example of this in 1999 with a broadside
against the nature of the transformation process. He observed:
... citizens of the eastern states compare their experiences before 1989 and after
1989. The result is that the vast majority of the population is seeking neither to
retain the current society evident in the FRG, nor that which they experienced in
the GDR. And the western Germans ask themselves what has come of all the
money that gone across the Elbe? What belongs together is actually not growing
together. In fact, exactly the opposite is happening, German society is split right
down the middle.
The race to catch up in eastern Germany stopped in 1996. The
Aufschwung Ost transformed itself into the Abschwung Ost. The rigorous
privatisation policies of the Treuhand holding agency are getting their own back
now, as even in Mecklenburg West Pomerania large-scale de-industrialisation is
taking place. The divide between the East and the West is getting bigger, growth
in eastern Germany is smaller than it is in the West, unemployment is growing in
the East, while reductions are predicted in the West684•
682 See Christoph Dieckmann (1999): 'Das Bier von Hier', in Die Zeit, 14 October 1999, p.14.
683 See http://www.statistik-berlin.de/wahlen
684 Helmut Holter (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. Mm 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommem: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 his 1998 (Schwerin: Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 1998),
p.5164.
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Holter avoids direct mention of an eastern German sense of identity, but he indicates
that as a result of both the socialising effects of life in the GDR and the difficult processes of
societal adaptation post-1989, eastern Germans expect a quantifiably different FRG (whatever
that may mean) from the one in which they now live. This is the type of Trotzidentitdt that
the third chapter of this work conceptualised as being in evidence in the eastern states. Ingrid
Tschirch, a former PDS MdL in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, further demonstrates the
knack that PDS politicians have of relating the specific experiences of the transformation
process to an individuals own life-experiences?":
... the solidarity and trust in the future dissipated as the excesses of capitalism
became apparent. This occurred when in 1991, the old structures in the economic
sphere, in administration, culture and the sciences were dissolved. As
unemployment and short-time working grew more in regularity, as the insecurities
not just in the world of employment, but also in the social system, in the
unfathomable new masses of legal regulations and laws as well as the mountains
of bureaucracy, the 'giant leaps in rents and tariffs, the claims for redistribution of
eastern German land came flooding in, younger people saw their future prospects
darken and the over 50s were consigned to the scrap-heap, doubts grew about the
promises of politicians and the agreements that were set down in the unification
treaty.
The PDS is open in its definition of this as 'discrimination' against Easterners. The
parliamentary work and the programmatic initiatives of the PDS are subsequently unique in
their attitudes towards the legal, social and political 'discrimination' of eastern Germans. The
1998 'Rostock Manifesto' leaves the reader under no illusions as to how such a position has
come about:
(
The results of eight years of constitutional unity are the results of political
approaches that were wrong (verfehlt) from the very beginning. The political
approaches pursued were anti-economic (unwirtschaftlich), anti-social and
undemocratic 686.
In the 1998 Federal Election Programme the PDS is less forthright, as it concentrates
on the outcomes that have thus resulted:
68~ Ingrid Tschirch (POS): '83 Sitzung am 31. Mlirz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.5167.
686 Das Rostocker Manifest, POS Parteivorstand (1998): 'op. cit. p.4.
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According to the Basic Law, should German unity be achieved, the population has
the right to vote on the creation of a new constitution. This demand has remained
unmet. Even today eastern Germany remains a special area (Sondergebiet) ...
(and) ... the PDS is left fighting against inequalities of income and pensions, the
evictions from homes and off property, the reduction or abolition of legitimate
subsidies, against Strafrente, Berufsverbote, political Strafverfolgung and the
abuse and discrediting of eastern German biographies?",
None of the other parties defends widely perceived eastern German concerns about
their qualifications, their previous working-lives or their 'biographies' in nearly as strong
words688• The PDS touches this uniquely eastern German perception by stressing feelings of
, .
societal exclusion that Easterners still perceive (see chapter three). In the words of Gabi
Zimmer, then former PDS leader in the Thuringian state parliament, and now PDS party
leader, Gerhard Schroder and the SPD's Aujbau Ost" ... needs to help to end the inequalities
of incomes earned and the discrimination that citizens of eastern Germany still suffer,,689.
The 'discrimination' of eastern Germans is not emphasised at all by the CDU or the SPD,
even though, as chapter three revealed, this is a widely held sentiment in the eastern
population. The PDS perceives social discrimination to be widespread in eastern Germany -
something it has conceptualised in a number of different ways within the political arena. In
the Bundestag, for example, the PDS has tabled a number of Antrdge that specifically aim to
alleviate material differences between eastern and western Germans, On the 22 of June 1999
Gregor Gysi and the PDS Fraktion (parliamentary group) submitted an Antrag (parliamentary
bill) titled Fahrplan zur Angleichung der Lebensverhaltnisse und zur Herstellung von mehr
Rechtssicherheit in Ostdeutschland - "Chefsache Ost" (A Timetable for the Equalisation of
Living Conditions and the Production of more Rechtssicherheit in Eastern Germany),
containing detailed demands for more social justice, material equality and judicial 'fairness'
for eastern Gennans690• This is symptomatic of the parliamentary attempts that the PDS has
made to secure material equality for eastern Germans.
687 PDS: Wahlprogramm der Partei des Demokrattschen Sozialismus zur Bundestagswahl 1998: Far den
politischen Richtungswechsell Sozial und solidarisch - fiJr eine gerechte Republik (Berlin: Wahlburo der PDS,
1998), p.31.
688 'Die Doppelbiograhie der Bundesrepublik. Zum Phanomen der deutschen Zweistaatlichkeit', Dokumente
zur Geschichte der PDS (Thesenpapier der Historischen Kommission beim Parteivorstand der PDS, on
http://www.pds-online.delgeschichte/9903/doppelbiograhie.htm). See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 13, 31
Mm 1999.
689 Gabi Zimmer (PDS): 'Neue Losungen fUr den Osten statt Festhalten am "Nachbau West'", in PDS
Pressedienst, Nummer 14, 7 Apri12000, on http://www.pds-online.de/pressedienstlOOI4/16.htm
690 See http://www2.pds-online.delbtlthemenl9906/99062407.htm
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Another PDS approach towards the articulation of discrimination towards Easterners
has been to denounce the lack of solidarity that is seen as being evident between the eastern
and western Lander. This is not limited to a few lines in its party programme. In
parliamentary debates the PDS is equally vociferous on this topic. The PDS called an
'Aktuelle Stunde' in the Mecklenburg West Pomerania Parliament on 31 March 1998 (the
title of which was the 'Reduction of solidarity between the old and new federal states') as it
aimed to increase awareness of continued EastIWest animosity. The leader of PDS
parliamentary party, Catherina Muth, felt that the very nature of the unification process,
dominated as it was by Westerners, with their structures, judgements and arrogant
Besserwisserei, meant that talk of solidarity ever existing was somewhat misleading. Muth
expressed the opinion that Westerners have never shown the requisite social and
psychological solidarity with Easterners as they were unwilling to accept that anything in
'their' Weltanschauung may need overhauling. Or, in her exact words, "In order to see
solidarity weakening, that means that solidarity between the old and the new federal states
did actually once exist!691
PDS politicians do not recognise the huge financial subsidies that have come from
western Germany692 as being sufficient expressions of solidarity. This represents popular
feelings within eastern German society (see chapter three) recognising the immensity of the
financial transfers from West to East, as well as the unambigu~us material increases in wealth
that have been experienced by many since 1990, but Easterners see no reason to except lower
levels of wealth, employment and general standards of everyday activity than Westerners
continue to enjoy. Ii appears to both the PDS and to a swath of Easterners decidedly
unsolidaristic that Westerners continue to enjoy a higher standard of living than they do.
Lothar Bisky articulated this point well by observing that "the eastern German pensioner is
not now being punished ... (it terms oflower pensions) ...just for his/her political orientation,
as nowadays the criteria of his/her heritage suffices 1,,693.
Only when living standards and opportunity structures within society are perceived as
being equal will the PDS regard Easterners as having attained equality within Germany.
Gregor Gysi, as is often the case, articulated these sentiments in a broader fashion in a 1996
Bundestag debate:
691 Catherina Muth (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. Marz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.SI59.
692 By the end of 1998 these sums amounted to DM1369 billion! Presse- und Informationsamt der
Bundesregierung: 'Deutschland von der Teilung zur Einheit' (Bonn: Bundesregierung, 1999) p.158.
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German unity will be achieved on the day that the special legal treatment of
eastern Germans has ceased, on the day that Easterners and Westerners earn the
same, on the day that there are as many eastern Germans owning property on Sylt
as there are currently western Germans owning property on Rugen and on the day
that an eastern German becomes Prime Minister of a western German state - and
on the day that all of these things do not interest anybody in the slightest. This
shows how far this process still has to go694.
The quest for inner unity may not be completed, but the PDS remains adamant that
eastern difference is not one of the problems that have prevented this from happening. The
PDS is of the opinion that Westerners have to learn to accept that the East is different: that it
is not the West, and it never will be - and this should not be seen in any way as a threat. The
East must be regarded as different in the same way that Bavaria is - and not in the threatening,
critical way that it is at the moment. The PDS regards itself as merely a representative of a
difference political culture and political heritage in the East, and it is time that citizens of East
and West alike recognise the party as a representation of 'normality', For, as Gysi puts it,
"those who want to see unity in this land will have to get used to both the PDS and to me. If
people can't do this, then they are simply not going to get unity69s.
Cultural and value differences are evident in many ways between eastern and western
Germany, and PDS politicians are not just apt at picking up on the more obvious examples of
these such as increased emphasis on egalitarianism, employment and the role of the state.
Much of the vocabulary that is used when discussing eastern Germany is also resented by
both Easterners at large, and the PDS in particular. Examples of this are plentiful. The term
'ehemalige DDR' (former GDR) might appear innocuous to many, but the use of the word
former indicates that, from a linguistic sense, there should be a 'new' GDR that has replaced
it696• There, of course, is not, and it is indicative of the sloppy treatment that the GDR
receives in western discourse that small, relatively unimportant point like this continue to
rankle697• The impression is also often given that the eastern states are still tantamount to
being "abroad". A not inconsiderable number of Westerners have never been to the eastern
693 Lothar Bisky (POS): 'Streit urn langsamere Rentenanpassung', in Schweriner Volkszeitung, 20 January
1996.
694 Gregor Gysi, speech to the federal Parliament on 11 September 1996, in Gregor Gysi: Nicht nur freche
Sfsroche (Berlin: Schwarzkopf and Schwarzkopf, 1998). p.19.
6 S Gregor Gysi, speech to the Federal Parliament on 23 May 1996. in Gregor Gysi (1998): op. cit. p.1S.
696 Interview with POS MdL Mecklenburg West Pomerania, 17 May 1999.
697 It was pointed out in one interview that no one would think of talking about the former Gestapo or the
former NVA. There has only been one Gestapo. and there has only been one National Peoples Army - just as
there has only been one GOR. Interview with POS MdL Mecklenburg West Pomerania, 17 May 1999.
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states and continue to remain uninterested in most aspects of life there. Jurgen Hart, a well-
known cabaratist from Leipzig, has commented that much that is reported on in the media,
with the notable exceptions of ORB and MDR, has a tinge of foreign affairs about it, and an
easterner can easily get the impression that the reporter is reporting from Leipzig, Dresden or
Magdeburg as helshe just happens to be there, and must report something'?".
The term transfer, much used in the context of western money that has travelled
eastwards since 1990, also has arrogant undertones. Gregor Gysi has openly bemoaned this in
the Bundestag, in October 1997699:
You ... (to a CSU member of the Bundestag) ... view the eastern states as being
somewhere ex-territorial. Who is it who uses the word transfer? If Bavaria gets
money from any of our federal institutions, then it is referred to as a
Bundeszuschufi. But when the eastern states receive something, then it is called a
'transfer'. It is within you that the East is seen as a foreign entity, not within me
The PDS builds on these psychological undercurrents to illustrate what it believes are
the processes that have led to the lack of suitable eastern Germany representation in the new
German state. This stretches from the processes that were set in motion immediately
following unification to the persistent under representation still evident today. Catherina
Muth illustrated this explicitly by stating that once the GDR vanished, there was no obvious
way for eastern Germans to raise a political voice in the united Germany:
The parts of the unification treaty that did contain elements of solidarity between
East and West Germany quickly grew to be, after the actual process of annexation
had taken place, more disadvantageous for the citizens of the GDR than was
originally expected, as the second partner that signed the treaty, ladies and
gentlemen, the GDR, that could have represented the interests' of the East German
population, does not exist any more700• '
The direct behaviour of western politicians has also caused strong feelings of
solidarity between eastern German citizens and the PDS. CDU and CSU politicians have
periodically advised/warned/threatened Easterners about supporting the PDS at the ballet box.
698 Jilrgen Hart: Die Zeit, 19 July 1997.
699 Gregor Gysi, speech to the Federal Parliament on 9 October 1997, in Gregor Gysi (1998): op. cit. p.19.
700 Catherina Muth (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. Miirz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 his 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.5160.
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The PDS has been variously described as the "SED Konzentrat,,701,or the "Stasis from
yesterday'T", while politicians within the CDU have periodically demanded that the PDS be
put "morally on the same level as the DVU and the Republicans,,703as the PDS is not capable
of existing democratically in the FRG as it "does not in truth accept the Basic Law,,704.
Edmund Stoiber (CSU) has even claimed that:
the PDS conducts itself like the SED, and the situation is comparable to one
where the NSDAP, under the leadership of Herman Goring, had simply re-named
itself in 1946, and tried to carry on as normal'".
As such observations imply, a number of western politicians have tried to paint a
picture of the PDS as the SED re-incarnate - a vision that paradoxically has caused increases
in the PDS's share of the vote706• The PDS has been able to use such accusations to tum the
tables on western parties who do not understand the complexities of the eastern electorate'?'.
Former General Secretary of the CDU Peter Hintze became a particular figure of disdain,
following a series of undiplomatic remarks about the history and political goals of the PDS.
Hintze was the driving force behind both the red socks (in 1994) and the red hands (in 1998)
campaigns demonising the PDS. PDS politicians have been able to take the moral high-
ground by depicting CDU and CSU politicians as stooping to populist rhetoric in order to try
and increase their profile - principally in the West, where the PDS is still a tool with which
the conservative parties can mobilise support. Catherina Muth and Dietmar Bartsch have
epitomised the reactions of both the PDS and Easterners to such campaigns when they
responded by stating that:
701 Peter Hintze (CDU): in 'Inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung mit falschen Parolen', Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 21 October 1999, p.2.
702 Bernhard Vogel (CDU): 'Vogel: 'Freistaat' heillt Unions-Domane', in Neues Deutschland, 8 November
1999, p.S.
703 Peter Hintze (CDU): 'Heftiger Streit in der Union uber Haltung zur PDS', in Saddeutsche Zeitung, 20
October 1999, p.l.
704 Helmut Kohl (CDU): 'Bluhende Landschaften? 'Zu diesem Satz stehe ich nach wie vor" in Rheinischer
Merkur, 3 November 1999. See http://www.merkur.de Kohl has also recalled Kurt Schumacher's famous
phrase directed at East German communists by denouncing the PDS as "red-painted fascists". See Ann L.
Phillips: 'An Island of Stability - The German Political Party System and the Elections of 1994', in West
European Politics, Special Issue, July 1995, p.221.
70S Edmund Stoiber (CSU): quoted in Bild am Sonntag,S May 1991, p.l.
706 Hans-Georg Golz: 'Machtwechsel', in Deutschland Archiv, NovemberlDecember 1998, p.876.
707 Regardless of how well the western parties understand the parameters of political competition in the East, it
is also clear that they are not averse to using the issue of the PDS as a stick with which to try and beat each other.
The CDU and CSU, in particular, use the PDS as a picture of the enemy with to mobilise the more conservative
elements of their electorate in western Germany. This is often in spite of the negative impression that it can
231
Chapter 4 The Capacity of the PDS to Mobilise Easternness
Through his 'red-hands' campaign, Herr Hintze has remained true to his virulent
campaigning of yesteryear. Typically for the COU, Herr Hintze is pedalling old
slogans and symbols. This is a sign that, on the one hand, he wants to divert the
citizens of the eastern states from the economic and social problems evident
within eastern Germany - the causes of which lie in the policies of his party, the
COU. On the other hand, it is patently obvious that he can't think of anything
new on which to campaign. He is producing a dull and dreary spectacle. We, on
the contrary, are going to conduct a campaign that is based on arguments and a
discussion of the issues708. '
Western politicians have persistently shown a misunderstanding of the political
situation in the eastern states, as they try to conduct political activity on western guidelines.
This leads to both resentment in the population at large (see chapter three), as well as support
for the cheeky and resilient little Ostpartei. As Peter Porsch, the POS leader in Saxony has
observed:
CSU and COU have once again proved themselves to be the organised arrogance
of the western states towards the eastern ones, and concurrently the greatest
danger on the path towards inner unitl09
Erwin Huber, the leader of Bavarian Staatskanzelei caused particular waves in 1998
by demanding that if the POS remains in government in certain eastern states, then financial
transfers from the Bund would have to either be cut or stopped altogether. Huber was of the
opinion that the PDS would simply waste the money on socialist projects that had no long-
term future7!0. Furthermore, if coalitions continued to be formed in the East that were not too
the CSU's satisfaction, he threatened that Bavaria would begin to pull its ministers out of
federal committees and governmental bodies?". Huber's' comments were backed by the
leader of the CSU Parliamentary Party who observed that "our friend Huber has articulated
here a very widespread view among the Bavarian population,,7!2. It is clear that this looked
leave in eastern Germany. For evidence of criticism of this approach see Richard von Weizsacker: in Die Zeit,
10November 1995.
708 Caterina Muth and Dietmar Bartsch (PDS): Rote Socken und rote Hande haben keine Angst vorm schwarzen
Mann (Schwerin: PDS Presseerkliirung, PDS Pressestelle, Nummer 1000), 27 Mai 1998.
709 Peter Porsch (PDS):"Huber verUU3tBoden des Grundgesetzes', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 2, 14 Januar
1999.
710 Erwin Huber (CSU) was quoted as saying that "we are not going to permit money that is designated by the
Bund and the federal states for the rebuilding of the eastern economy to be misused for the resurrection of the
communist East'. See Die Zeit, 14 January 1999, p.2.
711 See Der Tagesspiegel, 16 January 1999, p.l.
712 Stefan Kuzmany: 'Kein schwarzes Geld flir den roten Osten?', in Die Tageszeitung, 9 January 1999, p.6.
See also 'Emporte Reaktionen auf Hubers Vorsto6 zur Einstellung der Ost-Hilfen', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 8
January 1999.,
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to many like another western attempt to dictate to eastern Germans, And it came as no
surprise when Gregor Gysi, speaking for the PDS, offered Huber a sharp response:
The threats issued by the CSU politician Huber indicating that financial support
for the eastern states will be stopped, as, in his opinion, Easterners are not voting
correctly, and the right parties are not coalescing in government, is nothing more
than an attempt to alter the long-established right in the Basic Law stating that
parties have the freedom to form coalitions as they think appropriate. People who
want to replace politics with blackmail are only showing that they themselves are
politically finished. The citizens of the eastern states are not, however, going to
allow their electoral freedoms to be taken away from them - on the contrary, Herr
Huber should perhaps pay a bit more attention to how many Bavarian firms make
their profits through economic activity undertaken in the eastern states, only to
pay their taxes in Bavaria - or not at all, as the case may be. None the less you are
not going to hear me calling for a boycott of Bavarian firms who are active in
eastern Germany713.
The disgust that such comments cause in the East was further illustrated by Dietmar
Bartsch:
We eastern Germans are humble in our thanks to Herr Huber that he has not
hesitated to march into the eastern states and ensure that order is restored! 714
In April 1998 Roland Koch, the CDU Prime Minister in Hesse, indirectly supported
Erwin Huber's claims by observing that financial support for the Aujbau Ost should only be
guaranteed if 'political responsibility' could also be ensured. Koch further added that it was
unfair to expect the western states to look on while "red governments economically run down
the eastern states,,71S. Dirk Wenz, a spokes~an for the Hesse government further added that
"it is simply not fair that western German taxes are creating thousands of jobs in the eastern
states, while the problems of the western states are pushed to one side,,716. PDS politicians
once again articulated eastern German ire at such perceived western German arrogance.
713 Gregor Gysi (PDS): 'Huber verlaf3t Boden des Grundgesetzes', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 2, 14 Januar
1999.
714 Dietmar Bartsch (PDS): 'Huber verliif3t Boden des Grundgesetzes', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 2, 14
Januar 1999.
715 Roland Koch (CDU): 'Koch will rur Kredite Erfolgsgarantie: Hessischer Regierungschef wirft Osten
Misswirtschaft vor', in Suddeutscbe Zeitung, 10 April 1999, p.8.
716 Dirk Wenz: 'Koch will rur Kredite Erfolgsgarantie: Hessischer Regierungschef wirft Osten Misswirtschaft
vor', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 10 Apri11999, p.8.
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Christa Luft branded such remarks "downright rude" (unanstandig), and a demonstration of
. 717the lack of understanding that was shown by Westerners towards the eastern states .
Attempts by western politicians718 to characterise the PDS as a re-incarnation of the
SED/as a communist party play into the hands of the PDS, as it is able to illustrate how
distanced these Westerners are from the political realities in the eastern states. A look at the
PDS's communal political activity would quickly illustrate that the vast majority of PDS
politicians behave in exactly the same way as politicians of other parties do at this level.
Rhetorical attacks on the PDS also ignore the fact that Easterners remain in a unique position:
they have experienced a state and a whole system that collapsed around them, and this makes
them particularly sensitive when it comes to comparing one societal and economic system
against another. Citizens who have spent much of their lives in a society stressing
egalitarianism have, in spite of an undoubted appreciation of parliamentary democracy,
individual freedom and the social market economy, a much finer feeling for evidence of
power, arrogance, injustice, bureaucracy and corruption. Party-politically the PDS has
remained the only party that has represented theses feelings, as all other eastern parties are
dominated by resources and members imported from the western states - and it is against this
very important backdrop that the PDS has developed into an articulate of easternness.
But this does not mean that Easterners are unaware of the PDS's history and heritage.
The PDS is widely (and correctly) perceived as being the Nachfolgepartei (successor party) of
the SED, but this is, against a background of widely experienced social injustice and of
broken and battered personal biographies, not solely disadvantageous. For segments of the
eastern electorate this ostracisation represents a part of their own lives. The PDS is seen in
certain socio-cultural milieus as a Weggefiihrte, as a party or a group of people that has been
affected by the irritations and uncomfortable experiences of the last few years - but is still
able to articulate feelings of Trotz and Easternness within the political arena719•
Frequently the PDS's activities aim to save/defend particularly eastern German
symbols or unique characteristics. Examples of this are surprisingly numerous. The PDS was
717 Christa Luft (PDS): 'Koch will fur Kredite Erfolgsgarantie: Hessischer Regierungschef wirft Osten
Misswirtschaft vor', in Suddeutsche Zeitung, 10 April 1999, p.8.
718 There are also numerous examples of Eastern CDU politicians levelling dramatic accusations that tend to
isolate themselves more than the PDS. Wolfgang Riemann, for example, claimed that "if it had been down to the
SEDIPDS. then in Leipzig we would have had something akin to an East German Tiananmen Square massacre
... and the Prime Minister of this state would have been in a concentration camp". Wolfgang Riemann (CDU):
'83 Sitzung am 31. Mm 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommem: Zur Arbeit des Landtags in der 2.
Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.5168.
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vocal in its defence of the Gruner Pfeil, a traffic arrow allowing cars to turn right despite the
traffic lights remaining on red - and the green arrow has also become a common sight on
western German roads72o• The PDS also remained vociferous in its support of the eastern
German Ampelmiinnchen - an issue which attracted considerable media attention, and had led
to the retention of many (ifnot all) of the unique eastern Ampelmdnnchen. The PDS launched
a number of campaigns arguing that the eastern figure, with his sun hat and bouncy walk,
attracted more attention and appeared more personable - and as such had the effect of
attracting the attention of the pedestrian and making himlher aware of the dangers of crossing
the road. PDS members could be seen on the streets wearing Ampelmiinnchen T-shirts and
selling other Ampelmdnnchen memorabilia''". The PDS used this peculiarly eastern symbol
to remind and reassure voters that it too was from the East, and w~ prepared to fight any case
where the West rode roughshod over eastern sensibilities.
The PDS also took the imposition of western German norms - in the above mentioned
case in the form of a very stilted figure with an abnormally large head (which came to be
known as a 'bubble head') - as another example of western practices simply being imposed
onto eastern Germans. Easterners, and the PDS, saw no reason to dispose of their little
figures for the (allegedly) characterless western version - and as such the PDS fought long and
hard for the retention of this specifically eastern landmark.
The PDS has also been more than willing to defend the Jugendweihe - the traditional,
non-religious ceremony that many Easterners go through around the time of their fourteenth
birthday. The Jugendweihe was first recorded as taking place in 1852, as a non-religious
replacement for confirmation, and although it also existed in the early twentieth century as
well as in Nazi Germany, it was only in 1954/55, when the SED designated it an official
Festakt, that it became a widely practised rituaI'22. Against many predictions, the
. .
Jugendweihe has survived the collapse of the GDR723, and in recent years the number of
719 Dietmar Wittich: 'Zur Soziologie der Umwandlung der SED in die PDS' in: Lothar Bisky et al (eds.) (1996):
0Po- cit. p.184.
70 Statistics produced by the Bundestag indicate that 'Green Arrows' can be seen at between 400 and 500
crossroads in eastern Germany, and, since the new ruling allowing 'Green Arrows' in the western states was
introduced on the l" of May 1994, they are evident at around 160 in the western Germany as well. See
http://www.bundestag.de/aktueIVwib95/89519S.htm
721 The campaign was partly successful, as the Ampelmiinnchen are still visible in Berlin, Saxony, and Saxony
Anhalt. See http://www.interactive.de/ampel.html
722 In 1955 less than 20 per cent of 13/14 year olds took part, but by 1989 this figure was over 90 per cent. In
the FRG there were very, very few Jugendweihe ceremonies. See Andreas Meier: Jugendweihe - JugendFEIER:
Ein deutsches nostalgisches Fest vor und nach 1990 (Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997).
723 70,000 youngsters had their Jugendweihe 's in 1993 (or 30 per cent of eastern Germans of the relevant age).
80,000 did so in 1994, while 85,000 did so in 1995. 95,000 did so in 1996 (or just under 40 per cent of eastern
childrenwho were 13 and 14). See Andreas Meier (1997): op, cit. pp.8-9.
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Easterners who have been through the process has actually increased. The PDS remains the
only party to actively support the retention of the ceremony - even though a wide cross-
section of Easterners are in support of the Jugendweihe.
Table 31724
Are you of the opinion that the Jugendweihe, that stems from GDR times, should
continue or should it be abolished? (Answers according to party preference (per cent»
CDU/CSU SPD Alliance PDS
90/Greens
I think that it should continue 62 83 88 100
I think that it should be 14 2 7 -
abolished
I am undecided/do not know 24 15 5 -
Total 100 100 100 100
Much to the consternation of religious organisations, the PDS in Mecklenburg West
Pomerania has took the unprecedented step of recognising the Interessenverein
Humanistischer Jugendarbeit (The Interest Group for Humanistic Youth Work) as an
organisation that should be permitted to gain money off the state (in the form of subsidies) in
order to continue its role supporting and advising eastern German youngsters - and in
supporting the institution of the Jugendweihe. As Andreas Bluhm from the PDS
Landtagsfraktion in Mecklenburg West Pomerania has stated:
The Jugendweihe has existed for over 100 years. Even today it represents for
youngsters and for their families a high-point on the way to adulthood. Alongside
this there are numerous information and education events, as well as projects
based on the most diverse of topics. This should not be confused with religious
confirmations ... (but) ... every organisation that conducts work with the younger
elements of society has the right to apply for financial subsidies. This is exactly
what the religious institutions are also able to do for the work they put in with
youngsters 725.
The SPD-PDS coalition in Mecklenburg West Pomerania has also attempted to create
an environment where Easterners support and buy products that stem from eastern Germany.
This encompasses products that are new, and have appeared since unification, as well as older
products that have survivedlbeen revived from GDR times. While other parties in other states
clearly also attempt to support indigenous economic development, the governing parties in
724 Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate KOcher (1997): op. cit. p.S87.
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Mecklenburg West Pomerania are unique in their inclusion of such an explicit clause in their
coalition agreements.
In order to increase the presence of eastern German products in national and
international markets the state government, together with the federal
administration, will organise sales subsidies in a much advantageous fashion for
eastern products 726.
These few examples illustrate how the PDS is keen to mobilise symbols of eastern
uniqueness into its political platform .. This is, of course, not always a straightforward task, as
many symbols (coffee, cigarettes, washing powder and so forth) of Easternness do not easily
lend themselves to political adaptation.' But when a characteristic of eastern life is under
threat or is seen as requiring a political advocate, the PDS is quick to jump to its cause. This
naturally means that the PDS is not able to mobilise regional symbols and characteristics in .
quite such an enigmatic fashion as other regional parties. The PDS is not able to call on
positive recollections or associations with 'nationhood', just as it does not resort to flag-
waving separatism. But the PDS is able, when the time and the issue is right, to selectively
support and advocate eastern German symbols that are unduly threatened by western German
norms and traditions.
4.5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has indicated that the PDS possesses the capacity to mobilise
'Easternness' within the political arena. It is in possession of a number of structurally
advantageous variables that present it with a clear advantage over the 'western' parties. By
applying the second part of the typology developed in chapter two it has been illustrated that
the PDS is capable of mobilising territorial sentiment in a similar way (although of course in a
nationally unique context) to other regional parties across the western world.
72S Andreas Bluhm (PDS): PDS ftr Anerkennung des Jugendweihevereins als Trager der freien Jugendhilfe
~Schwerin: PDS Presseerklarung, PDS Pressestelle, Nummer 73,8 April 1999).
26 'Koalitionsvereinbarung II. Zukunftsfllhige Arbeits- und Ausbildungsplatze schaffen und die
Wirtschaftskraft starken', Abschnitt 2 Teil 23: in Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen
Partei Deutschlands und dem Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Schwerin: Landtag Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, 1998). See also http://www.mv-pds-ltf.delkoalitionliOOOOO.httn For support of attempts to
protect eastern German products from the vagaries of international capitalism see Rolf Kutzmutz's speech to the
Bundestag in the plenary sitting of 5th February 1997. 'Absatzfbrderung ftlr Produkte aus Ostdeutschland',
Bundestag Plenarprotokoll13/216.
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The PDS has been lucky in that it has possessed a telegenic and charismatic leader.
Gregor Gysi has managed to drag the PDS forward without disillusioning some of his more
conservative supporters. His influence was of particular importance in the early 1990s, as the
PDS sought to cement itself into eastern German political life, and his is an achievement that
should not be underestimated. Gysi's appeal has enabled the PDS to go at least some way
towards improving the party's popular image away from the SED and towards a form of
'normality'. Gysi, as well as the reformers in the PDS leadership who have been active
around him, have been to mould the structural strength of the PDS in the East into
programmatic positions that manage to placate a conservative membership yet still appeal to a
broad spectrum of the eastern population.
The leadership of the PDS has also appreciated that the structure of the German
federal system has enabled the PDS to offer enthusiastic and talented members the
opportunity to mitmachen (take part) in political activity. The PDS has created a leadership
hierarchy that effectively appeases all strands of ideological thinking within the diverse
membership. Inner-party democracy flourishes, and members are given ample opportunity to
exert influence both within the party, and for the party, within the parliaments and councils of
the eastern German communes. The 'second tier' of leadership figures in the eastern German
Landtage (such as Helmut Holter, Petra Sitte, Roland Claus, and Catherina Muth) have
proven capable of shaping the PDS's profile in the lower levels of eastern German politics,
just as the large pool of 30-50 year olds who work for the PDS in Landtage, Stadtriite and at
other levels of communal politics are seen as being hard-working, genuine and approachable.
It is for this reason that the communal politicians of the PDS remain one of the party's great
strengths over and above other parties in eastern Germany.
Importantly for the PDS's Basisarbeit (grass-roots work), the PDS is also in
, possession of a network of active and enthusiastic members who ensure that the PDS's
message is passed on to the wider eastern German community in less formal arenas. This can
often be over the coffee-table, in the local supermarket or at the bus stop. The effective )and
often almost banal) extra-parliamentary activity of the PDS at the micro-levels of eastern
German politics enables it to foster an image as the party of eastern German interests. The
PDS remains embedded deep in eastern Germany's civil society and has managed to foster an
image of a caring, compassionate actor in a harsh and unforgiving (new) environment. The
PDS is now a broad church, that appeals to a number of broad strands within eastern German
society. The key common denominator remains territory - as eastern Germans from many
different sections of society are attracted by the PDS' s 'eastern Germanness' .
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Most importantly, the POS has also managed to present itself as the representative of a
community: eastern Germans. It gives voice to the unique eastern German identity within the
political process. No other party is in a position to do this, as no other party is as deeply
rooted in eastern German society and political culture. The POS skilfully makes use of its
heritage and ideological orientation in voicing concerns that are evident in the eastern German
identity of defiance. It does not shirk from using populist terminology in articulating these
sentiments, and this plays an important part in ensuring that Easterners identify with the PDS
as the party that is 'fighting in their comer'. PDS politicians excel at rhetorically bringing
concerns that are unique to the identity of defiance into everyday political discourse. The
POS, owing partially to its similar experiences in being forced to come to terms with a new
multi-party political system, has been able to appeal to sentiments that are widely held across
the eastern states (see chapter three) and has been able to act as a Weggefiihrtin along an
uneasy path.
In order to further understand how the POS gainers support in eastern Germany one
must move on and discuss how the POS proactively articulates eastern German interests
within institutional arenas. This chapter has concentrated largely on the structural factors that
assist the POS in articulating eastern German interests (Le. effective leadership and party
organisation), as well as highlighting how the PDS articulates eastern German identity within
the political process. Chapter five moves the discussion on further to highlight how the PDS
has articulated eastern German uniqueness in terms of policies it has developed and attempted
to implement in regional and national legislatures. The POS has a strong core of specific
policy proposals that reflect the uniqueness of territorial sentiment in the eastern states. This
is the nature of the 'big idea' that has proven to be so fundamental to the success of regional
parties in the western world, and it is to this that the discussion moves next (chapter five).
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Chapter Five
5. The PDS as a Successful Regional Party II: The PDS Making
Policy for Eastern Germany
5.1. Articulation of a Particular Cause - A 'Big Idea'. The PDS and Eastern Policy
Approaches
The fourth chapter of this work illustrated how the POS has developed a capacity to
mobilise eastern German territorial sentiment. By employing the typology that was
developed in chapter two, it was highlighted that the POS is skilful at adapting to the societal
contours and structures around it in its attempt to articulate regional specificity. As the
typology in chapter two revealed, this is a trait common to many regional parties. These
variables range from a territory where the POS has its political home to a visible and
articulate leadership, and from the articulation of an eastern German 'Trotzidentitiu' to an
efficient and effective party organisation. This chapter moves the argument forward by
illustrating how the POS puts forward its eastern German interests policy. This comes under
section 2.4.2.3. of the typology. The POS has developed a broad bundle of policies that
articulate eastern German uniqueness and represent specific eastern German interests. This
has enabled the POS to develop, despite its disadvantaged starting position, a solid and loyal
eastern German electoral base. The eight policy areas that are discussed in this chapter
encompass the main areas of attitudinal difference between eastern and western Germans.
The POS has been able to incorporate the eastern German territorial difference as it was
conceptualised in chapter three into its unique policy agenda. Hence this chapter takes the
key planks of the eastern German identity of defiance and specifically 'eastern German
interests' and illustrates how the POS expressly articulates them within the political arena.·
This fifth chapter thus concretises one of the main planks of regional party success -
the notion of political articulation of a regionally specific bundle of issues. The PDS has
developed political approaches and policy options that reflect and mirror the attitudes and
opinion of a significant portion of eastern Germans - and as such the POS is perceived by the
electorate at large and the membership and activists within the party, as the party which best
defends and forwards the interests and demands of eastern Germany. It is this 'big idea'
which has led to the stabilisation of the party as a political force within the eastern states -
240
Chapter 5 The POS as an active Articulator of Eastern German Interests
and subsequently to its dismal failure in the western states, where such a 'big idea' has no
relevance. The immediate viability of the policies that the PDS has developed is not an issue
- it is more the rhetorical significance and uniqueness of their political appeal that render them
effective. Easterners see the PDS 'fighting their cause' and support it because of its territorial
roots. The chapter is split into eight thematic subsections, illustrating how the PDS has
developed a broad range of regionally specific policy alternatives. The sub-sections
represent, as was stated at the beginning of chapter four, the policy areas where the PDS's
approaches differ from those of the other main parties and where the PDS has created a clear
and unambiguous eastern profile for itself.
The PDS generates eastern inputs into the political process, as well highlighting the
(perceived) lack of sufficient eastern-specific political outputs. The sections below therefore
illustrate the policy initiatives that the PDS has developed in order to specifically tackle
eastern German problems and issues. The PDS has done this in a number of documents, the
most prominent of which was the 1998 Rostocker Manifest (Rostock Manifesto). The
manifesto, written principally by Christa Luft, economics spokesperson of the PDS and
launched at the April 1998 conference, is a contribution to the debate over the economic and
social future of eastern Germany727. It is seen as the most comprehensive attempt by the PDS
thus far to articulate eastern German uniqueness, and has as its goal the economic and social
rejuvenation of the eastern states. It is viewed as a direct challenge to the globalising forces
of international capitaf28, with the aim of tackling the most fundamental of eastern
Germany's social and economic ills - high unemployment. Over and above the Rostock
Manifesto, the PDS has produced, through the work of its working and interest groups, its
work in local, regional and national parliaments a and through its election material, a wide
variety of literature on the nature of its commitment to eastern German interests.
5.1.1. 'Eastern Germany'
Chapters three and four illustrated that the 'eastern German community' has a
different set of attitudinal preferences to western Germans. The dual processes of
socialisation and situation have ensured that 'eastern German interests' remain specific to
citizens of the eastern states. These are quantifiably different to those in the western Lander,
727 Judith Dellheim: 'Ostdeutschland - Region in Europa, das 'Rostocker Manifest' europaisch diskutieren', in
Beitrl1ge zur Wirtschaftspolitik: Globalisierung oder Regionalisierung? (Berlin: Arbeitsgemeinschaft
Wirtschaftspolitik beim Parteivorstand der POS, 1999), p.28.
728 Judith Dellheim (1999): ibid. p.36.
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as they stem both from different societal processes and the different political culture that has
subsequently developed in eastern Germany. This work has also stressed, however, that
'eastern German interests' are not uniform. The development of an eastern German identity
. ,
of defiance (Trotzidentitat) has not brought with it a coherent political outlook. The rise of
the territorial identification that was discussed in chapters three and four is, however, based
on a number of attitudinal and situational similarities. The PDS both reflects and promotes
this. The following parts of this chapter illustrate the diversity of eastern German territorial
claims, as well as the common denominator that links them all: the association that they have
with the economic, political and social realities of life in eastern Germany both today, and in
. the past.
The PDS realises that conceptualising 'eastern German interests' is the key motor of
its electoral support - even if it chooses not to define it as such in the public sphere - and this
is as the typology of regional parties outlined in chapter two would suggest. Even the most
cursory glance at the programmes of the major parties in Germany shows that the issue of
eastern German uniqueness (in all its many facets) is highly divisive. The term
'Ostdeutschland' is often generalised into a few paragraphs with little or no substance
detailing exact policy approaches. It is for this reason that this section is titled 'East German
Interests' - as it is in this fashion that political parties tend to bundle issues relating to the
eastern states together.
As one would expect, the PDS handles the issue of 'eastern Germany' in a way that
sets it apart from the other major German parties. Harry Nick observes that it is the issue that
divides the CDU/SPD/Alliance 90/Greens apart from the PDS the most729. This is not so
much in the area of economic and social policy approaches, although the PDS does differ
considerably in its policy alternatives to these issues, but rather in interpretations of the extent
and causes of eastern Germany's economic and social difference. The 'Rostock Manifesto' of
1998 threw ample light on how the PDS views the positions of eastern Germans within the
current polity - something that clearly differentiates it from other parties and also represents
the feelings of fear and forbidding that prevail in much of eastern Germany (see chapter
three):
The decision on whether something is good or bad is made with reference to
whether it is good or bad for the western states. The majority of eastern Germans
perceive themselves has having hardly any opportunity to influence decisions
729 Harry Nick: Altemativen '98? Die Wahlprogramme von SPD, PDS und Bundnis 90lDie Griinen im
Vergleich (Berlin: Diskussionsangebot der POS, Grundsatzkommission der POS, 1998), p.35.
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made in the FRG today. GDR heritage is often sufficient reason to be
discriminated against ... and the promise of blossoming landscapes has proven
itself to be the biggest lie of unification year730• .
The emphasis that the PDS places on current governmental responsibility for the
economic, social and political dissatisfaction in eastern Germany mirrors the popular feeling,
that the CDU, and to an extent the SPD, are principally responsible for the Easterners' current
plight (see chapter three). The PDS does not mention the decrepit state of the GDR economy
in 1989, and as such purposefully relieves itself of any of the blame for the economic
difficulties of the last ten years?". The PDS in Saxony Anhalt, for example, explicitly blames
post-1989 CDU policies for the unhealthy economic climate that prevails in that state. As a
declaration from the February 1999 conference observes:
since the beginning of the second legislative period in Saxony Anhalt, the
financial, .economic and labour market performance has been persistently poor -
and this is as a result of the policies of the Treuhand holding agency and the CDU
inspired de-regulation of Saxony Anhalt's industrial base732
The high rates of unemployment are seen as ensuing solely as the CDU led federal
government has been pursuing 'neo-liberal' economic policies, that ensure the rich get richer
and the poor get poorer?33. The PDS articulates a widely held belief that the West has used
and abused eastern German assets and economic capabilities. As Catherina Muth observed
(in 1998) in the Mecklenburg West Pomerania state parliament:
it is a mistake to believe that the Government was simply incapable of effectively
tackling the problem of unemployment. Quite the opposite. The policies of the
CDU/CSU and FDP have led to a nationwide redistribution of wealth and power
in the direction of employers734.
730 Das Rostocker Manifest, PDS Parteivorstand (1998): op. cit. pp.2-3.
731 'Die Doppelbiograhie der Bundesrepublik. Zum Phlinomen der deutschen Zweistaatlichkeit', Dokumente
zur Geschichte der PDS (Thesenpapier der Historischen Kommission beim Parteivorstand der PDS, on
http://www.pds-online.de/geschichte/9903/doppelbiograhie.htm). See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 13, 31
Mlirz 1999.
732 Declaration of the fourth session of the fifth Landesparteitag of the PDS in Saxony Anhalt on the 6 and 7
February 1999 in Magdeburg. In PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 8, 26 Februar 1999, p.7.
733 'Keine Unterstiitzung fUr CDU-light-Politik' in PDS Pressesdienst, Nummer 45, 6 November 1998, p.l.
See also speech by Gregor Gysi at the fifteenth Gewerkschaftstag der Gewerkschaft Handel. Banken und
Versicherungen in Bremen, 28 October 1998, in PDS Pressesdienst, Nummer 45,6 November 1998, p.8.
734 Catherina Muth (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. Marz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 his 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.5160.
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Peter Porsch reiterated a similar disdain for neo-liberal, capitalist polices following the
1999 elections in Saxony:
The voters of Saxony have entrusted us ... (the PDS) ... with the key role of being
the principal opposition party to the neo-liberal policies, representing the interests
of a few large western German and foreign companies, of Kurt Biedenkopf and
his CDU735•
Although the eastern electorate certainly does not regard the SED as being relatively
blameless for the poor starting position of the eastern economy, a significant minority of the
electorate appears more eager to punish the mistakes of the last ten years rather than those of
the previous forty. And it is this echo which the PDS both reacts to and actively promotes, as
it is in precisely these areas, as chapter three highlighted, where eastern and western German
preferences differ the most.
The PDS is explicit in its demands for 'a better deal' for eastern Germany in general.
The PDS is exceptionally proficient at tabling motions and questions, at both the federal and
regional levels, with the aim either of highlighting (perceived) governmental failures in the
eastern states, PDS options for improvements or simply campaigns to bring things to the
governments/population's attention. The PDS is able to talk about the 'big picture', and it is
also adept at breaking it down into policy proposals within thematic areas - with an
underlying emphasis being on a 'fair' treatment of Easterners:
We want more competencies to be granted to eastern. Germans in the key
questions of their development. We want to have the courage to enable Easterners
to come up with their own innovative solutions to problems. We want to
strengthen the eastern states as a prerequisite to strengthening federalism in
Germany and in a Europe of the regions736•
Lothar Bisky continues by adding that:
73S Peter Porsch (POS): 'Unsere Zukunft liegt nicht in der Gegenwart anderer Parteien, sondern in einer Partei
als Netwerk demokratischer Bewegung', speech at the sixth Landesparteitag of the POS in Saxony, in PDS
Pressedienst, Nummer 2, 14 Januar 2000. See also http://www.pds-online.de/pressedienstl0002/09.htm
736 Lothar Bisky (POS): speech to the Rostock Party Conference, 3 April 1998, in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer
15-16, 17April 1998, p.4.
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We do not want any Dekret that lifts eastern Germany over and above western
Germany or that differentiates the East from the West. We are not in the game of
replacing the failed ideas about the 'historic mission of the working classes and
their Marxist-Leninist party' with that of the even more absurd idea of the
'historic mission of the Ossi and their PDS'. We want a relationship between East
and West, put nice and simply, that is characterised by solidarity - where it is
necessary - and fair and open competition - where it is possible - just like the
relationship is between the North and South of Germany737.
Without the PDS representing the interests of eastern Germans, many issues and
problems would not have been handled in parliament, as none of the other parties are likely to
have dedicated the same amount of time to them. On occasion issues have been placed on the .
agenda by the western parties, but only after - on occasion years - of pressure from the PDS to
do so738. The PDS is adamant that other parties frequently reject their policies per se only to
place them on the agenda themselves in the future.
With specific regard to eastern Germany, the PDS places many Kleine Anfragen in the
Bundestag, with the aim of ensuring that the federal government has to answer specific
questions relating economic and political activity in the eastern states. Throughout the 1990s
the PDS remained the most vocal party in forcing the Federal Government to defend its record
in eastern Germany. On the 19 February 1999, for example, the PDS placed a catalogue of
demands on the (after September 1998) SPD led administration, demanding to know how the
Chefsache Aufbau Ost was proceeding. These included:
• How the cost of living, as well as average wages and salaries in the eastern and western
states, had progressed since 1990, and how the government viewed these developments
with regard to the aim of equalising living standards?
• Which academic qualifications and other certificates of achievement obtained in the GDR
are not presently recognised in the FRG? Does the Federal Government see any
737 Lothar Bisky (PDS): speech to the Rostock Party Conference, 3 April 1998, in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer
15-16, 17April 1998, p.4. .
738 An example of this came in September 1996, when the PDS placed a motion to retain special payments to
80,000 poorer pensioners in the eastern states. The governing coalition had proposed a bill stopping extra
payments to pensioners in the East who received more than DM647 a month from 1 January 1997. All parties in
the Bundestag (with the exception of Alliance 90/Greens) voted against the PDS's motion on the 5 December
1996. On the same day the CDU/CSUIFDP and the SPD proposed a bill guaranteeing elderly citizens in the East
more social support - a demand previously made by the PDS, over and above the motion that had been rejected
on the same day. See http://www2.pds-online.delbtlthemenlrb980802.htm A further example of this concerns a
motion that the PDS proposed in order to try to introduce a yearly wealth report in 1996. After rejecting the
motion, the SPD drew up an Antrag in rnid-1997 caUing for regular reports of both poverty and wealth to be
drawn up. See Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/6527.
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opportunity for increasing the number of the qualifications that could be recognised in the
future?
• When will doctors, medics, artists, scientists, railway employees, postal workers and thos~
in the public services, at both state and federal levels, be able to claim the liquidierten
Versorgungsanspriiche that they have been due since GDR times?
• How high is the proportion, at the federal level, of civil servants within the public sector
who were, on the 3 October 1990, citizens of the GDR? How many of these are in upper
ranking positions of service, and how does the Federal Government aim to increase the
number of eastern Germans in such positions?
• Article 44 of the Unification Treaty states that the rights that come in to force with this
(unification) treaty can be validated by citizens of the eastern states and Berlin. This
article has not been, until now, acted upon. How and where can these rights be exercised?
Does the Federal Government see any necessity to elaborate more on this article, so as to
ensure clarity?
The PDS tabled a Grope An/rage on the subject of 'The Situation in Eastern Germany'
(Zur Lage in Ostdeutschlandi, containing 232 individual (and very detailed) questions on the
economic, social and legal situation in the eastern states since 1990739• This was followed in
April 1999 by another Grope An/rage on the 'Development and Situation in Eastern
Germany' (Zur Entwicklung und zur Situation in Ostdeutschlandy; containing 133 questions
and demands 740. These were supplemented by numerous other motions on specifically eastern
German issues (see below) as well as a proposed 'Economic and Ecological Alternative
Programme in the Eastern States'?",
The work of the PDS in regional parliaments also illustrates the PDS's ability to
conceptualise its eastern interests political platform in terms of policy initiatives. In
comparison to the other parties in the eastern states, the PDS is a clear and consistent
opposition Fraktion742 and it has established itself, by a considerable distance, as the party
that forwards that most parliamentary initiatives.
739 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/8369. The CDU/CSUIFDP Government replied with a 130 page
document in May 1998.
740 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 14/860.
741 The main points of this were the creation of a long-term investment programme; efficient implementation of
public money with the aim of creating employment; support for science and research; democratic control of the
implementation of contracts distributed by the Treuhand holding agency and so forth. See Deutscher Bundestag:
Drucksache 13/7519.
742 This is, of course, with the-exception of Mecklenburg West Pomerania where, since the 1998 Land election,
the PDS has been a junior coalition partner.
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Table 32743
Parliamentary Initiatives proposed by the PDS in the Eastern German Landtagen and
the Abgeordnetenhaus in Berlin
Gesetzentwurfe Antrdge Grofie Anfragen
Berlin 14 96 5
Brandenburg 15 130 12
Mecklenburg West 14 155 6
Pomerania
Saxony 19 186 24
Saxony Anhalt 15 158 6
Thuringia 9 123 6
Christine Ostrowski, a (former) PDS Landtag representative from Saxony managed to
accumulate over 100Kleine and GroJ3eAnfragen on her own744• The thematic areas that PDS
initiatives refer to reflect the worries and insecurities that Easterners display. The sheer
volume of them also ensure that the PDS is viewed as a party that is 'doing something'. In
terms of social policy, for example, the PDS concentrated in the second legislative period on
questions of rent levels and Wohnungspolitik, as well as levels of social assistance and
pensions. These are interests that reflect the insecurity of Easterners about the cost of living
and the insecurities they have experienced post-1989. In the area of economics the PDS has
persistently stressed the need to tackle high unemployment and the importance of
rejuvenating the regional economy (see section 5.1.4), while doing away with high cost
prestige projects like the Eurofighter or Transrapid. This once again is a reflection of the .
eastern sentiment (chapter three). In terms of culture, the PDS has sought to retain eastern
cultural uniqueness against the onset of western German domination (and particularly when
theatres and cinemas are threatened with closure), while in the field of education the PDS has
sought to expand the number of Hochschulen in eastern Germany and the number of training
places available. The PDS is consistent in its call for better financing of communal politics
(see section 5.1.4.), while in terms of lnnenpolitik the PDS seeks equal rights for eastern
Germans and those discriminated against as a result of their activities in the GDR (see section
743 These figures relate to the period from the beginning of the second legislative period of the Landtage until
the 1sI of January 1997. See PDS Parteivorstand (Hrsg.): Studien zur inneren Verfaf3theit der PDS (Berlin: PDS,
1997), p.16.
744 See Christine Ostrowski: Ossi's PDS-Gesetze (Dresden: Projekt Piccolo, 1999). See also Jurgen P. Lang:
Das Prinzip Gegenmacht: Die PDS und Parlamentarismus (Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interne
Studie Nr. 166, 1998), p.49.
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5.1.2.)745. These summarise broad areas ofPDS activity, although it is clear that across the
legislative bodies of the eastern states the PDS remains active and vocal in many fields of
interest.
The PDS is thus able and willing to voice particular regional sentiment in federal and
regional political arenas. Its position as an eastern German outsider enables it be particularly
vocal in its demands and criticisms of governmental policies. The PDS is also at an
advantage as it has not been in a position to influence governmental policy, thus successfully
enabling it to shift the burden of blame for eastern German dissatisfaction onto the western
parties.
5.1.2. Defence of the GDR and of East German History
Alongside actively discussing the political and economic position of eastern Germany,
the PDS is also adept at discussing the historical position of the GDR and the citizens of
eastern Germans who used to live there. The PDS frequently tables motions and adopts
policy approaches that seek recognition of lived existences in the GDR (see also section
5.l.l.). The PDS seeks to place the GDR at the same level of acceptance and legitimacy as
the FRG. In the 1990-1994 legislative period these included initiatives aimed at securing
more protection for officials who worked in the public sector in the GDR, the equal
recognition of teachers from both East and West Germany, a Bestandsgarantie for companies
that were to be revitalised and sold-off by the Treuhand agency, the weitere Behandlung der
Altkredite der LPG-Rechtsnachfolger and an amnesty for spies746• This PDS is also keen,
perhaps unsurprisingly, to draw a line under the GDR in terms of prosecuting officials who
are accused of committing crimes before 1989747• This may seem a politically logical step for
a party like the PDS to take, as members of the party are still embroiled in such cases, but it
none the less finds a sizeable echo in society at large. Although there is little direct empirical
data available on public opinion, it remains clear that a sizeable proportion of eastern
Germans are unhappy with the relentless attacks on 'their' state and 'their' lives in the pre-
745 PDS Parteivorstand (Hrsg.) (1997): op. cit. p.18.
746 For an enlightening analysis of the PDS's parliamentary activities in the 1990-1994 legislative period see
Christian von Ditfurth: Ostalgie oder linke Alternative? Meine Reise durch die PDS (Koln: Kiepenheuer and
Witsch, 1998), p.238. See also R(h)einb/ick, the monthly newsletter of the PDS Bundestagsfraktion.
747 PDS Parteivorstand: Fraktionsvorstand zu Schwerpunkten 2000: PDS schtirft ihr Projil (Berlin: PDS
Pressemitteilung, Nummer 1156, 14 January 2000).
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Wende period (see chapter three)748. In this respect, the SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens
adopt similar positions to the CDU/CSU749. The PDS Claims that, in view of the 60,000
judicial hearings and over 320 guilty verdicts, the German state should cease prosecuting
those who held positions of authority within the GDR. The PDS proposed a law that would
have ended the prosecution of GDR officials (Strafverfolgungsbeendigungsgesetz) on the 27
June 1995750 (although in principal, a clause remained for exceptional cases). This proposal
was, however, rejected.
Following the creation of the first SPDIPDS government in Mecklenburg West
Pomerania in 1998, the PDS negotiated an amendment to the Regelanfrage examining the
history of every citizen seeking to take up position in public service in Mecklenburg West
Pomerania with regard to possible contacts with the MfS in the GDR. Paragraph 161 of the
coalition agreement between the SPD and the PDS stated that:
The Government of Mecklenburg West Pomerania will not require the
Bundesbeauftragten for die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes to
investigate any individual person for activities relating to any work with the MfS
unless there is suspicion to do S0751.
The PDS has, therefore, been active in defending specific groups within eastern
German society against alleged discrimination at the hands of western Germans and· the
'western German system'. It is loud and vociferous in its attempts to attain equality and
fairness for the injustices that both it and significant portions of the eastern German populace
see as being done to them since 1989. This has been done in direct, specialised attempts to
revoke or review laws, as well as within the broader strategy of representing eastern Germans
per se. Broad based discrimination on the basis of qualification or experience gained while
living in the GDR is stringently opposed. As Lothar Bisky phrases it:
?48 In March 1997 Allensbach did ask directly if a Schluj3strich (line) should be drawn under East German
history, and 48 per cent of eastern Germans supported this notion. More surprisingly, and perhaps typical of the
contradictory data that opinion polls sometimes reveal, 51 per cent of western Germans thought that such a line
should be drawn! When a similar question was asked in June 1994 asking if too much time was spent 'working
through' East German history, however, more eastern Germans (44 per cent) than western Germans (38 per cent)
thought that this was true. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate KOcher (1997): op. cit. p.591.
749 Harry Nick (1998): op. cit. p.36.
7S0 See R(h)einblick: httpllwww2.pds-online.de/bt/themenlrb980802.htm
7S1 'VIII Die Demokratie starken und die personliche und offentliche Sicherheit gewahrleisten. Abschnitt 2
OberpIiifungen', in Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Parte; Deutschlands und dem
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Schwerin: Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 1998). See also
http://www.mv-pds-ltf.delkoalitionliOOOOO.htm
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We are continuing to fight for fair recognition of eastern German biographies.
The discrimination and defamation of eastern Germans has to be stopped, as does
the totally unnecessary humiliation of hundreds of people in the eastern states.
We demand that everybody be treated equally. We demand an end to the political
isolation (Ausgrenzung) of Easterners752
The PDS is particularly keen to dismiss any attempts at equating the GDR dictatorship
with that of the Third Reich. Conservative politicians in particular have on occasion tended to
place the two dictatorship on something of a par. The PDS, while not seeking to legitimise
the crimes and offences that were committed in the GDR, is vehemently against this. This
was evident, for example, in 1992 when the constitution of Saxony was passed in the Saxon
Parliament in Dresden. The PDS was the only party that voted against the precisely because
the PDS believed that in the preamble of the constitution there was insufficient differentiation
between the two German dictatorships of the twentieth century'".
The PDS has not, however, been so enthusiastic in taking part in institutionalised
'working through' of the GDR's history, This also, perhaps curiously, represents popular
sentiment in eastern Germany, where the top-down approach to discussing the GDR in the
Enquete Commission at the federal level left Easterners distanced from the process 754.
Easterners felt that Westerners expect them to be unduly critical of their own past, while
subsequently refusing to discuss the contradictions that may have existed in the FRG. The
Commission itself aimed more at establishing an historical record, and as such its audience
was the Bundestag, scholars and citizens who had the staying power to sit through its lengthy
and complex procedures. Indeed, although it was a public event, and hearings were held all
over eastern Germany, the statist nature of the commission ensured that its work was simply
too dry, aloof and unexciting for many citizens. Consequently interest in and knowledge
about the Bundestag's Enquete Commission is not great. Furthermore, the Enquete
Commission adopted a working brief that expressly indicated a preference for researching
into the history and consequences of the SED Dictatorship'i", This directly indicated that no
m Lothar Bisky (PDS): Speech to the Rostock Party Conference, 3 April 1998, in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer
15-16, 17 Apri11998, p.ll.
753 PDS-Fraktion im Sachsischen Landtag: Sachsische Verfassung und Wirklichkeit: Eine Festschrift der PDS-
Fraktion der Sacbsischen Landtag zum S. Jahrestag der Sachsischen Verfassung am 26. Mai 1997 (Dresden:
PDS-Fraktion im Sachsischen Landtag, 1997), p.l.
754 Jennifer A. Yoder: 'Truth without Reconciliation: An Appraisal of the Enquete Commission on the SED
Dictatorship in Germany', in German Polities, Volume 8 Number 3, December 1999, p.72.
?SS The full title of the commission was 'The Investigatory Commission on the Working-Through of the History
and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship inGermany'. See Jennifer A. Yoder (1999): ibid. p.71.
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attempt was to be made to analyse the history of the two German states, or even of the
Alltagsleben within the GDR, even if this second element was undoubtedly covered, to some
degree, under the Commission's remit. And while no half-way rational individual is going to
dispute that East Germany existed under dictatorial conditions, or that this had some
gruesome 'consequences for the population, it is important to remember that the GDR was not
just a Stasi state - which one could believe if one takes some of the exaggerations about the
role and influence of the Stasi at face value. To many Easterners it appeared very easy to
overlook, if one just concentrates on the effects of the dictatorship, the fact that the GDR did
have more to its history than this (albeit very important) single poine56•
The PDS was highly critical of what it viewed as the party political nature (and in
essence the western German dominance) of the Commission. The PDS was not permitted
voting rights and it was excluded from the discussions that led to the proposal for a
foundation aimed at continuing the process of working through the history of the SED
dictatorship. Regardless of whether these procedural decisions were legitimate or not, the
exclusion of the PDS meant that an expressly eastern German party was devoid of an
institutionalised voice in questions concerning the GDR. In a final statement on the
Commission's work the PDS claimed that "the Enquete Commission could not and would not
avoid instrumentalisation by political parties,,757, adding that "fundamental decisions on
historical processes and developments, as well as on political and social systems cannot be
decided by parliamentary majority,,758. The PDS thus remained highly critical of the
commission's motives, its procedures and of its conclusions.
756 Peter Bender: 'Deutsche Legenden seit 1990', in Peter Bender et al.: Zeichen und My then in Ost und West
~Rostock: Universitat Rostock, Rostocker Philosophische Manuskripte, 1999), p.8.
57 'Zum Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission 'Deutsche Einheit' des Bundestages', in Dokumente zur
Geschichte der PDS (Gemeinsame Erklarung des Parteivorstandes und der Bundestagsgruppe der PDS, on
http://www/pds-online.de/geschichte/9806/schlussbericht.htm). See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 26,25 Juni
1998.
7S8 http://www/pds-online.de/geschichte/9806/schlussbericht.htm See also PDS Pressedienst, Numrner 26, 25
Juni 1998.
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The majority of members in the Commission expressed an anachronistic and
militant anti-communism, whose prejudices, cliches and anti-liberal undercurrents
were not suitable for reaching historically sound judgements or feelings of mutual
understanding. The generalisations that the GDR was an Unrechtstaat, the
condemnations of GDR history as being only about dictatorship and criminality
and, above all, the attempts to place the SED regime on a par with the Nazi
regime simply lead to new walls being erected and to history being falsified759•
The PDS has claimed that all of the western parties have disillusioned many
Easterners - including parts of their own electorates - by dictating how the GDR should be
perceived in popular discourse. The top-down nature of a process that has been dictated by
the western parties has rode roughshod over the small, but significant, parts of life in the GDR
that people wish to retain in their minds as positive recollections. The PDS has also been
enraged by the refusal of western actors to carry out similar processes of historical self-
reflection in the western states760• This is not, of course, an attempt to de-legitimise the FRG,
rather it is seen as a useful process on the path to inner unity, as the FRG comes to terms with
controversial issues like the imperfect de-nazification process of the 1940s and 1950s, as well
as the impact and treatment of left-wing terrorism in later decadea''".
The PDS even drew attention to what it described as a much more constructive and
thoughtful attempt at working through the history of the GDR in Mecklenburg West
Pomerania'f". Mecklenburg West Pomerania was the only state to create its own Enquete
Commission in order to record how life in the GDR functioned, what mistakes had been made
and what could be learnt from this. The CDU and SPD Fraktionen decided at the Landtag
session of 17May 1995 to constitute an Enquete-Kommission under the title of 'Leben in der
DDR, Leben nach 1989 - Aufarbeitung und Versbhnung' (Life in the GDR, Life after 1989 -
Working Through and Reconciliation) - something that made Mecklenburg West Pomerania
unique amongst federal states. The PDS originally voted against the creation of the
commission in this particular form, preferring to attempt to change the nature of the
commission by submitting a motion that would have changed the title from 'Working
7S9 http://www/pds-online.de/geschichte/9806/schlussbericht.htm See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 26, 25
Juni 1998.
760 'Die Doppelbiograhie der Bundesrepublik. Zum Phlinomen der deutschen Zweistaatlichkeit', Dokumente
zur Geschichte der PDS (Thesenpapier der Historischen Kommission beim Parteivorstand der PDS, on
http://www.pds-online.de/geschichte/9903/doppelbiograhie.htm). See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 13, 31
Marz 1999.
761 http://www/pds-online.de/geschichte/9806/schlussbericht.htm See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 26, 25
Juni 1998.
762 http://www/pds-online.de/geschichte/9806/schlussbertcht.htm See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 26, 25
Juni 1998.
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Through and Reconciliation' to 'Realities, Contradictions and Chances for a New Political
Culture,763, The PDS put forward four other proposed alterations, all of which were aimed at
neutralising the pejorative (in the opinion of the PDS) terminology used by the CDU and SPD
dominated parliament when creating the commission, and the commission itself when it
commenced its work764, Hence it quickly became apparent that although the PDS was
prepared to praise the workings of the commission in Mecklenburg West Pomerania at the
federal level, it proved a difficult partner for the other political parties in the commission
itself. From the beginning of the Commission's lifespan, in 1995, the PDS, as it had done at
the federal level, stubbornly fought its corner about the legitimacy of the GDR, and the
importance of recording not just "Stasi, Stacheldraht und Schiefsbefehl" (Stasi, barbed wire
and orders to shoot) but also "alltdgliches Leben" (everyday lifef6s, It was not prepared to
see western Germans sit in judgement once more on eastern German life and lives.
The PDS was consequently very active within the Commission. But it was also
obstructive on occasions, and the PDS used every opportunity to insist upon a less derisive
tone in the' discussion of the GDR766, One such example occurred as the Commission was
deciding upon which academics should research which particular issues:
In the course of the discussion it has become evident that members of the CDU
and the SPD have considered asking academics from universities outside of
eastern Germany to complete projects with regard to the work of this
Commission, so as to ensure as much competence and neutrality as possible, The
PDS group cannot support this, We would much rather see the qualities of
academics who have been 'abgewickelt' since 1990, and have been through a
process of unemployment, before finding new positions in newly founded
research institutes, both recognised and rewarded as outstanding academic
personalities 767,
763 'Landteg Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998):
0E' cit. p.621.
7 Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998):
ibid. p.619.
765 Interview with PDS MdL, Mecklenburg West Pomerania 17May 1999.
766 Four members of the Enquete-Kommission resigned in the course of the proceedings, mainly as a result of
the blocking tactics and ineffectiveness of the Enquete-Konunission. Jiirgen Pohl, the first person to resign,
expressly stated that the blocking tactics of the PDS ensured that the Commission was not going to be able to
carry out its work properly. He observed that is was not possible to work through history alongside people who
were unable to look truth in the face. Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit des Landtags in der 2.
Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.633.
767 Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Zur Arbeit des Landtags in der 2. Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998):
op. cit. p.626. In this instance, the PDS's claim was rejected - and on 23 May 1996 in a debate in the
Mecklenburg West Pomerania Landtag it was decided that the universities and polytechnics in the new Lander
had been suitably 'cleansed' of GDR teachers, and that they most certainly could be trusted to carry out tasks
that the commission set them. Unanimity couldn't however be reached on the proposal to do this. 15Auftrlige
were distributed to different departments/professors for completion.
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Like the populace at large, the PDS therefore remained somewhat distanced from
institutionalised attempts to 'work through' the history of the GDR. This is not to say that the
party has not attempted to come to terms both with the role that the SED played in the GDR,
the broader implications that this has both for the PDS's political future, and the wider
political environment in the eastern states768. Easterners themselves remain unconvinced by
the work of the Enquete Commissions, as the commissions have not been able to articulate
many of the complexities and contradictions that life in the GDR entailed. The dominance of
the western parties (even if eastern politicians and academics, particularly in Mecklenburg
West Pomerania, contributed to the process) has also done nothing to increase their popular
legitimacy.
The PDS represents the defensive mentality of a broad swath of Easterners towards
their lives in the GDR. The PDS represents a popular will to grant parts of everyday life in
the GDR a form of legitimisation that Westerners are never likely to grant it. The PDS is
therefore voicing complex feelings of collective memory towards the now defunct GDR-
something that only it, as a product of the eastern German political environment, is in a
position to do.
5.1.3. Democratising Democracy
Since the collapse of Nazi Germany in 1945, the Federal Republic has developed into
one of the most stable democracies in the world. The reasons for this are easy to see. The
Basic Law is excepted by almost about all political parties (this even includes most of the
extremist fringe groupings), freedom of speech, political pluralism and human rights are
rarely issues in normal political debate. As such, few of Germany's parties make the issue of
democracy a key plank of their party programmes. The PDS is the exception. The PDS sees
not only eastern Germans as being underrepresented in the political process, it sees
fundamental flaws within the democratic structures of the Federal Republic as a whole. It
has, however, no intention of overthrowing either the regime or the constitution (contrary to
some of the more excitable analysis of the PDS that has been undertaken). It has committed
itself completely to democratic means of political activity in order to try and achieve its
goals769• The PDS does, however, want to alter some of the mechanics of the way democracy
·768 For evidence of the POS's discussions on the GOR, see http://www.pds-online.de/geschichte
769 See the POS's party programme on http://www.pds-online.de/dokumente/programmlpunktS.htm for details
of this. Commentators who view the POS as an extremist political organisation claim that the POS's belief that
"extra-parliamentary activity is decisive" (see the POS Party Programme on the above mentioned website)
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in the Federal Republic functions. The PDS seeks to bring citizens into the political process,
and to give citizens the opportunity of having more control over more aspects of their daily
lives. The PDS looks to support the parliamentary model of democracy with elements of
direct, plebiscitary democracy'I", The PDS looks to encourage 'bottom-up' democracy,
through the introduction of referenda and the rejuvenation of communal politics through
policies that they have broadly titled a 'democratisation of democracy'.
The 'democratisation of democracy' initiative of the PDS corresponds with
dissatisfaction in eastern Germany with the functioning procedures of democracy and its
institutions (see chapter three)?", This is unique amongst the parties of the Federal Republic.
A 'democratisation of democracy' corresponds with the collective wishes of large sections of
the eastern German populace who feel that they are excluded from political, cultural and
economic decisions. The PDS has pleaded, at different times, for a new constitution772, a
third chamber that deals specifically with social movements and eastern German problems
and issues, as well as a thorough system of plebiscites773• These recommendations are
enthusiastically received in the eastern electorate'?",
In the 1998 Federal Election Programme the PDS devotes six sides to the issue of
improving Germany's functioning democracyi". The reasoning behind this, according to the
1998 Election Programme, is that:
ensures that commitments to bring about political change through parliamentary majorities are illusory. Such an
analysis tends to lack empirical basis. The PDS uses the term 'extra-parliamentary' to mean engaging with
groups within civil society. That the PDS seeks to mobilise these groups (trade unions, particular interest groups
and so forth) to its cause is self-explanatory - and it is something that all political parties attempt to do, whether
they admit it or not. It does not mean that the PDS aims to revolutionise society in order to overthrow the
democratic order - as even the most cursory glance at the PDS's societal activity reveals.
770 As the constitutions of the eastern states were being drawn up in the early 1990s, the PDS made concerted
attempts to have considerable measures of direct democracy included within them. These failed at the hands of
the CDU/CSU and FDP. There are, however, lower thresholds for initiating petitions and referenda than there
are in the West. See Arthur B. Gunlicks: 'The New Constitutions of East Germany', in German Politics,
Volume 5 Number 2, August 1996, p.265.
771 It is not solely in the eastern states where such attitudes are visible. The Suddeutsche Zeitung of 23
November 1998 bemoaned the lack of, and consequently called for, a "democratisation initiative in the eastern
states", much along the lines of the policies that the PDS is advocating. See Suddeutsche Zeitung: 'Neue
deutsche Lehrjahre', 23 November 1998, p.3.
772 The PDS calls for a new constitution in its party programme of 1993. See http://www.pds-
online.de/dokumente/programm/punkt40 1.htm
773 This claim has also received been repeated in the popular press. See for example 'Uberall fordern BUrger
Volksabstimmungen. Die Zeit ist reif rur mehr Demokratie', in Die Zeit, 8 August 1998, on
http://www.archiv.zeit.de/datenlpages/demokratie.txt.19980408.html
774 Peter Christian Segall et al (1999): op. cit. p.38.
775 PDS: Wahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus zur Bundestagswahl 1998: Fur den
politischen Richtungswechsel! Sozia/ und soltdarisch - fUr eine gerechte Republik (Berlin: Wahlbilro der PDS,
1998), pp.31-36.
255
Chapter 5 The PDS as an active Articulator of Eastern German Interests
Many people no longer believe in the ability of democracy to change societal
conditions for the better ... The threat is looming of power becoming
uncontrollable. In this situation, the necessity of democratic, public controls and
the ability to shape democratic activity is urgent776•
The PDS realises that citizens of the eastern states feel shut out of the decision making
processes that shape their lives. This is at the political level, within the companies where they
work and within other organisations such as trade unions.
The most recent policy document on 'democratising democracy' chooses to phrase the
PDS's main aims as thus:
The PDS calls for: the power to decided within the eastern states instead of
decisions being taken elsewhere about ... (my emphasis) ... the eastern states. In
order to make this possible, more competencies have to be passed down from the
federal level to the state and the communal levels - as an attempt at allowing
more decentralisation 'in the federal structures of the German state - so as to
enable a politics of social justice and socio-ecological development to be
implemented/",
The SPDIPDS state government in Mecklenburg West Pomerania has sought to
actively put this subsidiarity into practice. In sections 184 and 185 of the 1998 coalition
agreement they state:
Functional reform is going to continue. The government will examine which
competencies can be passed down from the state level to the Landkreise and the
kreisfreien Stddte as well as which tasks can be passed down from these levels to
the Gemeinden. In this context, the government will examine the case for the
introduction of another level of communal government called the Grofien
kreisangehorigen Stadt ... the amalgamation of some smaller Gemeinden into
more effective and modem units, on the basis of voluntary and democratic citizen
participation will also be supported",
776 PDS (1998): ibid. p.31.
777 Das Rostocker Manifest, PDS Parteivorstand (1998): op. cit. pp.7-8.
778 'Koalitionsvereinbarung IX. Selbstverwaltung der Konununen ausbauen und ihre Leistungsfahigkeit sichem.
Abschnitt 1: Konununalpolitik' in Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei
Deutschlands und dem Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Schwerin: Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorponunem,
1998). See also http://www.mv-pds-Itf.de/koalitionliOOOOO.htm
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The PDS also concretised this in other elections: in Saxony, for example, the 1999
election programme for the Landtagswahlen explicitly referred to the need to lower the
quorum for referenda from 450,000 signatures to 250,000, in order to facilitate more citizen
inspired democratic participation?".
The PDS is clear and consistent in both its calls for greater democratisation and citizen
participation, and the SPDIPDS government at the state level has made clear attempts at
achieving this. This corresponds directly with eastern German dissatisfaction at the perceived
deficiencies in the democratic methods and procedures of the German state (see chapter
three).
5.1.4. Unemployment
The PDS is the only party that voices parliamentary opposition to the structures of
capitalist society. The PDS promotes the idea that capitalism as an ideology is detrimental to
the economic, political and social future of not just the eastern states, but the western ones as
w~1l78o and that the capitalist order that was imposed in the eastern states following
unification is not only detrimental to the fundamental interests of the socially disadvantaged,
but to Easterners per se781, It is consistent in its condemnation of the 'neo-liberal,782 policies
of both the Kohl government and the Schroder administration that has followed it. In the
, Bundestag Gregor Gysi has, once again demonstrating his eye for the witty remark, claimed
that the Kohl labour market policies were merely successful in creating extra work for staff in
unemployment offices, and his criticisms of the CDU/CSUIFDP government's record are both
unrelenting and unequivocal:
779 See Eckhard Jesse (2000): op. cit. pp.69-87.
780 PDS (1993): op. cit. p.6.
781 Judith Dellheim (1999): op. cit. p.32.
782 As has been mentioned in chapter four, 'neo-liberal' is a term much used by PDS politicians, yet, bar
ascribing it to the politics of the Conservative Coalition under Helmut Kohl, it is very rare to hear any sort of
definition of what is precisely meant by the term. Cuts in social services and benefits as well as increases in
unemployment are frequently mentioned in the same breath, but conceptualising the meaning of the term is
rarely, if ever, attempted.
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If it were the case that the reductions in company taxes and the reductions in the
amounts of social support that the state provides were stimulatory factors in
creating new jobs - and that is the theory - then we should theoretically now be
begging for foreign labour to come and fill all of our vacant employment
positions; however, this approach, that the government has been pursuing for 15
years, has in reality led to over 4 million registered unemployed, de-facto 6
million, in Germany tOday783.
As the number of Germans not employed in gainful economic activity has stabilised at
worryingly high levels, the PDS has actively campaigned for radical changes in approach to
the support and regulation of the labour market. This clearly is a sentiment (chapter three)
that is echoed in the eastern states, as the inability of the state to provide the population with
employment is seen as a much greater 'sin' than it is in the western part of Germany - an
attitudinal difference that is part of the socialist legacy of the GDR. Both the SPD and the
CDU have attempted to create a dynamic impression in the eastern labour market - but the
stubbornly high unemployment statistics have sill left many Easterners with the impression
that the state is still doing too little in creating employment in eastern Germany (see chapter
I
three). Hence the PDS has been the tub-thumper calling for a radical (if still somewhat
unspecified) change of approach.
5.1.4.1. The PDS's Policies for Reducing Unemployment
The PDS election campaign of 1998 centred on the need for a change of government
at the Federal level as a basic prerequisite for achieving any up-turn in employment statistics.
The only plausible way of achieving this goal was to support the replacement of Helmut
Kohl's CDU with Gerhard Schroder's SPD as the main party in government.. The PDS
perceived its role as putting the centre-left coalition under pressure to remember its social
conscience (it termed this Druck von Links (pressure from the left) so as to make sure the
government remained committed to policies of social justice, increased employment, support
for the socially disadvantaged and so forth). In practice, and despite the Keynesian tendencies
of the Finance Minister Oskar Lafontaine, the PDS quickly proclaimed itself highly
dissatisfied with the work of the SPDI Alliance 90/Green government with regard not just to
783 G Gregor ysi, speech to the federal Parliament on 14 June 1996, inGregor Gysi (1998): op. cit. p.l7.
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employment, but all manner of governmental activity784. The Schroder government was
quickly condemned as being neo-liberal and in pursuing policies that we detrimental both to
Germans on lower incomes, and to Easterners.
The PDS subsequently demanded (and continues to demand) socialist alternatives to
the neo-liberal 'hegemony'. It broadly takes on Keynesian doctrines of economic demand
management, with the state having a fundamental responsibility both in stimulating demand
and providing its citizens with employment that enables demand to rise. This corresponds
directly with the socialist legacy in eastern Germany. Like a number of socialist parties
across Europe the PDS aims to counter high levels of unemployment by advocating policies
such as legally enforceable reductions in the number of hours that employees are allowed to
work, a reduction in the length of time that citizens are allowed to work throughout their
lifetimes' and drastic reductions in the amount of overtime that is presently worked in both
Germany and the European Union78S. In concrete terms, this was conceptualised in a motion
put forward in the Bundestag requesting a maximum working week of 35 hours and, in the
long-term, a five day week of just 30 hours786. The PDS also claims that drastic reductions in
the I.8bn hours of overtime that are worked yearly in Germany could create a further 600,000
jobs 787. Helmut Holter has described this basic economic concoction as being not only
beneficial in terms employment levels, but also in generating demand within the economy and
of setting off a virtuous cycle of economic prosperity788. This populist approach to labour
market strategy represents a clear articulation in eastern Germany of the need to 'do
something' in order to reduce unemployment levels.
The PDS is looking for radical alternatives to the 'failures' of the 'neo-liberal' policies
of recent years. The PDS makes no qualms about demanding the return of full
784 At the rhetorical level, the PDS articulated such criticisms within a matter of weeks, and within months the
PDS was tabling· parliamentary initiatives demanding to know what had happened to Chancellor Schroder's
promises to make the Aufbau Ost his Chefsache (key priority). Such initiatives included one placed in the
Bundestag on the 19 February 1999 (see section 5.1.1. of this work); one in March 1999 on the •Entwicklung und
Situation in Ostdeutschland' (On the Development and Situation in Eastern Germany - Deutscher Bundestag:
Drucksache 14/860) and one on the 22 June 1999 on the Fahrplan zur Angleichung der Lebensverhaltnisse und
zur Herstellung von mehr Rechtssicherheit in Ostdeutschland - 'Chefsache Ost' (a timetable for the equalisation
of living conditions and for ensuring more Rechtssicherheit in eastern Germany - see http://www2.pds-
online.delbtlthemenl9906/99062407.htm). .
785 PDS Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: 'Filr eine andere Beschaftigungs- und Wirtschaftspolitik in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern. BeschluB der 4. Tagung des 4. Landesparteitages der PDS Mecklenburg- Vorpommem, Parchim,
15 and 16 Februar 1997', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 8, 21 Februar 1997, p.8.
786 This has also been written in to the party programme. See PDS: Programme of the Party of Democratic
Socialism (Berlin: POS, 1993), p.17.
787 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/10015.
788 Helmut Holter (POS): 'Arbeitspllitze gehen vor Profit', in Schweriner Volkszeitung, 27 May 1997.
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employmentf". It is of the opinion that this is not just desirable, but vital for the restoration
of a citizens self-respect and for the good of society as a whole. It also believes that such an
aim is a viable one, even if only in the long-term. Lothar Bisky has chosen to articulate this
position thus:
When we make the claim to a society with full employment, we make it very
seriously. The right of every citizen to work if they wish to is, in our opinion, a
human right that has to be fought for. If ever fewer people have to work ever
longer hours, while at the same time more societally needy tasks cannot be
successfully completed, then available work clearly has to be newly divided up
and employment that benefits society as a whole newly defined'",
The PDS is not scared of saying how it aims to go about doing this. It actively calls
for government participation in the economy, following the principle that the government has
to actively help to create as much employment as is possible. This is a clear representation of
the territorial sentiment illustrated in chapter three. The SPDIPDS government In
Mecklenburg West Pomerania states:
(Active) ... unemployment policies and the programme 'Work and Qualification
for Mecklenburg West Pomerania' (AQMV) are, in the current period of mass
unemployment, indispensable. Job-creation schemes, further and re-education as
well as the wage costs subsidy programme are going to form the backbone of our
active unemployment policy in the future?",
The PDS is, however, careful not to promise to solve Germany's large unemployment
position ovemight''", but it does claim t~ have new and different strategies for tackling the
problem. The PDS in Mecklenburg West Pomerania has, since it entered government in
789 Even Andre Brie, widely perceived as being on the social-democratic wing of the POS, has concluded that
full employment is both a legitimate and necessary goal. See Andre Brie (POS): 'Erfordernis, Moglichkeiten,
Schwierigkeiten und Inhalt eines Strategiewechsels der POS', on http://www.pds-
online.de/pressedienstl9951/06.htm See also PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 51, 23 Oezember 1999.
790 Lothar Bisky (POS): Speech at the Rostock Party Conference, 3 April 1998, in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer
15-16, 17April 1998, p.2.
. 791 'Koalitionsvereinbarung II. Zukunftsflihige Arbeits- und Ausbildungspl!itze schaffen und die
Wirtschaftskraft starken. Abschnitt 1 Teil 9: Arbeit und Ausbildung' in Koolitionsvereinbarung zwischen der
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und dem Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Schwerin: Landtag
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,1998). See also http://www.mv-pds-ltf.delkoalitionliOOOOO.htm
792 Helmut Holter stated that the aim of the SPOIPOS government in Mecklenburg West Pomerania was to
create between 15,000 and 20,000 new jobs within the state. Given Mecklenburg West Pomerania's high rate of
unemployment, this is perhaps not as many as the POS originally would have hoped, but it is none the less a
considerable commitment. See Helmut Holter (POS): 'Sparkurs der Bundesregierung wirkt sich verheerend
aus', in Schweriner Volkszeitung, 21 May 1999.
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1998, looked to give an impression of dynamism, activity and energy'93, and it has not been
shy from investing in programmes that are aimed at creating extra employment. The PDS in
Greifswald, for example, proposes a regional 'Alliance for Jobs', with the aim of bringing
together universities, research bodies, companies and trade unions under the supervision of
the state in order to work together to increase employment'". It also proposes to expressly
favour companies from the region when public contracts are distributed, as well as subsidising
the development of small and medium-sized businesses795. Such an alliance is supported by
the PDS 'Fraktionen' or groupings throughout the eastern states. The PDS in Mecklenburg
West Pomerania hopes that, even if unemployment figures do not drop drastically, it will be
given credit at the next state election in 2002 for its willingness to try new approaches in
tackling what seems an intractable problem. Easterners do, after all, appear to want to see
more action and inventiveness from their governments (chapter three).
5.1.4.2. The 'Pilot Projekt Ost'
As such, it proposes a pilot project in eastern Germany that has become a key element
of the PDS's entire employment policy package. It is aimed at prompting regional, economic
development in the eastern Lander, at encouraging investment in technologically advanced
industries and in, most importantly, creating employment. The SPDIPDS coalition in
Mecklenburg West Pomerania phrases it thus:
793 The POS has made every attempt to give the impression that it is a party of dynamism and of action, and its
election activity is particularly geared to being as visible and as energetic as possible. See Peter Christian Segall
and Rita Schorpp-Grabiak: Die PDS vor den Europawahlen (Munchen: Akademie fUr Politik und
Zeitgeschehen, Hanns Seidel Stiftung e. V, 1999), p.18.
794 POS Greifswald: Mit guten Leuten und neuen Ideen in der Burgerschaft (Greifswald: POS, 1999).
79' POS Greifswald (1999): ibid.
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The state government of Mecklenburg West Pomerania will attempt, in the
medium-term, to promote conditions that will enable the creation of sustainable
employment at the federal level in the form of a publicly subsidised employment
sector (OBS)796. The state government of Mecklenburg West Pomerania will
support the federal government in an attempt to reform employment subsidies.
Possible savings in the AQMV as a result of the employment policies at the
federal level will be used to finance the creation of an OBS. Priority will be given
to creating I ,000 jobs in the areas of youth social work and school social work797•
Even though the PDS is open in admitting that the initial aims of the 'Pilot Projekt' are
limited, it remains convinced that the project is the most important component available in
addressing the economic difficulties in the eastern states, and is subsequently seen as a new
approach towards "social, political and cultural rejuvenation" in all of Germany798. The three
key thematic priorities of the Pilot Projekt are improvements in social justice, sustainable
economic development and democratic subsidiarity to the eastern states799• It is an approach
that clearly differentiates the PDS from other parties, and is something that the PDS at all
levels is attempting to help construct800. In terms of economic policy, the state is encouraged
to be active in attempting to alleviate economic difficulties. This once again is an articulation
of widely held eastern German sentiment. Helmut Holter phrases the approach thus:
The construction and the support of regional networks of economic activity in of
primary importance for economic development in the eastern states. Reviving
regional co-operation in the economic sphere and linking them to new,
environmentally-friendly em~loyment structures opens up future ways for
prosperity in the eastern states 01.
796 The PDS has tended to use somewhat confusing terminology when referring to the publicly subsidised
employment sector. In public debate and in the majority of PDS literature the term CBS is used. But in studies
undertaken by the Mecklenburg West Pomerania government in 1999, and in particular with regard to the
. implementation of this policy in certain cities (notably Rostock), the term 'gemeinwohlorientiertes
arbeitsmarktgefordertes Beschliftigungsprojekt' (GAP - subsidised employment project for the well-being of the
community) has been preferred. Despite the different categorisations, the policy is the same. For details on the
OBS in Rostock, see Machbarkeitsstudie zu einem Offentlichen Beschaftigungssektor in der Region Rostock
(Schwein: Ministerium fUr Arbeit und Bau, November 1998); PDS Rostock: Kommunalwahlprogramm der
Rostocker PDS /999 (Rostock: Rostocker PDS, 1999). p.l.
797 'Koalitionsvereinbarung n. Zukunftsflihige Arbeits- und Ausbildungsplatze schaffen und die
Wirtschaftskraft starken. Abschnitt 1 Teilll: Arbeit und Ausbildung' in Koalittonsvereinbarung zwischen der
Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und dem Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (Schwerin: Landtag
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 1998). See also http://www.mv-pds-ltf.delkoalitionliOOOOO.htm
798 Lothar Bisky (PDS): Speech at the Rostock Party Conference, 3 Apri11998, in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer
15-16.17 April 1998, pp.3-4.
799 Judith Dellheim (1999): op. cit. p.36.
800 The DBS is mentioned in many election programmes of the PDS at the national, regional and communal
levels. stressing how the non-profit sector is going to create jobs in the socio-cultural area.
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An example of this is the strenuous efforts that the PDS has made at both the regional
and federal levels to try and attract new technologies to eastern Germany. Since the idea was
first mooted in 1998 the PDS has been vociferous in its attempts to attract Airbus to Rostock
in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, with the aim not just of creating 2000 new jobs, but also of
sending a sign to the industrial world that the eastern states are an attractive place to invest.
The PDS MPs Gregor Gysi, Rolf Kutzmutz, Christa Luft and Dietmar Bartsch tabled a joint
motion on the 9 November 1998 in the Bundestag expressly calling for active support from
the government in trying to win the battle to see 'the new Airbus factory located near
Rostock802•
As was mentioned above, the PDS has very specific ideas on how to encourage
increased employment within the public sector. These include the creation of the non-profit
sector (the so-called offemltch geforderten Beschdftigungssektor (publicly subsidised
employment sector)) and programmes to support the expansion of the industrial and service
base. While the non-profit sector formed only a relatively small part of the coalition's labour
market strategy in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, its unprecedented nature ensured that it
received more than its fair share of attentionf'".
Christa Luft, the main force behind the Pilot Projekt, describes the logic and principles
behind the PDS's 'non-profit sector' as thus:
... communal service agencies hive. socially, culturally and ecologically
worthwhile tasks into the public sector at the market price (my emphasis), in order
to distribute them to public bodies and private actors. The service agencies would
buy up the tasks in order to sell them on to the consumers, who would take
advantage of these services at politically (my emphasis) set prices. The prices for
the people or organisations who make use of these services would be orientated
towards their ability to pay .: The state would make up the difference between the
price at which the service is sold and the price at which it has been bought. This
will prove more cost-effective than funding mass-unemployment and crippling
social security benefits ... the intention is to create a regular employment sector
alongside the normal profit-orientated private economy and the publicly run
companies and services that exist for the well-being of the community as a
whole804•
801 Helmut Holter (PDS): '83 Sitzung am 31. Mlirz 1998', in Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpomrnern: Zur Arbeit
des Landtags in der 2, Wahlperiode 1994 bis 1998 (1998): op. cit. p.5164.
802 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 14/25.
803 The PDS put forward a motion attempting to create an CBS at the federal level which was, unsurprisingly,
rejected by the Bundestag's other Fraktionen. The key difference between the SPDIAlliance 90/Greens and the
PDS was that the other centre-left parties saw the CBS as, at best, a short-term solution. The PDS aims to see
the CBS become a long-term institution within the German economy. See Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache
13/7417.
804 Christa Luft: Abbruch oder Aufbruch? Warum der Osten unsere Chance ist (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch
Verlag, 1998), pp.l02 -103. .
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The OBS (Non-Profit Sector) within the 'Pilot Projekt' is, therefore, intended to be an
approach that offers the opportunity of bypassing the profit-making imperative. It is an
articulation of eastern German scepticism towards capitalism. It is also part of the PDS' scali
for large scale subsidiarity and grass-roots democracy - an approach that a number of post-
communist parties have since chosen to take80S• The SPDIPDS coalition in Mecklenburg
West Pomerania is the first state government that is faced with putting the PDS's employment
policies into practice. This has proven particularly difficult in Mecklenburg West Pomerania,
as the financial constraints of the government remain great, while the economic problems in
Germany's poorest state mount. In 1999 the SPDIPDS government had DM164 million less
at its disposal than in the previous year. None the less, Helmut Holter, the deputy Prime
Minister and Construction Minister was still insistent that 8000 extra jobs could be created806•
Holter stressed that the process of reducing unemployment was going to be a long-one, but he
still predicted that the Dffentlich gefordeten Beschiiftigungssektor would be able to promote
3,500 jobs in the medium term807• Angelika Gramkow (PDS Parliamentary Leader in
Mecklenburg West Pomerania) has, however, admitted that this is still something of a drop in
the ocean808:
3,500 is not a large number of jobs ... but in view of the large unemployment here
in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, it is a representation of the realities in this state
that work that is useful to society ... (in the non-profit sector) ... but remains
profitable, is still recognised across society and is also affordable.
Indeed, in view of the excessive rates of unemployment in Mecklenburg West
Pomerania, the PDS had to look for "new innovative ways in terms of labour market
policieio9 - and these take time to conceptualise. The SPD does (begrudgingly) support this
key plank of the PDS economic strategy and, according to Harald Ringstorff, the Prime
Minister of Mecklenburg West Pomerania, it is a "further building block in our labour market
policy ..810. By May 1999, the leader of the PDS faction within the Mecklenburg West
Pomerania Landtag claimed that DMIOm had been invested in the creation of the 'third
80S Gerald R. Kleinfeld: 'The POS: Between Socialism and Regionalism', in Mary N. Hampton and Christian
Sf2Ie(eds.): Between Bonn and Berlin: German Politics Adrift? (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp.137.
154.
806 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Landtags Nachrichten: Jahrgang 9, Nummer 2, 1999, p.5.
807 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Landtags Nachrichten (1999): ibid. p.5.
808 Angelika Gramkow (POS): Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Landtags Nachrichten (1999): ibid. p.7.
809 Helmut Holter (POS): Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Landtags Nachrichten (1999): ibid. p.5.
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labour market' over the first six months of the SPDIPDS coalition"! - although the project
will only be effectively evaluated after a much longer period of time.
The PDS is, however, very aware of the need to remain credible on this issue. It is
one thing to promise to reduce unemployment by a considerable number, but it is another
altogether to achieve this in practice. Dr. Christian Westphal, leader of the PDS in Rostock
city council, stressed that all of the jobs in the non-profit sector have to be financially viable
in the long-term. The OBS cannot be an initiative that supports Prestigeobjekte, rather it must
help improve services in schools, hospitals and so forth that are in and around the local
community. Westphal was keen to stress how Easterners has been promised flourishing
landscapes before, but the CDU had let them down - and this was not a mistake that the PDS
could afford to make in either Rostock, or Mecklenburg West Pomerania as a whole812•
The SPDIPDS government in Mecklenburg West Pomerania is particularly keen to
create employment for younger members of society. By 2 November 1999, it reported that it
had been able to create 1000 positions for 'Youth, School and Social Workers' within the
non-profit sector813• This is in tune ~ith the PDS's emphasis of providing every schoolleave~
throughout Germany with the right to a training place - something that the PDS has also tried
to have enshrined in the Basic Law814•
Methods of financing the OBS seem fanciful at best: but this has not (yet) stopped the
PDS from attempting to push the project through. The financial basis of the 6BS rests on
attaining levels of full employment that have not been seen in western countries for a number
of years. Rather than spend billions of Deutschmarks on funding unemployment (DM163
Billion was spent on unemployment benefit in 1996, rising to DM 180 Billion in 1997815),
societally beneficial work should be encouraged. When this is coupled with a redistribution
of wealth from the rich and the super-rich down through society (and based on a re-shaping of
the tax system) the PDS is of the opinion that an OBS is affordable. This is a clear attack on
the widely held eastern belief that income differentials between the rich and the poor are too
large. It also incorporates populist economic policies that have a positive resonance in the
broader electorate on account of their simplistic and solve-all nature, even if very few
economists propagate them as the answer to eastern Germany's economic ills.
810 Harald Ringstorff(SPO): Mecklenburg-Vorpommem Landtags Nachrichten (1999): ibid. p.5.
811 Angelika Grarnkow (POS): 'POS steht zu hoher Investitionsquote und zurn Einstieg in den OBS' (Schwerin:
POS Presseerklarung, POS Pressestelle, Nurnmer 82, 4 Mai 1999).
m Interview with Dr. Christian Westphal, Kreisvorsitzender of the POS Fraktion in Rostock, 29 April 1999.
813 'Soll und Haben inNordosten': in Neues Deutschland, 2 November 1999, p.2.
814 Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/8573.
815 Das Rostocker Manifest, PDS Parteivorstand: op. cit. p.22.
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In more concrete terms, this would involve:
• A one-off tax (Vermogensabgabe)S16 on large sums of money, as well as on private wealth
(Grundvermogeni. This would apply to both private capital and to capital owned by
insurance institutes and banksS17•
• The introduction of a 'Wealth Tax' (Vermogenssteuer)818. The PDS estimates that a
Wealth Tax will enable the state to raise between DM9 Billion and DM30 Million819. This
would be complimented by a reform of inheritance taxes (Erbschaftssteuer).
• A closure of tax loopholes.
• Increased tax revenues as more people are employed, and more people pay into the tax
system.
• Increases in the social contributions of companies. This will be based on profits made82o•
The PDS is also vocal in support of active labour market policies for lowering the
number of young people in Germany without gainful employment. This is a particular
problem in eastern Germany, where not only do many younger citizens have no work, but
there is an underlying tendency for groups of young people to lean towards right-wing
political activity in the form of sub-cultures in towns and cities821• The PDS aims, through a
816 The PDS committed itself to this at the 1997 Schwerin conference. The Alliance 90/Greens demanded in
their election programme in 1998 a one off levy on assets of over DM2 million. The PDS demand levies that are
spread over 10 years. For those with net assets of between DM300,OOOand DM500,000 there would be a charge
of 2 per cent a year, and for assets over this it would be 3 per cent. See http://www2.pds-
online.delbtlthemenlrb980802.htm
817 The PDS has had a motion to this affect rejected in the Bundestag once. It involved the implementation of a
'luxury tax' (defined as being 6 per cent above the rate of value added tax) and a reduction in the rate of VAT for
medication and for labour intensive services by 7 per cent. All other Fraktionen rejected this motion on 7 May
1998. See Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksache 13/9760.
818 The question of the (re)introduction of a wealth tax arises periodically in political discourse, even though the
Federal Court declared such a tax to be illegal in 1997. Hence, since the 1997 party congress in Schwerin, the
PDS has talked more (although not exclusively) of a Vermogensabgabe, where one-off payments are demanded
on large sums of property and wealth. In December 1997 the PDS conceptualised this in the Bundestag by
bringing a motion calling for the introduction of a capital transactions tax. See Die Rote Schanz: Zeitung der
PDS Ingolstadt, (Ingolstadt: PDS Stadtvorstand, Nummer I, 1998), p.6.
819 Heide Knake-Werner (PDS), Arbeitsmarktpoltiische Sprecherin der PDS: 'Die gesetzliche Rente wird seit
Jahren kaputt geredet', inNeues Deutschland, 3 November 1999, p.3.
820 Das Rostocker Manifest, PDS Parteivorstand: op. cit. p.22.
821 The Grunau area of Leipzig, once the largest Plattenbaugebiet in East Germany, is known to have a strong
right-wing sub-culture in youth clubs, and in smaller Saxony towns like Wurzen there is also known to be so-
called national befreite Zonen (German zones) where foreigners are not welcome. The PDS sees a strong link
between broad swathes of disenchanted, unemployed and bored youths and the increased presence of right-wing
political activity. For evidence of this in elections see Charlie Jeffery and Daniel Hough: 'The German Election
of September 1998', in Representation, Volume 36 Number I, Spring 1999, pp.78-84. For evidence of 'German
zones' see 'Breite volkische Bewegung', in Schweriner Yolkszeitung, 2 November 1999 or 'Wie kriegen Euch
alIe', in Schweriner Volkszeitung, 15 July 1995.
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Sofortprogramm (immediate programme) to offer every young person an Ausbildungsplatz
(training place) when they leave full-time education and after this a full-time job822• The PDS
aims to change the constitution in order to give every citizen the right not just to jobs, training
placements and education, but also to the right to accommodation'+'.
The practicality of implementing these policies is not something that the PDS is likely
to have to worry about in the near future. The PDS is only active in one eastern Government,
and as the next election in the eastern states are not until 2002 (in Mecklenburg West
Pomerania), it is unlikely that the PDS will have to test its policy agenda further against the
realities of governmental participation. Even in Mecklenburg West Pomerania the PDS
openly admits that the opportunities for implementation of such radical plans are small. This
is no bad thing for the PDS. The PDS remains in a position where it can voice loud criticism
of the federal government without having the opportunity to do a better job itself. The policy
approaches above do not, as yet, meet with overwhelming support in the electorate. That
having been said, the PDS is not seen as a party that is in possession of governmental
competencef'". But surveys by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung reveal that none of the parties
enjoy particularly large support in terms of Problemlosungskompetenzen in eastern
Germanl25• However, the (the reforming leadership of the) PDS has understood that if it is
going to remain able to articulate eastern German specificity, then the issues of democracy
(section 5.1.3.) and employment are key battlegrounds. And the PDS has benefited in the last
few years by having a different profile on these issues. Helmut Holter is clearly aware of this:
"The PDS will have to make the future nature of work and the democratisation of society its
key issues in order to be the main political alternative826• This remains in spite of the
questionable nature of the practical (from a financial and a theoretical point of view) nature of
822 "The state Government will ensure that there is a training place made available/or all young persons ... the
state government will also strive to offer every young person the opportunity 0/ employment after their training
has been completed", 'Koalitionsvereinbarung II. Zukunftsfahige Arbeits- und Ausbildungsplatze schaffen und
die Wirtschaftskraft starken, Abschnitt 1 TeillS and Teil 16: Arbeit und Ausbildung' in Koalitionsvereinbarung
zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Parte; Deutschlands und dem Parte; des Demokratischen Sozialismus
(Schwerin: Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 1998). See also http://www.mv-pds-ltf.delkoalitionJiOOOOO.htm
823 POS: Farbe bekennen (Berlin: Parteivorstand der POS, 1998), p.l.
824 This is when figures collected by public opinion agencies are compared with those for the COU and the
SPO. Other sections of this chapter do illustrate that eastern Germans are, however, ascribing more and more
Problemlbsungskompetenzen to the PDS in certain areas. For example, in 1998 3S per cent of eastern Germans
thought that the PDS would do the most towards equalising living standards between eastern and western
Germany. 33 per cent thought that the PDS would do the most for families with children. A year later in 1999,
around 20 per cent of the eastern German population thought that the POS would be the most effective party in
both these areas as well as in improving the situation of Jugendliche, and soziale Sicherheit gewdhrleisten. See
'Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bereich Forschung und Beratung, Kumulierter Datenfile', in Viola Neu (1999): op.
cit. p.4.
m See Viola Neu (1999): ibid. p.3.
826 Helmut Holter (1999): op. cit. p.2.
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the PDS's programmatic initiatives. None the less, it is clear that the PDS sees the issues of
democracy and employment as the two issues on which it can continue to profile itself, as it
clearly reflects a willingness achieve the goals of many eastern Germans - regardless of their
practicalities in the cold light of day.
5.1.5. Social Justice
The PDS actively seeks to be regarded as the party of social justice. This corresponds
strongly to eastern German feelings of egalitarianism and personal 'social injustices'. The
attempt by the SPDI Alliance 90/Greens Government under Gerhard Schroder to restructure
and balance the federal books entailed Finance Minister Hans Eichel pushing ahead with a
package of savings measures. This led the PDS to increasingly profile itself as the only
German party that proposes to protect the socially disadvantaged from the excesses of both
global capitalism and the misguided (in the opinion of the PDS) policy options of the Federal
Government. Throughout the election year of 1999 the PDS, therefore, continued to
increasingly stress its commitment to 'social justice' - mirroring eastern Germans clear
preference for social equality rather than individual freedoms. Eastern Germans also came to
perceive and consciously appreciate this. The extent of this was shown by an Allensbach
survey that was carried out in the eastern states in April 2000 which revealed that 56 per cent
of Easterners perceived the PDS as the 'party of social justice'. Only 23 per cent were of the
opinion that the SPD was the party that would most effectively strive for this (albeit fuzzy)
ideal827•
Despite the persistent refusal of the PDS to define what it understood by the term
social justice828, the issue of soziale Gerechtigkeit remained highly prominent in all PDS
literature published in 1999. The 1999 communal election Wahlprogramm in Leipzig urged
827 See Toralf Staud: 'Ankunft irnModernen: Die PDS braucht ein neues Prograrnrn und einen neuen Chef, in
Die Zeit, 6 Apri12000, on http://www.archiv.zeit.de/zeit-archiv/datenlpages/200015.pds_.html
828 It is assumed that such calls for more social justice centre around a better working and social environment
for the 'socially disadvantaged'. An underlying presupposition that universal standards of social justice both
exist, and are attainable, is evident within the POS's political rhetoric. But it remains clear that such standards
are by no means universally excepted. and the means and methods that different actors propagate in an attempt
to achieve 'social justice' are therefore wide, diverse and often plain contradictory. The PDS remains skilled at
articulating the worries of Easterners about their social and working environments, just as it is vociferous in its
egalitarian, anti-capitalist rhetoric. Yet it (the PDS) is not willing to define its broad understanding of 'social
justice' over and above basic calls for equality and more 'fairness'. But this is as it is not (yet) in a position
where it is forced to • as only when it is required to implement the policies that it espouses will it be forced to
consider the constraints and contradictions of governmental responsibility and idealist policy positions. For an
analysis on the theoretical underpinnings of social justice, see David Harvey: 'Class Relations, Social Justice and
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citizens on its front cover to "Zukunft sozial gestalten" (shape the future socially)829 while the
PDS in Bad Doberan (Mecklenburg West Pomerania) called its communal election
programme "For Social Justice and Human Rights,,830. These are representative of the
numerous election programmes that the PDS produced in the eastern states in 1999. The PDS
is adamant that " ... (in view oj) ... the dominant political discourse. we have developed
suggestions. proposals and campaigns with the aim of increasing the amount of social justice
in Germany today" and that it is the only party that can be trusted to look after the interests of
pensioners, the ill and infirm, the unemployed, those on social security benefits, those on
lower incomes, those not in a position to defend themselves and those who feel anxious about
the capitalist world around them831. Easterners, on account of their disadvantageous
economic situation (in terms of levels of unemployment, wage levels and economic growth)
and self-perceived disadvantageous social situation widely place themselves within this
bracket, or alternatively have sympathy for the PDS' s ideals.
The PDS has vociferously complained that the Federal Government takes money away
from those who need it most. It also claimed that the government was reluctant to take money
away from corporations and richer citizens. During the 1999 European election campaign, as
well as during the state elections of the same year, the POS was never slow to stress its role as
the ''protector of the socially disadvantaged',s32. It also urged voters, on campaign posters, to
"sozial wdhlen" (vote socially) - a clear play on the SPO's alleged move towards the centre-
grounds33. The political system in the eastern states, functioning largely around the socialist
sub-culture that the PDS represents, and the social-market sub-culture represented by the
CDU has been receptive to the calls by the PDS for a radical redistribution of wealth in the
direction of the poorer segments of society. Lothar Bisky has recognised that the widely held
public perception of the PDS 'on the left' and the COU 'on the right' has contributed to a
polarisation of the eastern political system on all social issues. As he phrased it:
the Politics of Difference' in Michael Keith and Steve Pile (eds.): Place and the Politics of Identity (London:
Routledge, 1993), pp.41-66.
829 PDS Stadtvorstand Leipzig: 'Leipzig 2000 - Zukunft sozial gestalten', Wahlprogramm zu den
Kommunalwahlen (Leipzig: PDS, 1999).
830 PDS Kreisvorstand Bad Doberan: 'Fiir soziale Gerechtigkeit und Menschenwurde', Wahlprogramm zu den
Kommunalwahlen 1999 (Bad Doberan: PDS, 1999).
831 PDS Sachsen: 'Ein Land fUr die Menschen. Veranderung beginnt vor Ort', Landeswahlprogramm 1999
~Dresden: PDS Landesgeschaftsstelle, 1999), p.2.
32 Interview with Catherina Muth (MdL), 13 May 1999.
833 The PDS has not been afraid to claim that it preserves the social democratic tradition in Germany better than
the SPO is able to do. In view of the SPO's particularly poor showing in the Saxon state election of September
1999 the PDS unambiguously claimed, for example, that "the social democratic tradition is ... better preserved
by the POS". Quoted in David Patton (2000): op. cit. piSS.
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The differing options on the issue of social justice are those proposed by the COU
and the POS. If the elector wants to see improvements in the Standort
Deutschland under the guidance of an economic party (Wirtschaftspartei), then
the elector votes for the COU. If he/she wants to see improvements and reforms
under the principle of social justice, then they decide for the POS834
,The POS's anti-capitalist stance has won it recognition as the party that continues to
fight for the 'little man,835. The POS has adopted an open and provocative attitude towards
issues of social justice, as it realises that the populist rhetoric it espouses is well-received in
the eastern electorate at large, and the POS is unlikely to have to deliver on any of the
demands that it makes. The PDS also attempts to use social justice as a lever with which it
can increase contact with other societal groupings - so as to spread its influence across society
as much as is possible. The PDS executive has explicitly called for discussions to take place
on the issue of social justice between the DGB, individual trade unions, the farmers
associations, the Christian churches and even the Zentra/rat der Juden - all under the
leadership of PDS politicians836. Regional and local politicians are encouraged to work with
other societal actors, explicitly trade unions, Betriebs- und Personalriiten to introduce new
models of employment=" and to exert responsibility in providing the fundaments of a socially
secure existence for citizensf", The parliamentary motions put forward by the PDS at both
the federal and state level also place issues of social justice at their centre; in Mecklenburg
West Pomerania the PDS Antrdge have centred on issues that defend the social rights of
citizens: examples of this include attempts to guarantee lower rents and housing, labour
market policies that aim to maximise employment through the creation of more jobs in the
areas of care work and social assistance, criticism of the policies of the Treuhand successor
organisation and attempts to save the Rostock shipping yards839. At the federal level the PDS
is also not slow to campaign for more funding for housing and social issues instead of for
'prestige objects'. Klaus-Jurgen Warnick (a PDS MdB) observed in light of the final budget
834 Lothar Bisky (PDS) in: 'Und dann das Meisterstilck', in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 November
1999, p.12.
835 Interview with Angelika Grarnkow (MdL), 19 May 1999.
836 'Angebot zum Dialog uber soziale Gerechtigkeit: Bericht von den Beratungen des Parteivorstandes', on
http://www.pds-online.de/parteivorstandlberichte/9911 0 l.htrn
837 See section 5.1.4. '
838 POS Mecklenburg-Vorpommem: 'FOr eine andere Beschaftigungs- und Wirtschaftspolitik in Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern. Beschluf der 4. Tagung des 4. Landesparteitages der POS Mecklenburg- Vorpommern, Parchim,
15 and 16 Februar 1997', in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 8, 21 Februar 1997, p.8.
839 Nikolaus Werz: Nikolaus Werz and Jochen Schmidt (Hrsg.) (1998): op. cit. p.95.
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of the CDU/CSUIFDP government 1998 that the federal government persistently appears to
get its priorities wrong - at the expense of the socially disadvantaged and eastern Germans:
Our proposals (supported by the SPD and Alliance 90lGreens) to increase the
funds for sozialen Wohnungsbau (the construction of social housing) by DM2.6bn
and for Stddtebaufbrderung (subsidies for construction in towns) in eastern and
western Germany by DMlbn were rejected. But there still appears once again to
be enough money for unnecessary expenditure like the Transrapid, the
Eurofighter, over-priced parliamentary and governmental buildings in Berlin as
well as tax breaks for the purchase of property 840.
The PDS adopted the slogan Reichtum begrenzen, Armut bekdmpfen (limit wealth;
fight poverty) in the 1998 election campaign, emphasising the importance of the 'social' in
the parties platform. And this emphasis clearly had a resonance in eastern German society at
large. In the October 1999 state elections in Berlin, 77 per cent of Easterners who voted for
the PDS did so in the hope that the PDS would be able create a more socially just society''".
The PDS is gradually gaining acceptance in the eastern states as the only party that is not
prepared to accept the capitalist dynamic that ensures decreasing job security and higher
unemployment. This was further highlighted after the publication of the Blair-Schroder paper
in 1999. The PDS roundly condemned the SPD's shift rightwards, and while the joint paper
caused only mild consternation amongst western social democrats, it caused widespread
disillusionment within both the SPD and the PDS in the East - illustrating the differing
political constellations in eastern and western Germany. The publication of the paper allowed
the PDS to present the SPD as saving for savings sake, and present itself as the only
trustworthy protector of the less well off. Gregor Gysi subsequently published a paper
announcing 12 reasons why social justice is modem, attacking the western parties for
negating on their obligations to protect the socially disadvantaged842• The PDS is also not
averse to showing its more populist colours when it talks about this issue. The PDS often
stresses the huge income differentials between rich and poor, relating this back to the relative
equality (with obvious exceptions) of citizens incomes in the GDR. Gregor Gysi polemically
commented in the Bundestag that:
840 Klaus-Jurgen Warnick (PDS): Wohnen ist Menschenrecht (Bonn: PDS im Bundestag, Rundbrief Nr. 15,
December 1997), p.3.
841 Infratest Dimap: Wahlreport Berlin /999 (Berlin: Infratest Dimap, 1999), p.12.
842 Gregor Gysi (PDS): 'Gerechtigkeit ist Modem', Dokumente zur programmatischen Debatte on
http://www.pds-online.de/programmdiskussion/9908/gysi-thesen.htm
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Between 1983 and 1989 the number of income millionaires in Germany rose from
just over 33,000 to around 56,000. Since 1989 the Federal Statistical Office (das
statistische Bundesamt) has stopped announcing these figures publicly.
Meanwhile, the number of income millionaires has risen by around 40 per cent,
and now there are roughly 100,000. Of these 100,000 people, roughly 1,000 earn
more than DMI0 million a year. Can anyone explain to me how anybody can put
in so much work that helshe should merit a wage of over DMIO million a year?!
There is simply no justification for this, even if helshe were to work all day and
all night and never sleeps43.
The PDS is, therefore, a vocal and visible advocate of 'equality' rather than 'freedom'
and 'social justice' as opposed to 'economic individualism'. The PDS has taken advantage of
the SPD's weakness in eastern Germany to profile itself in direct opposition to the CDU. The
PDS subsequently appears to be the only party articulating the considerable eastern
dissatisfaction with the economic realities of the German state. The PDS represents an
expressly eastern articulation of the social need for fairness, equality and solidarity within the
political process.
5.1.6. NATO, Kosovo and Foreign Affairs
The PDS articulates regional specificity on much of German foreign policy. Chapter
three illustrated that eastern Germans, mainly as a result of their socialisation within the GDR,
are much more sceptical about the role of NATO, the WEU and in their appreciation of what
role (if any) German soldiers should play in international (peace keeping) affairs. Falling as
they did in the Summer and Autumn of 1999, the elections to the European Parliament and to
the Landtage in Saxony, Brandenburg, Thuringia and Berlin offered the PDS the ideal
opportunity to profile itself as the 'anti-war' party - as the controversial 'Kosovo War' took
place in the early months of the same year. The PDS incorporated this into the title of its
1999 European election programme by claiming that "The Europe of the 21st Century needs
Peace, Employment and Democracy ..S44 and one of the key slogans of the PDS election
campaign subsequently became Europa schaffen ohne Waffen (Create a Europe without
weapons). The 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO planes, with the active participation
of German forces', explicitly highlighted, as was shown earlier in this work, the differences of
opinion in eastern and western Germany on a number of aspects of foreign policy. Aside
843 Gregor Gysi, speech to the Federal Parliament on 27 November 1996, in Gregor Gysi (1998): op. cit. p.19.
844 PDS: 'FUr einen Kurswechsel in Europa. Du Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts braucht Frieden, Arbeit und
Demokratie', Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialtsmus (Berlin: Wahlburo der PDSt
1999).
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from the POS, all parties that were represented in the Bundestag were in favour of the
attacks845• The POS, calling on the pacifist traditions of the Friedensbewegung (Peace
Movement), as well as the clear popular reluctance of a majority of eastern Germans to
support the bombings, spent the duration of the war condemning the actions of what it viewed
as western imperialism. It profiled itself as the 'anti-war party', organising peace
demonstrations'i", public displays of popular dissent847, distributing anti-war newspapers and
other 'peace-orientated' literature. Lothar Bisky illustrated how clearly the POS was able to
profile itself on the issue of Kosovo when he observed that:
the opinion polls that the federal party has commandeered prove unequivocally
that it is not just us, the POS activists who are against this form of military
activity by German soldiers. Our party is against it. The vast majority of POS
voters are against it. And the majority of Germans are against it848•
Gregor Gysi further illustrated this in the Sondersitzung (special sitting) of the
Bundestag on the issue of the Yugoslavian War on the 15 April 1999, when he bemoaned the
ineffectiveness of war as a policy instrument.
You cannot avoid one simple truth about this war. Not a single bomb that has
been directed at Yugoslavia - and I have seen849 all those people who have been
injured by them, all the factories that have been ruined by them, the buildings that
have been destroyed by them as well as a heating plant that has been put out of
action by them - ensuring that 200,000 people are freezing in a city with no
warmth - has been of any help at all85o•
84S Only Alliance 90/Greens showed any sign of being hesitant in showing their support although Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer eventually managed to persuade his party to follow his line.
846 Friedensdemonstrationen (peace demonstrations) were organised in the majority of eastern Germany's
major towns and cities. Most were held weekly, although special weekend demonstrations in Berlin were also
&eriodicallyorganised.
7 The PDS in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, for example, organised a concert in May 1999 called Kunstler
gegen den Krieg (Artists against the War), where musicians and popular entertainers performed in the name of
bringing the war with Yugoslavia to an end. Interview with Konstantin Brandt (PDS), AG Sport, Kreisverband
Parchim, Mecklenburg West Pomerania, Schwerin, 20 May 1999.
848 Lothar Bisky (PDS), speech to the Landesparteitag of the PDS in Saxony on the 11 April 1999 in
Schneeberg. PDS Pressedienst, Nummer 15, 15April 1999, p.4.
849 In early April 1999 Gregor Gysi paid a personal visit to Yugoslavia to speak with the Yugoslavian President
Siobadan Milosevic. His visit was strongly criticised in Germany, although Gysi and the PDS claimed that it
was an attempt at engineering dialogue between Milosevic and the West.
aso Gregor Gysi (PDS): An die Stelle des Wahnsinns des Krieges wieder die Vemunft setzen (Berlin:
Landesvorstand der PDS Berlin, 1999), p.8.
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The Kosovo crisis was a clear and unambiguous case of the PDS standing alone as a
representative of eastern German sentiment. The PDS alone represented the majority opinion
in the eastern states that rejected the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia.
For the PDS, the need to demilitarise international relations and to insert a civilian
dimension to global conflict solution has the highest priority. The PDS is clear in its rejection
of any expansion of the WEU into a military arm of the EU85!, and the party is of the opinion
that Europe needs to be an area that is completely devoid of nuclear weapons852. The
weapons industry should be transformed into an industrial sector geared to improving
"civilian production" capaciry!", while NATO should be abolished altogether and Russia
incorporated into a new European security frameworkf". Eastern Germans displayed deep
unease at NATO's willingness to unilaterally launch attacks on Yugoslavia in 1999, and the
PDS was active in stressing that if NATO was going to continue to have any role, it must be
under the auspices of the UN. International law is something that the PDS continually
stresses has to be adhered to at all times855.
The OSCE also needs, in the opinion of the PDS, to be broadened into an organisation
that fosters a non-military security structure across Europe, while the United Nations needs to
be given much increased powers to enable it to effectively keep the global powers (principally
the USA) in check856. The UN and the OSCE must, together, be the fundament of new
European security structures (particularly in light of the proposed abolition of both NATO
and the WEU), while expensive projects such as the Eurofighter and new attack helicopters
should be rejected857. The role of the Bundeswehr should also be severely restricted:
principally to one defending German and NATO territory, rather than as a part of
international Einsatztruppe (international rapid-reaction force)858. The PDS envisages both
the abolition of national service and a 65 per cent reduction in the number of Bundeswehr
troopsto around 100,000859.
The PDS is therefore articulating the pacifist leanings of a citizenry that lived in a
highly militarised state (the GDR) and is inherently more sceptical about the need and
8S1 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: op. cit. p.42.
8S2 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid. p.42.
853 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid. p.43.
8S4 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid. p.43.
8SS PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid. p.42.
8S6 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid. p.43.
857 •Fur eine 100,000 Personen-Armee', inNeues Deutschland, 19 May 2000, p.I4.
858 'Fur eine 100,000 Personen-Annee', inNeues Deutschland, 19 May 2000, p.I4.
859 •Der PDS reichen 100,000 Mann', in Neues Deutschland, 17 May 2000, p.I,
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legitimacy of armed combat in general, and German participation in such events in particular
(see chapter three) than is the case in western Germany.
5.1.7. The Euro and The European Union
Eastern Germans remain more 'eurosceptical' than western Germans. This includes
greater scepticism towards the institutions of the EU, as well as the processes of European
integration and European enlargement. This came to a very public head in the immediate
period in the run-up to the implementation of the Euro in 1999, but this should not
overshadow the fact that latent scepticism of the integration process has long been persistently
more evident across the eastern states than it has been in the West (see chapter three).
The PDS does define itself as a "European socialist party" within the context of the
European Union86o• But this acceptance, mirroring the territorial sentiment held in the eastern
states, is certainly not unequivocal, and the PDS is quick to point out that it is highly critical
of the EU in its present form861• Alonso Puerta observes, for example, that the PDS
politicians are "critical Europeans that are of the opinion - Europe yes, but not like this!,,862.
Or, in the words of the PDS Spitzenkandidatin at the 1999 European election, Sylvia-Yvonne
Kaufmann, "the political nature and shape of the EU of the future is not yet known, and it is
this that offers a left-wingparty like the PDS the opportunity to exert influence on the future
shape of the Union,,863.
,
The issue of the Euro became a barometer of this. While the PDS supports the idea of
a European wide currency in principlef", it was exceptionally critical of the restrictive strait-
jackets, in the form of the economic convergence criteria, that were placed on European
economies in order to make them lean enough to enter.· The PDS chose to stress the
importance of creating what it describes as a 'social union' in order to protect against rising
unemployment and increased economic insecurity - and to encourage an ecological, social and
democratic process of European integration. The PDS remained the only party in the
860 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: op. cit. p.l.
861 POS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid, p.l.
862 Alonso Puerta (POS): 'Der Kampf gegen das neoliberale Europa braucht aile Krafte", speech at the PDS
Conference in Suhl, March 1999, inPDS Disput, Nummer 3, Mm 1999, pp.16-17.
863 Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (POS): 'Wir wollen Europa schaffen ohne Waffen', speech at the POS conference
in Subl, March 1999, in PDS Disput, Nummer 3, Miirz 1999, pp.11-15.
864 The POS does see advantages in a single currency: currency speculation between the currencies of European
countries would be eliminated, granting investors more long-term security; costs of currency exchange would be
abolished; it would be possible to directly compare the costs and prices of goods and services across the entire
European Union, increasing economic transparency. See 'Euro? So nicht! Gemeinsarne europaische Wahrung -
Fragen und Antworten' in PDS im Bundestag (Bonn: Arbeitsbereich AuBen- und Friedenspolitik, 1997).
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.Bundestag to vote against the implementation of the Euro, and as such it was articulating
considerable popular sentiment in the eastern states. The PDS saw the advantages that were
to be gained through a single currency as being beneficial mainly to large companies in order
for them to be able to compete at the trans-national level. Such companies remain more
mobile than workers are, and it is these companies that benefit from economies of scale.
Hence the PDS demanded increased social protection in the face of the forces of international
economic competition.
While accepting that these advantages were helpful to industry, the PDS energetically
voiced concerns about the 'social' effects of the currency union. The PDS predicted that
downsizing and increases in economic efficiency would inevitably lead to increases in
unemployment, a decrease in wages (in the long-term) and a decrease in job securitl65• This
corresponds to the negative feelings that many Easterners have with regard to future economic
development in the eastern states. Small and medium sized companies will, according to the
PDS, find themselves in a yet-more competitive market place - resulting in more job losses, as
competition forces firms to streamline their operations. The social net would have to be
drastically curtailed, so as to lower costs for companies to remain viable, and to allow
countries to cut deficits in order to reel in their national debts, All of these effects were likely
to be more pronounced, according to PDS politicians, in the East.
The eastern states are already a test-bed in terms of neo-liberal economics.
Eastern German employees are already told that if they do not work under the
agreed wage agreements, then the firm will simply go bust. This process will
simply be transposed onto the European level when the Euro highlights the fact
that differing wage levels are paid for the same work on a Europe wide basis866
At its most populist, the PDS claimed that Europe was on the verge of a violent
dumping competition in both low wages and decreasing social standards, as capitalism
ravaged the weaker sectors of the European economl67,
Hence the PDS is vocal in its call for more citizens rights in the area of social policy,
and this became a central plank of the PDS's election campaign in 1999868• The PDS was the
865 For a detailed analysis of the PDS's position on the Euro, see Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann: Die Euro-Falle:
Pltidoyer flJr ein soziales Europa (Berlin: Dietz, 1999). For discussion of the likely effects of the Euro's
implementation on jobs, job security and the labour market see in particular pp.116-117.
866 Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufinann (1999): ibid. p.12!.
867 'Euro? So nicht! Gemeinsame europsische Wlihrung _Fragen und Antworten' in PDS im Bundestag (1997):
op. cit.
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only German party, in the words of Lothar Bisky, that "put issues of social protection, labour
market policy and ecological politics ahead of the Euro", as such emphasising eastern
German angst both about the social and economic environment, and the wisdom of joining the
Euro-zone under present conditions869• The 'social union' that the PDS calls for is aimed at
''preventing competition to provide the lowest wages, the weakest forms of social protection
and the most ineffective social and trade union rights", and represents clear eastern German
demands for increased security in everyday life as well as a defence of the working classes87o•
EMU needs to be, in the minds of the PDS, regulated by the combined forces of not just a
social union, but also an employment and ecological union - all flying in the face of the neo-
liberal logic of th~ integration dynamic thus far87). The employment strategies advocated by
the PDS at the European level mirror their national strategies: reductions in the number of
hours that citizens work each day, every week, every year and throughout their lives; a
reduction in the permitted amount of overtime and so forth872•
The PDS also articulates issues that are of particular salience in the eastern states, as a
result of experiences garnered in the transformation process, within the European arena.
These include lack of suitable democratic representation in the political process in Europe (as
well as in Germany), disquiet at high rates of unemployment (across Europe) and the
dominance of large companies in the (German and European) marketplace. The PDS
supports the introduction of a European constitution, as it aims to broaden its initiative to
'democratise democracy' onto the European level873• The PDS also stresses the need to make
the EU more open to its citizenry, as it aims to democratise the EU's institutional structures
and workings'i". "Now more than ever before the European Union is suffering from
insufficient democratic legitimisation,,87s claimed the PDS in its 1999 European election
manifesto, before continuing:
868 The PDS produced a number of placards on this theme. They included "Demokratisch, Gerecht, Zivil. Fur
ein soziales Europa. PDS" (Democratic, Just and Civil: For a Social Europe. PDS), "Sozial und Solidarisch in
Europa. PDS" (Social and Solidaristic in Europe. PDS) and "Europa ftlr aile. PDS" (Europe for all. PDS).
869 Lothar Bisky (PDS): 'Ein gemeinsamer Wille und Geist des Politikwechsels muJ3unsere Wahlklimpfe
bestimmen', speech to the PDS Conference in Suhl, March 1999, in PDS Disput, Number 3, Marz 1999, pp.3-10.
870 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Parte; des Demokratischen Sozialismus: op. cit.
871 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Parte; des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid; See also Sylvia-
Yvonne Kaufmann (1999): op. cit. p.12S. .
872 PDS (1999): Europawahlprogramm der Parte; des Demokratischen Sozialismus: ibid.
873 See Andre Brie (PDS): 'Zugunsten von Koalitionszwlingen nicht Prinzipien aufgeben. Andre Brie tiber
Bundnisse mit der SPD, Europapolitik und den Reformprozef der PDS', in Fretes Wort, 6 March 1999.
874 http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenidokumente/europawahlprogramml02.htm
m http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenidokumente/europawahlprogramml02.htm
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The European Parliament was indeed given more powers in the Treaty of
Amsterdam, but one is still not in a position where citizens of the European Union
can democratically take part in politics at the European level. The results of this
are scepticism, mistrust and distance from the European Union and from the
process of European integration!".
These calls correspond to the PDS's national calls for a reform of the democratic
procedures in the FRG, with a particular emphasis on increased citizen participation. The
onset of ever closer union has made the reform of the political structures of the EU ever more
urgent, as:
... it is now clearer than ever before that it is vitally important to politically
reform the European Union. This is in order to correct the imbalance that
currently ensures a contradiction between single market and economic and
monetary union on the one hand, and the lack of democratic participation and of a
political union on the other877•
The PDS proposes to do this by:
• the inclusion of inviolable fundamental, human rights in European Union treaties878•
• the Beseitigung of the increasing centralisation of power within the Executive branch and
the bureaucracy through increased representative democracy, above all in the European
Parliament (EP) and the national parliaments. This would include giving the EP the right
to elect the President of the European Commission and the European Commissioners and
the implementation of a single electoral system across all member states. It would also
include giving national parliaments clear opportunities to participate in the decision-
making processes at the European level.
• more opportunities for popular participation and for more direct democracy in European
politics. In cases of fundamental importance to the future development of the EU, such as
treaty changes, expansion plans and so forth plebiscites would be held in all member states.
• the democratisation of employment and economic activity. This would mean increased,
institutionalised rights for trade unions, and for citizens to have the right of consultation at
the work place879•
876 http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenidokumente/europawahlprogramml02.htm
877 http://www.pds-online.delwahlenidokumente/europawahlprogramml02.htm
178 It is clear that the parties of the left remain the biggest critics of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. The
PDS, the French Communist Party, the Italian Communist Party, the Spanish Communist Party and, to an extent,
the Portuguese Communist Party are all highly critical of the capitalist emphasis in these treaties. See Peter
Christian Segall and Rita Schorpp-Grabiak (1999): op. cit. p.l3.
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Populist terms are also invoked. The PDS has, for example, called for the European
governments and institutions to make a concerted effort to reduce stubbornly high rates of
unemployment. In the words of Andreas Wehr the PDS suggests that:
the aim of high levels of em&loyment ... (should be taken) ... into consideration by
the European Central Bank 0. In the future this aim should be accorded at least
the same priority as monetary stability. In the current situation; this means a clear
drop in interest rates in order to stimulate demand881•
The PDS claims that the 'guidelines' that currently exist with regard to encouraging
employment at the European level are seen as being far too weak to have any genuine effect,
and they must be lifted up to the level of high profile aims that individual governments have
to fulfil - or they should be made to face financial penalties. The PDS repeats many of the
claims that it forwards at the national level: overtime should be reduced across Europe, the
working day, the working week, the working year and the amount of time citizens work in
their lifetimes should also all be reduced882• Wehr provocatively claims, for example, that if
the aim of a reduction in unemployment by half in each European state had been adopted
(with appropriate financial penalties for non-achievement) as one of the convergence criteria
for entry into monetary union, then unemployment would not be at its current high levels883•
Lothar Bisky further demands that the European Central Bank be placed under political
control, in the form of the European Parliament, so that coherent, transparent European-wide
strategies be developed, by accountable politicians, in order to tackle Europe's disastrously
high unemployment figures884• Alonso Puerta adds that only a European government can
ensure that the Europeanisation of economic policies can be democratically controlled''".
879 http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenidokumente/europawahlprogramml02.htm
880 Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann has explicitly called for the European Central Bank (ECB) not just to have price
stability as its key aim, but also to take into account specific social and employment goals - i.e. to aim for full
employment Europe-wide, and to create the economic conditions suitable for achieving nachhaltige Entwicklung
~sustainable growth). See Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (1999): op. cit. p.12S.
81 Andreas Wehr (PDS): 'Nach der Wahrungs- nun die Beschaftigungsunion?', on http://www.pds-
online.de/disputl9811l39712.html See also PDS Disput, Number 11,November 1998.
882 See http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenidokumente/europawahlprogramml02.htrn and Sylvia-Yvonne
Kaufmann (1999): op. cit. p.127.
883 Andreas Wehr (PDS) (1998): op. cit.
884 Lothar Bisky (PDS): 'Ein gemeinsamer Wille und Geist des Politikwechsels mull unsere Wahlkampfe
bestimmen', speech to the PDS Conference in Suhl, March 1999, in PDS Disput, Number 3, Marz 1999, ppJ-IO.
See also http://www.pds-online.de/wahlenidokumente/europawahlprogramml02.htrn
885 Alonso Puerta (PDS): 'Der Kampf gegen das neoliberale Europa braucht aile Krafte', speech at the PDS
Conference in Suhl, March 1999, in PDS Disput, Number 3, Marz 1999, pp.16-17.
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Hence the PDS articulates deep-seated scepticism about the processes of European
integration that are evident in eastern Germany. The PDS does not reject the EU as an
institution, but it has grave misgivings about the European Union's democratic nature, its
capitalist instincts and its manipulation by big business. European policy is an area where the
PDS has been at its most successful in articulating territorial uniqueness in the eastern states.
Western Germans have grown up with the European Union, and accept it as a fundamental
necessity if Europe is to enjoy peace and prosperity in the future. Easterners, meanwhile,
remain broadly pro-European, but this has not prevented critical standpoints from being taken
on many of the EU's shortcomings. The PDS is the only party that articulates this in the
political arena, and the PDS is not slow to put the CDU and the SPD in the same boat with
regard to being responsible for developing and supporting some of the EU's
Fehlorientierungen.
5.1.S. Bodenreform
The PDS also actively tackles the controversial issue of the Bodenreform. Many
eastern Germans have either lost what they perceived to be their property (or are still unsure
as to the future of what they currently own) as a result of the Kohl Government's policy of
returning property confiscated during the SED dictatorship to its former owners. The PDS is
against the continued insecurity on issues of property ownership, and as such actively
supports the retention of the Bodenreform that was passed in March 1989 in the GDR. As the
1998 Federal Election programme states:
We energetically condemn all attempts to reverse the law concerning the
Bodenreform. The federal law on 'rights of property holders on property resulting
from the Bodenreform of6 March 1990' should be completely abolished886•
The PDS is particularly critical of the Entschadigungs- und Ausgleichsleistungsgesetz
(EALG) of 1994, which the PDS sees as a fundamental contravention of eastern German
rights. The PDS accuses the Federal Government of serving the interests of western
capitalists - and neglecting the interests of eastern Germans who, in some cases, see their
livelihoods compromised as a result:
886 PDS Bundestagswahlprogramm (1998): op. cit. p.32.
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The facts of the matter are that this law ... (the EALG) ... opens the floodgates for
former owners of property (Alteigentumen to claim land in eastern Germany back
for themselves. This leaves eastern Germans in a permanently disadvantageous.
position. The land is been taken literally away from underneath their feet. This is
not a suitable balance of interests between different sides, this is politics on behalf
of a distinct interest group887.
The PDS is therefore being an explicit defender of eastern German interests, in that it
seeks to be the political articulation of eastern contempt for a policy that is perceived as
assisting western German former land owners. The PDS remains convinced that:
only the concerted defence of the legally and judicially correct decision not too
grant the owners of property confiscated in the period 1945-1949 their land back,
safeguards the livelihoods of the many eastern German who have built their lives
up, often over decades, on the basis of being the owners of this property. There
still remain over 1.5 million hectares, fields, meadows, woods, heathland, that
qualify as Bodenreforrnland. Everything else has long since got its western owner
888
Lothar Bisky has further added that:
The aggressive defence of the Bodenreforrn is not a nostalgic attempt to defend
former East German 'achievements' (Errungenschaften). Rather, it is a defence
of the legitimate, and in the documents on unification expressly defended,
interests of many eastern Germans - concurrently combined with a real
opportunity to propagate something new for all of Germany889.
Klaus Bartl, a PDS member of the state Parliament in Saxony has further added that:
Thousands of citizens and families have been chased off their property and are
having to pursue long-winded and expensive legal claims in order to fight off the
restitution claims of Alteigentiimer. The principle of Rilckgabe vor
Entschddigung (the return of property in preference to compensation) deprives
eastern Germans of their rights and is the cause of much Lebenstragik (personal
tragedy) in the eastern states890•
887 Lothar Bisky (PDS): speech at the Rostock Party Conference, 3 April 1998, in PDS Pressedienst, Nummer
15-16,17 April 1998, p.13.
888 Lothar Bisky (PDS) (1998): ibid, p.13.
889 Lothar Bisky (PDS) (1998): ibid. p.14.
890 Klaus Bartl (PDS): in PDS-Fraktion irn Sachsischen Landtag: Sachsische Verfassung und Wirklichkeit: Eine
Festschrift der PDS-Fraktion der Slichsischen Landtag zum 5. Jahrestag der Sachstschen Verfassung am 26.
Mai J 997 (1997): op. cit. p.8.
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The northern areas of eastern Germany, in areas like Mecklenburg and West
Pomerania, have suffered particularly strongly from the policy of 'return rather than
compensate', as their large agricultural sectors have seen numerous claims made upon them.
This has led the PDS to be particularly active at all level in Mecklenburg West Pomerania, as
it seeks to avoid more land passing into the hands of western German owners. As GUnther
Rogin, the PDS leader in the Ludwigslust Kreistag has claimed:
... (there is a need) ... to change the existing laws on the land reform in order to
alter the bias towards the previous owner. The Kreistag condemns the new and
rejuvenated attempt to revise the Bodenreform, in contravention of the rights and
interests of eastern Germans, and in particular eastern German farmers. The
implementation of this law would have negative consequences for citizens who
live and work in the country, as well as deepening and cementing eastern German
disadvantages in terms of property ownership. This is completely unacceptable -
particularly in the context of Gennan-Gennan growing together and the future
development of inner-unity with Germany''".,
The PDS is therefore articulating territorial specific sentiment with regard to property
ownership. The PDS is a vocal (if not particularly effective in this case) defender of eastern
German property owners in the face of attempts by western Germans to claim land back that
they once, many years ago, used to own.
5.2. Concluding Remarks
Section 2.4.2.3. illustrated that regional parties have a particular set of territorially
specific policies which underpin their political support. The nature and scope of their policies
will depend very much on the regional context. In many cases the policy package of regional
parties will be articulated in 'ethnonationalist' terms, as parties seeking achieve improved
rights and privileges for a particular ethnic group. In other cases they may involve achieving
a restructuring of the nation-state (this may, of course, also be an intrinsic aim of
ethnonationalist parties as well), the defence of economic prosperity or the preservation of a
unique culture.
This chapter has illustrated that the unique policy package of the PDS is based around
articulating eastern German interests within the political arena. In order to do this the PDS
has understood what makes eastern Germans different (chapter three), it has understood how
891 Gunther Rogin (PDS): in Kommunal Spezia/ (Schwerin: Kommunalpolitsches Forum Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern e. V, March 1998), p.3.
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best it can take advantage of the structural assets it is fortunate enough to possess (chapter
four) and it has developed unique policy approaches that both differentiate it from other all-
German parties and allow it to effectively represent the demands of a broad cross-section of
the eastern German population in the political process. The PDS remains the only political
party to effectively conceptualise the attitudinal and value differences that were illustrated in
chapter three within the national legislature, as well as the regional and local parliaments in
eastern Germany. The policies on which the PDS has built its unique programmatic platform
are therefore specific representations of eastern German interests - and it is by successfully
re-adapting to the contours of political competition in the eastern states that it has created a
niche for itself that enables it to rest agenda setting functions from both the SPD and the
CDU.
The policy package that the PDS espouses may indeed not be widely regarded as
applicable for solving the social and economic problems of eastern Germany, but there is a
growing acceptance that in certain areas (the attainment of social justice, the defence of
eastern German uniqueness, pacifism and so forth) the PDS is regarded as a capable and
effective political actor. The PDS is taken seriously by electors as a legitimate actor that is
seeking a 'better deal' for the citizens of eastern Germany. The policies that the PDS
advocates represent, in a way that only a party with clear roots in the eastern German
community can do, the feelings and dispensations of a large minority of the eastern German
populace. This is as the PDS is the visible representative of the cleavage divide that splits the
eastern and western states.
The PDS has successfully moulded elements of both continuity and change into its
political platform. It has developed an agenda that neither rejects the GDR past, nor glorifies
it. The PDS also manages to incorporate elements of theoretical continuity (i.e.
egalitarianism, a rejection of NATO and of capitalist economics and so forth) and clear
change (Le. the acceptance that the market must play a role in economic management,
proposals to 'democratise democracy' and so on) - incorporating key elements of the eastern
German identity into its own political platform,
This chapter brings to a close the main body of the argument that runs through this
thesis. The sixth and final chapter of this work brings the strands of the thesis' argument
together and sums up the key findings.
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Chapter Six
6. Conclusions
,.
6.1. Summary of Research
This work set out with a number of key aims. Firstly, it aimed to throw new light on
the reasons for the political success of the PDS in eastern Germany. It also aimed to construct
an analytical framework suitable for analysing parties that restrict themselves (or are
restricted by external constraints) to a particular territory: a typology of regional parties.
Chapter one highlighted that other authors have tended to adopt one of four broad, if
often inter-linked, approaches when seeking to understand the political success of the PDS.
Protest has been a key fundament behind PDS support, and all authors acknowledge the key
role that it has played in the PDS's electoral stabilisation. Easterners have sought to
demonstrate their dissatisfaction with elements of the society within which they now live by
voting for the 'anti-establishment' PDS. This approach gained particular credence in the early
and mid-1990s when the PDS successfully expanded its voter base beyond the hard core of
former SED functionaries and supporters. In later years, however, the rise of the extreme-
right has indicated that the nature of 'protest' has changed - and that the PDS voter base is
more aligned with the party than many originally suspected.
The second approach tends to view the PDS more as the party itself wishes to be
viewed: as a modem, reforming, socialist party. This is an approach that is advocated by a
minority of authors, and those that tend towards it often do so from left-wing positions. None
the less, it highlights that the PDS is clearly a left-wing party, whose ideological distaste of
capitalism is resonant in their political work. The major problem that authors who adopt this
approach inevitably come across is the PDS's clear and unambiguous failure to register any
success at the western German polls. Socialist or not, the PDS remains a party that is a
prominent and well-organised political actor in the East, but a non-actor in the West. While it
is clear that all parties have heartlands as well as areas where their basis of support is weaker,
the discrepancies in the PDS vote are too extreme to be classified as such. Hence the PDS
remains an eastern German regional party, and not an all-German socialist party.
Proponents of the third approach have produced the most (in terms of quantity)
academic analyses on the PDS, stressing what they perceive as 'extremist' and 'anti-
democratic' tendencies. They see the PDS as a threat to Germany's stable parliamentary
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system of governance, and are highly sceptical of both the PDS's aims and methods. This
body of work does illustrate that the PDS is not yet a 'normal' party. It also points out that
some of the extreme-left elements of the party have what can best be called ambiguous views
on the nature of parliamentary democracy. However, this approach offers little in explaining
the political success of the PDS. It concentrates on internal party mechanics (and often in a
politically partisan fashion) and does not seek to explain how the PDS has reached where it is
today.
The final approach discusses the PDS as a milieu based eastern German interest party.
Much of the analysis that these authors offer helps to understand the nature of the PDS's
success through its stabilisation within distinct social and cultural milieu. The PDS is seen as
representing societal groups that remain unable or unwilling to come to terms with life in the
FRG. It is therefore this author's contention that the analysis produced by these writers is the
most enlightening in terms of explaining the longevity of the PDS, as it concentrates on the
PDS's political work in its social, cultural and political Heimat. The one major drawback of
this approach is its inherent short-termism. The PDS is still largely viewed as a transitory
phenomenon that will fade away as Easterners become more like Westerners. This is in spite
of the clear and unambiguous cultural, social and economic differences that exists between
the new and old federal states.
This work has attempted to approach the study of the PDS from a hybrid regional
perspective. While it is clear that all of the approaches discussed offer valuable insights into
the development of the party, none of them explicitly discuss the PDS in the context of the
cultural, economic, social and political cleavage divide that has stabilised along the former
inner-German border. Hence rather than just concentrate on the internal mechanics of the
eastern German case, a broad regionalist framework has been adopted, illustrating that the
PDS has been politically successful as a result of its unique understanding and political
representation of territorially specific interests. It is, therefore, successful because of its
territorial anchorage - much as, so it was hypothesised, other regional (nationalist) parties are.
It is for this reason that a typology of political regionalism and regional parties was created.
Chapter two explored regional parties in the context of the academic literature on both
political regionalism and party systems. It illustrated that regional parties are not easy
political actors to clarify and that they have been the subject of remarkably little academic
research. Yet it remains clear that where they succeed, they make use of a territorial cleavage
divide that exists between the region and the larger nation-state. Regional parties are able, on
account of their anchoring within the economic, social and political structures of that
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particular region, to articulate unique territorial sentiment within the political process. This
may take any number of differing forms, but it is always based on the articulation of regional
interests that 'national' parties are not ably to fully (and sometimes not even partially)
incorporate into their political programmes. Chapter two aimed to create a tool that would
enable this thesis to analyse the regional successes of the PDS in eastern Germany, as well as
contribute towards a greater understanding of regional party success in the wider democratic
world. The tool that was created was a typology of the structural and causal factors inherent
in political regionalism and, secondly, of the agency factors in evident in the mobilisation of
this regionalism.
The first typology aimed to highlight the structural processes that underpin the
creation of a quantifiably differing political environment - defined in this work as a 'regional
space'. It was hypothesised that the existence of a form of regional identification is necessary
if a regional party is going to successfully mobilise regional political sentiment. The typology
was also created in a flexible enough way so as to be able to incorporate other important
factors that demarcate regions from the 'centre'. This is as no one factor alone is sufficient to
explain the existence of a 'regional space'. Hence cross-cutting cultural and socio-economic
cleavages were all seen to play fundamental roles in the creation of regional uniqueness and
regional identities - and this became evident in the development of the typology in section
2.4., as well as in its application to Bavaria (section 2.5.) and eastern Germany (chapter three).
Furthermore, if the concept is to have any meaning for the population at large, the core
territory must have some value -. in emotional or psychological terms - to a significant
number of the regions residents - and a significant number must therefore identify with the
region as a unit. Citizens of the region will do this if, firstly, there are clear signs of
difference available and, secondly, if societal actors are able to mould these structural
variables into a coherent entity.
The analysis in section 2.4. illustrated that other structural factors also play important
roles in creating the uniqueness of each regional space, even if they are not evident in each
and every case. Where a number of territorially salient structural variables cross-cut (Le.
ethno-cultural difference and economic weaknesses) regional identities and the dynamics of
regional difference will be of more salience. Both eastern Germany and, to an even greater
extent, Bavaria are examples of regional spaces where a number of structural variables re-
enforce the territorial divide. Although it is not possible to weight each case in real terms
(each region is too unique for such an exercise to have any explanatory value), it is clear that a
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propensity towards greater regional uniqueness, in the shape of a strong regional identity and
regional political system, indicates that the regional space will be more clearly defined.
Economic disparity is one of the most divisive structural variables and in certain cases
it has proven to be a key marker in regional debates. The case of Belgium remains the most
explicit case, as the Dutch and French speaking areas of the country remain divided not just
linguistically but also by differences in prosperity. Northern Italy and Canada also remain
highly prominent cases of economic diversity shaping the nature of political debate and social
attitudes in particular regions.
Having analysed the key determinants that lie behind the creation of regional spaces,
the thesis moved on to discuss the methods that actors (parties) used in mobilising such
differences within the political arena. Although regional parties are heterogeneous in nature,
they still display a number of common characteristics and determinants that differentiate them
from 'national' parties.
The second typology illustrated that regional parties must accomplish two tasks.
Firstly, they must articulate tenets of a regional identity within the political process. Regional
parties must appreciate what it is that psychologically and socially differentiates citizens of
the region from citizens of the larger nation-state. They must then transform this into a
recognisable set of regional policies and issues. This overlaps with the second imperative for
regional party success: the creation of a 'big idea'. Regional parties need a key raison d'etre:
or set of policies with which they are instantly recognisable. Examples of this include the
preservation of cultural rights (PC), the representation of an ethnic minority (the Siidtiroler
Volkspartei) and preservation of economic affluence (Lega Nord). Both the CSU and the
PDS have their own 'big ideas': the representation of Bavarian and Eastern German
uniqueness as well as the articulation of broader territorial interests in the political process.
The second part of the typology revealed that a number of other factors assist in the
facilitating of regional party success: although it is clear that the variety of regional parties
ensures that no other factors are as visible as the above two mentioned factors. Strong
leadership appears to have been important in initially establishing and then stabilising a
regional party within a given political system, and a number of parties have had both
particularly charismatic leaders who have served their parties for many years. Both the 'PDS
and the CSU have benefited from this phenomenon. In spite of the tendency for charismatic
leaders to lead regional parties, it is also clear that the importance of motivating and
empowering members has also been understood. Some parties have successfully mixed the
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two phenomenon (PC, RW), while others have shifted the emphasis more towards member
participation (FDF, PNV) in the knowledge that it is an important way of ensuring vote
maximisation at election time. As later sections revealed, both the CSU and the PDS have
clearly benefited from their strong organisational presence in their respective regions.
Chapter two also undertook to apply the typology to the cases of Bavaria and its
regional party, the CSU. The CSU's role as a Bavarian regional party was discussed in order
to illustrate that a party already exists that mobilises regional sentiment within the German
party political system. The application of the typology emphasised that Bavarian interests and
self-perceptions are uniquely articulated by 'Bavaria's party'. A distinct regional political
culture has developed over and above Bavarian micro-regional cultures - and the CSU has
grown, over the last thirty years in particular, to be the political representative of this. The
CSU is therefore a regional party that articulates territorial sentiment much as the PDS does in
eastern Germany - and as such a discussion of the methods and means that it employs in
doing this is useful in highlighting the success that regionally specific political parties are able
to enjoy within the Federal Republic. This Bavarian identity is more religious, traditional and
conservative than that of other Germans. Bavarians are also highly conscious of this
difference and the CSU has been electorally successful as it has encapsulated Bavarian
identity into it's raison d'etre, The CSU has indeed come to be seen as the political voice of
Bavarianism and Bavaria in turn as a CSU state. The discussion of the CSU therefore
illustrated that regional political mobilisation already occurs in the FRG - and that the PDS's
success in the eastern states mirrors, from a structural point of view, that of the CSU in
Bavaria.
Having developed the typology in chapter two and applied it to Germany's other
regional party, chapter three carried the discussion further by applying the first part of the
typology to eastern Germany. This enabled the cultural and socio-economic cleavages
between eastern and western Germany to be de-constructed in terms of the creation of a
separate sense of identity in the eastern states. The typology helped to illustrate that
Easterners possess a set of attitudinal and cultural characteristics that differentiate them from
their western brethren. These span a broad set of topics, issues and contentious social
debates. The typology helped to demonstrate that it is the complex interaction of pre-1989
socialisation and post-1989 lived experience that has led to differing conceptions of the state,
of German politics, economics and society as well as the place of the individual (western
and/or eastern) German within this. While the eastern identity of defiance is clearly not a
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monolithic construction, it is clear that when it is measured against the dominant norms that
govern (western) German society, eastern Germans have clear and relatively unambiguous
attitudes, expectations and preferences that have much more in common with those of other
Easterners than they do with Westerners.
The second part of the typology was applied in chapters four and five to the PDS at
the regional and federal level. The aim was to test the hypothesis that the PDS mobilises the
key tenets of 'eastern Germanism' within the national and regional political arenas. It was
hypothesised that the PDS was likely to exhibit similar characteristics to other political parties
who prosper on account of their success at articulating particular regional political sentiment.
Chapter four emphasised that the PDS has been able to mobilise support as a result of
the societal cleavage that the unification of Germany helped to spawn. The PDS has the
capacity to mobilise Easternness as a result of its own political heritage (i.e. its 'eastern
Germanness'), its political orientation (Le. its left-wing nature) and its position as the only
genuine eastern German political actor. The PDS is in possession of a number of
organisational (its large and politically active membership) and genetic (in view of its
heritage) advantages over the other political parties. The PDS is able to concentrate on
articulating specifically eastern German concerns about broken biographies and the alleged
discrimination towards Easterners, just as it is able to disown itself of political responsibility
on account of its lack of participation in governing coalitions at the federal and regional
level892• This has enabled it to tap-in to the unique set of political attitudes and circumstances'
that exist in the eastern states.
,Chapter five discusses the unique policy package that the PDS has developed. The
PDS's programmatic agenda' centres around the political articulation of eastern German
interests. Chapter three empirically illustrated the variables that contribute to the eastern
German identity of defiance, while chapter four illustrated how the PDS has developed a
capacity to articulate this. Chapter five illustrates that the PDS proactively articulates eastern
German uniqueness as it has developed a policy package that is representative of eastern
German specificity: in its scepticism towards the capitalist system, in its criticisms of the
892 This is in spite of the PDS participation as a silent partner in Saxony Anhalt (since 1994) and as an active,
minority partner in Mecklenburg West Pomerania (since 1998). The lack of state elections in the eastern states
in the forthcoming period (i.e. the next state elections in eastern Germany will be in the same year as the next
federal election (2002) in Mecklenburg West Pomerania) indicate that this position is unlikely to substantially
change in the foreseeable future. For an initial analysis of the SPD-PDS coalition in Mecklenburg West
Pomerania see Manfred Gerner: 'Die SPD-PDS Regierungskoalition in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Nagelprobe
fUr die Regierungsfahigkeit der SED-Nachfolgeorganisation', in Gerhard Hirscher & Peter Christian Segall
(Hrsg.): Die PDS: Zustand und Entwicklungsperspektiven (Milnchen: Hanns Seidel Stiftung, 2000), pp.97-108.
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western German-led transformation process, its attitude to the GDR, its emphasis on a more
active role for the state, its defence of 'social justice' and so forth.
The PDS concentrates on conceptualising eastern German uniqueness within the
policy arena. This dictates that the PDS's policy package is a peculiar mixture of defensive,
backwards looking policy proposals (Le. attempts to 'upgrade' eastern German qualifications
and experiences to a par with those of western Germans, to achieve an amnesty for GDR spies
and to protect those who served in the GDR's Dienstklasse from 'social discrimination'),
nominally left-wing proposals to alleviate eastern German inequalities (Le. proposals t~
equalise wages rates in eastern and western Germany, to achieve increased social security for
the unemployed, to fight against the Bodenreform and so forth) as well as the articulation of
other regionally specific issues (Le. eastern German scepticism of NATO, the mechanics and
the policies of the EU, democracy as it functions in the Federal Republic etc.). This, so it has
been argued, is what demarcates the PDS from its political competitors. It has developed an
image and a political platform that conceptualises what Easterners perceive as differences
.between themselves and Westerners. And it is this platform that has enabled the PDS to
achieve the electoral successes it has registered since the implosion of the GDR in 1989.
6.2. The Analytical Framework and Methodology
The analytical framework that was adopted in this thesis was an initial attempt at
understanding the nature of regional party success. The framework itself could not build on
any particular body of regional party literature - hence from the very beginning it was likely
that it the framework would need to be modified through both experience and trial and error.
The typology has proven to be an applicable tool for analysing the core hypothesis.
The first part of the typology enabled the nature of eastern German regional identification and
territorial uniqueness to be placed within the context of other regions. This is, in itself, a
unique contribution to the academic debates on the uniqueness of the eastern German
transformation process. The second part of the typology enabled the author to discuss at an
abstract level the key mobilisational and strategic factors that underpin regional party success.
The typology proved to be a simple and applicable vehicle for highlighting and discussing the
contributing factors in explaining the political and electoral success of regional parties.
However, there may in the future be scope for broadening and refining the typology in
some way. Future research may seek to apply the typology to particular cases of regional
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party success in other countries, and the findings of such research will no doubt help to enrich
the typology through further application.
The methodology that this work employed was, in the author's opinion, also valid and
rigorous. The opinion poll data employed in chapter three was spread across a variety of
polling organisations, and care was taken to ensure that bias in the choice of data used was
avoided. Differences between eastern and western Germans were stressed - while
commonalities were acknowledged, if not elaborated upon. A vast array of PDS primary
sources, spanning all policy issues, were collected and assessed. The analysis of the PDS's
ideological and programmatical positions was therefore comprehensive. Much of this was/is
available on the internet, but, wherever possible, attempts were made to obtain primary
documents first hand. The same can be said for material produced by the PDS in the
Mecklenburg West Pomerania state Parliament, where access to parliamentary debates and
bills was easily available. The minutes of Bundestag sessions and the PDS's work in the
federal parliament were obtained, for the most part, through electronic means - as the internet
and the Bundestag's internet resources ensure that obtaining such data remarkably simple.
Interviews proved interesting and thought-provoking, although not particularly useful
in the final welding together of the thesis's argument. Politicians and activists were always
open and friendly, but dissecting political rhetoric from hard and fast fact was not
straightforward. The semi-structured interviewing technique proved useful, as it enabled the
discussion to continue in a reasonably controlled manner, while giving the respondent the
opportunity to diverge to points of interest that they believed were important. Therefore while
not perfect (as politicians too often used the opportunity to make implicit political points) this
technique proved satisfactory.
6.3. The Core Hypothesis Reviewed
The core hypothesis of this work was that the electoral success of the PDS is based upon
the political mobilisation of uniquely eastern German cultural, social and political interests.
The analytical tools created in this thesis offered the opportunity for empirically testing such a
. hypothesis. And, as the analysis in chapters three, four and five highlighted, the PDS's
electoral success in eastern Germany has come about as a result of its successful articulation
of' eastern Germanness'. Voters may not tend to grant the PDS high ratings when it comes to
policy efficacy, but they do value the importance of having a uniquely eastern German actor
on the national and regional political stage. The POS possesses attributes that assist it in
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doing this (party organisation, a visible and articulate party leadership, the unique articulation
of regional symbols and characteristics and so forth) just as it has a policy package that
represents the ideological undertones of the eastern electorate (see chapter five).
The introduction of the CSU illustrated a discussion of Bavaria's regional party
highlights similarities with the PDS's ..position. Both political actors mobilise support along
the cleavage divides that have grown to historically divide them from the wider German
electorate as a whole. The structural distinctiveness of the Bavarian political, economic and
social landscape has allowed/encouraged the CSU to develop a broad political platform that is
more conservative, religiously orientated and economically flexible than that of the other
parties. This correlates strongly with the ideological and attitudinal positions of the Bavarian
electorate and has allowed the CSU to cement its position as a regional hegemon. The PDS,
meanwhile, has proved very successful at adapting to the structural particularities of eastern
German political, economic and social life. It, too, is firmly embedded within regional
structures, it is in possession of regionally advantageous organisational and rhetorical features
and is clearly 'at home' within the environment that helped to spawn it. The comparison of
the two parties therefore revealed the underlying similarities in their political development,
even if their policy positions and ideological orientations are diametrically opposed.
The PDS has, therefore, developed a political package that is unique and is representative
of regionally specific sentiment. However, if the PDS were ever to be in a position where its
policy approaches may have some influence on the national stage, then the issue of policy
practicality would no doubt rise in salience. In its current situation, the PDS has achieved
political success at the eastern German polls on account of fulfilling a function as an eastern
German party. Opinion poll data and programmatic orientation illustrate this clearly. The
PDS's rhetorical rejection of western German dominance, its perceived attempt at giving
legitimacy to East German lives and its defence of territorially specific economic concerns
and culturally unique eastern issues offers it political legitimisation in the eyes of the eastern
German electorate. This is something that the other parties, on account of the,ir western
German heritage, are unable to do.
This work also posited a supplementary hypothesis stating that a key determinant of
regional party success w~s the existence and high political and social salience of a territorial
identification. The analysis in chapters two and three highlighted the complex mosaic of
influences that contribute to the creation of regional identities, while chapters four and five
illustrated how one particular regional party has garnered support around its existence. It was
highlighted that regional parties do indeed prosper in regions where the population exhibits a
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sense of regional consciousness. This is inherent in regional party success as regional parties
need to create/articulate regional difference over and above other interests and salient
cleavage divides. The nature of regional identities are, of course, moulded around regionally
specific factors (be they historical, economic, social and/or political) and as such the scope of
any analysis that crosses national borders would need to be very large if it were to be all-
inclusive. Hence the evidence presented in chapter two is useful in highlighting that regional
identities play significant roles in regional party success - but it is not able to illustrate causal
linkages. Individual case studies of particular regional parties in their own regional
environment are required to do this. Chapter two did, none the less, illustrate that if a regional
party is going to be successful it needs to base its political profile around regionally salient
issues: and for these issues to have sufficient enough salience to be recognised across the
regional population, residents of the given area need to express a 'positive' (in whatever
fashion) identification with their region.
The typology developed in chapter two is an analytical tool that will enable further
research on this issue to be conducted and it is for future researchers to investigate the
linkages that this thesis has highlighted further.
6.4. The Future Prospects of the PDS
At the time of writing, the future of the PDS is, as it periodically seems to be, somewhat
uncertain. But this is nothing new. On a number of occasions through the 1990s the PDS was. .
hypothesised as having reached its political and electoral zenith - only to continue
confounding critics by remaining a vocal and visible actor at the local and regional levels in
the eastern states, as well as at the national level. This was most evident in the 1998 and 1999
elections when the PDS was the only clear and consistent victor893 in every poll in the eastern
states.
The (impending) resignations of both Lothar Bisky and Gregor Gysi from their
respective positions have added a new dimension to the debate on 'where does the PDS go
from here?'. Without the two politicians who have most come to encapsulate and represent
the PDS in the public arena there is an urgent need for new, energetic and effective
replacements to be found. Given the importance of Bisky and, in particular, Gysi in keeping
893 By this it is meant that the POS continued both to improve, in terms of percentage share of the vote and on
most occasions absolute shares of the vote, its standing vis-a-vis the other parties. For evidence of this see the
appendix of election results since 1990 at the end of this work.
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the party together and presenting an image of effectiveness and vitality this will not prove a
straightforward task.
However, the PDS has (frequently) found ways of triumphing over adversity. And PDS
politicians and activists remain in no doubt that the leadership 'Nachwuchs' is up to the task
of carrying on the good work of both Bisky and Gysi894• Gabi Zimmer, Petra Pau, Petra
Blass, Helmut Holter, Roland Claus and Dietmar Bartsch are all energetic figures who have
the ability to rise to the challenge of leading the party.
The PDS may have more to worry about in terms of political competition form a re-
vitalised and eastward looking CDU led by the Mecklenburger Angela Merkel. Merkel's
moderate and conciliatory style is likely to considerably improve the electoral chances of
what came to be seen as a gentrified and distant CDU in the eastern states. This may
challenge the PDS on issues of'Easternness' and territorial uniqueness.
However, the key to PDS future success is likely to lie elsewhere. If all else remains
equal (i.e. if Merkel proves to be a good rather than a truly outstanding leader, if the 'new'
PDS leadership proves capable of offering sufficient direction and enthusiasm, if the party
avoids major policy or rhetorical disaster895 and so forth) then the future prospects of the PDS
rest on it continuing what it does best: representing eastern German difference in the political
arena. This thesis has highlighted that it is in this role that the PDS has been successful thus
far. There is no guarantee that the social, cultural, economic and political differences that
currently exist will continue ad infinitum. But for as long as attitudinal and value differences
of the type that were discussed in chapter three do prevail - and there is every indication that
this may be the case well into the medium and long-terms - then there will be scope for a
party to articulate them in the political arena. And the nature of the eastern identity of
defiance and the attitudinal and cultural differences that this thesis has highlighted indicate
that a party with the PDS's resources, ideological inclinations and territorially specific
advantages will remain in the best position to exploit them.
The analysis presented in this thesis has highlighted that the PDS certainly has more in
common with the Bavarian CSU than either party likes to admit. Although ideologically at
differing ends of the political spectrum, the parties prosper in the environments that have
spawned them - as they react and mould political debate and activity within their respective
894 Interview with Catherine Muth MdL, Interview, 13May 1999.
89S The PDS Parteitag in MUnster in April 2000 was widely viewed in the (western) media as such a disaster,
when the Party Executive was defeated in a motion regarding the deployment of UN troops in international
activity. It remains, at the time of writing, to be seen if the eastern electorate, with its strong peace-orientated
inclinations, will pass so harsh a judgement on the PDS.
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regions. This is of particular importance to the PDS as the westward expansion of the party
has met with such dismal failure. The PDS has concentrated considerable resources on
competing in western state elections and attempting to build a western base 'from the bottom
up'; but to no avail. The most recent Land elections in the western states, in Northrhein
Westphalia in May 2000, where the' PDS was hopeful that the substantial working class
,
electorate would offer it the opportunity to jump out of the 1 per cent ghetto, proved yet
another electoral disaster - with the PDS polling a mere 1.1 per cent of the popular vote.
Despite the alleged 'move rightwards' of the SPD and the 'neo-liberalisation' of not just
German but European politics, the PDS is manifestly incapable of mobilising western
Germans behind its claims that it is the party of social justice, economic equality, peace and
"progressive politics. The PDS's heritage (i.e. its previous life as the SED) prevents it from
alleviating the impression that it is an Uberbleibsel (left-over) of a failed and bankrupt
regime. This must also be coupled with the fact that to the left of the SPD there appears to be
no room for a socialist/communist political party within the German political system. The
failings of the KPD are the most illustrative example of this, and a nation-wide anti-capitalist
party does not appear to have an electoral base substantial enough to exist upon. This is as the
SPD has managed the political agenda to incorporate left-wing political beliefs into its
platform. And in spite of the personalisation of politics and the alleged drift towards the
centre this appears to have changed little after unification.
But the federal system of governance allows, and in many ways positively encourages,
regional representation within the political system. And it is clear that, as a pragmatic actor
within eastern German state and communal parliaments, the PDS has 'normalised' its position
as an eastern German regional party. It has also 'normalised' relations with Germany's other
political parties and both eastern German politicians and citizens no longer regard the PDS
either as an extremist or dogmatic political actor. Anything but, in fact, and at the communal
level the PDS exhibits political pragmatism and flexibility in seeking to find solutions to an
array of complex problems.
The comparison with the CSU presented in this work therefore offers the PDS the
most productive route to political influence in the future. As an eastern regional party,
working in unison with other political parties (although principally, one would presume, the
SPD), the PDS will be able to capitalise on its social and political strengthens as well as exert
more influence, over the longer term, on German politics at the national level. Tough though
this may be for the PDS leadership and membership to accept, the realities of political
competition in Germany indicate that the failed westward expansion of the party is not likely
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to be reversible - and as such the POS needs to seek to stabilise its electoral potential at
around 30 per cent in the eastern states and/or seek to maintain the four directly elected
MdB's it already possessesi",
6.S. The Contribution of this Thesis to Understanding the Nature of Regional Political
Mobilisation
This work has highlighted that although regional parties are heterogeneous and multi-
faceted, it is possible to construct analytical approaches that adequately conceptualise the
reasons behind their success. By creating a typology that separates the structures of political
regionalism from the agency variables that regional parties take advantage of in articulating
regionally specific sentiment, this thesis has created a framework that is applicable for the
study of other regional parties in other parts of the world. This work is therefore a tentative
attempt at illustrating the commonalities behind such apparently disparate political actors,
while still offering the opportunity to analyse regional parties within their own national
context. The combination of factors that must come together to enable regional parties to be
politically successful (in whichever way they choose to define 'success') is indeed place-
specific, but there do remain a number of cross-national factors that generally tend to spawn
regional political mobilisation ..
This work has subsequently stressed the importance of regional consciousness in
permitting territorially specific regional issues to become salient enough to generate political
support in the form of regional party representation. It has also illustrated that regional parties
possess the capacity to mobilise regional uniqueness through such things as their (generally
de-centralised) organisation, their manipulation of regional symbols/characteristics and/or
history, their pragmatic articulation of changed electoral circumstances, their
conceptualisation of a particular 'big idea' and so forth.
It is therefore apparent that this thesis has attempted to tread new ground. Nowhere
have such complex phenomena as regional parties ever been conceptualised within one 'ideal
type' framework - hence it should not be surprising that such attempts leave plenty of scope
for future research (section 6.6.).
896 The five eastern Berlin constituencies offer the POS the greatest opportunity of achieving directly elected
political representation. The POS also possesses a concentrated core support in Rostock, where Wolfgang
Methling narrowly missed direct election to the Bundestag in 1998. Hence it is not unthinkable that the POS
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6.6. Possible Avenues of Future Research
The electoral performances of the PDS in the eastern states have ensured that other
political parties no longer see it as a transitory phenomenon. No longer do the SPD and CDU
long upon the PDS as a pariah - to such an extent that both parties are keen to learn from the
POS's successes as a representative of eastern German uniqueness. Even though the POS has .
developed a unique role for itself in eastern Germany, the Anndherung (coming together) of
all three parties in the eastern states is much greater than perhaps any of them would like to
admit; particularly as both the SPD and the COU attempt to 'steal the POS's clothes' in terms
of representing eastern German interests. A detailed comparative break-down of, firstly, the
nature of policy change over the last 10 years in all three parties would highlight how the
dynamics of the eastern German regional party system have affected policy outputs and,
secondly, illustrate to what extent the PDS has contributed to setting the political agenda in
eastern Germany.
Over the past decade it has become clear that, after initially attempting to ostracise the
POS, both the COU, and certainly the SPD, have started to enter into discourse with the POS
in order to try and neutralise its political potential as an Eastern Auftenseiter897• The
mechanics of this political discourse remain very sketchy, and as yet the political interactions
of the three main parties in the East are largely piecemeal and remain difficult to
conceptualise and empirically break-down.
But it is clear that both the CDU and the SPO are attempting to deal with the POS
more and more on its own terms. The SPO has long swayed between denunciatory positions
(best encapsulated by the 1994 'Dresden Declaration', stressing the distance between the SPO
and the PDS and the SPD's subsequent unwillingness to enter into parliamentary agreements
with the PDS) and positive declarations of intent that pull the PDS into a left-wing anti-COU
alliance (encapsulated by the Erfurt Declaration of 1997)898. The structures of federal
may capture a direct mandate in this northern Hansestadt in 2002.
897 Despite popular rhetoric to the contrary, both the SPD and CDU have worked with the PDS at the micro-
level. Forms of co-operation between SPD politicians and those from the PDS have been much more common
than those of the CDU and PDS. CDU candidates, for example, only won votes onto Landrtue in Preignitz and
Uckermark (both Brandenburg) in the mid-1990s with the help of PDS votes, while other forms of co-operation
exist (or have existed) in Schwerin, Gustrow, Bernburg and Halle. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22
February 1994;Der Tagesspiegel, 17 July 1994;DerSpiegel, Nummer 15,1997; Daniel Hough: The Creation of
a Regional Divide: The PDS as a Regional Actor in Eastern Germany (Birmingham: Discussion Paper in
German Studies, University of Birmingham, Number 15,1999), p.30.
898 The Erfurt Declaration of 1997 was signed by trade unionists, church representatives, intellectuals and
politicians bemoaning the state of the German nation and calling for an urgent change in the CDU government.
The document called for the three parties of the left (the SPD, the Alliance 90/Greens and the PDS) to work
together in order to achieve this aim. See Nick Hubble (1998): op. cit. p.78.
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governance in Germany also allow the SPD to bring the PDS into governing coalitions in
some states (Mecklenburg West Pomerania and to an extent Saxony Anhalt), while it
continues to fundamentally reject all forms of co-operation in others (Le. in Saxony). The
apparently schizophrenic attitude of the SPD towards the PDS, facilitated by the de-
centralised mode of governance in operation in Germany today, warrants much greater
academic debate than it has as yet merited899•
The CDU has also started to interact with the PDS in a way that it would not have
done in the early 1990s. Although this is rarely in a direct way, it is clear that the CDU
recognises that the PDS has become a political actor in the eastern states that has to be taken
seriously. Furthermore, the CDU has started to question its own ideological position in
eastern German politics and has begun to react to the eastern German criticisms that the PDS
articulates. Examples of this include the discussion paper produced by Eckhard Rehberg from
Mecklenburg West Pomerania that led to nationally salient discussions on the policy and
ideological beliefs of the CDU in the eastern states900• But like the SPD - PDS relationship,
there remains precious little academic analysis of how the CDU and the PDS interact at the
regional and sub-regional levels. CDU politicians are prepared to work, in certain
circumstances, with PDS politicians in eastern German communes, largely as PDS politicians
are clearly able to put aside the ideological rhetoric evident at the national level in order to
help find answers to difficult local problems. A discussion of the mechanics of CDU - PDS
relationships at this level, once again in view of the PDS's relative permanency on the
political stage, is noticeably lacking.
It is also hoped that the analytical framework that has been developed in this thesis can
be honed and re-defined with the benefit of further application. Regional parties will continue
to rise and fall, and only by analysis of the underlying factors behind this will students be able
to understand the determinants of success that enable some to have a more enduring influence
on the political system than others. Detailed analysis of more regional parties will no doubt
899 Although a broad base of literature has developed on the POS, it has mostly concentrated on studying the
reasons behind the stabilisation of the party within the German polity. Very little has been published on the
relationship of the party to other political parties. Apart from a number of speculative articles, a gaping chasm
therefore currently exists in terms of in-depth studies into the relationship of the two major left-wing parties in
eastern Germany. The articles that have appeared on SPO-POS relationships so far include Jurgen Hoffman &
Viola Neu: Getrennt agieren, vereint marschieren?: Die Diskussion aber ein Linksbundnis bei SPDIGrfJnen und
PDS (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Interne Studie Nr 162, 1998); Klaus-Jurgen Scherer:
'Die SPD und die PDS', in Peter Barker (ed.) (1998): op. cit. pp.182-193; Eckhard Jesse: 'SPD and POS
Relationships', in German Politics, in Volume 6 Number 3, December 1997, pp.89-102; Joachim Raschke
(1994): op. cit. pp.1453-1464.
900 See Eckhard Rehberg: Identitatsgewinn im Aufbau Ost (Schwerin: CDU Fraktion im Landtag Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, 1996).
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enrich the typology created here,facilitating greater understanding of the dynamics of
regional party activity.
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Appendix: Regional and National Election Results in
the Eastern German States since 1990
Table 1
The 1990 GDR Volkskammer Election of March 18, 1990 (in per'
cent)
Party Vote
Alliance for Germany 48.0
CDU 40.8
DSU 6.3
DA 0.9
SPD 21.9
PDS 16.4
BFD 5.3
Bundnis 90 2.9
DBD 2.2
Griine-UFV 2.0
NDPD 0.4
DFD 0.3
AVL 0.2
Others 0.4
Table 2
The 1990 Federal Election in Eastern Germany (in per cent)
Branden- Meck- Saxony Thuringia Saxony Berlin
burg West Anhalt (East)
Pomerania
Turnout 73.8 70.9 72.2 76.4 76.2 76.0
CDU 36.3 41.2 38.6 45.2 49.5 24.3
SPD 32.9 26.5 24.7 21.9 18.2 1.3
PDS 11 14.2 9.4 8.3 9 24.8
FDP 9.7 9.1 19.7 14.6 12.4 7.7
Alliance 5.9 5.9 5.3 6.1 5.9 7.4
90/Greens
DSU 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.3 1.7
Reps 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.5
The Grey 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0
Party
Others 0.4 0.5 1.3 0.7 1.0 9.2'
1 Of this 9.2 per cent the Green/Alternative List polled 8.8 per cent.
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Table3
The 1990 Land Elections in Eastern Germany (in per cent)
Branden- Meck- Saxony Thuringia Saxony Berlin
burg West Anhalt
Pomerania
Turnout 67.1 64.7 65.1 71.7 72.7 80.8
CDU 29.5 38.3 39.0 45.4 53.8 40.4
SPD 38.2 27.0 26.0 22.8 19.1 30.4
PDS 13.4" 15.7 12.0 9.7 10.2 9.2
FDP 6.6 5.5 13.5 9.3 5.3 7.1
Greens 2.8 4.2 5.3" 6.5'+ - 5.0;>
Alliance 90 6.4 2.2 - - - 4.4U
Reps 1.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 - 3.1
Others 1.9.' 6.30 3.6' 6.51v 11.6
11 0.5
Table 4
The 1994 Federal Election in Eastern Germany (in per cent)
Branden- Meck- Saxony Thuringia Saxony Berlin
burg West Anhalt (East)
Pomerania
Turnout 71.5 72.8 70.4 74.9 72.0 78.9
CDU 28.1 38.5 38.8 41.0 48.0 19.5
SPD 45.1 28.8 33.4 30.2 24.3 33.1
PDS 19.3 23.6 18.0 17.2 16.7 34.7
FDP 2.6 3.4 4.1 4.1 3.8 1.9
Alliance 2.9 3.6 3.6 .4.9 4.8 6.9
90/Greens
Reps 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.7
The Grey 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 -
Party J
Others 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 2.2
2 At the 1990 Landtagswahlen thePDS campaigned on a combined platform with the Linke List.
3 Grline/NF
4 Grline/NF/DJ
, Grune/Al:
6 B90/GrlinelUFV
7 Of this 1.9 per cent the DSU polled 1.0 per cent.s .Of this 6.3 per cent FORUM polled 2.9 per cent and the CSU 1.1 per cent.
9 Of this 3.6 per cent the DSU polled 1.7 per cent.
10 Of this 6.5 per cent the DSU polled 3.3 per cent.
II Of this 11.6 per cent the FORUM polled 5.6 per cent and the DSU 3.6 per cent.
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Table 5
The 1994/95 Land Elections in Eastern Germany (in per cent)
Branden- Meck- Saxony Thuringia Saxony Berlin
burg West Anhalt (East)
Pomerania
Turnout 56.3 72.9 54.8 76.6 58.4 68.3
CDU 18.7 37.7 34.4 42.6 58.1 23.6
SPD 54.1 29.5 34.0 29.6 16.6 20.2
PDS 18.7 22.7 19.9 16.6 16.5 36.3
FDP 2.2 3.8 3.6 3.2 1.7 1.1
Alliance 2.9 3.7 5.1 4.5 4.1 10.0
90/Greens
Reps 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.9
Others 2.2 1.6 1.8 2.2 1.7 5.9
Table 6
The 1998 Federal Election in Eastern Germany
Branden- Meck- Saxony Thuringia Saxony Berlin
burg West Anhalt (East)
Pomerania
Turnout 78.1 79.4 77.1 82.3 81.6 80.1
CDU 20.8 29.3 27.2 28.9 32.7 33.4
SPD 43.5 35.3 38.1 34.5 29.1 14.1
PDS 20.3 23.6 20.7 21.2 20.0 30.0
FDP 2.8 2.2 4.1 3.4 3.6 2.1
Alliance 3.6 2.9 3.3 3.9 4.4 7.9
90/Greens
Others 9.0 6.6 6.6 8.1 10.2 12.5
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Table 7
The 1998/99 Land Elections in Eastern Germany
Branden- Meck- Saxony Thuringia Saxony Berlin
burg West Anhalt (East)
Pomerania
Turnout 54.3 79.4 71.5 59.5 61.1 62.5
CDU 28.7 30.2 22.0 51.0 56.9 26.9
SPD 38.2 34.4 35.9 18.5 10.7 17.8
PDS 25.3 24.4 19.6 21.3 22.2 39.5
FDP 3.1 1.6 4.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
Alliance 2.S 2.7 3.2 1.9 2.6 6.4
90/Greens
Reps - 004 0.7 0.8 1.5 2.8
Others 2.2 6.1 14.41': SAl.) 5.0 5.21'1
12 Of this 14.4 per cent the OVU polled 12.9 per cent.
13 Of this 5.4 per cent the OVU polled 3.1 per cent.
14 Of this 5.2 per cent the NPO polled 1.6 per cent.
360·
